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This thesis is a genealogy of the Thai conception of détente in the long 1970s (1968-1980), largely 
based on newly declassified documents in Thailand.  It argues that Thai détente marked a history 
of rupture in Thai foreign policy narrative that was fundamentally different from the hegemonic 
discourse of anticommunism. By the late 1960s, the latter had become seriously challenged by the 
deteriorating situation in the Vietnam War and exacerbated by the concomitant prospect of 
American retrenchment. This sequence of events resulted in discursive anxiety in Thailand and the 
idea of ‘flexible diplomacy’ was initiated by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to cope with the 
changed environment. Since then, détente emerged as a new diplomatic discourse to normalize 
relations with the Communist powers in general, and specifically, the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
The thesis closely examines three episodes of Thai détente, including that of Thanat 
Khoman (1968-1971), M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and Chatichai Choonhavan (1975-1976), and General 
Kriangsak Chomanan (1977-1980). It argues that each episode, epitomized by varying concepts of 
‘flexible diplomacy’ and ‘equidistance’, developed out of discursive struggles between détente 
proponents and Cold Warriors. These struggles precipitated attempts to sustain the anticommunist 
discursive hegemony, which culminated in the military coups in November 1971 and October 
1976. The thesis demonstrates how these coups can be interpreted as events born out of foreign 
policy, and specifically to deter, or at least temper, the course of détente. 
The thesis also asserts that, throughout the long 1970s, détente in general transformed Thai 
foreign relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC from the discourses of ‘enemy’ towards 
‘friend’. This diplomatic transformation was represented in numerous diplomatic practices, such 
as ping-pong or sports diplomacy, petro-diplomacy, trade, cultural diplomacy, the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, and normal state visits. Despite its decline in the early 1980s, the détente 
discourse remained intact and determined Thai diplomacy toward the Communist powers.    
Finally, the thesis interrogates the so-called bamboo or bending-with-the-wind diplomacy, 
which is often treated as an ahistorical ‘tradition’ of Thai diplomacy, and argues that bamboo 
diplomacy emerged as a new narrative or knowledge only in the early 1970s. It aimed at not only 
legitimizing Thailand’s changing diplomatic practices, namely détente, but also constituting the 
metanarrative that could explain and evaluate (the success or failure of) Thai diplomacy in the 
past. This narrative was then an invented tradition, which was socially and epistemically 
constructed as a result of the transformative practices of détente in Thailand. By tracing the birth 
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A Genealogy of Thai Détente 
 
1.1. Puzzles  
‘When a friend is in trouble’, said the Thai Prime Minister, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, ‘moral 
support from allies is needed. Russia still chooses to be friends with Thailand today, and we will 
ensure the bond of friendship remains tight.’1 Since the May 2014 military coup d’état, General 
Prayut’s regime has been diplomatically shunned by democratic Western powers. In response, 
Thailand’s leaders have forged closer ties with two other great powers, namely, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. In this respect, Thailand is blatantly pursuing 
a balancing strategy: pitching China and Russia against the West, and specifically, the United 
States (US).  
For example, during Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s trip to Bangkok in April 
2015, General Prayut overwhelmingly praised Russia as a ‘good friend’ to Thailand during its time 
defined by military rule, and the concomitant Western pressures.2 In a recent interview with Time 
magazine, Prayut recognized that ‘China is the number one partner of Thailand’. He pointed out 
that ‘the friendship between Thailand and China has existed over thousands of years’, compared 
with Thai-US relations, which have been ‘for around 200 years’.3     
The discourses of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ are ubiquitous in the languages of Thai foreign 
policy. However, for the Thai military government today, the openings to Russia and China are 
tactically important because they can play Russia and China against the United States. This, 
however, raises a number of questions:  Is Thailand’s contemporary foreign policy continuity or 
change? Why does Thailand pursue this kind of strategy? How does Thai foreign policy come 
about and come apart? How successful is Thai foreign policy in balancing with the great powers? 
To what extent is this policy appropriate or effective for secondary or ‘small states’ such as 
                                                          
1 ‘Prayut Reaches Out to Moscow: Boosting Trade Tops Medvedev’s Agendas,’ Bangkok Post, 9 April 2015.    
2 ‘Prayut Reaches Out to Moscow: Boosting Trade Tops Medvedev’s Agendas,’ Bangkok Post, 9 April 2015.    
3 ‘Thailand’s Leader Promised to Restore Democracy. Instead He’s Tightening His Grip’, Time, 21 June 2018.    
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Thailand? These are the contemporary puzzles that seemingly repeat themselves or strangely 
parallel in Thailand during the so-called long 1970s (1968-1980) when the country had pursued 
détente with the Communist powers.   
Détente broadly defined is the relaxation of international tension, and has been used 
particularly in relation to the Cold War and International Relations (IR). However, there are many 
different ways to conceptualize détente: superpower détente (such as Nixinger’s [a portmanteau of 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger], Leonid Brezhnev’s or Mao Zedong’s détente), European 
détente (such as Charles de Gaulle’s détente and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik) and, to a lesser extent, 
small powers’ détente. Détente, therefore, connotes different things to different states (and 
statesmen) at different time.4 In Thailand, there is little literature regarding Thai foreign relations 
with the Communist powers in the 1970s, and of that there is almost nothing on Thai détente as 
such. The thesis asserts that Thailand had its own conception of détente in the long 1970s, 
culminating in so-called ‘triangular diplomacy’ (karntoot samsao) with the Soviet Union and the 
PRC. Thai détente can be divided into three main phases: (1) Thanat Khoman’s (1969-1971); (2) 
M.R. Kukrit Pramoj’s (1975-1976); and (3) General Kriangsak Chomanan’s (1977-1980).  
Before proceeding, it is useful to establish what this thesis is not about. First and foremost, 
this thesis is not a history of Thai foreign relations with the great powers per se. It specifically 
takes issue with a conventional history in Thai Studies that usually chronicles the history in a 
directly continual, linear manner. Despite narrating temporally, the thesis rather seeks to 
understand discontinuity or rupture in time – a historical time of Thai détente with great powers in 
the 1970s – and show how this differed from the hegemonic discourse that preceded it – in this 
case, anticommunism. In addition, the thesis does not use historical facts parsimoniously or 
ahistorically.  Historical ‘facts’ are not presented themselves, but are selectively represented and 
interpreted in time and space. Therefore, the thesis illustrates historical contingency and 
complexity. If the thesis is a ‘history’ of Thai foreign relations at all, it is only in the sense that 
history is reread and reinterpreted in a different way: a genealogy of Thai diplomacy. 
Second, the ultimate goal of the thesis is not to find the factors or motivations (regardless 
of security, economics, ideas, ideologies, and so forth) behind Thai foreign policy makers’ 
decisions or actions. Unlike historiographical debates about motives, the thesis aims to understand 
                                                          
4 I have discussed global détente studies elsewhere, see Jittipat Poonkham, ‘Détente Studies in Cold War 
International History: Questions (Un)Marked?’ Interstate - Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (2015/2016).    
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the processes of changing Thai diplomatic discourses and practices: how such discourses of the 
Soviet Union and China intersubjectively transformed from enmity toward friendship. It also seeks 
to explore when and to what extent Thai elites have come to believe in such understandings as 
conventional wisdom in Thai foreign policy.     
Third, this thesis does not focus on the view from below: public opinion of and about Thai 
normalization with China and the Soviet Union, such as the views of students, university 
professors and intellectuals, journalists, peasants, urban workers, Communists and so on. Rather, 
it is the study of Thai elites and how they perceived the two great powers. The thesis, therefore, is 
ultimately interested in the power struggles within Thai politics. That is to say, unlike a 
constructivist perspective, the thesis asserts that the emergence of Thai détente is not merely an 
ideational change or a change in norms, but represented a radical break in knowledge and political 
practices. It emerged out of a power contestation between different social forces at the top echelon 
of power, in particular between so-called détente proponents and détente opponents.5  
I define the former as those whose identities were intersubjectively shared by discursive 
changes of Thai détente and who acted upon or according to them in foreign policy thinking or 
decisions. The latter were the ones whose identities have not (yet) interpellated according to the 
novel discourse and remained attached to the predominantly Cold War ideology, thereby 
envisaging the Soviet Union and China as ‘Communist menaces’.  
Furthermore, the thesis recognizes that knowledge is neither value-free nor neutral, but 
rather historically situated and alterable. As E. H. Carr assiduously asserted, ‘knowledge is 
knowledge for some purpose’.6  Knowledge about Thai foreign policy, likewise, significantly 
changed in discursive practices during the long 1970s. In this sense, rather than following a 
conventional history in the studies of Thai foreign policy, this thesis is to historically problematize 
the dominant knowledge and instead situate it within a historical time.     
 
 
                                                          
5 For a constructivist approach, see for example Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1999); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).  
6 E.H. Carr, What Is History?, with a new introduction by Richard J. Evans (Hampshire: Palgrave, 1961 [2001]), p. 
22. Robert W. Cox similarly claimed ‘theory is always for someone and for some purposes’ and ‘there is… no such 
thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space.’ See ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory’, in Robert Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), pp. 206-7.    
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The thesis thus asks two central research questions:  
 
(1) How did Thailand transform its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China in the long 1970s?  
(2) How and to what extent did Thailand’s new approach allow for détente with the 
Soviet Union and China? 
 
To answer these questions, the thesis employs a genealogical approach, which is 
conceptualized as a history of the present and a history of rupture. A genealogy is then employed 
to be a tool for analyzing and reinterpreting practice-based discourses of Thai diplomacy. First, 
Thai détente is a history of the present. Current Thai foreign policy practices with the great powers 
are in this sense linked to a legacy of discourse – the discourse of détente with the great powers in 
the long 1970s. They are conceptualized as so-called ‘bending-with-the-wind’ or ‘bamboo’ 
diplomacy, which is often treated as an ahistorical continuation of Thai foreign policy tradition. 
This thesis argues that the birth of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy happened very recently, in 
the early 1970s. 
Second, genealogizing Thai détente, as a history of rupture, attempts to investigate and 
reassess Thailand’s changing diplomatic discourses and practices towards the Soviet Union and 
the PRC during the critical turn of the Cold War. This should be reconsidered as a rupture or 
discontinuity, rather than continuity, in Thai foreign policy. A genealogy also elucidates that 
détente marked a remarkable shift from a discourse of ‘enemy’ toward that of ‘friend’ in Thai 
foreign relations with the Communist powers. Détente, in turn, intersubjectively constituted a new 
normal or common sense in the 1970s.  
The thesis is first and foremost a genealogy of Thai détente. This chapter outlines my 
conceptual and analytical framework for explicating its emergence. It begins with an examination 
of a historiographical literature of Thai détente. The second part elucidates a genealogical approach 
to Thai détente, which comprises a history of rupture, history of the present, and the discourse 
approach. The third part discusses sources of evidence, primarily the newly declassified materials 






1.2. Literature Review  
 
‘There was no official declaration of détente, no official starting points, no clear-cut end.’ 
– Jussi M. Hanhimäki7  
 
In Cold War International History, the global phenomenon of détente is less studied, or even 
understudied, if we compare to other periods or processes of the Cold War such as the origins, 
development, crises or endings.8 As Vojtech Mastny observes, ‘the “golden years” of détente in 
the early 1970s are the least researched period of the Cold War’.9 In recent years, the studies of 
détente have gradually increased, largely due to the declassification of new materials. Although 
détente literally means a relaxation or easing of tensions, contested and contestable debates – 
ranging from the definitions and natures of détente to periodization, sources, and motivations 
behind its origins and fall – are widely prevalent.10   
The literature on Thailand in the early Cold War is extensive, and widely researched.11 
However, Thai détente is only sporadically and little addressed. The exception is Sarasin Viraphol, 
                                                          
7 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold 
War (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), p. xviii. 
8 The notable exception is Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 
Vol. 2 Crises and Détente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
9 Vojtech Mastny, ‘The New History of Cold War Alliances’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 4: No. 2 (Spring 
2002): p. 77.  
10 Etymologically, the term détente comes from the French word ‘détendre’, meaning to release or lessen the tension 
on the archer’s bow-string as the arrow goes on its way.    
11 The origins and development of Thailand’s Cold War strategy and alignment with the United States can be 
classified into four main paradigms. First, the Cold War orthodox paradigm emphasizes the international narratives 
and contestations, driven by either ideological or security imperatives, see R. Sean Randolph, The United States and 
Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986); 
Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965); Donald E. 
Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); Apichart 
Chinwanno, ‘Thailand's search for protection : The making of the alliance with the United States, 1947-1954’, PhD 
Thesis, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, 1985.  
The second paradigm is the domestic politics, focusing on the internal factors in Thailand, in particular the 
dynamisms and interests of the military elites, see Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic 
Paternalism (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1979[2007]); Daniel Fineman, A 
Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1997); John L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); 
Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thailand Military Rule, 1947-1977 (Bangkok: Duang 
Kamol, 1988); Sutayut Osornprasop, ‘Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina, 1960-1974’, PhD 
Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2006.  
The third paradigm is a revisionist, which stresses the economic dimensions of the Cold War, see Arlene 
Becker Neher, ‘Prelude to Alliance: The Expansion of American Economic Interest in Thailand during the 1940s’, 
PhD Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1980; Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, ‘Kanmueng Thai yuk Sarit-
Thanom phaitai khrongsang amnat lok [Thai Politics during Sarit-Thanom Regimes under Global Power Structure] 
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who mentioned the term ‘détente’ in passing. Sarasin, surveying Directions in Thai Foreign Policy 
in the 1970s, observed: ‘after the loss of the American pivot, Thailand is trying to search for a new 
political alternative’. The Foreign Ministry had ‘spearheaded détente’ with the Soviet Union and 
the PRC. The ‘acceleration of involvement by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 
in Thailand’, for Sarasin, needed a policy of equidistance. That is, ‘the adoption of a balancing of 
interests policy, which has a mind toward keeping the two powers at arm’s length’.12 A few 
scholars such as Wiwat Mungkandi directly link global détente with changing Thai diplomacy. 
They tend to agree that it was not easy for Thailand to adjust to changing global power relations.13 
However, most works do not conceptualize the long 1970s as the age of détente in Thai diplomacy.    
 The discussion now turns to consider the important and yet otherwise hitherto overlooked 
study of Thai détente. Without spelling out the concept of ‘détente’, some scholars had touched 
upon the practices of normalization between Thailand and the Communist great powers in the 
1970s. There is still no comprehensive work on Kriangsak’s foreign policy and relations with the 
Communist powers.14 In general, Thai foreign policy in the détente era is explained either by the 
narrative of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy or by the causation of Thai foreign policy in 
specific periods of time and/or its bilateral relations.  
First, in the existing historiography, Thai foreign policy has since the 1970s largely been 
interpreted through the conventional lens of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy. By using a 
                                                          
(Bangkok: 50 Years Foundation, The Bank of Thailand, 2007); Natthaphon Jaijing, ‘Kanmueng Thai samai rattaban 
Chomphon Po Phibun Songkhram phaitai rabiap lok khong Saharat America (2491-2500)’ [Thai Politics under Field 
Marshal Phibun in US World Order (1948-1957)], PhD Thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn 
University, 1999. 
Fourth, the cultural politics paradigm explicates the politics of ‘truth’, ideologies, and culture; see Benedict 
Anderson, ‘Withdrawal Symptoms’, in The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World 
(London and New York: Verso Books, 1998), pp. 139-173; Kasian Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism: The 
Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927-1958 (Australia: Trans Pacific Press, 2001); Prajak Kongkirati, 
And Then The Movement Emerged: Cultural Politics of Thai Students and Intellectuals Movements before the 
October 14 Uprising (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 2005); Puangthong Pawakapan, Truth in the Vietnam 
War: The First Casualty of War and the Thai State (Bangkok: Kobfai, 2006). And yet there is an emerging ‘cultural 
turn’ in the Cold War history, which discerns a broader range of topics such as popular culture, including film, 
songs, literature, fashion, and so forth; see Matthew Phillips, Thailand in the Cold War (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2016).  
12 Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 
6-7, 52.  
13 Wiwat Mungkandi, ‘The Security Syndrome (1941-1975)’, in A Century and a Half of Thai-American Relations, 
eds. Wiwat Mungkandi, and William Warren (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1982), pp. 61-114.   
14 The rare exception is one chapter on Kriangsak’s foreign relations with the US, see R. Sean Randolph, The United 
States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, 1986).    
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bamboo analogy, Thai diplomacy is flexible, pragmatic and even opportunistic. Given its status as 
a small power, Thailand strives for survival amid the great power politics.15 As Sarasin sums up, 
‘Thailand is only a regional state with no desire for involvement in the great power rivalry; all that 
it desires is the maintenance and protection of its own national security’.16  
Corrine Phuangkasem suggests that Thailand’s ‘bending-with-the-wind’ or flexible 
diplomacy comprised three basic tenets.17 First, Thailand pursues an accommodation policy with 
the great powers that are perceived as potential threats to national independence or survival. 
Second, Thailand plays off one power against another to provide a counterweight. Siddhi Savetsila, 
the former Foreign Minister, called it a ‘balance of power policy’.18 Third, Thailand seeks to 
befriend all great powers. Some might call this third tenet of Thai diplomacy an ‘equidistant 
policy’.19 Thai diplomacy is often criticized for a lack of firm principles, in that Thailand almost 
always aligns with the dominant or victorious power. As Likhit Dhiravegin has put it, ‘The style 
of bending with the wind … means at a time when the dust is still not settled, the Thai leaders will 
be waiting on the wing. … But as soon as the dust has settled, the Thai leaders will lean to the side 
which has risen in power’.20 Corrine contends that the nature of Thai foreign policy during the 
Cold War remained ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’, in the sense of an alignment with the 
great powers.21     
                                                          
15 Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976); 
Wiwat Mungkandi, and William Warren, eds., A Century and a Half of Thai-American Relations (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 1982); Arne Kislenko, ‘Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai 
Foreign Policy’, International Journal, Vol. 57: No. 4 (Autumn 2002): pp. 537-561. For a literature on Thailand as a 
small power, see Astri Suhrki, ‘Smaller-Nation Diplomacy: Thailand’s Current Dilemmas’, Asian Survey, Vol. 11: 
No. 5 (May 1971), p. 438. 
16 Sarasin Viraphol, ‘The Soviet Threat: Development of the Thai Perception’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 
Vol. 11: No. 4 (Winter 1985): p. 69.  
17 Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1984); Corrine Phuangkasem, ‘Thai Foreign Policy: Four Decades since the Second World War (1945-1989)’, in A 
Collection of Articles and Speeches on Thai Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present, Vol. 1, eds. Corrine 
Phuangkasem et al. (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1999), pp. 56, 70. 
18 Siddhi Savetsila, Pan Rorn Pan Nao (Bangkok, 2013), pp. 78, 191. 
19 Thanat Khoman, ‘The Initiative of Establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, in 
Collection of Articles and Speeches on Thai Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present, eds. Corrine 
Phuangkasem, et al. (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1999), pp. 186-187. 
20 Likhit Dhiravegin, ‘Thailand’s Relations with China, the US, and Japan in the New Political Environment’, in A 
Collection of Articles and Speeches on Thai Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present, Vol. 1, eds. Corrine 
Phuangkasem et al. (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1999), p. 358.  
21 Corrine Phuangkasem, ‘Thai Foreign Policy: Four Decades since the Second World War (1945-1989)’, in A 
Collection of Articles and Speeches on Thai Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present, Vol. 1, eds. Corrine 
Phuangkasem et al. (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1999), p. 56. 
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From this narrative, the history of Thai diplomatic relations has been interpreted as one of 
continuity. Thai diplomacy, at least since the late nineteenth century, has sought to balance one 
great power or a number of powers vis-à-vis the others.22 The ability to bend with the wind is also 
orchestrated by wise (and male-dominated) statesmen, who have successfully maintained 
Thailand’s independence. Thailand, so the stories go, has had a cautious and calculated foreign 
policy, and avoided anything more than temporary entanglement with the great powers. From the 
bending-with-the-wind diplomacy paradigm, the cases of Thailand’s alignment with Japan during 
the Second World War, and its ‘special relationship’ with the US in the Cold War, are not portrayed 
as a radical departure.23  
Sarasin claims that in the 1970s, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed bending-
with-the-wind diplomacy: it had pursued ‘the traditional pattern of foreign diplomacy (prevalent 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) which continually requires attention and 
wisdom in steering the nation through difficult times’. Unlike Corrine, Sarasin argues that this 
flexible diplomacy differed from ‘the seemingly dogmatic and inflexible pattern of foreign 
relations as practiced by the previous military and other conservative elements’.24  
 Second, rather than studying détente as a single entity, the existing literature on Thai 
foreign policy in the long 1970s is compartmentalized into specific periods and focused only on 
bilateral relations, either with the Soviet Union or the PRC.25 This literature is also preoccupied 
with why Thailand made its foreign policy or what factors caused that particular policy. The 
literature can be organized into four distinct groups. The first provides a ‘security-ideology nexus’ 
explanation. Thai détente with the Communist powers happened largely due to the convergence of 
                                                          
22 See Likhit Dhiravegin, ‘Thailand Foreign Policy Determination’, The Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 11: No. 4 
(1974); Likhit Dhiravegin, Siam and Colonialism (1855-1909): An Analysis of Diplomatic Relation (Bangkok: Thai 
Wattana Panich, 1975); Pensri Duke, Karntangprated kub aekkarat lae attippatai kong thai [Foreign Affairs and 
Thailand’s Independence and Sovereignty, since King Rama V to the Phibun Government] (Bangkok: The Royal 
Institute, 1999); Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Siam, Russia, Thai: Karntootkarnmuang Karnmuangkarntoot, Aded 
pajupan anakod [Siam, Russia, Thailand: Diplomatic Politics, Politics of Diplomacy, Past Present and Future] 
(Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 2013).  
23 See Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-1945 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1977); Pensri Duke, Karntangprated kub aekkarat lae attippatai kong thai [Foreign Affairs and 
Thailand’s Independence and Sovereignty, since King Rama V to the Phibun Government] (Bangkok: The Royal 
Institute, 1999).  
24 Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), p. 52.  
25 Corrine Phuangkasem and Chulacheeb Chinwanno provided an overview of Thai foreign relations in the Cold 
War. See Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1984); Chulacheeb Chinwanno, ‘Thai Foreign Policy during the Cold War’, in A Collection of Articles and 
Speeches on Thai Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present, Vol. 1, eds. Corrine Phuangkasem et al. (Bangkok: 
Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1999), pp. 72-99. 
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interests. 26  On Sino-Thai rapprochement, a deep and comprehensive study by Chulacheeb 
Chinwanno emphasizes the security dimension. He argues that the diplomatic recognition on July 
1, 1975 was ‘a strategic decision as Thai leaders were concerned with change in the international 
strategic environment, global as well as regional, especially the normalization between the US and 
China’. 27  M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Surachai Sirikrai also emphasize a convergence 
between Thailand and China’s security interests as the main cause in their closer ties during the 
Third Indochina War, when Thailand formed a tacit alliance with the PRC and the US in support 
for the Khmer Rouge.28   
On Thai-Soviet Relations, although most of the literature provides an ideologically driven 
explanation,29 Noranit Setaputr suggests that change in Thai foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union came because of security interests.30 I have previously argued that Thai-Soviet relations 
emerged and developed largely due to a synchronization of economic interests between the two 
countries.31 Thai-Soviet relations are also touched upon briefly by the literature that studies Soviet 
engagement with the broader region in Southeast Asia.32 
                                                          
26 In one of the most illuminating works on the rise and decline of Thai-US relations, R. Sean Randolph explains a 
change in Thai foreign policy toward the US in the long 1970s from a divergence of interests between these two states, 
which originated from the internal and external pressures, underlying the readjustment of Thai relations with the US. 
He claimed that its alteration was ‘the critical problem of national survival’. Randolph, The United States and 
Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985, p. 129.   
27 Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Sam sib pee kwam sampan tang karntoot thai-jin: kwam ruammue rawang kalayanamitr, 
2518-2548 [Thirty Years of Diplomatic Relations between Thailand and China: Cooperation between Truthful 
Friends, 1975-2005] (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005); Chulacheeb Chinwanno, ‘Thai-Chinese 
Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership’, Working Paper No. 155, S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, Singapore, 24 March 2008; Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Sam sib har pee kwam sampan tang karntoot thai-jin, 
2518-2553: Aded pajupan anakod [Thirty-five Years of Diplomatic Relations between Thailand China, 1975-2010: 
Past Present and Future] (Bangkok: Openbook, 2010). 
28 M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, From Enmity to Alignment: Thailand’s Evolving Relations with China (Bangkok: 
Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1987); Surachai Sirikrai, ‘Sino-Thai 
Relations: A Thai Perception’, in China-ASEAN Relations: Political, Economic and Ethnic Dimensions, ed. Theresa 
C. Carino (Manila: De La Salle University, 1991). 
29 See, for example, Paul R. Shirk, ‘Thai-Soviet Relations’, Asian Survey, Vol. 9 (September 1969), pp. 682-693; 
Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Siam, Russia, Thai: Karntootkarnmuang Karnmuangkarntoot, Aded pajupan anakod [Siam, 
Russia, Thailand: Diplomatic Politics, Politics of Diplomacy, Past Present and Future] (Bangkok: Thammasat 
University Press, 2013). 
30 Noranit Setabutr, Kwam sampan tang prathet rawang Thai-Russia [Thai-Russian Foreign Relations] (Bangkok: 
Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University Press, 1985[2006]). 
31 Jittipat Poonkham, Withet Panid Sampan su Songkram Yen: Kwam sampan rawangprathet Thai-Russia (1897-
1991) [Foreign Economic Relations to the Cold War: Thai-Russian Foreign Relations (1897-1991)] (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 2016). 
32 Leszek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Donald S. Zagoria, 
and Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia’, in Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed. Donald S. Zagoria (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 153-173; Bilveer Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN, 1967-
1988 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1989). 
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 The second group is an explanation of threat perception. A great deal of this literature 
explains Thailand’s adjustment with the Communist powers on a transformation in threat 
perceptions in the 1970s. On the one hand, Sarasin Viraphol and Chantima Ongsuragz study Thai 
perceptions of the USSR, arguing that the Soviet Union remained a persistent threat to Thai 
national interests until the end of the Cold War. They do not see a change in Thai diplomacy.33 As 
Chantima states, ‘Since communism rejects monarchical government and religion and views them 
as impediments toward a classless society, Thailand is fundamentally anticommunist. The 
principal values and institutions of the Thai society make communism appear to be a natural 
enemy’.34 On the other hand, Thailand’s changing perceptions of the Chinese threat are examined 
by Naruemit Sodsuk and Surachai Sirikrai, who argue that by the late 1970s Thailand gradually 
changed its perceptions toward the PRC from enmity towards friendship.35 These works also 
consider the different perceptions to those Communist powers among key actors within Thailand, 
such as the military and civilian elites.   
The third group of literature focuses on bureaucratic politics within Thailand. M.L. 
Bhansoon Ladavalya is the exemplary. Based on Graham Allison’s framework, Bhansoon studies 
foreign policy decision making on Thailand’s normalization with the PRC during the Kukrit 
Pramoj administration, by claiming that this decision was the principal result of ‘a long conflict 
between organizational interests and varying perceptions of national interests within the 
government’, especially between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.36  
The last group emphasizes the internationalization of the state. Drawing from the 
declassified documents in the US and UK, Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead highlights the role of US 
hegemony and its allies, or the so-called internationalized elites in determining not only Thai 
foreign policy but also Thai domestic politics.37 Similarly, Rapeeporn Lertwongweerachai studies 
                                                          
33 Sarasin Viraphol, ‘The Soviet Threat: Development of the Thai Perception’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 
Vol. 11: No. 4 (Winter 1985): pp. 61-70; Chantima Ongsuragz, ‘Thai Perceptions of the Soviet Union and Its 
Implications for Thai-Soviet Relations’, in The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region, 
eds. Pushpa Thambipillai, and Daniel C. Matuszewski (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 122-133.  
34 Chantima, ‘Thai Perceptions of the Soviet Union and Its Implications for Thai-Soviet Relations’, p. 122.  
35 Naruemit Sodsuk, Sampantaparp tang karntoot rawang thai jeen [Diplomatic Relations between Thailand and the 
People’s Republic of China] (Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich, 1981); Surachai Sirikrai, ‘Thai Perceptions of China 
and Japan’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12: No.3 (December 1990): pp. 247-265.  
36 M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, ‘Thailand’s Foreign Policy under Kukrit Pramoj: A Study in Decision-Making’, PhD. 
Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1980, p. 4.   
37 Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, ‘Kanmueng Thai yuk Sarit-Thanom phaitai khrongsang amnat lok [Thai Politics 
during Sarit-Thanom Regimes under Global Power Structure] (Bangkok: 50 Years Foundation, The Bank of 
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the role of Thanat Khoman in Thai foreign affairs, by arguing that changes in Thanat’s foreign 
policy, such as Sino-Thai rapprochement, followed the transformation of US hegemonic power. 
These changes led to a direct conflict with the military elites, which ended in the military coup in 
1971.38    
 
All these significant works ostensibly approach the long 1970s from historical and bilateral 
perspectives. Though some touch upon the domestic and international contexts within which Thai 
détente emerged, there is a huge gap in the literature that needs to be further explicated. First, 
despite their differing views on Thai foreign policy in the 1970s, the existing works are 
preoccupied with explaining the why-question or causation. They do not see how détente emerged 
and became possible. They pay little attention to the process of diplomatic practice transformation, 
namely how the new discourse of détente transformed foreign policy thinking and practices of key 
actors. When and how did the discourse of détente come about? How was it possible that during 
the 1970s, the USSR and China shifted from being Thailand’s foes towards friends and even tacit 
allies? How did this discourse become dominant? When did these discourses come undone? How 
and to what extent has détente become a discursive legacy to Thai foreign policy tradition?  
For example, when Thailand initiated the new approach of flexible diplomacy toward the 
Communist powers, it deviated from dominant Cold War certainties. Many works tend to concur 
that it was largely due to the Nixon Doctrine, when the US President Richard Nixon proclaimed 
to withdraw from the region under the rubric of ‘Vietnamization’ in 1969.39 As this thesis will 
indicate, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman coined the term ‘flexible diplomacy’ in 1968, even 
before the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine. Unlike the bending-with-the-wind diplomacy 
narrative, Thailand was in fact bending before the shifting wind. 
In addition, failing both to recognize the term ‘détente’ to conceptualize Thai foreign policy 
in the 1970s and to see Thai détente as a holistic practice transformation, previous scholarship 
largely neglects the fact that Thai détente occurred within a changing domestic context and 
                                                          
Thailand, 2007); Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, ‘The Cold War and Thai Democratization’, in Southeast Asia and the 
Cold War, ed. Albert Lau (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 215-240. 
38 Rapeeporn Lertwongweerachai, ‘The Role of Thanat Khoman in Thai Foreign Affairs during 1958-1971’, MA 
Thesis, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 2002.    
39 M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, ‘Thailand’s Foreign Policy under Kukrit Pramoj: A Study in Decision-Making’, PhD. 
Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1980; Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).     
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configurations. First, the aforementioned works ignore the discursive struggle within Thai politics, 
namely how the dominant discourse of anticommunism was called into question, and how the new 
discourse of détente emerged and developed. This thesis argues that diplomacy and politics were 
not separable, and diplomacy was the contested site of domestic political contestation. Second, the 
existing literature does not see Thailand’s changing perceptions towards the Communist powers. 
By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and the PRC were no longer rendered as ‘enemies’, but rather 
‘friends’ in Thai foreign policy discourses. Third, it overlooks a transformation in identity or 
subject position of those détente proponents, and in particular within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Through the détente process, the MFA became an increasingly independent institution that 
sought to conduct diplomacy in a more flexible and professional way.   
Last but not least, many, if not most, take the narrative of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy for granted. They tend to adopt this narrative, and concur that Thai foreign policy was 
governed by overarching ahistorical and persistent themes such as the national interest and national 
survival.40 Rarely have scholars asked how bending-with-the-wind diplomacy came into being in 
the first place. Because these existing works refer back to the bending-with-the-wind diplomacy 
narrative by way of explanation, they fail to ask when and how this style of diplomacy came about 
and became the dominant explanation, or a so-called ‘tradition’, that determined Thai foreign 
policy. This thesis argues that this narrative was epistemically constructed in the early 1970s, as 
the result of the changing practices of Thai détente. Bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is not a 
natural or neutral tradition, but rather an invented tradition.41 
 
In this thesis, I provide a direct and comprehensive discussion of the term ‘Thai détente’ to 
conceptualize changing diplomatic discourses and practices in the long 1970s for three reasons. 
First, the Thai elite, especially those in the Foreign Ministry, employed the globally recognized 
term, ‘détente’, so as to communicate with the world about how Thailand intended to mean and 
act diplomatically. 42  The practices of détente, such as back-channel, ping-pong, and petro-
                                                          
40 Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985, p. 129; Sarasin Viraphol, Directions 
in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976); Noranit Setabutr, Kwam sampan 
tang prathet rawang Thai-Russia [Thai-Russian Foreign Relations] (Bangkok: Sukhothai Thammathirat Open 
University Press, 1985[2006]).    
41 I borrow the term from Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).   
42 Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).  
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diplomacy, continued throughout the 1970s. Second, the term ‘détente’ was also widely used by 
local and foreign newspapers at the time to capture Thailand’s changing relationship with both the 
Soviet Union and the PRC.43 Third, conceptualizing Thai diplomacy in the long 1970s as détente 
situates the thesis within the global studies of détente. The current state and status of Thai détente 
literature is little different to global détente studies more generally. Both are relatively 
understudied. This thesis aspires to fill this gap. It also indicates how the alternative strategy of 
small states or powers in the Third World was able to contribute to Cold War superpower politics, 
and how successful that strategy was. In this sense, a study of Thai détente can be framed in terms 
of comparative and global dimensions of Cold War history.    
In this thesis, the Thai conception of détente is defined as a process of diplomatic 
adjustment with formerly antagonistic powers such as the Soviet Union and China. The terms, 
détente and ‘flexible diplomacy’ (karntoot yeutyun) were used interchangeably. In the process, the 
Thai state sought to pursue ‘kanprab kwamsampan’ (readjustment) with the Soviet Union, and 
‘kanreufeun kwamsampan’ (rapprochement) with China. The other term, ‘equidistant’ relations 
(‘kanraksa rayahang’) with great powers, was also used, in particular during the Kukrit and 
Kriangsak administrations, as a state of flexible diplomacy that positioned Thailand in a more 
balanced and equal status vis-à-vis other great powers. All these key concepts were part and parcel 
of Thai détente. This diplomatic move was first and foremost a response to the prospect of 
American military disengagement from the region, and how to manage the changing international 
context. By the early 1970s, détente itself became a well-established norm in world politics of 
which Thai détente was a part.  
The ultimate aim of the thesis, therefore, is to examine the emergence, development, and 
transformation of détente discourse, and its concomitant narrative of ‘bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy’, in Thai foreign policy since the American disengagement in 1968 until to the onset of 
the Third Indochina War in the late 1970s. Rather than seeing this as a continuation of Thai 
diplomacy, the process of détente was fundamentally a pivotal rupture in Thai foreign policy, and 
established the conditions of possibility for the present. In narrating the rupture in Thai foreign 
relations with the great powers, the thesis is methodologically committed to a genealogy of Thai 
détente.   
                                                          
43 See ‘Thanat’s Ostpolitik’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 July 1973, pp. 24-25; ‘Beijing Ready for Détente 




1.3. A Genealogy of Thai Détente  
1.3.1. Genealogy as Historical Problematization 
A genealogy is often supposed to connote a tracing of a pedigree or history back to its origins. For 
Michel Foucault, it is the opposite: a genealogy is an alternative approach that contentiously 
discards and disrupts (some commonly held beliefs about) a historical origin.44 In his study of 
diplomacy, James Der Derian articulates, which is worth quoting at length:   
 
[G]enealogy is a history of the present, not in the sense of tracing the seamless development 
of a phenomenon from some pristine origin, or projecting contemporary characteristics of 
it back into the past, but rather in the sense of discovering the transformations engendered 
by the instability and violent contests which diplomacy had mediated with discontinuous 
success. We might say, then, that while history does not repeat itself, there are historical 
confrontations of power and truth which recur and generate parallel sets mediatory rules 
and practices.45 
 
 A genealogical approach tells us a radically different story: a history of rupture and a 
history of the present. As Foucault argues, ‘What is found at the historical beginnings of things is 
not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity’.46 In 
the thesis, the Thai conception of détente emerged as disparity or differences – the ubiquitous fear 
and estrangement of the domino theory as the fall of Indochina and the prospect of American 
military disengagement from the region began to loom on the horizon. This, in turn, generated a 
new ‘system of rules’ that helped mediate the ongoing conflicts and violence, thereby rendering 
                                                          
44  In his seminal essay, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Foucault proposes a genealogical approach with two 
interrelated concepts: descent, and emergence. First, rather than a search for an origin, genealogy is a search for 
descent, which ‘is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered 
immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with 
itself’. The analysis of descent dissolves the socially constructed unity of things, and discloses the dispersion, 
multiplicity and heterogeneity of events, which lie behind any historical beginnings.   
Secondly, genealogy is the analysis of emergence. Historical emergence is conceptualized by Foucault as a 
temporary episode in ‘a series of subjugations’ or in ‘the hazardous play of dominations’, rather than the culminations 
of events or the end of a process of development. It is merely a momentary manifestation or a stage in the power 
struggle between different social forces. The emerging form of events is the (inter)play of dominations. Michel 
Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1991 [1984]), pp. 82-83. See also Michel Foucault, ‘Lecture on Nietzsche: How 
to Think the History of Truth with Nietzsche without Relying on Truth’, in Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at 
the College de France, 1970-1971 and Oedipal Knowledge, trans. Graham Burchell (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), pp. 202-223.  
45 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 76. My emphasis.  
46 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p. 79.  
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détente with the Communist powers possible. As a historical method and critical ethos, a 
genealogy differs from a conventional history in the sense that it historically problematizes the 
political construction of knowledge.  
In this thesis, a genealogy of Thai détente addresses three-fold analyses: a history of 
rupture, the discourse approach and a history of the present. It closely examines the complex 
relationship and interplay between discursive and non-discursive meanings and practices, in 
particular the interaction between power/knowledge, discourses and subject positions in Thai 
foreign policy. Unlike Foucault, the thesis focuses on the ‘macrophysics’ of power: the study of 
Thai elites, especially those détente proponents.  
The thesis argues that, first, Thai détente was a radical break with the hegemonic discourse 
of anticommunism. A genealogy saw discursive anxiety in Thai diplomacy, and the power struggle 
between détente proponents and détente opponents. Second, rather than being simply viewed as 
an inevitable result of the objective qualities of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy, as is often 
supposed, Thai détente is better understood as a political construction that occurred through a 
series of fortuitously historical events, and as the result of contingent political contestation. 
Knowledge of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy was in fact produced by the changing practices 
of Thai détente.  
   
1.3.2. A History of Rupture   
First, a genealogy of Thai détente demonstrates a history of rupture. On the one hand, it engages 
with global détente studies with a different set of questions. Rather than explaining the motivations 
or factors that precipitated the rise and fall of Thai détente par excellence, a genealogy attempts to 
understand how and to what extent Thai détente was formed as a hegemonic project in Thai foreign 
policy.  
On the other hand, in reassessing Thai détente, a genealogy negates the teleological 
historiography of Thai foreign policy, most of which focuses on the continuity of ‘bending-with-
the-wind diplomacy’ (see Figure 1.1). This is because this conventional interpretation is 
historically conflated. In fact, there was a critical rupture in the late 1960s when a new approach 
of ‘flexible diplomacy’ emerged. In other words, genealogy rejects history in its uninterrupted, 
continual, stable, and essentialist form, when in fact it was constituted by historical contingency 
and complexity.   
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Figure 1.1: A Conventional History vs. Genealogy of Thai Foreign Policy 
 
A Conventional History: Thai Foreign Policy as Continuity 
 
Bending-with-the-wind Diplomacy 
1890s – the late 1940s-1990s – the present 
 
A Genealogy: Thai Foreign Policy as a Rupture 
 
A Highly Unbalanced 
Strategic Rigidity  
A Balanced Strategic 
Flexibility 
An Unbalanced Strategic 
Flexibility 
The late 1940s-1960s The Long 1970s 
(1969-1979) 
1980s 
   
 
During the Cold War, Thai foreign policy was not ruled by a singular logic of strategy, but 
at least three logics (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). The first logic happened after the 1947 military coup 
d’état. Afterwards, Thailand pursued a highly unbalanced and rigid strategy by deeply engaging 
with a Cold War narrative, closely forging an alliance, or ‘special relationship’, with the United 
States, and adversely antagonizing the USSR and China.47  For the US, Thailand became an 
invaluable anticommunist ally, and a forward base, or so-called ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, 
especially during the Vietnam War.48 While the relationship was occasionally preoccupied by a 
latent contradiction, it can be reflected in US commitments, such as military and economic aids 
given since 1950, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) membership between 1954 and 
1977, and the Thanat-Rusk joint communiqué in 1962, all of which ensured the US obligation to 
help Thailand in case of a Communist attack. Under the first logic of strategy, Thailand was 
extensively involved in the escalating conflicts, both in Vietnam and across the region. Benedict 
                                                          
47 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 
48 John L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 231.  
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Anderson called the period the ‘American Era’.49 Similarly, this period sees Thai foreign relations 
between late 1940s until 1960s not as ‘bending-with-the-wind’, but as strictly tied to rigid strategy 
dominated by the anticommunist discourse.50 
 
Table 1.1: Thai Foreign Policy Discourses 
Period  Late 1940s-1960s  1970s  1980s  
Nature Strategic rigidity  Strategic flexibility  Strategic flexibility 
Relations with the 
















with the US  
 Unbalanced;  
 Closer 
association 





the US  
Relations with  
neighboring 
countries  
Engaging in the 
regional conflicts  
Freezing or 
neutralizing the 




Table 1.2: Thai Discursive Perceptions of the Great Powers  
Great Powers/ 
Period 
Late 1940s-1960s  1970s  1980s  
The US Close ally  Distanciated ally  Semi-distanciated 
ally  
The USSR Red menace  Neutral friend  Tacit frenemy  
China Red menace Tacit ally Tacit ally 
 
The second logic of strategy emerged in 1968, when American power and prestige globally 
and regionally had been challenged by events in Vietnam, precipitating the reversal of America’s 
Vietnam policy. Lyndon Johnson first promulgated the halt in bombing Vietnam, followed by the 
Nixon Doctrine of ‘Vietnamization’ and military disengagement from the region in 1969. During 
this period, Thai foreign policy saw a radical departure from the first logic. Due to its strategic 
anxiety emerging out of American retrenchment from the region, Thailand initiated a truly 
balanced form of flexible diplomacy, or détente strategy. It pursued ‘equidistance’ (‘kanraksa 
                                                          
49 Benedict Anderson, In the Mirror: Literature and Politics in Siam in the American Era (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 
1985).   
50 Randolph, The United States and Thailand, p. 10.  
26 
 
rayahang’) with the great powers, and simultaneously began the processes of normalization with 
the Communist powers, by adopting rapprochement (‘kanreufeun kwamsampan’) with China, and 
readjustment (‘kanprab kwamsampan’) with the Soviet Union. Thailand, therefore, deemphasized 
the role of the US in maintaining its own national security, and pushed the agenda of a 
demilitarization of the American presence in Thailand. Girling calls this period a ‘new course’ in 
Thai foreign policy.51 I can call it Thai détente.       
The third logic of strategy began in the late 1970s after the Soviet-backed Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Many scholars readily agreed that by the end of the 
decade, détente was in decline, and finally collapsed.52 However, I argue that despite its relative 
decline of triangular diplomacy, the discourse of détente remained and became the unfinished 
project of Thai diplomacy. Rather, what changed in the 1980s was the unbalanced nature of 
strategic flexibility: the move to what might be described as unbalanced détente. By the end of the 
1970s, triangular diplomacy was orientated toward one-side. Thailand formed a close association 
with a tacit ally, namely China, in the Third Indochina War. In its relationship with the Soviet 
Union, Thailand did not return to the pre-détente era of strategic rigidity and hostility. Instead, it 
still engaged with the Soviet Union, although from a distance and with skepticism. This was largely 
because of Soviet support for Vietnam and its increasing interest in the region in general. 
Consequently, in the 1980s Thailand under General Prem Tinsulsnonda engaged deeply in regional 
conflicts and in particular joined an unlikely alliance with China and the US in support of the 
Khmer Rouge.  
To conclude, a genealogy differs from a conventional history in the sense that it emphasizes 
rupture in Thai foreign policy, which détente became the separate logic in diplomatic practices. 
Although the thesis mainly focuses on the second logic, it highlights how détente emerged out of 
the declining anticommunist hegemonic discourse, while maintaining that the second and third 




                                                          
51 John L. S. Girling, ‘Thailand’s New Course’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 42: No. 3 (Autumn 1969), pp. 346-359. 
52 See Leszek Buszynski, ‘Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 22: No. 11 
(November 1982): pp. 1037-1055.  
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1.3.3. The Discourse Approach: Discursive Anxiety and the Clash of Discourses    
A genealogy also draws on the discourse approach to explicate Thai détente in three different 
episodes: Thanat Khoman’s first détente (1969-1971); M.R. Kukrit Pramoj’s second (1975-76); 
and General Kriangsak Chomanan’s third (1977-1980). The discourse approach is part and parcel 
of a genealogy, which closely examines both discursive and extra-discursive practices. Discourses 
can be broadly defined as ensembles of social practices, representations and interpretations through 
which certain regimes of truth, and their concomitant identities, are produced and reproduced in a 
particular historical context.53 They are inseparably connected to social practices where meanings 
are given to subjects, objects, and states’ behaviors, such as diplomacy.     
In order to narrate each and every episode in Thai détente, the discourse approach analyzes 
how the elite’s ‘regime of truth’ made possible ‘certain courses of action’ or a state’s behavior 
while ‘excluding other policies as unintelligible or unworkable or improper’. Discourses are 
meaningful ‘background capabilities that are used socially, at least by a small group of officials if 
not more broadly in a society or among different elites and societies’.54 However, as Foucault 
notes, discourses are not simply ‘groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or 
representations)’, but rather ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speaks’.55 
Analyzing discourses then is not simply a study of meanings but more importantly a study of 
‘sense-making’ practices. 56  The discourse approach to foreign policy thus focuses on what 
policymakers actually say and do.   
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Diplomacy, as a set of social and discursive practices, depends on the representations and 
articulations of identities, including the representations of national identity and ‘the others’, such 
as ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. The formation of national identities was inseparable from the new 
representation of the otherness. Through the process of foreign policy making, identities are 
(re)produced.57 In the 1970s Thailand, two processes stood out: the subject formation of détente 
proponents and the representation of the Soviet Union and the PRC as ‘friends’ (see Table 1.3). 
Both marked how Thai détente proponents thought about, spoke of, and acted on the Communist 
powers anew, shifting foreign policy into a more flexible direction. Simultaneously, these new 
identities provided a justification for these emergent foreign policy orientations. In other words, a 
change in discourse ostensibly legitimized the process of rapprochement with China as well as 
readjustment with the USSR. 
 
Table 1.3: Official foreign policy discursive practices shift toward the Soviet Union and China   
 Late 1940s – 1960s The long 1970s  
Official foreign policy 
discourses 
Cold War  Détente  
Foreign policy practices  Antagonism  Agonism/ diplomacy 
Identity  - Thailand  Anticommunist state  Normal state  
The other – the Communist 
powers  
Communist menace  Communist friend 
Agents: Subject positions  Cold Warriors  Détente proponents  
-Thanat Khoman  
-M.R. Kukrit Pramoj/ 
Chatichai Choonhavan  
-Kriangsak Chomanan 
 
These double representations should be put into historical context. I introduce the concepts 
of ‘the clash of discourses’, and ‘discursive anxiety’ to understand how Thailand encountered 
diplomatic transformation throughout the 1970s. In general, anxiety is the existential state of 
feeling an uncomfortable disconnect with the self and disorientation from the world. 58  In 
international politics, discursive anxiety, including diplomatic incident, happens when states 
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experience changing international contexts which make national understandings about the world 
problematic. As Ned Lebow suggests, these states suffer deep-seated anxiety ‘when these routines 
are disrupted by novel or critical situations’.59 Discursive anxiety also brings about uncertainty 
and unpredictability in diplomatic relations.  
Therefore, this condition of uncertainty not only causes the divided selves within the state 
but also affects foreign policy toward other states.60 This kind of anxiety is not simply ontological 
(about the sense of the self in the world) but discursive (about the understanding and expectation 
of the world). As anxious actors, states attempt to reduce or relieve discursive anxiety by seeking 
new discourses or narratives as well as developing coherence and consistency in their 
understanding of the world. In particular, they will adapt the narratives that states have told about 
who they are, and who their ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ are in international politics. As Epstein argues, 
the function of discourse is to provide ‘important principles of coherence for statehood’, which are 
reflected in both ‘the everyday language used to describe international politics’, and ‘the practice 
of diplomacy’.61 That said, discourse brings narrative coherence to events that seem contingent. In 
particular, the discourse of a ‘friend’ reduces discursive anxiety and paves the way for international 
recognition.62 This thesis argues that in a changing and contingent international context, states do 
not simply aim to pursue physical or existential security63, but rather seek to have secure discourses 
that help them better make sense of the world and that shape their diplomatic practices toward 
other countries.  
In Thailand, discursive anxiety emerged in the late 1960s when the dominant discourses of 
pro-Americanism and anticommunism became increasingly meaningless for some social agents in 
making sense of world politics. Discursive anxiety, and its concomitant lack of relative consistency 
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in diplomacy, brought about a change in discourse. The discourse of détente was thus spoken by 
Thai détente proponents, whose subject positions were produced by this new discourse. A change 
in discourse in turn translated into novel diplomatic practices toward the Communist powers, such 
as ping-ping diplomacy.       
Furthermore, discursive anxiety set the conditions for the clash of discourses in politics, 
whereby the existing and dominant discourse was deeply delegitimized and challenged by the 
emerging one. Different social forces, both attached to the old and new discourses, were deeply 
anxious about their respective status and position within the changing power structure. In this 
sense, a genealogy emphasizes that history is irreducibly based upon a constant struggle, or even 
warfare, between different power blocs, attempting to impose their own systems of domination 
and rules.64 
I argue that such concepts of discursive anxiety and the clash of discourse shed light on 
both ontological and epistemological dimensions of diplomacy as well as the power relationships 
of foreign policy. First, discursive anxiety saw a new social ontology: new kinds of social agents, 
or new subject positions, which in turn brought about new social relations into being. These social 
agents had subject positions, or a position within a discourse.65 In doing so, they were establishing 
themselves as the subjects speaking that particular discourse, such as détente discourse, and 
thereby identifying themselves as détente proponents. The discourse they spoke and acted upon 
not only marked who they were, but also provided them with narratives on how to make sense of 
the world they lived in and on. The agents were, strictly speaking, socially and discursively 
embedded actors with particular subject positions in the foreign policy making process.  
In this thesis, Thai détente proponents were mainly linked to new social forces, mostly 
civilians, such as Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister (1959-1971), and M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, Prime 
Minister (1975-1976), or progressive military leaders, such as General Chatichai Choonhavan, 
Deputy Foreign Minister (1973-1975) and later Foreign Minister (1975-1976), and General 
Kriangsak Chomanan, Prime Minister (1977-1980). Détente opponents or Cold Warriors, on the 
other hand, were mostly military leaders or conservative civilians, most notably Thanin Krivichien, 
Prime Minister (1976-1977). Later, I argue that some ardent détente opponents gradually and 
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implicitly embraced détente discourse, as evidenced in the late Cold War and the Third Indochina 
War in particular.  
The second, and related, issue is that during the period of discursive anxiety, a discursive 
struggle is unavoidable, if not inevitable. It is evident through a series of socio-political 
showdowns, such as student demonstrations, civil protests, revolutions and coups d’état. These 
discursive struggles illustrate that foreign policy discourses have never been absolutely 
hegemonic, but are subject to challenges, rearticulations, and resistances. As Foucault notes, 
‘discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing 
for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized’.66  
In each episode, Thai détente challenged the hegemonic discourse of anticommunism, and 
brought about a discursive struggle, which manifested in a contestation with the Thai 
establishment. While détente proponents gained discursive momentum due to the decline of 
American power in the region, successive episodes of détente were thus historically contingent 
and relatively short-lived: resulting in either a military coup d’état or a downfall of the government. 
Although détente proponents suggested certain elements of détente diplomacy, some opponents, 
who held the Cold War ideological hegemony and were strongly supported by conservatives, still 
dominated Thai politics. In this period, a coup can be equally seen as a coup about foreign policy, 
or a foreign policy coup.  
Third, epistemologically, discursive anxiety requires a newly formed consensus in terms 
of knowledge about diplomacy so as to justify the new diplomatic practices, and reinstate the 
secure representations of national identity and interest. To create successful and effective 
diplomatic practices, new discourses required knowledge production. Like every social struggle in 
history, this new diplomatic knowledge informed who the state was and determined what its 
foreign policy looked like. In the case of Thai détente, that knowledge was bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy, which will be discussed in the next section. In other words, there was a transformation 
in diplomatic practices at the same time as new knowledge was invented and produced.     
In sum, a genealogy in this case concerns the discursive politics of Thai foreign policy. The 
diplomatic discursive framework can problematize a conventional history in Thai studies, which 
takes the discourses and practices of diplomacy for granted. Following Foucault, the discourse 
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approach is not only the study of discursive and knowledge formation, but also sheds light on 
subject formation as well as power contestation between different subject positions. It also 
illustrates that international politics is the contested realm of friend-enemy relationship.67 The 
thesis further examines how discursive politics in Thai foreign policy shaped the way in which the 
discourse of ‘friend’ changed Thailand’s diplomatic perception and practices toward the 
Communist powers.    
 
1.3.4. A History of The Present: The Birth of Bending-with-the-wind Diplomacy    
Last but not least, a genealogy of Thai détente exposes the making of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ 
diplomacy which, I argue, only emerged as accepted and legitimate knowledge in the early 1970s. 
This section examines how knowledge of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy was disseminated 
through discursive practices of détente and academic narratives in the early 1970s. The latter began 
to explain many episodes of Thai foreign policy in the past as well as in the present through this 
new lens. More importantly, both academic and policy-making practices rendered bending-with-
the-wind diplomacy an ahistorical ‘truth’ or conventional wisdom of Thai foreign policy. This 
section begins with tracing the descent and emergence of ‘flexible diplomacy’ discourse in the 
elite perspectives. Then it indicates how this new discourse has shaped and constituted knowledge 
production within Thai academia. 
First of all, changing practices produced the new narrative of ‘bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy’. In the early 1970s, the narrative challenged the anticommunist discourse, which had 
dominated during the early Cold War. Some people termed this new discourse ‘flexible 
diplomacy’, while others called it ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’. Regardless of the name, 
this emerging discourse rendered a rupture with the hegemonic discourse of anticommunism.  
This thesis argues that it was Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman who coined the term, 
‘flexible diplomacy’ in the late 1960s. He suggested that foreign policy ‘should be flexible in a 
world of changing conditions. A rigid policy is dangerous, especially for a small country’.68 
However, it was in fact Pridi Phanomyong, the former Thai Prime Minister, who juxtaposed this 
‘flexible diplomacy’ with the conceptual lexicon of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy.     
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In his interview with The Nation’s special correspondent in Paris, Pridi claimed that China 
was ready to establish relations with Thailand if the Thai government ‘changes her hostile policy’. 
During his exile in Beijing for many years, which made him quite familiar with some high-ranking 
Chinese officials, he said that the crucial issue for rapprochement with China was about motives: 
‘If Thailand had good motives towards them, they would certainly reciprocate. Let bygones be 
bygones. I don’t think there are any problems with Communist China. It would be a noble thing if 
two hostile persons can patch up their quarrels’. Like Thanat, Pridi strongly urged a ‘flexible’ 
foreign policy with the objective of ensuring Thailand’s survival amidst changing global and 
regional dynamics. He traced this policy back to the reign of King Rama V in the late nineteenth 
century: ‘Just look back at the example set down by King Rama V. We followed a neutral policy 
and that saved our country. There was a balance of powers. We must accept that while all other 
neighboring countries fell into the hands of foreign countries, King Rama V saved Thailand from 
imperialism because His Majesty followed a flexible policy’. ‘Whenever we took a different line 
set down by His Majesty King Rama V’, Pridi continued, ‘we always had troubles such as when 
we sided with Japan during World War II’.69   
Pridi also suggested that Thailand should trade with every country without taking their 
political regimes or ideologies into consideration. As he puzzled,  
 
What kind of Chinese are we talking about? Look at those Chinese merchants in the 
country. Why are they so rich? If we trade with Communist China, it should be on a 
government-to-government basis. They hold two trade exhibitions every year. When 
foreign merchants visit them and sign trade contracts, they sign on behalf of their 
governments. The government can also choose to allow some particular organizations to 
deal with Communist China – not private merchants.70  
 
Trade with China, for him, was inevitable. Commenting on President Nixon’s visit to Beijing, he 
asserted that: ‘The United States simply cannot afford to ignore a country with 800 million people. 
It’s a big market’.71  
Undoubtedly, Pridi shared the discourse of flexible diplomacy with Thanat Khoman, and 
strongly supported détente with the Communists. Later on, Prime Minister Thanom admitted that 
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both Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and Deputy Foreign Minister Sa-nga Kittikachorn had met 
separately with Pridi at the Royal Thai Embassy in Paris in 1971. He denied that Pridi was asked 
to serve as a middleman in contacting China. As he told Thai reporters, ‘I have never assigned 
Pridi to do anything’. Both cabinet members did not discuss any political issues with Pridi. Thanom 
said that ‘Pridi talked about his life in Beijing’.72 Pridi himself also denied that he was a ‘third 
party’ making contact between the two countries.73 
 The concept of ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’ became ubiquitous from the 1970s. For 
example, in his famous July 1972 speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, 
Boonchu Rojanastein, the leading and influential director of the Bangkok Bank, spoke about the 
need to ‘bend with the wind’. He remarked:  
 
As Americans, you see us as corrupt, trafficking in drugs, full of bureaucratic red tape, 
alien bills, etc. On our part, we complain about your military bases, your hippies, your 
Americanization of our culture, your arrogance. But whatever dissatisfactions there are 
with each other, America has been the closest friend and ally of Thailand for the past 20 
years. For the past 20 years you have served us well, and we have served you well. But the 
time, I think, of America being our closest friend and ally is coming to an end. Perhaps not 
of our own choosing, it’s more of yours. When the time comes and we shall have to part, 
let it not be said that Thailand broke away, but rather that the national interests of both our 
countries made it undesirable for the United States to have exclusive rights over Thailand’s 
relationship. But let us remain good friends.74 
 
Boonchu continued, ‘For example, we are grateful that the U.S. has given us a protective umbrella 
for many years. How can we now refuse your request to open up an air base, say at Takli? The 
Thai nature would allow this even if it were against our better judgment. Yet in giving in to such 
a request, we have virtually allowed the U.S. to bind us to her, and taken away the opportunity of 
greater flexibility in our foreign policy. The more you want to get out of Vietnam, the more you 
tie up Thailand. And when the time comes for you to withdraw, we will be blamed for “flexibility” 
again. Is this really fair to us?’75 
Subsequently, Anand Panyarachun, former ambassador to the US and the UN, gave a 
speech by asking ‘What is diplomacy?’ He said that ‘diplomacy is the art of the possible’, and 
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compared Thai diplomacy with a ‘bamboo’ that ‘bent with the wind’. Anand disregarded those 
who charged that Thailand was a country with no firm principles. Rather, he claimed, Thailand 
pursued ‘flexible’ diplomacy. ‘If international politics or foreign policy of any country did not 
have flexibility’, Anand went on, ‘the tree would have broken … when the storm is coming.’ He 
highlighted the difference between ‘slippery’ [ka-lorn] and ‘flexible’ [yeutyun] diplomacy. For 
Anand, the former did not ‘accept the truth’, ‘wish to know the truth’ or ‘seek the truth’. On the 
contrary, ‘the aim of flexibility is to know the certain truth, find a right fact … and how to deal 
with the fact’. During the high time of the Cold War, ‘Thailand lacked this flexible diplomacy. 
This was partly because we were a victim in the Cold War’.76 
That said, so-called ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy has become the metanarrative in 
a historiography and theory of Thai foreign policy only in the 1970s. This kind of knowledge is 
the result of Thai détente.     
 
The second, and related, issue is that bending-with-the-wind diplomacy has become a 
metanarrative in academia since the mid-1970s. This followed the transformation of détente 
discourse and its diplomatic practices. If we are to understand the emergence of ‘bending-with-
the-wind diplomacy’ narrative, we should begin with an analysis of the historiography, which only 
emerged during the 1970s. Three exemplary and well-renowned scholars in Thailand, namely 
Likhit Dhiravegin, Sarasin Viraphol, and Thamsook Numnonda, narrated Thai foreign policy by 
employing the lens of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy.77 I argue that this was the first time 
that this conceptual lexicon was employed, not only to justify Thai foreign policy in the present, 
but also explicate Thai diplomacy in the past. This has included explanations of Siamese foreign 
policy during the nineteenth century, and Thai foreign policy during the Second World War.  
In his 1974 oft-cited article, entitled ‘Thailand Foreign Policy Determination’, Likhit 
Dhiravegin conceptualized Thai foreign policy as ‘bamboo diplomacy’. He contends that ‘the basic 
foreign policy of the country is to watch the ‘direction of the wind’ and bend accordingly in order 
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to survive …. The present writer would like to term this Thai national style as “bamboo 
diplomacy”.’78 In his 1975 book, Likhit extends this conceptual lexicon to explain Siam’s survival 
amidst imperialism/colonialism during the nineteenth century. Siam survived the imperialist threat 
and colonization because of her ‘flexible’ diplomacy that the Thai kings diligently mastered.79  
In his 1976 book, Sarasin Viraphol also used the narrative of ‘bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy’ to explicate contemporary Thai foreign policy. 80  In 1977, Thamsook Numnonda 
reinterpreted Phibun’s foreign policy during the Second World War in line with this flexible 
diplomacy. As she put it, ‘The Thai art of [bamboo] diplomacy had once again saved the country. 
And this, of course, has always been the way the Thais have met and overcome every crisis’.81    
While such studies were expertly argued, the lens itself is anachronistic, in the sense that 
scholars have used this very recent concept to universalize or essentialize Thai foreign policy. It is 
also tautological in the sense that the scholars reproduced knowledge of Thai foreign policy while 
appearing to be unaware of power/knowledge production of ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’. 
Since the 1970s, scholars have repeatedly adopted and shared this powerful narrative. A genealogy 
of Thai détente then renders this ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’ narrative highly problematic. 
This section has explicated a close examination and exposition of the concept itself – how it first 
emerged and subsequently has been appropriated in the Thai discourse of diplomacy. 
 
To sum up, a genealogy of Thai détente is a historical problematization in two senses: in the first 
place, it explicates the descent and emergence of Thai détente in the long 1970s. We call it a history 
of rupture. Through the analysis of discourse, it saw discursive anxiety and tussles within this 
historical rupture. In the second place, a genealogy calls into question the conventional history of 
‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’ and asserts the constructedness of this narrative. We call it a 
history of the present. In other words, such genealogy aims to historically situate diplomacy, to 
interrogate what is deemed as conventional wisdom, and to show how knowledge functions as a 
power relationship. 
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1.4. Archives   
In this thesis, ‘archives’ – including collections of writings, speeches, and works as well as other 
related documents of key policymakers – are closely studied as a ‘set of texts’ in order to 
understand the overlapping discourses within Thai elite circles, especially the discourse of détente. 
It also analyzes the ‘intertextuality’ of such sources, meaning the interconnectedness among texts 
and meanings through reference to other texts, in order to observe what practices were performed 
in diplomacy. These archives are not simply ‘a register of statements’ but also ‘constitute evidence 
of ways of thinking and ways of relating to the world’. In this sense, archives can be understood 
as ‘sites of interrogation’, which reflect evidence of imaginaries and ‘power relations involved in 
deciding what to store, how, where, and the design of systems of retrieval of material’. As Luis 
Lobo-Guerrero put it, ‘the imaginaries of the researcher meet, if willing, the imaginaries of those 
who classified and stored the material, of those who recorded the facts and designed the recording 
systems … and of the actors involved in the narratives there contained’. 82  Following the 
Foucauldian way, archives are not merely ‘the mass of texts gathered together at a given period, 
those from some past epoch that have survived erasure’, but rather ‘the set of rules which at a given 
period and for a given society define’ what the sayable (and unsayable) statements are, how these 
sayings are circulated (or prohibited), who has access to them and on what terms, and, importantly, 
who is permitted to speak of them in the first place.83 By interrogating the archives, the discourse 
of détente produced not only diplomatic practices but also conventional wisdom of society at large. 
To understand the transformation of Thai foreign policy in the long 1970s, the thesis draws 
on a number of sources including primary materials such as newly available archival materials, 
collected volumes, newspapers, memoirs, private correspondence, and other related writings, 
coupled with in-depth interviews and secondary literature. It is largely based on newly declassified 
archival documents from Thai sources, including those from the National Archives of Thailand 
[TNA] and Library and Archives Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] in Bangkok. 
The former contains related documents, most of which are a variety of newspapers and a number 
of official documents during the late 1960s and early period of the 1970s, while the latter provides 
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a number of official documents during whole periods of the 1970s. Some Chinese sources are 
available at the Thai MFA. Regarding the Russian sources, Thailand and Russia have closely 
cooperated in the exchanges and translation of the archival documents, all of which are from the 
Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). Recently, four volumes on 
Thai-Soviet relations have been published commemorating the 120th anniversary of diplomatic 
relations in 2017. The first volume covers the early Cold War until 1970 while the other three 
volumes cover the periods between 1971 and 1991.84  
The thesis also consults with foreign archival documents, most of which have been 
published online, including the US State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS), National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] and Central Intelligence Agency 
[CIA] online databases.   
This thesis has thus attempted to conduct a multiarchival research, with an emphasis on 
Thai sources. This is largely because it studies Thai détente from a Thai perspective. It focuses 
mainly on Thailand’s shifting discursive perceptions of, and practices toward, such Communist 
powers as the USSR and China, not the other way round. However, I uses foreign sources both for 
cross referencing and for ‘imaginary interviewing’: in the sense that, as these sources prevailed, 
these international diplomats and officials directly engaged with and talked to Thai elites as well 
as pursued a kind of participatory observation during the particular period. I, therefore, use these 
foreign archives with the aim of being able to ‘correct national bias, to measure influence, impact 
and effect, to monitor perception and misperception and even to learn what cannot be found in the 
archives at home’.85          
          
1.5. Contribution and Structure  
The thesis makes a contribution to at least two fields of study. First, and most obviously, it 
theoretically and empirically contributes to Thai Studies, especially to the study of Thai foreign 
policy. The reinterpretation and reassessment of Thai diplomatic practices in the 1970s, and their 
concomitant narrative of ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’, call into question the dominant 
                                                          
84 Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collected Volume of Soviet Archival Documents, 1941-1970 (Bangkok: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016); Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collected Volumes of Declassified 
Documents on Thai-Russian Relations, 1970-1991, Vols. 1-3 (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). 
85 Zara Steiner, ‘On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More’, International Affairs, Vol. 73: 
No. 3 (1997): p. 541.  
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historiography within Thai Studies. One key finding is that the conception of Thai détente is 
inextricably linked to the knowledge and political construction of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy as well as to the formation of new subject positions. Diplomatic practices were a result 
of power contestation within Thailand, and Thai détente happened in the long 1970s as a historical 
rupture in Thai foreign policy. The genealogical break marks the moment when the unthinkable – 
the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Communists – began to become thinkable, and 
shaped the way in which Thai foreign policy has been conducted in the present. The second finding 
is that a genealogy problematizes the continuation of ‘bending-in-the-wind’ diplomacy and asserts 
that knowledge itself was constituted as the metanarrative in Thai diplomacy in the early 1970s.  
Second, the thesis aspires to contribute to Cold War International History, especially global 
détente studies, in double ways. First, it provides an insight into the case studies of Thai détente, 
which indicates how small powers, such as Thailand, initiated alternative strategies beyond 
superpower politics, and how successful these strategies were. Although the success of diplomatic 
détente in part depended on the receptivity of the great powers, this thesis shows that Third World 
or Non-Western States were no longer passive agents in global politics, and had to an extent impact 
upon the global Cold War. Cold War International History should pay much greater attention to 
the agency of small powers, and their strategies of détente with the Communist powers. Second, 
the thesis might also reassess the way in which we can conduct research on Cold War International 
History by using alternative approaches, such as genealogy.     
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provided the historical background 
of the Cold War discursive hegemony and its discontents between 1958 and 1968. The next two 
chapters examine the first episode of détente, discussing Thanat Khoman’s discourse of ‘flexible 
diplomacy’ (Chapter 3), and changing Thailand’s diplomatic practices with the Soviet Union and 
the PRC under the context of American withdrawal from the region (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 is an 
interregnum of the 1971 military coup, which at first sought to lessen détente, but in fact continued 
it. Détente culminated in the ping-pong and trade diplomacy with the PRC.   
Chapter 6 examines the second détente under Kukrit Pramoj’s and Chatichai Choonhavan’s 
foreign policy of rapprochement with China, and to a lesser extent normal relations with the USSR 
between 1975 and 1976. Chapter 7 explores the third détente under Kriangsak Chomanan, whose 
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foreign policy of ‘equidistance’ with great powers between 1977 and 1980 culminated in balanced 
détente.   
Chapter 8 concludes by reflecting on the significance of a genealogical approach to Thai 
diplomacy. First, a genealogy as a history of rupture indicates the hallmark of détente’s discursive 
practices, rather than their decline, in the 1980s. What changed due to, or despite, the Third 
Indochina War was merely the unbalanced side of flexible diplomacy – closer alignment with 
China. In other words, it was a decline in triangular diplomacy whereas the discourse of flexible 
diplomacy with the great powers has resiliently persisted. Second, a genealogy as a history of the 
present asserts that détente epistemically produced the novel knowledge or narrative of ‘bending-
with-the-wind diplomacy’, which in turn has politically constituted the conditions of possibility 
for the present representations of identities and foreign policy. In other words, it explicates how 
and why the practice-based discourse of détente have significantly influenced, and had an impact 
on, Thai foreign policy thinking and implementation until the present day. In general, Thai détente 
was a long-term process of diplomatic transformation that not only shaped the practices of Thai 
foreign relations with the Communist powers but also produced knowledge of bending-with-the-
















 Chapter 2 
Cold War Discursive Hegemony: 
Anticommunism, Americanism and Antagonism 
 
‘Communism can be worse than the Nazis or fascists. In practice, it is more terrible than 
dictatorship.’ – King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1967)1  
 
 ‘We in Thailand want to coexist with everyone including Communist countries, but the 
trouble is that some Communist countries do not want to coexist with us. They want to 
wipe us out of our existence, or they want to control us as you may have seen. Beijing has 
started to say that they declared guerilla war on Thailand. Well, this is not coexistence. 
This is the opposition to coexistence. … God should condemn us to make accommodation 
with the Communists’. – Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister (1967) 2 
 
It is impossible to understand the emergence of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ or ‘flexible’ diplomacy 
in the long 1970s without first tracing how anticommunism became hegemonic in the late 1950s. 
This chapter examines how anticommunist discourse emerged out of a discursive struggle within 
Thai politics and foreign policy formation, and is divided into two main parts. The first part 
discusses the struggles and clash between four contradictory and competing discourses – or myths 
– of Thai diplomacy: discourses of independence, lost territory, anticommunism, and flexible 
diplomacy. It elucidates the power struggle between royal nationalism and military nationalism, 
which set the context for the emergence of anticommunist discourse in the Cold War, as well as 
the countervailing discourse of flexible diplomacy. The second part specifically examines the 
descent and emergence of anticommunism since the late nineteenth century until the military 
regimes under Field Marshals Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) and Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-1968). 
It argues that although the concept of anticommunism predated Communism, it was merely used 
                                                          
1 King Bhumibol, interview, Look magazine, 1967, Quoted in Jim Algie, et al., Americans in Thailand (Singapore: 
Editions Didier Millet, 2014), p. 189.  
2 Thanat Khoman, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Japanese Pressmen’, at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 10 July 1967, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 1, 1967 (Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2014), pp. 52-53; Thanat Khoman, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Mr. Walker Stone, 
Editor-in-Chief of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers’, Bangkok, 27 September 1967, in Collected Interviews of H.E. 
Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 1, 1967 (Bangkok: Department of 
Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 111. 
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as a tactic to hinder the antiradical discourses, to destroy political enemies, and to justify the status 
quo. It was only from the coup in 1958 that anticommunism became a hegemonic discourse. This 
discourse not only demonized the Communist threat but also shaped anticommunist identity and 
practices. Thai foreign relations with the Communist Powers including the USSR and the PRC 
were largely framed by this Cold War discursive hegemony.  
    
2.1. Discursive Struggles in Thailand  
The discourse of anticommunism was one among many foreign policy discourses in Thailand. 
Since the formation of the modern Thai state in the nineteenth century, Thailand had at least four 
faces, or myths, upon which diplomacy was based, namely the discourses of independence, lost 
territory, anticommunism, and flexible diplomacy. These four myths shaped the way in which 
Thailand perceived itself in the world as well as how a ‘threat’ was constructed in different periods 
of time. Discursive hegemony happened when one discourse became dominant at particular time. 
It defined conventional wisdom and marginalized other understandings. However, this does not 
mean that one discourse totally replaced another. On the contrary, new discourses tended to emerge 
alongside, and in contradiction with, older ones. Sometimes old discourses faded away, sometimes 
they discredited the new one.  
Thailand in the 1970s encountered the discursive struggle between these consecutive 
myths. The first discourse is that of independence. This is a royal nationalist narrative of Thai 
diplomacy that emerged out of the late nineteenth century. It asserts that Thailand is a unique or 
exceptional country in Southeast Asia in two senses: first, Thailand, unlike others in the region, 
was never colonized by Western imperialist powers. Second, Thailand cannot be compared with 
other countries.3 This discourse of independence remains a dominant discourse. The narrative goes 
that Thailand was a ‘victim’ of Western imperialism/ colonialism and it interprets French 
imperialism during the Franco-Siamese crisis of 1893 as a ‘threat’ that was defeated by the Thai 
establishment. In other words, the monarchy is portrayed as an institution that helped save the 
                                                          
3 See David Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Pensri Duke, 
Karntangprated kub aekkarat lae attippatai kong thai [Foreign Affairs and Thailand’s Independence and 
Sovereignty, since King Rama V to the Phibun Government] (Bangkok: The Royal Institute, 1999). Benedict 
Anderson bluntly observes that ‘what damn good is this country – you can’t compare it with anything’. See his 
‘Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies’, in Exploration and Irony in Studies of Siam over Forty Years 
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1978 [2014]), pp. 15-46.  
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country from imperialist expansionism and should be considered savior of the nation. 4  The 
discourse of independence has thus empowered royal hegemony.5 It also forms the national status 
and identity of Thailand as an independent state, which means not being colonized.     
The second discourse is that of the lost territory or ‘National Humiliation’. The royalist 
discourse of independence was not directly challenged until after the 1932 Revolution that ended 
the absolute monarchy. The discourse of lost territory emerged during the first administration of 
Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, aka ‘Phibun’ (1938-1944). This saw a shift from royal 
nationalism to military nationalism. This discourse was a ‘tool for delegitimizing state leadership’, 
particularly the monarchy, and ‘an effective way to discredit political opponents’.6 In The Lost 
Territories, Shane Strate elegantly argues that Phibun’s nationalist diplomacy heavily depended 
on the discourse of ‘lost territory while reassigning [the discourse of] never colonized to a 
subordinate role’:  
 
In order to construct an anti-imperialist discourse that would mobilize an entire nation, the 
government downplayed Siam’s legacy of independence and instead interpreted the 
Franco-Siamese crisis of 1893 as a defeat that robbed the nation of both its territory and its 
honor. The leaders of Thailand provoked the 1941 war with French Indochina because they 
felt confident that avenging the loss from a half century earlier would allow the military to 
replace the monarchy in the role of national savior.7            
 
The crisis of 1893 was redefined as a collective ‘trauma’ and loss of sovereignty while the alliance 
with Japan, and the 1941 war with France in Indochina, was portrayed as redemption. In turn, the 
military, instead of the monarchy, was presented as the national ‘hero’. However, the Japanese 
(coupled with Thai) defeat at the end of the Second World War delegitimized, yet did not end, this 
second discourse. The latter persists as a powerful discourse.8 Throughout the history of Thai 
                                                          
4 See Patrick Tuck, The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese Independence, 1858-
1907 (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1995). Thongchai Winichakul critically interrogates this metanarrative. See his 
Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).  
5 Thongchai Winichakul terms it ‘rachachatniyom’ [royalist nationalism]. See his ‘Prawatisat thai baep 
rachachatniyom: Jak yuk ananikhom amphrang su rachachatniyom mai rue latthi phor khong kradumphi thai nai 
patchuban’ [Royalist Nationalist History: From the Colonial Era to the New Royalist Nationalism], 
Silapawatthanatham, Vol. 23: No. 1 (November 2001), pp. 43-52.   
6 Shane Strate, The Lost Territories: Thailand’s History of National Humiliation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2015), p. 3.  
7 Strate, The Lost Territories, p. 4.  
8 This discourse was revivified during the losing Preah Vihear incident in 1962, which has persisted in Thai politics 
until recently.  
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diplomacy, both independence and lost territory discourses have been in a state of discursive 
tension.  
   The third discourse is anticommunism. Although this discourse began in the late nineteenth 
century to discredit any radical discourses and support the status quo9, it emerged as a dominant 
narrative or knowledge only after the 1958 coup of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat that installed a 
military regime and unquestionably aligned with the US. Within this discourse, the Communists – 
which included the powers of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China – were 
demonized as vital threats to national interest and survival. While Thailand had diplomatic 
relations with the USSR since 1941 and no formal relations with the PRC, Thai foreign relations 
with both powers were mutually antagonistic. The anticommunist discourse also positioned 
Thailand as an inviolable part of the Free World, where the US led and promised to guarantee its 
independence.   
The last discourse is that of flexible diplomacy. This is the idea that Thai foreign policy is 
firmly grounded in a basic pragmatism that ‘bends with the wind’. The ultimate objective is 
Thailand’s survival and independence, and it is therefore described as bamboo or bending-with-
the-wind diplomacy.10 In conventional historiography, the monarchs were portrayed as gifted 
leaders who saved the country from external threats.11 Thamsook Numnonda also reinterprets 
Phibun’s foreign policy as inherently flexible. As she puts it, ‘The Thai art of [bamboo] diplomacy 
had once again saved the country. And this, of course, has always been the way the Thais have 
met and overcome every crisis’.12 This discourse of flexible diplomacy is powerful in the sense 
that, first, it conveniently blends the discourses of independence and lost territory, and second, it 
demonstrates continuity for Thai diplomacy since the nineteenth century. This thesis argues 
differently, claiming that this discourse emerged out of the détente strategy and a concomitant 
historiography in the 1970s. Moreover, it was a discourse of diplomats.   
                                                          
9 Kasian Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927-1958 (Kyoto: 
Kyoto Areas Studies on Asia No. 3, 2001).   
10 See Likhit Dhiravegin, ‘Thailand Foreign Policy Determination’, The Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 11: No. 4 
(1974); Arne Kislenko, ‘Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy’, 
International Journal, Vol. 57: No. 4 (2002), pp. 537-561.     
11 See Likhit Dhiravegin. Siam and Colonialism (1855-1909): An Analysis of Diplomatic Relation (Bangkok: Thai 
Wattana Panich, 1975). 
12 Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-1945 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1977), p. vi.  
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To sum up, each discourse constituted a historical narrative as well as the national identity 
and interest in different time, which in turn determined who or what was constantly treated as a 
‘threat’ from within and without. Different discourses heralded the transformation of domestic 
subject positions. By the late 1950s, the anticommunist discourse, coupled with the 
anticommunists, started to dominate Thai politics and foreign affairs.    
 
2.2. The Emergence of Anticommunism  
2.2.1. Anticommunism as a Tactic (before 1958) 
This section argues that the idea of anticommunism predated Communism. It emerged in the late 
nineteenth century as a reaction of Thai royalism to any (anti-royalist) radical discourses. 
Anticommunism was fundamentally employed during both the absolutist and early democratic 
eras as a political tool to curb or combat the local enemies. In Cold War Thailand, while 
communism was highlighted as a red menace during the second Phibun administration (1948-
1957), the idea of anticommunism before 1958 was first and foremost a tactic in bargaining with 
the US for military aid. That is, anticommunism was an idea without any Communists.       
 The origin of anticommunism in Thailand can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. 
In 1881, King Chulalongkorn reportedly told American diplomats that all rulers in the world would 
some day be saved by Providence from ‘…those based classes Socialist, Nihilist, Communists 
etc’. In 1912, his son, King Vajiravudh, alarmed by domestic (the attempted coup in March 1912) 
and international factors (Chinese Republican Revolution in October 1911 and subsequent 
abdication of the Manchu emperor in February 1912), wrote diary entries on a critique of what he 
called ‘latthi khong sochialist’ (the doctrine of socialism). The latter was preached as impractical 
and unrealistic.13 From then, the terms ‘Communism’ and ‘socialism’ were used interchangeably. 
Both were counted as equivalent forms of radical discourses.14    
Nevertheless, only a few Thai students were influenced by Western radical discourses 
(such as Pridi Phanomyong and Prince Sakol Wannakon Worawan, alias the ‘Red Prince’). 
                                                          
13 Quoted in Kasian, Commodifying Marxism, pp. 13-14.  
14 On the emergence of radical and republican discourses, see Craig J. Reynolds, and Hong Lysa, ‘Marxism in Thai 
Historical Studies’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 43: No. 1 (1983), pp. 77-104; Craig J. Reynolds, Thai Radical 
Discourse: The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1987); 
Patrick Jory, ‘Republicanism in Thai History’, in A Sarong for Clio: Essays on the Intellectual and Cultural History 
of Thailand, ed. Maurizio Peleggi (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1987, 2015), pp.97-117.  
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Communism, on the other hand, was strictly limited to Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants. For 
Kasian Tejapira, their main aim was ‘externally oriented and anti-imperialist’. The specter of 
Communism was thus ‘less menacing’ but ‘more alien’ to the Thais.15 From the outset, it was an 
un-Thai ideology. However, since the collapse of the Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party 
alliance in 1927 and a shift in the Comintern’s strategy toward the so-called ‘Third Period’ of 
ultraleftism in 1928, the reckless Communist activities in Thailand precipitated the severe 
crackdown by the Thai government in 1929. The latter led to a series of deportation and 
imprisonment. At the same time, this event triggered a new turn to Communism in Thailand and 
the Communist Party of Siam was established in 1930.16     
 After the 1932 Revolution that ended Thai absolutism, anticommunism, and particularly 
anti-Chinese policies, continued under successive People’s Party governments. During this period, 
Communism was mainly used as a political tool to delegitimize political opponents in Thai politics. 
In his royal critique, or so-called Samud Pokkhao, King Rama VII himself attacked Pridi, leader 
of the civilian wing of the People’s Party, and his Economic Plan (Samud Pokleuang) as 
‘Communist’. He was quoted as saying:  
 
I do not know whether Stalin copied [Pridi] or whether [Pridi] copied Stalin … the only 
difference is that one is Russian, the other Thai … This is the same program that has been 
used in Russia. If our government adopted it, we would be assisting the Third International 
to achieve the aim of world Communism … Siam would become the second Communist 
state after Russia.17  
 
Eventually, Pridi went into exile whereas the first Anti-Communist Act was enacted on April 2, 
1933. The definition of ‘Communism’ defined in the Act was vague and extremely broad. 
According to Kasian, it was ‘veritably not anti-communist at all, but anti-socialist, or more 
specifically, anti-Pridi, anti-left wing of the People’s Party, and anti-Economic Plan’.18    
 The definition of Communism was revised after the second military coup in 1933. The 
1935 Amendment to the Anticommunist Act was instead to exclude socialist reformists, including 
                                                          
15 Kasian, Commodifying Marxism, p. 18.  
16 See Christopher E. Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885-1954 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Eiji Murashima, The Early Years of Communism in Thailand (1930-
1936) (Bangkok: Matichon, 2012). 
17 Quoted in Judith Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Study of Intrigue (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1991), pp. 37-38.  
18 Kasian, Commodifying Marxism, p. 39.  
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Pridi and his left-wing fellows. It continued to target the Communists. The Communist activities 
in Thailand drastically faded away when the Communist Party of Siam was demised in 1936. Then, 
from 1938, the Phibun government pursued nationalist policies.     
During the Second World War in the Pacific and the rise of anti-Japanese, anti-Phibun 
movements provided new opportunities for Communist activities in Thailand. However, the 
number of Thai Communists in the post-WWII era remained very small and their influence 
marginal.19 In addition, with the active domestic support of Pridi, the Anti-Communist Act was 
repealed in September 1946 in order to gain Soviet endorsement for Thailand’s membership in the 
United Nations (UN).       
 When Phibun returned to power in early 1948, anticommunism was not his first primary 
agenda. Phibun was indifferent to ideology, which was explicit in his policy toward local Chinese 
and Communists. ‘Anticommunist’ repression happened only when the US subsequently pushed 
the agenda on Thai elite.20 As Fineman puts it, ideology ‘maintained only a minor role in the Thai 
political system’ in the 1950s.21  
What changed Phibun’s foreign policy orientation was the quest for military aid from the 
US, which he considered as imperative for the fate of the military regime. At first, the US opposed 
the Phibun government and rendered military aid politically undesirable.22 But by early 1949, US 
policymakers came to concur that foreign aid would be a tool to strengthen Thailand’s will to resist 
Communism.23 It heralded Thailand’s increasing importance to America’s anticommunist policy 
in the region.   
                                                          
19 Kasian, Commodifying Marxism, p. 26.  
20 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); Soymook Yingchaiyakamon, ‘Thailand’s Foreign Policy towards the 
People’s Republic of China during Field Marshal P. Phibulsonggram’s Government (1948-1957)’, MA Thesis, Faculty 
of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 2001.  
21 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 75. Historiographically, Fineman transcends the predominant Cold 
War paradigm, or what he called ‘international-relations-oriented studies’ (p. 5), which explains the alliance from an 
ideological perspective, namely anticommunism. This paradigm ‘fails to explain the role of the military and military-
controlled governments in the alliance’ (p. 4). Fineman asserts instead that ‘rather than considering Thailand’s alliance 
with the United States as separate from internal politics and driven by the novel and imported ideology of 
anticommunism, as the Cold War model assumes, we should view the country’s domestic politics and foreign policy, 
as the Thais themselves did, as closely connected’ (p. 4).  
22 See Edwin F. Stanton, Brief Authority: Excursions of a Common Man in an Uncommon World (New York: Harper, 
1956), p. 209.  
23 Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 70   
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Phibun’s shift toward a pro-American stance was shown in his (at least rhetorically) self-
portrayal as a hardline anticommunist. Following the victory of Chinese Communism in October 
1949, he supported the Bao Dai and Korean War decisions in 1950. Despite the initiation of 
Military Assistance Agreement in October 1950, US military assistance to Phibun’s regime 
remained ‘limited and uncertain’, ‘significant but modest’. In other words, Thailand still occupied 
a ‘distant place’ in US foreign policy thinking.24     
By the mid-1950s, when the Americans had increased their involvement in Indochina 
following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Thailand gradually became an American ‘bastion’ 
against Communism in Southeast Asia. Military aid for Thailand rose dramatically, and the 
commitment to fight for Thailand’s survival was strengthened via the establishment of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. As the military regime 
consolidated power over the next five years (1950-1954), Thailand and the US became 
increasingly close allies.25  
Following incessant pressures from the US, the Thai military regime pursued a harsher 
policy toward Communists and dissidents, as well as the Soviet Union and the PRC. In 1952, 
Phibun banned a Soviet publication named Tass Bulletin, reduced quotas on Chinese immigration 
and imposed an embargo on all trade with Communist China.26 The PRC reacted by announcing 
the establishment of a Thai Autonomous People’s Government in the Southern province of Yunnan 
in 1953. By now, therefore, it was clear that Thailand’s pro-American stance was negatively 
impacting Thai relations with both the USSR and the PRC.27     
In domestic politics, the military regime developed a ‘triumvirate politics’, including such 
three rivaling strongmen as Phibun, Police General Phao Siyanon, and Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat of the Royal Thai Army.28 In brief, Thai authoritarianism was in tandem with American 
influence in the region. However, during the democratic interlude between 1955 and 1958, 
proceeding with elections, Phibun allowed political parties to form, lifted restrictions on the press 
and free speech, revived leftists and dissidents, and intensified the power struggle at the top of the 
                                                          
24 Fineman, A Special Relationship, pp. 131, 128.  
25 Matthew Phillips, Thailand in the Cold War (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 92-93.   
26 Paul Shirk, ‘Thai-Soviet Relations’, Asian Survey, Vol. 9: No. 9 (1969), p. 690.  
27 Anuson Chinvanno, Thailand’s Policies towards China, 1949-54 (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992).  
28 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
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state. This, in turn, saw a deterioration of the Thai-US alliance and the rise of anti-Americanism 
became ubiquitous in public debate.  
Moreover, in foreign affairs, Phibun started to veer toward neutrality and engagement with 
Beijing. This manifested in the emerging concept of non-alignment which had developed globally, 
following the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. Phibun sent his foreign minister, Prince 
Wan Waithayakon, to attend the Bandung Conference where the latter made an acquaintance with 
the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai.29 Phibun also initiated secret diplomacy with the PRC, by 
sending his unofficial emissary to Beijing. Then he sent two children of Sang Pathanothai, his 
close confidante, to Beijing as part of a tributary diplomacy. Warnwai, aged 12, and Sirin, aged 8, 
were raised under the tutelage of Premier Zhou.30  
For Phibun, neither neutrality nor non-alignment was conceived as flexible diplomacy. 
Thailand’s ‘China card’ was primarily designed by Phibun to pressure the Americans for more 
aid.31 According to Anand Panyarachun, ‘[Thai foreign policy] during the Phibun administration 
toward China was not serious. It was merely an insurance policy with fear’.32 The Thai non-
alignment orientation was temporarily short-lived and ended in the military coup in 1957 led by 
Phibun’s own protégé, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The first coup in 1957 was deemed essential 
because, as a cable to Washington reported, the Phibun government had ‘allowed secret contacts 
with Communist circles in China’. As US ambassador to Bangkok, Edwin Stanton, put it, the Thai 
foreign policy of anticommunism was ‘to run with the hare, and hunt with the hounds’.33  
In other words, Phibun was not staunchly anticommunist. For him, anticommunism was a 
means to obtain American military aid, and sustain his political survival. Phibun’s era in the 1950s 
was then a prolegomena to the genuine ‘revolution’ under the Sarit government.34 Especially since 
                                                          
29 Anuson Chinvanno, “Brief Encounter”: Sino-Thai Rapprochement after Bandung, 1955-1957 (Bangkok: Institute 
of Foreign Affairs, 1991).  
30 See Aree Pirom, Buanglang kan sathapana samphanthaparp yukmai thai-jeen [Background to the Establishment of 
Sino-Thai Relations in the Modern Period] (Bangkok: Mitnara Press, 1981); Warnwai Phathanothai, Zhou Enlai: 
Pupluek maitri Thai-jeen [Zhou Enlai, The Man Who Planted Thai-Chinese Friendship], 2nd Edition (Bangkok: 
Prakonchai, 1976[2001]); Sirin Phathanothai, The Dragon’s Pearl (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 
31 Fineman, A Special Relationship.  
32 Anand Panyarachun, ‘Patakata pised’ [Special Lecture], in Kwam sampan thai-jin [Sino-Thai Relations: Past and 
Future Prospect], eds. Khien Theeravit and Cheah Yan-Chong (Bangkok: Chualolongkorn University, 2000), pp. 12-
13.    
33 Quoted in Fineman, A Special Relationship, pp. 244, 66.  
34 On the contrary, Fineman claims that the year 1950 was a ‘revolution’ in Thai diplomacy towards pro-American 
alignment and anticommunism. This thesis argues differently that it was merely a ‘prelude to revolution’, rather than 
a revolution in itself. This period brought about a transition toward what can be called a ‘Cold War discursive 
hegemony’ in the 1960s (specifically, the period after the Sarit coup in 1958 through to 1968). See, Daniel Fineman, 
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his second coup in 1958, Sarit abruptly ended his ‘democratic’ experiment in Thailand, and was 
strongly committed to anticommunist discourse.   
In sum, the term ‘anticommunism’ was introduced much earlier to Thai political discourse 
when the Thai monarchy attempted to discredit radical discourses. It served as a political tool to 
battle domestic political opponents and to justify the political status quo. The demonization of 
Communism was done even before the existence of Thai Communists. Anticommunism was by 
and large repressive in the sense that Thai governments fought those alleged Communists. 
However, without any genuine Communists, they did not and could not produce the new subjects 
of politically committed anticommunists in the country.   
 
2.2.2. Anticommunism as a Hegemonic Knowledge (1958-1968)  
This section examines the descent and emergence of anticommunist discourse during the Sarit and 
Thanom administrations. Since 1958, anticommunism began to be the dominant knowledge. In 
turn, the new subject positions of anticommunists, such as the military elites and civilian 
conservatives, were socially constructed. By then, anticommunists emerged only when individuals 
strongly committed to this hegemonic discourse of anticommunism and defended it to a hilt. 
Thailand’s close alignment with the US and its involvement in the Vietnam War further deepened 
this discourse.     
After his return from medical treatment at Walter Reed Military Hospital in Washington 
D.C., Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) launched a second coup in 1958. He then assumed 
absolute power domestically.35 The coup was endorsed by the King, who was considered by the 
US’ State Department as pro-Western and strongly anticommunist. Sarit cited the Communist 
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threat as one of the justifications for the coup. He often called the Communists ‘trouble-makers’, 
and ‘our worst enemy, which poses an internal as well as external danger’.36  
Discursively, Communism was demonized as a menace in Thai politics.37 Sarit himself 
rendered it a ‘dirty plague’. 38  Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman (1958-1971) pathologized 
Communism as ‘spring fevers, call it red or pink’, or ‘Asian flu’. By so doing, he used the analogy 
of a ‘doctor’ that tried to cure this ‘rather vicious virus’: ‘I am glad that one of our doctors has said 
that the Thais are perhaps the most immune people from the Asian flu, and I wish that I can apply 
our immunity to that kind of Asian flu’.39 As Thanat put it, 
 
We are not going to allow the Asian flu to affect us, in the sense that the students in Paris, 
or Rome, not to speak of Berkeley or Michigan, who are less immune than we are, and who 
have been affected by what they euphemistically call the Cultural Revolution. How can 
you conceive that the Cultural Revolution can spread from the Empire of the Middle 
Kingdom [China] to the confines of Europe and America? And how the influence of the 
Cultural Revolution has surpassed us and bypassed us to go directly to Paris, or to 
California or to New York, it is beyond my conception. But that is the kind of things that 
we have to face and perhaps because we keep our eyes firmly on the horizon, scrutinizing 
openings for future settlement, and keeping our feet firmly on the ground we can escape 
the nefarious effects of those viruses. We can keep our minds, our hearts and our bodies 
healthy.40   
 
For him, ‘we are sick of Communist imperialism’. And ‘if anyone were to think that the 
Communists have abandoned the scheme of world domination, he is not of the sane mind’.41 The 
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specter of Communism was then metaphorically framed as a medical problem that required a series 
of therapeutic interventions. That was the pathologization of the other – the foreign body perceived 
to threaten the body politic. To deal with this ‘Communist’ flu or virus, said Thanat, ‘there is no 
alternative! We prefer to spend money and keep the Communist out rather than have the 
Communists in’. Thailand fought the ‘war against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia’ in 
order to ‘eradicate the Communist terrorists’.42   
Sarit believed that Thailand needed a stable military regime in order to simultaneously 
suppress Communism and attract foreign investment. Upon his consolidation of power, he 
dissolved the National Assembly, closed down many newspapers which were accused of 
supporting Communist activities, and banned political organizations and labor unions. The Sarit 
government also arrested Communist suspects and those who were labeled as Communist 
sympathizers, many of whom included political opponents, journalists, writers, and political 
activists.43 In particular, Sarit considered Chinese immigrants as a major source of Communist 
infiltration. In May 1959, for instance, his government restricted Chinese immigration in order to 
curb the domestic Communist insurgency. It also arrested a group of Thai actors who went to 
Beijing. They were charged with being involved in Communist activities. Four of them were 
accused of being Communist leaders, and executed by the special powers under Article No. 17.44 
Henceforth, the military regime took a strong anticommunist policy.   
Deeply embedded in anticommunist discourse, Sarit’s foreign policy was a major shift 
from Phibun’s. He abruptly ended the latter’s attempted strategy of neutrality and accommodation 
with the PRC. For Sarit, neutrality or non-alignment was vulnerable to the Communist threat. 
Foreign Minister Thanat said, in retrospect, that the idea of non-alignment became a ‘bankrupt 
concept’ because the Communists were ‘not willing to uphold the original concept of peaceful 
coexistence’, which was ‘a necessary premise or a necessary foundation for the policy of non-
alignment’.45 By 1958, the spirit of Bandung faded away and Thai state actors advocated a close 
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alliance with the US. Thanat justified the necessity of ‘protective umbrella’ by claiming that there 
‘are only two umbrellas in the world, either the Soviet or American umbrella. We cannot hope to 
have the Soviet umbrella. So we shall have to use the only one available, the American umbrella’.46  
Sarit’s foreign policy was based on the following characteristics. First, it strengthened 
Thai-US relations. The year 1958 marked a historical watershed because it restored and 
consolidated the Thai-US special relationship. As Fineman has put it, in 1958 ‘the question was 
whether the Americans would stand firmly behind the democratic process or selectively intervene 
on behalf of the elected government’s opponents. They chose the latter, and democracy paid the 
price’. ‘The Americans had not embraced military dictatorship in Thailand in 1958 because they 
had no other choice’.47 Rather, the Americans enthusiastically embraced military authoritarianism 
because it aligned with their strategic interests. This was the foundation of the so-called ‘special 
relationship’ between Thailand and the US throughout the Cold War. Both countries were 
intimately interdependent. While, on the one hand, Thai military stability and survival largely 
relied on American military and economic aid, the US, on the other hand, depended on Thailand’s 
congenially strong, stable, and pro-American military regime. This was not a coincidence, but a 
mutual construction. However, this alliance was a ‘tragedy’ for Thai democratization.48        
For Thailand, an alliance with the US was rooted in a number of assumptions: such as their 
shared belief in the domino theory; the US commitment to defend Thailand from Communism; 
and US military assistance and aid in supporting counterinsurgency warfare. The US started to 
develop air bases and military facilities, thereby using Thailand as forward defense stations in the 
region. 49  Sarit’s pro-American strategy was a pretext for an ever-closer alliance during the 
Vietnam War in the 1960s.    
Second, the Sarit regime reaffirmed Thailand’s commitment to SEATO. However, the 
alliance was significantly tested during the deteriorating situation in Laos in 1960-1962. The crisis 
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began when the right-wing government, led by Phoumi Nosavan, who was also Sarit’s cousin, was 
overthrown by the Communist forces, or the Pathet Lao, in August 1960. The Sarit government 
expressed his dissatisfaction with SEATO and the US government, which were reluctant to use 
military force to support the anticommunist factions. Sarit reportedly began to negotiate with the 
Soviet Ambassador on trade and cultural exchanges as a bargaining tool vis-à-vis the US.50 Sarit 
even threatened to withdraw from SEATO before President John F. Kennedy agreed to promulgate 
the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communiqué in March 1962. The communiqué was aimed to reaffirm the 
US military commitment to Thailand. It stated that the US would protect Thailand from 
‘Communist aggression and subversion’ by giving full support under ‘its constitutional process’.51  
While the Thanat-Rusk Communiqué was in fact a ‘bilateralization of SEATO’ without 
any clear substance52, the military regime viewed it as a significant assurance. After that, the US 
supplied Phoumi’s right-wing troops and trained the indigenous Hmong tribes under Vang Pao. 
Since May 1962, the US ordered a carrier task force of the 7th Fleet into the Gulf of Thailand, and 
deployed 5,000 US troops, US jet bombers and 1,800 US marines in Thailand.53    
The crisis in Laos obviously indicated a divergence of perceptions and strategies between 
Thailand and the US.54 First, the Laotian crisis was perceived as an immediate threat to Thailand. 
If the Phoumi’s faction in Laos collapsed, Thailand would become a ‘frontline state’. In turn, Laos 
would provide a support base for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Furthermore, the Thai 
military advocated a forward defense strategy, by fighting outside the country. As Field Marshal 
Thanom Kittikachorn later explained, ‘It is better for Thailand to fight the enemy away from home 
than wait for him to arrive at one’s door.’55    
The third characteristic of Sarit’s foreign policy was its antagonism towards the Soviet 
Union and the PRC. On the one hand, the Sarit government continued to be skeptical of Soviet 
activities in Bangkok. In 1959, it declared the Soviet attaché, persona non-grata, and expelled a 
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Tass newsman. However, Sarit also used the ‘Soviet’ card as leverage with the Americans when 
Thai-US relations turned sour. During the Laotian crisis, he talked about the possibility of trade 
relations with the Russians, and even exchanged formal Trade Notes.56 Yet, it did not come to any 
concrete outcomes.    
On the other hand, Sarit terminated Phibun’s initial accommodation with China. He 
proclaimed the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 in 1959, which banned trade with China. Sarit 
also strengthened the Anticommunist Act, thereby pursuing a repressive crackdown upon domestic 
Communist insurgents, or even Communist sympathizers.57  
His anticommunist and anti-Beijing policies were affirmed by a reversal of the PRC’s 
stance in 1957-1958, and the increasingly proactive role of the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT). By the end of 1957, Beijing resumed a militant, aggressive international policy. It increased 
the level of Chinese anti-Thai propaganda. In 1962, with Chinese support, the Voice of the People 
of Thailand (VOPT) began to operate from Yunnan in Southern China.  
In addition, the CPT began to undertake a clandestine insurgency in rural Thailand. In 
1960, it proclaimed that ‘for Thailand there can never be any peaceful path, but only the way of 
armed struggle’.58 In 1962, CPT’s ‘Prediction for BE2505’ was distributed in Thailand, calling for 
an establishment of a united front in order to oust the US and overthrow the Sarit military regime.59 
For the Thai military, these changes precipitated an actual threat of Communist insurgency in 
Thailand, which was supported and funded by foreign Communists, especially the Chinese.    
Fourth, Sarit pursued an American model of socio-economic ‘development’ in order to 
gain foreign investment and to fight Communism. Sarit thus rescinded Phibun’s economic 
nationalism and resuscitated liberalization. Shortly after the coup, his government initiated the 
Revolutionary Proclamation No. 11 as a plan to modernize the country, and Revolutionary 
Proclamation No. 33 to implement liberalism as economic policy. Sarit subsequently set up the 
National Economic Council in July 1959, and launched the first Six-Year National Economic 
Development Plan (1961-1966) in October 1960. He also cancelled the import tax for all 
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machinery for five years, which was put in the Investment Promotion Act of 1962. In turn, the US 
increasingly provided Thailand with more economic aid. Most of them were used for military 
objectives, such as building the 450-mile Friendship Highway between Bangkok and Nong Khai 
near Laos.60  In other words, by adopting the concept of ‘development’ (karn pattana), Sarit 
promoted capitalism in Thailand.   
Fifth, in the foreign policymaking process, Sarit monopolized power within the military 
group and thereby marginalized the roles of civilians in particular in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Although he appointed a civilian, Thanat Khoman, as Foreign Minister, Thanat’s role was 
relatively marginal.61            
In brief, the military regime of Sarit oversaw a major transformation in Thai politics and 
foreign affairs. His regime committed Thailand to an authoritarian road and a close alliance with 
the US. Most importantly, it established the discourse of anticommunism, and unlike his 
predecessors linked the ideology inextricably with both Thai nationalism and royalism. By 1958, 
the Cold War discursive hegemony, including discourses of Americanism, anticommunism, and 
antagonism with Communist powers, was fully established and implemented in Thailand. 
  
After Sarit’s death in December 1963, his successor, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, 
continued the anticommunist discourse. By that time, Thailand perceived the Communists, 
particularly the Chinese and North Vietnamese, as genuine ‘threats’ to national security. As Arne 
Kislenko put it, Thanom ‘was profoundly anticommunist, believing firmly that the threat [Beijing] 
and Hanoi posed to Thailand was real, immediate, and unyielding. Trying to accommodate 
Communism was useless, and so too was a return to a more neutral foreign policy’.62    
While the nature of their relationship was unequal, Thailand and the US were increasingly 
dependent upon each other. Thanom envisioned the US as the guarantor of Thai security. The 
Tonkin Incident in 1964, which led to direct American involvement and escalation in the Vietnam 
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War, made Thailand an invaluable anticommunist ally, or an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’. 63 
Benedict Anderson called this period the ‘American Era’ of Thai history.64  
After stepping up the air war (in late 1964) and ground war (in July 1965) against Hanoi, 
the US government under President Lyndon Johnson let the Thais to believe that the US would 
make a strong military commitment to protect Thai security and independence. Both countries 
concluded a secret military agreement, called the Contingency Plan of 1964 and from then, the 
Thanom government permitted the US to deploy its troops in the country, allowing for covert 
operations throughout Indochina to steadily expand, including the so-called ‘secret war’ in Laos.65 
In order to support the bombing of North Vietnam, Thailand allowed the US access to strategic air 
bases across the country. American airplanes flew out of Thai bases, with 25,000 bombing flights 
in 1965, 79,000 in 1966, and 108,000 in 1967. Until 1967, the Thai government publicly denied 
that the Americans bombed North Vietnam from Thai air bases.66 In 1967, both governments 
signed the Joint Use and Air Defense Operations Agreement. In return, the US increased economic 
and military aid to the Thai military government. It provided the Thai army with military hardware 
and advisors, while developing security programs, and launching counterinsurgency programs at 
the village level. Thailand also became R&R (Rest and Recreation) center for the US personnel in 
the region.   
Thailand’s increasing involvement in Vietnam had some of the following characteristics. 
First, the Thai military firmly monopolized Thai foreign and security policymaking decisions. This 
marked the waning power of Foreign Minister Thanat and the MFA, which were almost entirely 
excluded from the country’s foreign policy.   
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Second, with the exception of U-Tapao Air Base and Ramasun Radio Station, the stationing 
of US forces in Thailand was dealt with on an informal basis, with no written agreements. This 
was to avoid Congressional investigations for the US and difficult questions regarding sovereignty 
for the Thais.  
Third, Thailand’s close alignment with the US increased Communist activities inside the 
country. In fact, the first official attack by the Communist insurgents on Thai military forces in the 
rural areas only occurred in 1965.67 That is, anticommunist, counterinsurgency programs began 
long before there was any serious Communist threat in Thailand.  
Fourth, Thailand’s involvement with the Vietnam War weakened its foreign relations with 
the Communist powers. In 1965, the Soviet Union denounced Thailand’s pro-Americanism. When 
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Hanoi in January 1965, he pledged to provide military aid 
and supplies to North Vietnam. Thai-Soviet relations further worsened and when the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in August 1967, the Soviet Union 
complained about the anticommunist nature of the organization.68  
Also, since 1965, the PRC responded to the expanding influence of the US in the region, 
including Thailand, by providing direct support to the CPT and repeatedly attacking the Thai 
military government. It called on the CPT to step up its armed struggle to overthrow ‘the 
reactionary Thanom government’. In 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, allegedly 
declared the ‘hope to have a guerilla war going in Thailand before the year is out’.69 Likewise, 
Liao Chengzhi, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, announced that Beijing 
had ‘unshirkable obligations’ to support ‘the struggles of the people’ of Thailand.70 The revival of 
Communist insurgency, with Chinese sponsorship, alarmed the Thai military. In December 1965, 
the Thai government, with American assistance, established the Communist Suppression 
Operations Command (CSOC) in order to oversee and coordinate anticommunist activities among 
different agencies.71  
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Fifth, Thailand at first provided military facilities for the US in the Vietnam War, then sent 
its own special forces to fight in Vietnam. This was in exchange for a huge amount of military 
assistance. The first unit deployed to Vietnam in the late 1960s was the Royal Thai Army 
Volunteer Force, or the so-called ‘Black Panthers’, consisting of 11,000 troops.72  
Sixth, a vested interest in the US military presence grew among the higher echelons of the 
military elite, who became caught up in the intricate web of corruption. Their mutual demands and 
expectations from each other also rose.   
Lastly, as the Vietnam quagmire worsened and antiwar students and popular movements 
across the world, including in Thailand, emerged. The promulgation of the February 1968 election 
and the return to a parliamentary system meant that Thai foreign and security policy was opened 
to more public scrutiny.73    
Thus, by the 1960s, the discourse of anticommunism was arguably more deeply embedded 
in Thai politics and foreign affairs, inseparable from both pro-Americanism and antagonism with 
the Communist powers.  
However, the Tet Offensive, when South Vietnam was surprisingly attacked by the North 
Vietnamese forces on the Vietnamese New Year in January 1968, led to new pressure in American 
politics. President Johnson declared he would not stand in the next election, and began to negotiate 
an end to the war. Subsequently, he halted the air bombings in Vietnam. Thailand had not been 
given any prior warning of this announcement, which infuriated many Thai leaders. Foreign 
Minister Thanat said that he did not fear ‘the cessation of the bombing’ itself, but ‘the cessation of 
the hostilities’. For him, Thailand was ‘not opposed to the halting of the bombing of North Vietnam 
as such. But we would oppose the cessation of the bombing if it were to put the aggressive side in 
a position that will help them strike at us, at our soldiers, at our people, at the people in Vietnam, 
at the American and South Vietnamese soldiers who are fighting so bravely and also the Thai 
soldiers in South Vietnam’.74 It was this shifting American policy that provided the opportunity 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Thanat Khoman to conduct a more flexible diplomacy.         
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2.3. Conclusion  
This chapter has traced a genealogy of the anticommunist discourse within the discursive context 
of Thai diplomacy. Although anticommunism was spoken throughout diplomatic history, it 
became a hegemonic narrative only in the late 1950s. Thai governments under Sarit and Thanom, 
along with a military elite, became strongly attached to the anticommunist discourse and a pro-
American stance during the Vietnam War. The identities of the military and conservatives were 
constructed as staunch anticommunists. The Communists were discursively denounced and 
demonized as imminent ‘threats’ and Thailand’s foreign relations with the USSR and the PRC 
became mutually antagonistic. In general, Thai diplomacy in the Cold War was neither flexible 
nor bending-with-the-wind at all. Rather, it was rigid and confrontational. This only began to 
change in the late 1960s as a consequence of an emergent discursive struggle. It was this struggle 




Bending before the Wind: 
The Emergence of ‘Flexible Diplomacy’ (1968-1969) 
 
‘We claim we have been practicing the Nixon Doctrine [of self-reliance] even before it was 
announced’. – Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister1 
 
If the year 1968 was an annus horribilis for the discourse of anticommunism, it was also an annus 
mirabilis for Thai détente. The anticommunist discourse was severely questioned by the prospect 
of American retrenchment from the region following the Tet Offensive, when the North 
Vietnamese forces launched surprise attacks against South Vietnam on January 30. This raised 
discursive anxiety for Thailand’s security and diplomacy. The former Cold Warrior and long-
serving Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, began to see the changing international dynamism, 
thereby initiating the concept of ‘flexible diplomacy’ to meet the anxiety. At first, this concept 
comprises three main characteristics: anti-Americanism, regionalism, and détente with the 
Communist powers. By the end of 1968, flexible diplomacy and détente were used 
interchangeably. This chapter argues that in contrast to the existing literature, Thailand’s changing 
discourse occurred even before the Nixon Doctrine. We can say that Thailand was bending before 
the wind.  
This chapter begins with the discursive descent of flexible diplomacy by closely analyzing 
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman’s speeches between 1968 and 1969. It then examines a change 
in institutional practices within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which can be represented in the 
training programs of the newly established Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs 
(DVIFA). Both discursive and non-discursive practices rendered the formation of détente 




                                                          
1 ‘FM: We back China’s entry’, Bangkok Post, 18 September 1971.  
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3.1. Discursive Practices: Discourse of ‘Flexible Diplomacy’   
The Nixon Doctrine is often posited as an important milestone in prominent narratives of the 
changing trajectory of Thai foreign policy.2 On July 25, 1969, the newly elected US president, 
Richard M. Nixon, declared the Nixon Doctrine while visiting Guam, signaling the American 
retreat from Vietnam under the rubric of Vietnamization and the prospect of demilitarization from 
the region, including Thailand.3 The possibility of US retrenchment strategy aroused a growing 
state of anxiety among the Thai political elite, regarding the security arrangement with the US, and 
Thailand’s national survival amid the prospect of a Communist takeover of Indochina. However, 
while Thailand’s decision to establish relations with the Communist powers undoubtedly followed 
a transformation of US foreign policy, it was not directly caused or influenced by the US. In fact, 
the discourses and practices of détente preceded the American decision to demilitarize and 
deescalate the Vietnam War.4 In other words, Thailand was bending before the wind.     
 The new course began shortly after President Lyndon Johnson’s dramatic reversal of his 
Vietnam policy in March 1968. After the Tet Offensive, Johnson ordered a halt to the surgical 
bombing of Indochina, and began peace talks with the North Vietnamese. By that time, Thanat 
Khoman, Thailand’s long-serving and astute foreign minister since 1958, and other like-minded 
diplomats, began to realize that Thailand’s former diplomacy of strategic dependence on the US 
was no longer tenable. He declared that ‘The United States has tried to raise doubts in our minds 
and it has succeeded. It has succeeded in raising doubts in its own mind.’5 Thanat sought to find 
Thailand’s own response to the changing international and regional circumstance. The Thai 
Foreign Ministry decided to reconsider the situation as ‘the old era passes and the new one comes’.6 
By 1968, Thanat started to call for a reduction of the US military presence in Thailand, and more 
nuanced and more balanced relations with other great powers, particularly the Soviet Union and 
the PRC. He proposed a so-called ‘flexible diplomacy’.  
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3 See J. L. S. Girling, ‘The Guam Doctrine’, International Affairs, Vol. 46: No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 48-62.    
4 Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985, p. 136; Leszek Buszynski, ‘Thailand: 
The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 22: No. 11 (November 1982): pp. 1037-1055. 
5 Press release No. 52, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, New York, 8 July 1968. Quoted in 
Frank C. Darling, ‘Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty’, Asian Survey, Vol. 9: No. 2 (February 1969): p. 115.  
6 ‘Thanat Khoman’s Speech at Thammasat University’, July 1969, in China and Thailand, 1949-1983, ed. R. K. Jain 




3.1.1. Thanat Khoman’s Foreign Policy Options 
Since 1968, a genealogy of flexible diplomacy situated Thailand in a rapidly changing world which 
can be treated as the beginning of paradigmatic rupture in its foreign policy. Thanat Khoman was 
a leading voice in this newly emerging discourse of ‘flexible diplomacy’. While, in 1968, there 
remained a great ambiguity about the role of the US in Southeast Asia, Thanat began to reassess 
policy options in case of American retrenchment. He came up with five possible options: non-
alignment, bandwagoning, neutralization, bi-polarization, and regional cooperation.  
The first option was non-alignment or non-involvement. For Thanat, a ‘policy of not being 
involved with one side or another’ was ‘not very easy’, and ‘not a cure all, it is not even a safe 
device, because those who chose to follow a non-aligned policy have been the first to be subject 
to attacks and also to threatening dangers’. In his historical understanding, those non-aligned 
countries were ‘those who suffered most’ from their non-alignment strategy.7 This was because 
the great powers were ‘not willing to recognize that you are in the middle and that they should 
come to trample upon you’. According to Thanat, the non-aligned countries were ‘under boots, 
under the threat, under the guns, or right in the middle of the danger’. They were ‘right in the firing 
line.’8 As such, for Thanat non-alignment policy was not a suitable option.    
The second option was bandwagoning meaning a policy of coming to terms with the 
sources of danger themselves: in this case the PRC. In Thanat’s words, this option was to ‘win 
their favors’ and while equivalent to détente, Thanat at the time did not see it as such. In relation 
to this course of action, he questioned why we should ‘shun from going straight to the sources of 
danger and try to reason with, argue with them, and to come to terms with them.’ According to 
Thanat, while this offered a practical solution, from his recent experience, it was not yet possible. 
As a small state, he puzzled, ‘who are we … to dare to go direct to the source of danger? What 
result can we expect from having direct discussion, heart to heart discussions, and try to come to 
                                                          
7 Thanat Khoman, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club of Thailand’, Bangkok, 28 August 1968, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 2, 1968 (Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 250. 
8 Thanat Khoman, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club of Thailand’, Bangkok, 28 August 1968, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 2, 1968 (Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 250. 
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terms with the possible source of danger.’ For the time being, this option was not viable. However, 
Thanat still kept this policy option open for the future. As he succinctly asserted,  
 
We do not lose hope. If tomorrow, there are straws in the wind, and if the wind begins to 
blow and if the straws begin to fly we may decide to go directly and face the dangers, and 
try to talk and see what is going to happen. But so far there has been no indication. … 
There have been no straws and no winds.9 
 
As a result, Thanat concluded, ‘I don’t expect that in the case of Thailand, we can produce the 
straws and make the wind blow. But we keep our fingers crossed and we keep in the back of our 
mind the possibility.’10 This possibility was the option for détente with the Communist powers in 
the near future, which would be the bedrock of his flexible diplomacy.             
The third option was neutralization where the state officially declared its nonparticipation 
in any conflicts or wars. Thanat condemned certain quarters who liked to call themselves ‘liberals’ 
in the West, and suggested the policy of neutralization for those Southeast Asian nations threatened 
by Communist encroachments to ‘bow to such threats and neutralize themselves’. In an address to 
the University of Minnesota on October 22, 1968, Thanat stated that  
 
The authors of neutralization plan who do not call for similar neutralization on the part of 
the Marxist regimes, contend that the actual and potential aggressors may grant them a 
lease of free national life. The least one can say is that such a proposal is entirely one-sided 
and does not take into account the realities of life in Southeast Asia where bitter struggles 
are going on between the expansionist forces and those which staunchly resist Communist 
expansion and conquest.11     
 
For Thanat, this unilateral neutralization policy was the worst-case scenario which he ruled 
out from the outset. He said that ‘even if you join them because you cannot lick them, even if you 
join them, you are also licked. Even if you join them, you have to expect tanks, guns and troops to 
                                                          
9 Thanat Khoman, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club of Thailand’, Bangkok, 28 August 1968, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 2, 1968 (Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 251. 
10 Thanat Khoman, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club of Thailand’, Bangkok, 28 August 1968, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 2, 1968 (Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 251. 
11 ‘Address by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the University of Minnesota, USA’, 22 October 1968, in China 
and Thailand, 1949-1983, ed. R. K. Jain (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), p. 142.  
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come to your doors. So it does not solve the problems. … If you join them, you have to bow your 
heads very low, you have to follow the dogmas strictly to the letters and spirit. If you try to move 
a little bit away, you are either a revisionist or deviationist, with all the risks that accompany such 
qualifications’. Thanat admitted that, ‘Of course you can survive; for how long, you don’t know.’12     
Thus, ‘If you want to survive as free men, free nations’, contended Thanat, ‘neither of these 
solutions, non-alignment, win their favors, or even join them, will enable you to enjoy life as free 
peoples and free nations’.13 The fourth option was what Thanat termed the ‘bi-polarization’ policy, 
which was predicated upon ‘the co-existence of two centers of powers, one respecting the other 
and one allowing the other to exert its rights and influence without undue interferences. If such a 
situation is not recognized and one side even goes so far to seek the destruction of the other, such 
a proposition becomes wholly impractical.’14  
In other words, this policy of ‘bipolarization’ meant that in Southeast Asia there should be 
two poles or centers of power – namely the US and the PRC – both of which were obliged to 
recognize the rule of the game that guaranteed a peaceful coexistence among secondary or small 
states. However, for Thanat, this ‘bi-polarization’ policy ‘didn’t work, because China didn’t play 
the game’.15 Elsewhere, he contended that ‘neither a neutralization plan nor even a bi-polarization 
policy has been able to guarantee [small states] a peaceful and free existence, because some parties 
have shown themselves to be unwilling to play the game’.16      
Thanat’s fifth, and perhaps most reasonable, option – and what Thailand was ‘trying to 
perform now’ – was regional cooperation and regional solidarity in Southeast Asia.17 Thanat said 
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that Thailand was at the forefront of developing regional organizations such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which was established by the Bangkok Declaration on 
August 8, 1967 – in Southeast Asia, and also the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) in the Asia-
Pacific region in order to ‘outweigh the withdrawal of the United States from this part of the 
world’.18 Thanat suggested that ‘we are doing this to enable us to deal more effectively and more 
adequately, not only with our foes, potential and actual, but also with our friends. … We can deal 
on a more equal footing and more equal basis with our friends’. Thanat claimed that this possibility 
was ‘the practical and pragmatic policy’.19  
In his other interviews and speeches, Thanat also included the second option of détente 
with Communist powers as one of the practical and pragmatic policies as well.20 Both policies – 
regional cooperation and détente – would be mutually constitutive and inextricably intertwined. 
However, subsequently, the former was less strategically and discursively important than the latter. 
Above all, these foreign policies required for Thailand to rely on itself, and to work with other 
nations in Asia-Pacific. As he put it in December 1968,  
 
Now we in Asia do not want to rely on outside powers. We want to rely on ourselves and 
that is why Thailand for instance has been developing its own national strength in many 
fields, political, economic, social, cultural fields also. Thailand … has been making 
strenuous efforts to develop regional solidarity not only in Southeast Asia but in the Asian 
and Pacific region with Japan for instance.21  
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To put it differently, by 1968 Thanat attempted to lay out the basis for individual and regional self-
reliance, thereby replacing excessive dependence on external powers. While Thanat repeatedly 
discharged claims that this was a change in Thai foreign policy, the salience of these policy options 
was part and parcel of new discourse of flexible diplomacy from 1968 on.  
The thesis now turns to examine ‘flexible diplomacy’, a concept that Thanat coined in 
1968. At the outset, flexible diplomacy comprised three main characteristics or discourses: 
increasing doubts on Americanism, regional cooperation and cohesiveness, and détente with the 
great powers. As Thanat Khoman summarized,  
 
There are three big question marks. One is the uncertainty of the future attitude and policy 
of the US, which has been created by the Americans themselves through their mass-media, 
academic and political channels. … The second question mark was what will be the future 
policy of Communist China. And the third question mark was what we are trying to do to 
fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of western colonial powers to try to forge 
a new working relationship in order to prevent the Asian Communist powers from filling 
that vacuum with their own authority. We have had many set-backs with ASA and ASEAN. 
What will be the outcome of our efforts to create regional solidarity and cooperation. All 
these questions should be dealt with together.22    
 
3.1.2. Discourse of Anti-Americanism      
The first discourse involved increased skepticism of Americanism. Thanat began to identify the 
danger of being drawn into a highly dependent relationship with a single world power. An architect 
of the Thai-US security alliance in the 1960s, he admitted later that he had believed ‘the US 
presence was beneficial’. The objectives of the US and Thailand were aligned during the Vietnam 
War. That is, containing communism. Thanat said that he had advocated ‘close cooperation with 
the United States because our objectives were similar. I did not want, and still do not want, 
Thailand to be swamped by Communism’. But in 1968, for Thanat, ‘the United States, for domestic 
reasons, was no longer able to pursue that objective. … It became obvious that the objective to 
resist [the Communists], under which Thailand had joined with the United States, was no longer 
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there. The objective was changed on the part of the US. It was not we who changed; it was the US 
that changed. I felt that the presence of American forces in Thailand had lost its justification’.23      
In early March 1968, Thanat responded to possible US disengagement or withdrawal from 
Vietnam and the region with irritation. ‘Some people in the United States are advocating that the 
United States should get out’, he exclaimed, ‘I think those people, who talk so loudly about 
withdrawal, are not quite realistic’.24 He said that ‘the recent experience that we have got from our 
friends … opened our eyes. … We here in Thailand, and I should say in Asia in general, have been 
rather innocent and naïve. We have had a rather simple or simpleton approach that peoples are 
either friends or foes. That is not so. There may be foes among our friends’, by which Thanat 
meant some senators and congressmen as well as various media.25      
Furthermore, between 1968 and 1969, Thanat emphatically complained that the prospect 
of American retrenchment from Southeast Asia was not compatible with the image, status, prestige 
and responsibility of the US as a superpower. For him, this would inevitably lead to an erosion of 
American power and credibility, both in Southeast Asia and in the international system in general. 
First and foremost the effects would be directly felt by the United States itself. In August 1968, he 
argued that the  
 
US remains a great power. But if the domestic public opinion in the United States should 
force the administration to forsake its responsibilities in other parts of the world, then of 
course the effects will be felt by none other than the United States itself, and the American 
people. Because then, the US will not be able to perform the role of a great power. Because 
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if you are a great power, whether you like it or not, you will have to bear certain 
responsibilities. You cannot shake off your responsibilities and remain a great power or 
otherwise your influence, image, your presence will be eroded.26  
 
On another day, he again stressed the requirements of great power responsibility: ‘As a leading 
power in the non-Communist camp, if the United States were to say well, alright, we decided to 
retrench ourselves and recoil into our own hell, in “our fortress America”, the major effect will be 
felt by the United States and by the American nation, even more than by the rest of the world. … 
If that were to be the case, then the United States will have relinquished its role as a major power, 
a world power, to become only a regional power.’ He asked, ‘Would that be advantageous or 
disadvantageous to the United States position as a world power?’27       
Even after Richard Nixon won the presidential election, Thanat ostensibly warned the 
degenerating effects of ‘neo-isolationism’ in the US. In December 1968, for example, he stated 
empathetically: ‘… a world power like the United States in my opinion can afford to isolate itself 
only if it renounces its role as a world power. I don’t think a world power can retreat into Fortress 
America.’28  Although he had discerned that the Nixon administration would reduce military 
involvement in Vietnam, Thanat still wanted to believe that the reduction would be gradual. In his 
opinion, ‘American troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam in proper time. The question is 
to withdraw them in a gradual and appropriate way and not in a sudden massive pull-out because 
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then all the efforts and sacrifice which have been made for many years with the cost of so much 
money and so many lives may be lost’.29    
Subsequently, Thanat suggested that Thailand could no longer rely on America’s 
protecting presence, and should pursue self-reliance. In his speech on Tokyo television on 
February 25, 1969, Thanat said ‘there must be a recognition and perhaps acknowledgement of the 
fact that the intervention of outside powers in dealing with Asian problems may not be the most 
effective nor the most desirable device for their settlement. Either those powers may become tired 
of the exacting ordeals or their domestic public opinion may find the burden of responsibility too 
heavy for their taste. … We would do well, therefore, to acknowledge this new mood and prepare 
ourselves accordingly’. 30  In July 1969, Thanat relayed the same concept of self-reliance at 
Thammasat University:  
 
Thailand must consider the situation as the old era passes and the new one comes and above 
all we must strengthen ourselves to meet possible dangers from all sides. For with the 
possibility that the US would withdraw from the region, we must not continue to rely on 
others. We should be as self-reliant as we can. However, we must cooperate with all nations 
on an equal basis and status.31  
 
In light talk of American disengagement, put forward in the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, 
Thanat stressed a policy of self-reliance and the need for an American military withdrawal. He 
said ‘Thailand has been practicing this policy of self-reliance for many years already’.32 When 
President Nixon visited Bangkok after his famous declaration of the Nixon Doctrine at Guam on 
July 28, 1969, he reassured the Thai government of America’s commitment to protect Thailand’s 
security, as promised in the SEATO obligation (1954) and the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communiqué of 
1962:  
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We will honor our obligations under that treaty. We will honor them not simply because 
we have to, because of the words that we have signed, but because we believe in those 
words, and particularly believe in them in association with a proud and a strong people, the 
people of Thailand. We have been together in the past, we are together in the present, and 
the United States will stand proudly with Thailand against those threaten it from abroad, 
or from within.33     
 
In response to Nixon’s pledge, which was seemingly contradictory to the Guam Doctrine, 
Thanat proclaimed ‘We told President Nixon that Thailand is not going to be another Vietnam. 
We told him that we never asked for American soldiers to come and fight in defense of Thailand. 
We pledged that we will not ask for American soldiers to come and fight in defense of Thailand 
in an insurgent war. This includes even a covert invasion of the kind North Vietnam is carrying 
out against South Vietnam’.34 He constantly repeated that the existence of American troops in 
Thailand were specifically intended for strategic reasons to do with the Vietnam War, rather than 
to a local fight against Communist insurgencies in Thailand.35      
Thanat, first of all, had raised doubts about the US’s commitment to Thailand. As he told 
members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand on August 19, 1969,  
 
The partners to the Treaty will carry out that treaty obligation only if their national interests 
are concordant with us, but not otherwise. There are many escape clauses, called by such 
names as “constitutional processes” and so on and so forth. So, we believe that we can rely 
on ourselves, and only when our national interests are concordant with the national interests 
of others can we expect other nations to carry out, to implement, their obligation, not 
otherwise.36  
 
On the contrary, ‘Relations between Thailand and the United States’, Thanat suggested, ‘will 
evolve toward a more selective basis’.37  
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Secondly, Thanat began to press for the pullout of American forces. On August 20, 1969, 
he formally proposed to American Ambassador Leonard Unger that the process of ‘immediate 
evacuation’ of 49,000 US military personnel stationed in Thailand had to commence.38 Two days 
later, he announced that negotiations on American withdrawal would start soon. This idea was not 
so appealing to the military elites who did not want US troops to leave the country, and felt that 
the security of the regime was inextricably linked to the US military presence. The military 
government led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn disagreed with the urgency of the issue, 
and instead suggested a mutually agreed ‘gradual reduction’. On August 25, Prime Minister 
Thanom said that the discussions had not yet got under way: ‘a mutual agreement must be reached 
first’. The next day, a joint Thai-American statement stated that ‘talks to arrange for a gradual 
reduction of level of United States forces in Thailand consistent with the assessment of both 
governments of the security situation would be held in the near future.39 On September 3, Thailand 
and the US began a series of bilateral negotiations, led by Thai foreign minister Thanat and US 
Ambassador Leonard Unger, to discuss this gradual reduction of US troops in Thailand. During 
the talks, Thanat pulled back from his initial position towards a more gradualist position.  
By September 8, Thanat declared that the Thai government was ‘willing to discuss the 
prolongation of the presence of US forces in Thailand as desired by the US government’.40 The 
first pullout of troops, which was essentially a symbolic gesture, was proclaimed on September 
30, 1969 stating that 6,000 US military personnel were to be withdrawn from Thailand by July 
1970. They were to be pulled out ‘as expeditiously as possible consistent with the operational 
requirements related to the Vietnam conflict’. 41  Nevertheless, there was no mention of any 
schedule for the withdrawal of the remaining 42,000 American forces. Another 10,000 were 
withdrawn the following year, reducing the total US forces in Thailand to 32,000 by June 1971.   
While the Thai military elites attached to the Cold War discursive hegemony preferred the 
preponderance of American troops in Thailand, in retrospect Thanat consistently pushed for the 
withdrawal of American military forces from Thailand. As he summed up, the Thailand-initiated 
withdrawal program for the American forces had ‘improved Thailand’s position and given 
Thailand greater freedom in the conduct of its foreign policy for its own national interests and the 
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interests of the region’.42 By 1968, the discourse of skepticism of Americanism, or even anti-
Americanism, was widening and deepening in Thai politics.      
 
3.1.3. Discourse of Regional Cooperation  
The second discourse was regional cooperation and cohesiveness. From 1968, Thanat proposed 
that if the US were to withdraw from the region, a power vacuum would open up. In addition to 
the policy of national self-reliance, he forcefully recommended regional cooperation, solidarity 
and cohesiveness as an attempt to avoid any contending powers to fill the strategic gap or seek 
their own domination in the region. As he stated on television in December 1968, ‘this is why 
Thailand has been in the forefront in advocating greater cooperative efforts among the nations of 
this area, to work together, to think together, to join together in common endeavors, to preserve 
peace and to safeguard our national and regional interests in this part of the world’.43 In other 
words, efforts to build such regional groupings as ASEAN and ASPAC were meant to ‘outweigh 
the withdrawal of the United States’ from Southeast Asia. As he pointed out, ‘whether the US stays 
around here or not, it is in our interest to develop regional cooperation’.44 To a certain extent, the 
prospect of American disengagement, according to Thanat, provided a ‘sense of urgency’ as well 
as ‘a greater sense of responsibility’ for countries in the Asian and Pacific region to shape their 
own destinies, and to protect their own security and national interests.45 The ultimate aim of 
regional cohesiveness was to obtain a negotiating position vis-à-vis the great powers. Although 
still ‘very young, very tender, very soft, and perhaps very inefficient’, a regional grouping was for 
Thanat an ‘entity of respectable size’ – with more than 200 million peoples. As he explained,  
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We are doing this to enable us to deal more effectively and more adequately, not only with 
our foes, potential and actual, but also with our friends. If one is better organized, our 
friends will respect one more. They will not trample upon your foot, step on your toes, they 
will listen to your voices and your opinions, and they will respect your interests. If you are 
separated … you do not count much. But if you are joined together, becoming a respectable 
and sizable entity in terms of population of resources, and also of prestige, then you become 
somebody. … We are doing this so that we can cope with foes and we can deal on a more 
equal footing and more equal basis with our friends.46 
 
Thus, by working together, the region could build a larger or cohesive ‘power base’ which would 
‘afford us an entity which can cooperate more closely with friendly and like-minded nations on a 
more equal footing, to ensure peace and stability in the region’.47 Due to its respectable size and 
influence, a regional grouping could also have a greater say in global politics and deal adequately 
with the great powers. For Thanat, his idea of ‘collective political defense’ was not, and could not 
be, a military organization. As he reiterated, ‘none of us in Southeast Asia can be considered a 
military power: no military potential, no industry to support a military power. Therefore, we must 
use other means than military means to shore up our positions, our independence and our security. 
The only available means are diplomatic and political ones, political consultations, political and 
economic cooperation’. ‘Anyone who has any sense’, Thanat concluded, ‘can see very well that 
ASEAN cannot and will not be turned into a military organization’.48        
  In contrast to a collective defense system like SEATO, a new regional grouping would be 
based on a system that Thanat termed ‘collective political defense’, not military, but political, 
economic, socio-cultural and technical cooperation with the neighboring countries. As Thanat 
observed,  
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I do not think that military alliance is an answer to the problems. … Because we in this 
part of the world, we are smaller nations, we have no military potential, and even if we 
were to pull together our military resources, it will not be sufficient to stop or to prevent 
military incursions by big nations like Communist China. Therefore we believe that we 
should try to deter the other side, the aggressive regimes, from taking military actions 
through political means, through building up of regional solidarity and regional 
cohesiveness rather than expecting results from military means.49 
 
Thus, from 1968 Thanat sought an alternative to the former policy of dependence on the American 
security alliance by trying to build up a non-Communist counter-weight in Southeast Asia through 
‘regional cooperation’. Nevertheless, over time, he grappled with the pertinent question of 
American retrenchment by attempting to lessen the hostility of the Communist powers, particularly 
Communist China. In March 1969, while Thanat still discerned that the PRC had aggressive 
intentions against Thailand, he was shifting the discourse of regional cooperation to help ‘induce 
Communist China to come out and work with us’. He said the PRC might even agree upon true 
peaceful coexistence.50  
Crucially, therefore, Thanat suggested détente with the Communist powers before the 
promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine. That is to say, from early 1969 the discourse of regional 
grouping was already signposting and anticipating a future détente with the Communists. In 
February 1969, he said that ‘the key to a lasting peace in Asia rests in cooperation among the non-
Communist nations. Only if we succeed in working together among the non-Communist nations 
will the Communist nations come and talk to us. The Communist nations will never agree to 
discuss and build peace unless they know that the other nations of Asia want peace and that they 
are organized to preserve and maintain it’.51 In a Times article in August 1969 titled ‘Withdrawal 
and a New Era’, Thanat wrote  
 
Thus far there has been no dialogue with and no change of heart on the part of the Asian 
Communists. Nevertheless, renewed efforts must be made to establish, at least in the initial 
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stage. Such efforts can hope to meet with success only if the Asian nations organize 
themselves in a constructive manner. They will thus be in a better position to persuade the 
Communist reactionaries to forsake war for a more productive and mutually beneficial 
collaboration.52 
   
This required ‘some readjustment’ of attitudes within Thailand to ‘envisage a further widening of 
collaboration. This would include cooperation with the Marxist regimes if they should relinquish 
their policy of expansion and domination’.53 Thus, the practical and pragmatic discourse of détente 
with the USSR and the PRC loomed larger than the far-fetched discourse of regional cohesiveness 
and solidarity.   
 
3.1.4. Discourse of Détente  
The third discourse was détente with the Communists. Between 1968 and 1969, Thanat began to 
rethink how Thailand should choose to live with the Communists. One of his policy options was 
détente with the Communists. While this was not deemed an option at the present time, he believed 
that it would be a ‘practical and pragmatic policy’ in the future. He noted that the mention of 
opening dialogue with the Soviet Union and the PRC tended to be misinterpreted as a changing 
Thai foreign policy, and perhaps a move toward a neutralist position. He contended that this was 
a ‘complete mistake’. It was ‘not inevitable that the Communist aggressors would continue to be 
aggressive’.54 Thanat suggested that Thailand should prepare a policy to deal with the Communist 
powers and that would be better if Thailand adopted a ‘practical and pragmatic policy’. In 
particular, this was ‘more flexible in its policy towards China’. To date, Thanat admitted that it 
was the Chinese who showed no desire to meet. Yet, ‘if Beijing were to show any indication that 
it is approachable, I myself would recommend my Government to sit with them, to talk with them. 
But there has been no such sign’.55 In the future, he continued, ‘when Communist China should 
come back to its senses, and would want to deal with other nations on an intelligent, reasonable 
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basis, Southeast Asia shall not and should not be caught unprepared to deal with it, to preserve 
peace and strengthen our national independence’.56           
By late 1968, Thanat had reassessed Thai foreign policy in order to deal with the 
Communist powers properly, and decided that Thailand could pursue two separate approaches. On 
the one hand, Thailand could pursue regional cohesiveness in order to establish collective 
negotiating powers vis-à-vis the Communists. On the other hand, Thanat began to contemplate a 
bilateral approach of détente with the Communists.  
On February 26, 1969, at a press conference in Tokyo, Thanat Khoman spoke of Thailand’s 
willingness to have ‘serious talks’ with the Communist countries, especially the PRC. This was 
the first time Thanat advocated the opening of an unprecedented Thai-Chinese dialogue. Though 
it was not directly aimed at paving the way for diplomatic relations, this was a ‘peace offensive’ 
towards the PRC. Thanat asserted that Thailand was not ‘anti-Communist or anti-Chinese’. The 
objective of the negotiations was to find out ‘what we can do to live in peace’. ‘To show that 
Thailand is not anti-Communist and anti-Chinese’, Thanat stressed, ‘we are prepared to sit down 
and talk – and have meaningful discussion – with Beijing to establish peaceful coexistence’.57 He 
contended that ‘Thailand wants a dialogue and expect China to respond to a dialogue’. In Bangkok, 
when he was asked by the foreign press, Thanat replied, ‘By saying that we are willing to sit down 
and meet them – enter into contact with them – we want to show that we are willing to take 
responsibility in our hands and try to deal with the problem ourselves, not depend on the other 
nations to try to solve the problem for us’.58 The Foreign Minister also reassured foreign reporters 
that Thai foreign policy was not anti-Chinese. On the contrary, it was the Chinese who were ‘anti-
Thai’, as illustrated by the alleged declaration of Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi that the PRC 
would launch a guerilla war against Thailand. Thanat said that he wanted to know what China’s 
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genuine intentions and motivations were. Indeed, for him, this was the ultimate purpose of the 
decision to come into contact with the Chinese in order to clarify exactly what they meant by 
declaring war on Thailand. ‘We want to know whether that was what they intended to do, whether 
they intend to pursue that, and what were their motivations’.59 Thanat wanted to sound out what 
possibilities there might be for peaceful coexistence between the two countries.      
Thai foreign policy towards Communism should thus become ‘more flexible’.60 In March, 
in a television interview, he strenuously urged that he was ‘willing to meet a representative of 
Beijing at any place, at any time, if such a meeting would help bring peace in Asia. It was necessary 
to draw China out of her isolation so that she could become a member of the Asian family’.61 In 
other words, by early 1969, Thanat made a public offer to meet with the representatives of the PRC 
at international venues.  
Thanat also said he would be prepared to send an emissary to Beijing, and hypothetically 
suggested that M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, a well-renowned politician and influential publisher of the 
Siam Rath newspaper, or Klaew Norapati, a key socialist member of the Parliament, might be 
suitable emissaries to Beijing. However, Kukrit abruptly dismissed the whole idea of talking with 
the PRC as utterly useless: ‘If the purpose of talking with China is to ask China questions on why 
they want to destroy Thailand, then it is a waste of time, since we clearly know the answers, that 
is, that Thailand is on the American side’.62     
 Thanat repeatedly denied any change in Thai foreign policy in the media. He said that the 
goal of foreign policy, which remained the protection of Thailand’s independence and survival, 
had never changed. However, he argued that the means to that particular end needed to be adapted 
to cope with the changing global contexts. As he put it, ‘realizing the present situation, the changes 
in world powers’ positions and policies, we had to adopt a more direct approach in our policy. It 
does not mean that we have changed our policy. Our policy remains the same. We shall never 
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depart from the principles underlying our moral and intellectual stand’. What was different now 
however was that ‘a defensive policy is no longer possible. We have no other choice but to go 
ahead and face the trouble as it comes, to go to the source and try to meet the contingencies which 
may arise.’63 In other words, Thailand had to go to ‘the source of the danger and try to argue, to 
reason with them, and to find out whether there can be any possibility for them to relent in their 
militant policies or to have peaceful co-existence and co-operation with us’.64 He termed it a more 
‘forward approach’. Suppose the Chinese government were to respond in kind, Thanat argued that 
the Thai government would not hesitate to meet with the Chinese to end the hostile situation and 
to return to ‘the status of 1954-55 when, at the Bandung Conference there was an attempt to create 
a certain sense of solidarity and peaceful co-existence’. He reaffirmed that this change is not a 
‘personal policy of the Foreign Minister but the official policy of the Government of Thailand’.65 
Asking what would happen if the Communist Chinese asked Thailand to recognize them, Thanat 
replied that ‘the question of the recognition of either Beijing or Taiwan as the legitimate 
government is not a question for outside powers to resolve but for the Chinese to resolve it 
themselves’.66 For Thanat, the main point at the moment was to find out whether there were any 
possibilities for peaceful coexistence between Thailand and the PRC. Thanat publicly proclaimed 
that Thailand was willing to talk with the Communists, by hoping that ‘in our lifetime we may see 
the change of policy from enmity to a more friendly cooperation’.67         
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 In brief, the recurring discourse of flexible diplomacy for Thailand embarking on in the 
late 1960s was how to act upon in a so-called post-American world. It sought to deal with the 
Communist powers in a more balanced and flexible diplomacy in a rapidly changing global-
regional complex. As Thanat had suggested provisionally in September 1968,  
  
What we are trying to do is to have a political cooperation not only between the countries 
of Southeast Asia but between the countries of Southeast Asia and the outside powers, like 
the US, like the Soviet Union and in the future I don’t know when, with Communist China. 
This is what we are working at. We hope that within our life time, we will be able to see a 
new basis of cooperation first between the countries of Southeast Asia, next between the 
countries of Southeast Asia and the outside world on a more equal footing than it is the 
case now.68 
   
This reappraisal of policy discourses brought about a reassessment of Thailand’s relations with the 
Communist powers in the long 1970s. While Thanat constantly said that there was no change in 
the direction of Thai foreign policy, this new course sought shifting toward diplomatic flexibility 
and resilience. This unwittingly contributed to a new discourse of flexible diplomacy or détente 
with the Communist powers.      
 
3.2. Institutional Practices: Institute of Foreign Affairs and the 
Emergence of Détente Proponents   
 
‘Old diplomats never die they give way to the young ones’. – Thanat Khoman, Foreign 
Minister69 
 
The discourse of détente also had a non-discursive, institutional dimension. This section examines 
the institutional practices of diplomatic training, through the newly established Institute of Foreign 
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Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. As one of the key site and process of subject formation, the 
Institute was central to constructing the identities of those of détente proponents in Thailand.  
In the literature, there are two broad interpretations regarding the role of the MFA. The 
first is what I call a personal(ized) politics paradigm. Many scholars tended to concur that the 
Foreign Ministry had a slightly minor institutional role and influence in foreign policy formulation 
processes throughout the Cold War. The key foreign policy decisions were made by the military 
government and the Foreign Minister himself. As the Thai political scientist Suchit Bunbongkarn 
put it, ‘foreign policy formulation has been dominated by the cabinet, particularly the Foreign 
Minister. The military, long dominating the political scene in Thailand, has also been a powerful 
force in setting the course of the country’s foreign relations. The MFA has been left to be merely 
a policy implementation mechanism of the government’. 70  Some scholars traced the 
marginalization of civilians from the foreign policymaking process to the military authoritarian 
regime of Field Marshal Phibun in the 1950s.71 However, from 1958 on, when Thanat Khoman 
was an influential and (over)confident foreign minister (1958-1971) under the Sarit and Thanom 
regimes, the MFA increasingly became his ministry. On the one hand, some scholars suggest that 
Thanat’s decision in foreign affairs, with his authoritarian style, was paramount: ‘Thanat seldom 
used the Ministry’s staff for advice and consultation before reaching his decision. Most of the 
major issues and policies were decided by Thanat himself and the Ministry’s departments 
concerned were usually asked just to provide justifications for the adopted policies’.72  
The second interpretation is a bureaucratic politics paradigm. This claims that despite his 
discreetly personalized leadership, Thanat had a small group of trustworthy and loyal diplomats, 
who acted on his behalf. 73 Thanat’s close aides included, among others, Anand Panyarachun, 
Sompong Sucharitkul, M.L. Pirapongse Kasemsri, Arsa Sarasin, Manaspas Xuto, and Pracha 
Gunakasem. With degrees from English-speaking universities, they helped draft Thanat’s policy 
statements as well as speeches. According to one study, Thanat preferred policy recommendations 
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72 Suchit Bunbongkarn, ‘The Role of Social Science in Foreign Policy Making of Thailand’, p. 118.   
73 See, for example, Asadakorn Eksaengsri, ‘Foreign Policy-Making in Thailand: ASEAN Policy, 1967-1972’, PhD 
Dissertation, the Graduate School of the State University of New York, 1980.   
82 
 
by Anand and Sompong to those of Manasapas.74 Anand, after serving as a personal aide to Thanat, 
became Thai Ambassador to Canada (1968-1971), and Ambassador to the US (1971-1974). During 
the same time, he concurrently held a position as Ambassador to the UN (1969-1973). Pirapongse 
was a gate-keeping Secretary to the Foreign Minister while Sompong was the Director-General of 
the Economic Department (1966-1970) and Thai Ambassador to the Netherlands (1970-1974).  
 Beyond these two paradigms, this chapter suggests that flexible diplomacy can be 
understood in terms of institutionalized practices and power/knowledge. In the late 1960s, 
Thanat’s Foreign Ministry established the Institute of Foreign Affairs – which was later known as 
Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs (DVIFA). Its role was to professionalize and 
depoliticize diplomats through technocratic training in lines with the newly emerged discourse of 
flexible diplomacy.75 Since then, diplomats have been trained to be ‘docile’ bodies that followed 
the rules and norms of diplomatic discourses and practices.76    
 In Thailand, diplomatic training was initially aimed at enhancing the capacity of diplomats 
in terms of knowledge, skills and competence, attitude, and appropriate manners to reckon and 
grapple with the changing international situation. At first, the training was by nature temporary 
and ad hoc. Learning was achieved by doing, or on-the-job training, as well as through an informal 
system of apprenticeship whereby senior diplomats would pass tacit knowledge to junior 
diplomats.77 In 1962, proper training began with occasional in-service training, including practice-
oriented seminars on drafting official letters (in both Thai and English languages), official rules 
and regulations, diplomatic protocols as well as other practical and tacit knowledge. There was no 
permanent curriculum. The MFA also invited former ambassadors and distinguished experts to 
give talks on various topics.78 In 1963 and 1964 it trained junior diplomats who were about to hold 
positions abroad (20 and 40 diplomats, respectively) and in 1966, it extended the program to 
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include those civil servants in other ministries who would be positioned abroad (53 in total). 
Diplomatic training continued in 1968 (for 60 third secretaries), and in 1969 (twice for new 
diplomats – 28 and 20 respectively – and one for 31 first secretaries).79                   
 The Institute of Foreign Affairs was officially founded on December 12, 1967, as part of 
the Personnel and Training Division within the MFA. It was the initiative of Thanat that diplomatic 
training should be ‘routinized and permanent’.80 His aim was to systematically and effectively 
train and educate diplomats at every level – from junior to senior. Civil servants from other 
ministries were also welcome. Five curricula were set: (1) new diplomats’ orientation curriculum; 
(2) training curriculum for junior diplomats who would hold positions abroad; (3) training 
curriculum for attachés and third secretaries; (4) training curriculum for second- and third- 
secretaries; and (5) the English training curriculum. Between 1970 and 1973, five formal training 
programs for new diplomats, totaling 209, happened annually. Additional trainings occurred twice 
in 1971.81 The Institute of Foreign Affairs was officially opened during the Foreign Ministership 
of Charunpan Isrankul na Ayuthaya on February 14, 1974, and diplomatic training has continued 
ever since.                
In general, diplomatic training involved education, seminars, formal training and 
development, coaching, mentoring, on-the-job training, and rotation. The point, to use Thanat’s 
words, was to transfer a stock of tacit knowledge, or know-how, and practices (acquired through 
experiences) from ‘old diplomats’ to ‘the young ones’. Arguably, however, the knowledge that 
diplomats, particularly Thanat and his associates, passed on to other diplomats in the MFA was 
not the old knowledge, but in fact the new emerging discourse of détente.  
Like Thanat, many of these ‘experts’ – most notably Anand Panyarachun, Sompong 
Sucharitkul, M.L. Pirapongse Kasemsri – had previously been attached to the Cold War hegemonic 
discourse, but gradually became détente proponents in the early 1970s. They changed their 
identities and subject positions, largely due to the new discourse of détente. In other words, subject 
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positions emerged only in and through practices. Anand’s speeches at the UN provided good 
examples. In November 1969, he gave a harsh statement at the UN General Assembly proclaiming 
that Communist China still maintained ‘hostile behavior and inflexible policy’, and had not given 
up its ‘aggressive proclivities and expansionist tendencies’ towards the neighboring countries in 
Southeast Asia, including Thailand.82 But his view began to change following the Chinese entry 
into the UN in 1971 (See Chapter 4) and Anand soon became one of the key figures in negotiating 
a rapprochement with the PRC. As Director-General of the Ministry’s Economic Department, 
Sompong also played a key role in concluding the trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1970.  
Outside the close circle of Thanat, others, such as Major General Chatichai Choonhavan, 
then Ambassador to Switzerland, were pro-détente. In 1971, Chatichai was asked by Thanat to go 
to Rome with him to make contact with the Chinese. Between 1972 and 1974, he became Deputy 
Foreign Minister, during which time he conducted petro-diplomacy with the Chinese. He 
subsequently served as Foreign Minister (1974-1975) during the Kukrit Pramoj government, 
overseeing the normalization of the formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese in 1975 (See 
Chapter 5). Détente proponents who shared knowledge of flexible diplomacy thus emerged in and 
through emerging diplomatic practices of détente.  
 
3.2.1. Diplomacy as Power/Knowledge 
Taking diplomacy as power/knowledge seriously addresses the shortcomings of the paradigms of 
wise and competent leaders and of bureaucratic tussles. It sheds light on power in and through 
diplomatic practices in five ways.83  
First, diplomacy as power/knowledge was socially productive and constitutive. Through 
training and exercises, it established and constituted diplomatic subject positions. Diplomacy 
individually reconfigured social agents into ‘docile’ diplomats as a part of a specific historical 
bloc/group in the diplomatic site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case, the ‘docile’ 
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diplomats produced since the late 1960s were détente proponents. Like disciplinary power, 
institutionalized diplomatic power via diplomatic training involved not only bodies but also actions 
– or their potential actions (what they can or cannot do) – as its main targets.84 This kind of power 
was individualizing power in the sense that training positively developed and harvested diplomats’ 
capacities. Diplomatic discipline led to a less centralized, but much more economical and effective 
power over individual bodies through institutional training.  
Second, diplomacy had a practical character. It positioned career diplomats as competent 
players, with a specific set of tacit knowledge and competent skills, in making sense of and dealing 
with the changing international situation. Diplomatic competence was a ‘socially recognized 
attribute’, rather than an individual attribute, whereas the struggle for competence was never-
ending and inseparable from the struggle for recognition within the diplomatic site.85 As Foucault 
put it, ‘a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’.86 
Third, diplomacy was deeply relational. Diplomatic training, either informal or formal 
forms, was a system of apprenticeship that emphasized the master-apprentice relationship. For 
Thanat, it was about the relationship between old-young diplomats. Skillful or competent 
diplomats were not reliant on individual attributes. Rather, they were competent because they were 
locally situated in a hierarchical order of the Foreign Ministry as well as immersed in the emerging 
patterns of diplomatic discourse. The practice of apprenticeship provided the condition of 
possibility for this hierarchical structure and social stratification to dominate in the MFA. This was 
a ‘sense of place’ that diplomats embody87, while a community of Thai diplomats, despite their 
heterogeneous and dispersed nature, also gradually emerged.   
Fourth, diplomatic power was effective in the sense that it installed and produced a certain 
regime of truth, namely the knowledge of flexible diplomacy. Diplomacy was sutured as a sphere 
of expertise that required a particular kind of knowledge and a particular kind of ‘expert’, namely 
trained diplomats, rather than amateurs, including military elites or politicians. This new 
knowledge of flexible diplomacy shaped the way of doing things, particularly in regard to doing 
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diplomatic practices with the Communist powers. They also legitimized the dominant roles of the 
MFA over this emerging area of expertise.              
Last but not least, diplomacy was highly political. Diplomacy as power/knowledge was 
inseparable from the struggle for authority or influence in the contestation of power. Diplomats 
sought to establish their mastery of the diplomatic game by framing particular issues as 
‘diplomatic’ ones, and positioning themselves as technocratic, professionalized and depoliticized 
‘experts’. In other words, there was a ‘diplomatization’ of political issues, which can be read as a 
depoliticization or technocratization of diplomatic issues. In this sense, the struggle for diplomatic 
competence was fundamentally the struggle for hegemony in the foreign policy making process 
and in the public spheres in general. In the end, this thesis is a study of the politics of flexible 
diplomacy.    
    
In sum, reconceptualizing flexible diplomacy as a technique of power and knowledge formation 
helps understand those diachronic changes of subject positions – from Cold Warriors toward 
détente proponents. The incremental intensification of détente practices was in turn an emergence 
of a new mode of control and surveillance in Thai diplomacy. Through diplomatic schooling, a 
group of individuals were trained to be diplomats as well as docile bodies. However, the role of 
social agents was significant and irreducible to the languages or discourses in the sense that they 
performed as well as were performed in and through diplomatic discourse. Agents with specific 
subject positions were not purely rational actors, but socially and institutionally embedded actors 
performing within the field and relationship of power. Diplomatic practices are then an 
institutionally and socially embedded way of doing things diplomatically.  
 
3.3. Conclusion  
International uncertainty, in particular the worsening situation in Vietnam and the prospect of 
American disengagement from Southeast Asia, brought about discursive anxiety within the minds 
of many Thai foreign policy makers, most notably Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman during the 
late 1960s. This chapter has examined the emergence of détente or ‘flexible diplomacy’ with the 
Communist powers, as a new pragmatic discourse in order to manage this rising anxiety. It argues 
that this discourse, which challenged the anticommunist one, predated the enunciation of the Nixon 
Doctrine. In the process, the discourse of détente, coupled with a change in institutional practices, 
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formed a new subject position in Thai politics: that of détente proponents in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and beyond. Thailand’s perceptions towards the Soviet Union and the PRC were 
incrementally transformed from ‘enemies’ to ‘friends’. The next chapter will examine the first 
episode of détente with the Soviet Union and the PRC between 1969 and 1971, and the roles of 






Flexible Diplomacy  
Thanat and the First Détente (1969-1971) 
 
4.1. 1969 as a Volte Face? 
‘Escape from a tiger only to happen upon a crocodile’ is a famous and colloquial Thai proverb. 
This is similar to the fish in Aesop’s fable that jump from the frying-pan into the fire. In 1969, 
Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, used this allegory to compare a state of discursive 
anxiety in Thailand:  
 
If you avoid a tiger [China] and come to face a crocodile [the Soviet Union], it is not 
much of a change. … If we do not have any other alternative, may be we will have to 
live with the crocodile. … This is exactly the international pattern that may emerge if 
and when the United States has to yield to the pressure of completely withdrawing from 
this part of the world … because we cannot claim that our regional grouping is powerful 
enough. … We hope that you will be understanding and that you will discreetly support 
the efforts of the nations of the area who are trying to form a cohesive grouping.1    
 
The year 1969 marked a watershed in Thai politics and diplomacy. In domestic politics, 
it was an experimental transition from authoritarianism towards (semi-)democracy. After the 
promulgation of the new Constitution in June 1968, there was a parliamentary election on 
February 10, 1969. The result did not see a total victory for the pro-military United Thai 
People’s Party (UTPP), but immediately after the election, the UTPP recruited independents 
into the Party and thereby gained a parliamentary majority. The largest opposition party was 
the Democrat Party, led by former Prime Minister M.R. Seni Pramoj.2 Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikachorn retained his position as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. His close 
associate, General Praphas Charusathien, remained Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Interior. The most prominent cabinet members included Pote Sarasin, Minister of National 
Development, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Minister of Communications, and 
Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister. While the cabinet and Parliament were still dominated by 
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the military and civilian bureaucrats, a new democracy provided for new voices, new advocacy, 
new factionalism and new criticism. Détente also became a contentious domestic political issue 
as distinct groups began to contest both whether and how to deal with the Communist powers.   
In foreign affairs, Thailand encountered the prospect of American withdrawal and 
retrenchment from the region, culminating in the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969. This was a 
serious challenge to Thailand’s hegemonic discourse of pro-Americanism and anticommunism. 
Coupled with the deterioration of the Vietnam War, the Thai Communist insurgency, supported 
by the Chinese loomed larger while the survival of the Thai state was at high stake. Many 
commentators designated Thailand ‘another Vietnam’.3 Both internal and external challenges 
brought about niggling anxieties in the Thai body politic. The greatest puzzle for Thailand was 
how to deal with these new transformations.     
A ‘Thai version of détente’ was proposed by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman as a 
thorough-going attempt to end antagonism with the Communist powers. As one put it, Thanat 
was not ‘advocating a piecemeal adjustment to pressures, but a coming-to-terms with reality’.4 
While he regarded détente and the US military presence as an either-or situation, his approach 
was rather gradualist on both issues. That is, Thanat supported a cautious step-by-step process 
of de-Americanization from Thailand while advocating a gradual road of détente with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, what Thanat aimed for 
was an independent foreign policy of détente. 
This chapter examines Thailand’s changing diplomatic practices towards the 
Communist powers between 1969 and 1971. It explicates the ways in which the discourse of 
détente worked in and through diplomatic practices. The first section discusses how the Thai 
government pursued closer trade relation with the USSR, culminating in the bilateral trade 
agreement of 1970 and air transport agreement of 1971. The second section elucidates the way 
in which Thailand attempted to contact the Chinese through back-channel diplomacy via third 
parties in order to explore possibilities of rapprochement. Thanat’s ‘hope’ – a discursive change 
of Communist powers from ‘enemies’ to ‘friends’ – was rendered possible through new 
practices of détente. The chapter concludes by highlighting the politics of discursive 
contestation in Thai foreign policy, which ended in the 1971 coup d’état.            
   
                                                          
3 See Bernard Gordon, ‘Thailand: Its Meaning for the US’, Current History, Vol. 52: No. 305 (1967), pp. 16-21, 
53-54; Kenneth Young, ‘Thailand’s Role in Southeast Asia’, Current History, Vol. 56: No. 330 (1969), pp. 94-
99, 110-111.  
4 Harvey Stockwin even envisions Thanat’s détente as an equivalent of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. See ‘Thanat’s 




4.2. Living with the ‘Crocodile’: Thai-Soviet Relations   
 
‘You know, we have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (Laughter).’ – King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej5  
 
The Soviet Union had maintained formal diplomatic relations with Thailand since March 12, 
1941, and first exchanged their ambassadors after the end of the Second World War.6 However, 
during the Cold War, the Thai state was skeptical of Soviet activities in the country. The tension 
between the two countries rose with the Laotian crisis and Vietnam War in the 1960s. Both 
countries had condemned and leveled charges against each other, leading to the notorious 
deportation of Soviet trade representative Leonid Mamurin on espionage charges in September 
1969.7 
From a Thai perspective, the Soviet Union, unlike the PRC, did not directly support 
North Vietnam and the Communist insurgency in Thailand. Therefore, the Thai government 
did not regard the USSR as a hostile state. As Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman claimed, 
Thailand was friendly with the Soviet Union because, unlike Communist China, the USSR was 
not directly engaged in any hostile acts against it.8  With the grudging approval from the 
military government of Thanom Kittikachorn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Thanat 
demonstrated a willingness to respond to Soviet involvement in the region favorably and take 
trade relations into consideration. In the early 1970s, two significant changes in Thai-Soviet 
relations occurred. First, the Soviet Union launched a diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia 
which culminated in Brezhnev’s idea of so-called ‘Collective Security System in Asia’. The 
second was increased Soviet interest in expanding trade and technical cooperation with 
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4.2.1. Brezhnev’s Collective Security in Asia: Thailand’s Views   
From 1969, the USSR increasingly ‘pivoted’ to Southeast Asia. While American power was 
retreating from the region, the Soviet Union reasserted its presence and influence. At the end 
of his speech given to the International Conference of Communist and Workers parties in 
Moscow on June 8, 1969, Leonid Brezhnev proposed the idea of ‘a system of Collective 
Security in Asia’:  
 
For us, the burning problems of the present international situations do not push into the 
background more long-range tasks, especially the creation of a system of Collective 
Security in those parts of the world where the threat of the unleashing of a new world 
war and the unleashing of armed conflicts is centered. Such a system is the best 
substitute for the existing military-political groupings … We think that the course of 
events also places on the agenda the task of creating a system of Collective Security in 
Asia.9   
 
Brezhnev’s idea was vague, if not superficial, and this inevitably triggered doubts and 
speculation about Soviet motives. Most observers tended to focus on Sino-Soviet border 
conflicts, highlighted by the clashes at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River in March 1969.10 
Brezhnev’s proposal was believed to be mainly directed toward the PRC, as described by 
Vikenty V. Matveyev (pseudonym)’s article in Izvestiya a few days before Brezhnev’s 
enunciation. The article warned of Chinese expansionist designs on some Asian countries in 
response to American retrenchment. To counter this threat, the American withdrawal ‘should 
pave the way for the laying of the foundation of collective security, in which case the countries 
that have gained their freedom would, by pooling efforts, consolidate peace and repulse all 
machinations of imperialist expansionist forces’. Matveyev pledged that the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries would be prepared ‘to contribute to every effort helping to insure firm, 
dependable peace in Asia’.11    
 In September 1969, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the UN General 
Assembly that international events in the past few years ‘proved the need for a system of 
Collective Security in Asia’: ‘Many countries in Asia are seeking possibilities to ensure peace 
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and security by collective effort’. He claimed that the Soviet Union was ‘ready to take part in 
consultation and exchanges of views on all questions concerning a Collective Security system 
in Asia’.12 Rather than clarifying the term, Gromyko merely toyed with Brezhnev’s concept at 
the UN. One scholar argues that this vague concept of a Collective Security system in Asia and 
its lack of substance was deliberately aimed at testing the waters among Asian countries, and 
eliciting ‘reactions from potential members of the “system” before going further’. In short, it 
was fundamentally a ‘club in search of members’.13    
For Thailand, Brezhnev’s idea of a Collective Security system in Asia was seen as 
Soviet preparation to move into the power vacuum in the region.14 In an interview with The 
Asia Magazine, Thanat Khoman believed that while the USSR did not explain what exactly it 
expected of the alliance, it wanted a collective defense alliance in Asia in order to protect its 
interests after the US militarily withdrew from the region, and more importantly, to contain 
Communist China. Thanat also said that Thailand was ready to consider Soviet engagement in 
Southeast Asia as part of a new balance.  
In other words, Thailand did not react unfavorably to Brezhnev’s Asian Collective 
Security proposal. As Thanat noted, ‘the Soviet Union realizes better than the West that a 
(military) vacuum would not be in its national interest because there will be some other power 
that will try to fill the gap with its own authority’. ‘Asian countries’, Thanat added, would have 
to ‘look after their own interests and see who should fill the gap when the United States 
withdraws’.15 However, he disagreed with any military alliance in Asia, partly because he 
realized that those countries in the region were not military powers or potentials. As he put it, 
‘There is no use setting up new military alliances just on paper’.16 Thanat argued that ‘if it were 
to be a threatening power which showed itself to be hostile to nations in Asia, they may find 
the Soviet move more in conformity with their interests, rather than allow that large Asian 
power to fill the gap’.17    
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However, at the time, the trouble according to Thanat was that  
 
We do not know what shape or form the so-called Soviet suggestion of an Asian 
Collective Security has. They do not want to spell it out or to elaborate on their 
suggestion. So many nations, Asian or non-Asian, have been asking this question, but 
so far we have received no elucidation. It is very vague just to throw out the idea that 
Asian nations should develop their own security.18  
 
Later, Thanat asked the Soviet Ambassador to Bangkok to elaborate on what Brezhnev had in 
mind by collective Asian security. ‘The reply that we got’, he explained, ‘was that [the Soviet 
leaders] would like to hear the reaction from Asian nations about this idea. So we said that to 
be in a position to offer a reaction, we must first know what it is all about and what we can 
expect’.19 Brezhnev did not specifically explain the project until 1972. In his address at the 
Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions in March 1972, Brezhnev asserted:    
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the real road to security in Asia is not the road of 
military blocs and groupings, not the road of opposing some states against others, but 
the road of good-neighborly cooperation by all interested states. Collective Security in 
Asia, as we see it, should be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force 
in relations among states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, 
noninterference in internal affairs, extensive development of economic and other 
cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.20 
 
By that time, his idea of a ‘Collective Security system in Asia’ was largely neglected by Asian 
countries including Thailand. However, many countries in the region started to accommodate 
the more assertive Soviet power and its presence in the form of military aid, a naval presence, 
and bilateral relations, specifically trade relations.21        
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4.2.2. Trade Relations  
Second, the USSR accelerated its trade relations with Thailand from 1968. By 1968, the Soviet 
government strongly urged its Ambassador in Bangkok to contact the Thai government and 
push a Thai-Soviet commercial cooperation and agreement.22 This can be observed from a 
number of conservations between the Soviet leaders and the Thai Ambassador to Moscow, 
from Police Major Pramote Chongcharoen (1963-1967) to Yuad Lertrith (1968-1971). For 
example, Pramote concurred with his Soviet counterpart that despite their political differences, 
both countries should begin with trade and cultural relations to strengthen their ties.23 Yuad 
agreed that Thailand was determined to expand trade with the Soviet Union. However, in the 
views of the Soviet leaders, they had pushed proposals for trade agreement with Thailand for 
at least 7 years with no response. According to Soviet Ambassador to Bangkok, Mikhail M. 
Volkov (1965-1969), this was because of a limited trade. Before seriously engaging in trade 
negotiation, Volkov said both sides needed to first determine what agendas and issues would 
be negotiated so as to successfully review trade agreement.24       
The Thai government responded to the Soviets in kind because it felt that the USSR did 
not pursue ‘hostile’ policies and practices towards Thailand. In his conversation with Soviet 
Ambassador Volkov in early 1968, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya said that Thai-
Soviet relations were ‘normal, but not close friends’. Dawee respected the USSR in the sense 
that the Soviet Union, unlike the PRC, did not use force to expand its ideology in the region.25 
The present trend of improving relations with the USSR, as Foreign Minister Thanat 
subsequently asserted, was the Soviet Union did not pose a direct threat to Thailand’s existence 
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and the improved relations were ‘part of the policy of widening our horizons’, in a search for 
the possibility of ‘consolidating peace through commercial relations and cultural exchanges’.26      
In 1968, Prime Minister Thanom asked the new Ambassador to Moscow, Yuad Lertrith, 
to convey a message to the Soviet government that Thailand wished to strengthen and further 
develop the friendly relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and would send a 
delegation of Thai businessmen in the near future. He also encouraged the Soviet Trade 
Organization to buy more rubber from Thailand. 27  With regards to the proposed trade 
agreement, meetings were held once a week between the Economic Department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs led by its Director-General Sompong Sucharitkul, and E. A. Dmitriev, the 
Charge d’ Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, together with Russian Commercial 
Counselor, Nikolai P. Karpov. The pact was delayed considerably because of the Thai refusal 
to give in to Russia’s demands to accord full diplomatic privileges, including immunity, to its 
trade representation to Thailand, as well as to attach a navigation agreement to the trade 
agreement.28 Sompong strongly defended the position, by insisting that navigation would be 
negotiated only after concluding and signing the trade agreement.29  
Thanat commented in August 1968 that a trade agreement with the Soviet Union was 
mentioned ‘for many years, but no formal agreement has been reached’.30 This was due to 
many factors. First, bilateral trade was not in great volume. Second, the two economic systems 
were seemingly too different. As Thanat put it,  
 
Trade on our side is free. The Soviet Union can buy what it wants here and also tries to 
sell what it can, but there is a very competitive market. Of course trade on the other side 
is not free, it is a state monopoly; we do not have a socialist system, therefore the state 
doesn’t engage in controlling the merchants. Private firms not the governments are 
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engaged in trade. Therefore, it is very difficult. And we in Thailand do not believe in 
the barter system’.31  
 
However, he emphasized that Thailand had been prepared to discuss trade with the USSR ‘for 
many many years’.32 
Despite faltering negotiations on a trade agreement, the Thai government expressed 
willingness to widen the scope of relations with Moscow. By 1968, Prime Minister Thanom 
made a decision to send the Thai trade mission to Eastern Europe to seek new markets for Thai 
products, especially agricultural goods such as rice, jute, and rubber. At first, the government 
wished to send a trade delegation by the end of August 1968. However, the ‘Prague Spring’ 
and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deferred this trip.33 In his dialogue 
with Soviet Ambassador Volkov, Pramote, who was promoted to Permanent Secretary of the 
Foreign Ministry after his five-year turn as Ambassador to Moscow, informed that the purpose 
of this delegation, which would last one month, was to explore trade opportunities, both export 
and import. He asked the Soviet Union to take this trade delegation seriously.34  
In May 1969, Premier Thanom stated that ‘we already export many products to the free 
world, but now we wish to expand our trade with Eastern Communist countries’: ‘It is to the 
benefit of our international trade if we can expand markets for our products in these 
countries’. 35  A 26-member Thai trade delegation was led by Vicharn Nivatwongse, the 
Director of the Commercial Intelligence Department, and included two government officials, 
and another 23 prominent businessmen who financed their own trips. Over the course of the 
month, delegates visited the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia.36  
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Economic Affairs Minister, Bunchana Atthakorn, asked the mission to study ways and 
means of promoting the direct sale of Thai products to East European countries. Before his 
departure, Vicharn told the Press that ‘the mission has absolutely nothing to do with politics. 
All we want to succeed is to sell our raw materials and agricultural products to them’.37 By the 
end of the trip, Thailand exchanged goodwill missions with Yugoslavia, and established 
commercial relations with Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.  
The symbolic gesture of Thai trade delegation to a certain extent rendered the bilateral 
trade agreement unavoidable. In his conversation with Foreign Minister Thanat in December 
1969, the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires Dmitriev raised the delay of the trade agreement, and 
blamed the disagreement on three key issues: Russia’s demand for (a) a Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) clause; (b) full diplomatic privileges, including immunity, to its trade representation 
based in Thailand; and (c) a navigation agreement. On the one hand, the Soviet Union wished 
to negotiate both trade and air agreements all together. On the other hand, Thailand suggested 
that both agreements should be considered separately. For Thanat, these two parts of the 
agreement were different in scope and content. He reassured the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires that 
the Thai government was closely examining this draft, and wished to conclude it very soon. 
Thailand would undertake a negotiation process on air cooperation shortly after signing the 
trade agreement. Thanat said he was not in a position to speed up the process.38 Records of 
conversation between Thai and Soviet sides indicated that the Soviet Union was very proactive 
in concluding the trade agreement with its beneficial leverages and attached to other issues 
including air and navigation pacts. Thailand, on the other, preferred to negotiate the different 
issues separately, thereby prioritizing specific commercial agreement at the time. Ultimately, 
the Soviets wished that Thanat himself get directly involved in the negotiation in order to 
accelerate the process, and perhaps bypass bureaucratic obstacles.   
By the end of 1969, an agreement was in place that regulated imports and exports 
between the two countries, but that did not fix a trade balance figure. It excluded air and 
navigation agreements. The draft also stated that all trade transactions would have to be made 
on a government-to-government basis, through the Thai Chamber of Commerce or through the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, thereby prohibiting private Thai exporters from dealing directly 
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with the Russians.39 In March 1970, the new Soviet Ambassador to Thailand, Anatoly A. 
Rozanov (1970-1974), arrived in Bangkok and presented his letter of credentials to the King.    
On December 25, Thanat and Rozanov signed the first Thai-Soviet trade agreement, 
marking a pivotal moment in their relations. The pact was aimed at improving and developing 
closer commercial relations between the two countries. It identified a means of international 
payment, facilitation of trade and transportation, and lists of tradable commodities. The Soviet 
Union was determined to import rice and rice products, natural rubber, mineral products 
(especially fluorites), maize, millet, leather, precious stones and jewelry, while Thailand would 
import metals and metal parts, machinery products and their components, electrical equipment 
and parts, cars and car parts, tractors, and polymers.40 The Soviet Union would establish trade 
representation with a residence in Bangkok. Ambassador Rozanov wrote a related letter to 
Thanat on the day of signing the agreement, specifically emphasizing the importance of trade 
representation. Due to that fact that foreign economic relations in the Soviet Union was a state 
monopoly, the Ambassador claimed that the Soviet government needed trade representation in 
Bangkok. As he elaborated,  
 
The trade representation shall have the following functions to perform:   
a) to promote the development of trade relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Kingdom of Thailand; 
b) to represent the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Kingdom 
of Thailand in all matters relating to foreign trade of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics;  
c) to effect trade between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of 
Thailand  
 
Rozanov insisted that the trade representation, which was an integral part of the Soviet 
Embassy in Thailand, had full diplomatic privileges and immunity equivalent to diplomatic 
representatives.41  
With the signing of the trade agreement, Thanat expected greater cooperation with the 
USSR. Likewise, Deputy Foreign Minister Police Major-General, Sa-nga Kittikachorn, 
observed that in general the improved relations with the Communist bloc had led to an 
increased opportunity to export goods. The former policy of enmity toward the Communist 
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powers would be now ‘very risky’. Due to Thailand’s easing of relations with the Soviet Union 
and East European countries, Sa-nga claimed, ‘our foreign policy has made possible the 
reduction of the Communist threat’. ‘This will mean that we can devote more of our budgetary 
funds to economic development than to military defense’.42 In relation to the trade agreement 
specifically he stated that the Soviet Union ‘has already brought about an improvement in the 
price of fluorite’. Previously, Japan had been the sole market, and, as a monopoly, this had 
depressed the price for many years. Sa-nga thus asked Thai exporters not to sell all fluorites to 
the Japanese, but to also sell to the Russians, which helped them bid at higher prices.43 To 
reporters who asked him whether the US would object to the proposed closer trade relations 
with the USSR, Sa-nga markedly replied that ‘we don’t care. We mean to maintain our good 
relations with the United States. But through Russia we may reach an agricultural commodities 
agreement involving countries in the Soviet bloc. We may sell tapioca and animal foodstuffs.’44 
 
Table 4.1: Thailand’s Trade Volume with the USSR (million rubles) 
Year  Volume  Export Import  Trade balance  
1971  6.6  4.1  2.5  +
 
 
1975  17.3  13.3  4.0  +  
1979  33.9  26.3  7.6  +  
1980  173.1  164.5  8.6  +  
1981  320.4  312.4  8  +  
1982  141.8  132.9  8.9  +  
1983  62.5  54.7  7.8  +  
1984  73.9  62.6  11.3  +  
1985  67.9  54.5  13.4  +  
1986  90.9  80.7  10.2 +  
Source: Ministry of Commerce  
 
According to Thai trade statistics, the percentage of bilateral trade with the Soviet 
Union rose exponentially in the 1970s, though with relatively small volume compared to 
Thailand’s trade with other major partners. For example, in 1970, Thailand for the first time 
sold almost 35,000 tons of maize to the USSR.45 The overall volume of bilateral trade with the 
USSR in 1971 amounted to 6.6 million rubles. This increased to 17.3 and 173.1 million rubles 
in 1975, and 1980, respectively. In 1971, Thai exports to Moscow were 4.1 million rubles 
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whereas Thai imports were 2.5 million rubles (See Table 4.1). Between 1971 through the end 
of the Cold War, Thailand had a surplus in trade with the Soviet Union. In the year 1981, out 
of all the ASEAN countries, Thailand was the Soviet Union’s largest trade partner.     
At the same time, the Soviet Union pushed for an air transport agreement with Thailand, 
which was drafted by the Soviets in early February 1970. The Soviet airline, Aeroflot, which 
had recently begun to expand its flights and develop new routes in Southeast Asia to locations 
such as Singapore and Cambodia, asked the Thai government for flyover rights to Phnom Penh 
and landing rights in Bangkok.46 The negotiations officially started in May, when a Russian air 
team, led by aviation chief A. V. Besedine, went to Bangkok to discuss the air transport 
agreement with Thai officials headed by Sirilak Chandrangsu, Permanent Secretary of 
Communications. Thailand and the Soviet Union readily agreed in principle to allow each 
other’s national airlines to fly to their respective capitals and four points beyond. Thailand 
would grant Aeroflot rights to fly to Bangkok, and connect to Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, 
Singapore, and Jakarta. In return, Thai Airways International hoped to have stopovers at 
Tashkent and Moscow, and connect with Copenhagen, London, Paris, and New York, which 
would provide the shortest route service from Southeast Asia to Europe and America. The 
exchange of rights would be incorporated into the air transport agreement. Sirilak pointed out 
that the agreement would be fair to both countries. However, he said the USSR may have more 
benefits ‘because it has a larger company and will be able to make use of its rights much before 
THAI [Airways International]’.47  
However, the first meeting ended in a stalemate. Officials on both sides conceded that 
no agreement had been reached, and their governments had first to be consulted before further 
negotiations could be carried out. Sirilak said that ‘there are many important obstacles that have 
to be looked into by the Cabinet’. He claimed that both sides had ‘mostly differences in 
attitudes and ideologies’.48     
In fact, the differences mainly concerned the stationing of Aeroflot’s sales officers and 
mechanical personnel in Bangkok, which the Soviets demanded as necessary to facilitate its 
operation once the air agreement was established. Earlier, the Thai government had ruled that 
in establishing air links with the Soviet Union, Thailand would not allow the Russians to station 
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those personnel in Bangkok. In early June, the Communications Ministry proposed that the 
Thai government relax some restrictions against Russia to allow the Russians to set up their 
offices in Thailand.49 The Thanom government decided to approve the proposed relaxation, 
providing that the offices were not used for political purposes. He was also willing to continue 
and speed up the discussion of other details with the Russians. Soviet Commercial Counselor, 
Nikolai P. Karpov, expressed optimism in air cooperation and agreement, saying that the 
decision was a ‘good sign’. 50  The negotiators returned to the meetings and settled any 
difficulties.  
On May 6, 1971, the air transport agreement was signed by Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Police Major-General Sa-nga Kittikachorn, and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly A. Rozanov, 
in Bangkok. According to a spokesman from the Thai Foreign Ministry, the agreement was 
based on the principle of a ‘fair and equal opportunity’ for the designated airlines of the two 
countries to operate agreed services on their respective routes. The provisions of the agreement 
stated that, on the one hand, Thai Airways International was entitled to operate its services 
from Thailand via New Delhi, Karachi, Kabul, Teheran to Tashkent and/ or Moscow and 
beyond to Copenhagen, Paris or London and New York, and vice versa. On the other hand, 
Aeroflot was entitled to operate its services from the Soviet Union via Tehran, Karachi, New 
Delhi, Rangoon to Bangkok, and beyond to Kuala Lumpur or Singapore, Manila, Jakarta, 
Australia, and vice versa. After the signing of the agreement, Sa-nga expressed the hope that 
the direct air services would serve to develop air transport and promote trade to the two 
countries’ mutual benefits, thus helping to ‘further strengthen the cordial relations between the 
two nations’. Ambassador Rozanov assured Sa-nga that Aeroflot would begin its air services 
to Bangkok within a few months, following gaining approval from the Thai government for its 
Bangkok-based personnel.51 The inaugural Aeroflot flight arrived in Bangkok in November 
1971.52         
 On May 15, 1971, the Thanom government dispatched the second trade team, led by 
Economic Affairs Minister Bunchana Atthakorn, to the USSR and the East European countries, 
including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Three days 
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before the departure, the 34-man Thai trade and economic delegation was instructed by Deputy 
Prime Minister, General Praphas Charusathien, to remember that the Thai government wished 
to trade with any country that maintained a friendly attitude towards Thailand. Praphas 
expressed his support for Thailand’s more extensive trade relations with the Soviet Union: 
‘Russia has shown her good attitude towards us and has not involved itself in causing political 
problems for Thailand’.53 The mission, which lasted for three weeks, aimed at exploring the 
possibilities of expanding trade relations between Thailand and those countries.54 The mission 
was the first to be led by a cabinet minister, and the largest ever to be sent to the Communist 
bloc by the Thai government. According to Bunchana, ‘Russia has expressed its willingness to 
open broader trade relations with Thailand and the visit of our mission would help achieve 
this’. The mission listed 35 items to export to those countries, including rice, rubber, sugar, 
timber and mineral ores.55  
When the Thai trade delegation reached Moscow on May 19, Bunchana initiated talks 
with the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Ivan Grishin. In a statement, he said that the 
talks were aimed at improving the trade agreement of 1970. One important issue was whether 
trade should be conducted between the governments or between a government agency and 
private firms. He said that trade between the USSR and Thailand was worth 3.4 million rubles 
last year, and wished to increase the volume of export and import.56 The most interesting item 
was fluorite, which the USSR had begun to import from Thailand in 1970. One delegate, 
Vicharn Nivatwongse, Director General of the Foreign Trade Department, disclosed that the 
USSR wanted a five-year fluorite deal with Thailand. This presented an economic opportunity 
for Thai producers to diversify their markets, especially from the Japanese ones. The 
businessmen responded favorably to the Russian offer.57 One of them, Major General Pramarn 
Adireksarn, an influential politician and the President of the Association of Thai Industries, 
revealed later that throughout the mission, chambers of commerce in those Communist 
countries complained over restrictions on the entry of their people into Thailand. First, he 
suggested that ‘if the government lifted its restrictions on visas we’ll see that trade relations 
between Thailand and those countries would move up very fast’. Second, Pramarn also 
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recommended that the government form a single organization to trade with those countries 
because their foreign trade was undertaken by their governments.58          
 The trade agreement facilitated increasing commercial contacts between Thailand and 
the USSR in the 1970s. For instance, in 1971, the USSR made an approach to buy an additional 
150,000 tons of maize worth approximately 270 million baht. The proposal came from the new 
Commercial Counsellor of the USSR Embassy, Victor I. Ocheretin, who had direct contact 
with Vicharn Nivatwongse. Ocheretin informed Vicharn that the Russian buyers wished to 
import between 20,000 and 30,000 tons per month whereas Vicharn guaranteed that Thailand 
would be in a position to supply the Russians.59 Overall, according to Yuad Lertrith, the 
Ambassador to Moscow, there was good potential for Thailand to export maize, tin, fluorite, 
rubber and tobacco to the Soviet Union. However, he confirmed reports that Thai fluorite ore 
shipped to the USSR in early 1971 did not measure up to Soviet standards. Yuad mentioned 
two obstacles which needed to be overcome, namely poor Thai export control, and the lack of 
a regular shipping service to the Soviet Union. He recommended that should the Thai 
government develop the potential, it would establish a group consisting of Thai exporters and 
government representatives dealing specifically with each item.60         
 
In sum, Thailand since 1969 established ‘closer but correct and careful ties’ with the Soviet 
Union, which began to seek greater involvement in the region.61 For Thailand, the Soviet Union 
was no longer considered as an enemy. The Thai government performed diplomatic practices 
of détente with the Soviet Union in the realms of regional receptivity toward the Soviet Union 
as well as bilateral trade and air transport agreements, thereby increasing their mutual contact. 
Readjustment with the Soviet Union was still an ongoing and unfinished project in the long 
1970s. Yet, it was much further ahead than any rapprochement with China, which will be 
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4.3. Facing the ‘Tiger’: Back-Channel Diplomacy with China  
 
‘I don’t see why, if the United States can meet with the representatives of Beijing in 
Warsaw, we cannot meet with them somewhere in Asia, such as Japan or Hong Kong’. 
– Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister62 
 
From early 1969, Thanat Khoman explicitly expressed his public offer for a dialogue with the 
PRC. Between 1970 and 1971, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to establish greater 
contact with the PRC via third parties such as Albania, Sweden, France, and Italy, respectively. 
After China’s entry to the United Nations (UN) in October 1971, Thanat directly contacted 
Chinese representatives at the UN in New York. For the sake of analysis, this section is divided 
into two parts. The first part discusses the back-channel diplomacy with China. The second 
examines Thailand’s position and practices regarding China’s admission to the UN. As a matter 
of fact, both processes were not mutually exclusive.   
 
4.3.1. Contact via third parties  
First, the Thai MFA made incessant attempts to contact Chinese representatives via third 
parties at international venues. According to declassified documents thus far, there was no 
official memorandum documenting the specific detail of back-channel diplomacy. However, 
we can deduce the practices of back-channel diplomacy from what Thanat and high-ranking 
diplomats said and performed throughout the periods of 1969 and 1971. We now know that 
Prime Minister Thanom authorized and closely supervised the process himself.63 The absence 
of official documents can be explicated, as follows. First, the state and nature of the operation 
was diplomatically covert and secretive. Almost all these conversations were made verbally, 
rather than written. Second, the anxiety of the Thai state in general, and the ambiguity of 
Chinese intentions toward Thailand, rendered diplomatic contact with the Chinese largely 
secret, if not politically dangerous. To a certain extent, it provided a deniability clause for the 
Thai military elite. Despite the behind-the-scenes diplomatic missions, the contacts with the 
PRC via third parties were leaked, both intentionally and unintentionally, to the press and the 
public.       
Since early 1969, Thanat consistently engaged in a ‘peace offensive’ with China. He 
said that Thailand was ‘ready to sit down and talk with Red China, to seek genuine peace for 
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the sake of Asia’.64 In March 1969, in a speech to Parliament, Thanat reiterated that he was 
willing and ready to carry ‘the offensive for peace and stability to Beijing’, and if possible, to 
negotiate a trade pact with China. However, diplomatic relations were not contemplated for the 
time being.65 Thanat told foreign correspondents in April that Thailand ‘cannot simply stay 
behind an imaginary Maginot Line but will have to carry her own offensive, a peace offensive, 
to the source of danger to her existence’. This peace offensive was largely aimed at national 
survival as well as peace and security in the region. Thanat reasoned that the peace offensive 
was not uncomplicated because ‘Beijing is conservative. The Communist Chinese are petrified 
in their position. They have not changed their policy of supporting terrorist activities in many 
Asian countries, including Thailand. They have shown no flexibility whatsoever in their 
attitude towards peaceful co-existence’. As for Thailand, he went on, ‘we must be more flexible 
in our approach. We cannot simply stay behind an imaginary Maginot Line. If they [Chinese 
Communist leaders] do not respond to this peaceful initiative, they will be seen in an 
unfavorable light by the outside world’.66    
Thanat suggested that if talks with China were held, it would be ‘open talks’, something 
similar to those that took place at the Bandung Conference in 1955. He emphasized that there 
would be no ‘secret mission’ by any Thais to Mainland China.67 In 1969, Thanat’s main idea 
was to end the hostile situation so that both countries could return to the ‘spirit of Bandung’ 
when there was ‘an attempt to create a certain sense of solidarity and peaceful co-existence’.68 
In early 1970, Thanat specifically called for a ‘revival of the Bandung formula with necessary 
modifications’. He stated that ‘if the smaller nations could cooperate, they might convince 
China at such a meeting to come to terms with its neighbors’.69  
By the end of the 1960s, the Chinese had not responded to Thanat’s various offers in 
kind. As Thanat put it in June 1969, ‘so far there has been no reply or reaction on the part of 
Beijing. I suppose that is the general attitude of Beijing for the time being. Beijing has declined 
to meet with other nations; the only visible contact which Beijing has is with Albania and 
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perhaps with Sweden. But so far I am not aware that any progress has been achieved’.70 
Throughout 1970, Chinese reactions to Thailand were mixed. The Chinese continued their 
aggressive gestures and policies against Thailand. For example, it built a road in northern Laos 
near the Mekong River, which the Thai government perceived to be a vital threat to its 
territorial sovereignty.71  
The idea of meeting with the Chinese, nevertheless, remained open. In September 1970, 
Thanat reiterated that there remained a ‘public offer’ by the Thai government to ‘sit down and 
meet with Beijing representatives’. Thanat presumed that the Chinese government had not yet 
responded to his offer because it wanted secret talks. 72  Separately, a spokesman for the 
Government’s United Thai People Party and representative, Yuang Iamsila (Udon Thani), 
proposed trade with Communist China through third countries. He said: ‘Why not trade through 
Hong Kong or Singapore?’ In this issue, Thanat suggested that ‘whether we trade directly or 
through third countries, we have to first find out if we stand to gain or lose’.73    
By 1970, Thanat and his close associates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to 
make contact with the Chinese. In Paris, many reported that Thanat began the process of 
rapprochement with China. Discussions with Chinese officials were conducted through Pridi 
Phanomyong, the former Thai Prime Minister who had previously been exiled in China for 
more than 20 years, and since 1970 remained in exile in Paris74, and Étienne Manac’h, the new 
French Ambassador to Beijing (1969-1975).75 Manac’h was a personal acquaintance of Thanat 
and had passed through Bangkok in 1969 before he took up his ambassadorial post in Beijing.76   
In an interview with The Nation’s special correspondent in Paris in August 1971, Pridi 
claimed China was ready to establish relations with Thailand if the Thai government ‘changes 
her hostile policy’. His exile in Beijing made him quite familiar with some high-ranking 
Chinese officials and he said that the crucial issue for rapprochement with China was about 
motives: ‘If Thailand had good motives towards them, they would certainly reciprocate. Let 
bygones be bygones. I don’t think there are any problems with Communist China. It would be 
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a noble thing if two hostile persons can patch up their quarrels’.77 Like Thanat, Pridi strongly 
urged a ‘flexible’ foreign policy – with the objective of ensuring Thailand’s survival amidst the 
changing global and regional dynamisms. He traced this policy back to the reign of King Rama 
V in the late nineteenth century: ‘Just look back at the example as that set down by King Rama 
V. We followed a neutral policy and that saved our country. There was a balance of powers. 
We must accept that while all other neighboring countries fell into the hands of foreign 
countries, King Rama V saved Thailand from imperialism because His Majesty followed a 
flexible policy’. ‘Whenever we took a different line set down by His Majesty King Rama V’, 
Pridi continued, ‘we always had troubles such as when we sided with Japan during World War 
II’.78   
Pridi also suggested that Thailand should trade with every country without taking their 
political regimes or ideologies into consideration. As he puzzled,  
 
What kind of Chinese are we talking about? Look at those Chinese merchants in the 
country. Why are they so rich? If we trade with Communist China, it should be on a 
government-to-government basis. They hold two trade exhibitions every year. When 
foreign merchants visit them and sign trade contracts, they sign on behalf of their 
governments. The government can also choose to allow some particular organizations 
to deal with Communist China – not private merchants.79 
 
Trade with China, for him, was inevitable. Commenting on President Nixon’s visit to Beijing, 
he asserted that: ‘The United States simply cannot afford to ignore a country with 800 million 
people. It’s a big market’.80  
Later, Prime Minister Thanom admitted that both Foreign Minister Thanat and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sa-nga Kittikachorn had met separately with Pridi at the Royal Thai Embassy 
in Paris in 1971, but denied that Pridi was asked to serve as a middleman in contacting China. 
As he told Thai reporters, ‘I have never assigned Pridi to do anything’. Thanom said the cabinet 
members did not discuss any political issues with Pridi, who spoke ‘about his life in Beijing’.81 
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Pridi himself also denied that he was a ‘third party’ in making contact between the two 
countries.82           
However, Thanat continued to make appeals for dialogue with the Chinese. On January 
13, 1971, in an interview with Columbia Broadcasting Corporation (CBS) Television, he 
reemphasized his ‘peace offensive’ with China, despite the fact the Chinese had failed to 
respond. He said that time would be needed for the Chinese leaders to realize the benefits of 
peaceful co-existence with Thailand and other Asian countries. ‘As Asians’, Thanat added, ‘we 
are patient. If they want to play ball with us, we in Asia are always ready to join in the game. 
If, on the contrary, they want to create disturbances and insurgencies in our lands, we will fight 
them as indeed we are doing’.83  
The absence of any Chinese response was largely due to the domestic politics of the 
Cultural Revolution. When the Cultural Revolution ended in the early 1970s, the Chinese 
government began to look outward, and normalize its diplomacy with other countries, thereby 
opening a window of opportunity for Thailand. The first sign, or turning point, was Sino-US 
détente, beginning with ‘non-political’ events like a table tennis, or ping-pong, tournament in 
April 1971, and followed by the relaxation of the American trade embargo with the PRC.84 The 
Thai government officially welcomed this détente. As Prime Minister Thanom said, if the 
Chinese leaders ‘stop giving us trouble, we can be friends’. Thanat observed that ‘the Chinese, 
clever and chauvinistic, have now opened a window to the rest of the world’. ‘Communist 
China’, he went on, ‘has undergone internal convulsions and has isolated itself. It is now 
realizing that times have changed and that isolation is costly in terms of economic development. 
It cannot keep up with modern technology and it cannot compete with the United States, Japan 
and Europe’.85 Thanat said that China had moved in ‘a rather clever way’ because they used 
non-political ping-pong diplomacy to allow them to take steps toward the relaxation of relations 
with Washington.86  Nevertheless, for Thanat, China ‘continues to constitute a danger’ to 
Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. He expressed hope for China to renounce its 
sponsorship and support of ‘national liberation movements’ in those countries, including 
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Thailand. As Thanat put it, ‘if the Chinese Communist leaders change their attitude, we will 
change ours’.87 
Another good sign was the decrease in Red Radio attacks on the Thai government. In 
March 1971, General Saiyud Kerdphol, Director of the Communist Suppression Operations 
Command (CSOC), announced that Communist propaganda and attacks against the Thai 
government via the clandestine radio, ‘Voice of the Thai People’, had been reduced to a certain 
extent over the past 30 days. He attributed the ebbing of such attacks to be driven by improved 
trade relations between Thailand and other Eastern European countries. However, Saiyud said 
that Communist activities, which were intent on winning the hearts and minds of local villagers 
and in undermining Thailand’s national security, remained ongoing.88   
Despite some good signs, the Thanom government made it clear that Thailand would 
refrain from automatically following the American move, and would not rush into any 
premature postures. Thanat stressed that Thailand had its own independent policy to follow in 
order to protect its own national interests. He claimed he had anticipated the American move 
‘for quite some time’: ‘We knew that the United States would change its attitude towards 
Communist China and reopen trade links. Therefore, we are not surprised’.89 Thanat remarked 
that  
 
We watch developments with great interest. If the new smiles [from the Chinese] were 
to be followed by measures to ease the situation in Southeast Asia, so much the better. 
What we would like to know is what exactly is the meaning and import of those new 
smiles. Was it to pave the way toward recognition by more countries or to prevent what 
Beijing itself has called “hostile collusion” between the United States and the Soviet 
Union? Was it a move to join the Big-Powers club? Was there a real change of attitude 
or policy … a reversal to the Bandung policy? No one knows exactly.90   
 
According to Thanat, there could be at least two possible tests of China’s real intention. 
‘The first important test,’ he said, ‘is the Vietnam War. If there were a real change, then we 
should see a new mood or atmosphere reflected in the attitudes of North Vietnam and the Viet 
Cong at Paris’. ‘The second important test is the situation in Southeast Asia especially Beijing’s 
attitude toward Thailand and other countries in the region. If Beijing were to adopt a more 
peaceful approach with less doctrinaire support of “war of national liberation”, then there 
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would be a real change in Chinese attitude’. Thanat contended that ‘these two tests will be 
sufficient to gauge the reality of the new smile. … But if nothing happens, then it would be just 
a superficial, tactical move, and not a real change of direction’.91    
Thai foreign policy was thus forging a wait-and-see approach. As Thanat put it, ‘At 
present there are no changes. I cannot say now the Government will make any changes in the 
future’.92 In addition, the Thanom government took a cautious attitude towards the question of 
trade with China. The option of trade, without prior diplomatic recognition, was left open an 
option, should the Chinese renounce their aggressive and hostile policies. Mentioning that a 
number of European countries had begun to trade with the Chinese without having first set up 
formal diplomatic relations, Thanat said that Thailand could trade with China without prior 
diplomatic relations if it deemed to be economically advantageous to conduct such 
commerce. 93  Legally, trade with China would also infringe the Revolutionary Party 
Announcement No. 53, prohibiting the sale of goods to China. Deputy Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Prasit Kanchanawat, recommended that the law should be abolished as a step to further 
establish trade relations with China. If the government repealed the law, trade would become 
possible.94  
At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thanat set up a China-watching committee to study 
the pros and cons of trading with Communist China, as well as to monitor the developments in 
China and its external relations.95 Other cabinet members also gave their opinions. Deputy 
Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien said that China, like any other country, should purchase 
rice and other products directly from Thailand. Pote Sarasin, Minister of National 
Development, insisted that Thailand would begin trading if China separated ‘her trade from 
political issues’. However, according to Pote, the opening up of trade would not directly lead 
to diplomatic relations.96       
Sentiment to trade with Communist China was growing not only in the government but 
also among other members of the political and business community. Some opposition parties 
members, such as Pichai Rattakul (Democrat, Bangkok) and Somkid Srisangkhom (Social 
Democrat), expressed their agreement with Thanat’s proposal to establish dialogue with the 
                                                          
91 Thanat Khoman, interview, The New York Times, 21 April 1971; the National Archive of Thailand [TNA], (2) 
MFA 1.2/ 35, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents, p. 141. 
92 ‘Thailand hails US China Move’, Bangkok Post, 16 April 1971.  
93 ‘We can be friends, PM tells China’, Bangkok Post, 17 April 1971.  
94 ‘Abolish China Trade, says Prasit’, Bangkok Post, 18 April 1971.  
95 Theh Chongkhadikij, ‘Pressure grows to trade with China’, Bangkok Post, 26 April 1971.  
96 Statement by Pote Sarasin, 18 May 1971; and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien’s interview with 
the Bangkok Post, 26 May 1971, in China and Thailand, 1949-1983, ed. R. K. Jain (New Delhi: Radiant 




Chinese but cautioned that it must be carried out with extreme care and planning. As Pichai 
said, ‘Unlike the countries in the West, Thailand is within easy reach of Red China 
geographically’.97  Even the well-renowned proprietor of the Siam Rath newspaper, M.R. 
Kukrit Pramoj, who had previously disregarded Thanat’s ideas, now began to show support for 
the discourse of flexible diplomacy with China. He said that Thailand had to admit the existence 
of the PRC: ‘China is a big country, and being an enemy will not be beneficial to Thailand’.98     
Similarly, in the business community, Charoon Sibunruang, the President of the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of Trade, favored the opening of trade with China. 
He suggested that the government should abrogate the laws and regulations to permit trade 
with China, by explaining that ‘Thailand will gain a lot from trading with Communist China, 
since it is a huge market’. However, Charoon opposed direct trade with Communist China 
because ‘we are uncertain of what the Chinese Communists are up to’. For the present, trade 
should be conducted through a third country, preferably Hong Kong.99 Some businessmen, 
such as Major General Pramarn Adireksarn, the President of the Association of Thai Industries, 
disagreed. Pramarn claimed that Thailand was not yet ready for trading with Beijing because 
of the vulnerability to communism and the danger of developing a large trade deficit with 
Communist China.100 
Following Sino-US détente, Chinese leaders led by Premier Zhou Enlai opened up 
normal diplomacy with other countries. In May 1971, Thanat sounded optimistic about Sino-
Thai relations, and accordingly used the term ‘People’s Republic of China’ for the first time. 
He claimed that Beijing had responded favorably to Thailand. Communist China, he added, 
‘have shown interest in contacting us and are watching our attitude’.101 Having appealed to 
Chinese leaders for an open dialogue two years ago, Thanat disclosed that a number of ‘third 
parties’ had since approached Beijing on behalf of Thailand.102 He revealed that ‘after our 
announcement that we would like open dialogue with Beijing … some friendly “third parties” 
offered to make approaches for us. Tensions have been relaxed. Disturbances along the border 
have been reduced’.103 At that time, Thanat said he could not identify the ‘third parties’ because 
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of the delicate nature of their missions. As Thanat said, ‘Even if you asked for ten hours, I 
would not tell.’ Above all else, Thanat believed ‘the Beijing leaders have shown interest 
because we have made an open offer for a dialogue with them’.104 We now know that Thanat 
wanted to establish more contact with China via third parties such as Albania, Sweden, France, 
and Italy. Among them, France was the principal one.105 
These indirect exchanges had, he explained, a ‘better understanding between the two 
countries. Our differences have narrowed. The situation has improved. Beijing leaders have 
begun to understand us [Thailand]. It may well lead to a real dialogue’. 106 Asked when a real 
dialogue would take place, he said, ‘it’s not up to us alone. Diplomatic contacts have to be 
made quietly, discreetly. Participants and subjects of negotiations could never be disclosed. We 
have to be patient and careful, keeping the national interests in mind’.107 For Thanat, the 
ultimate aim of state-to-state dialogue with the Chinese was to dampen Communist insurgency 
in Thailand. As he put it, ‘the idea is to stop the killing. We want to stop being the enemy’.108 
However, Thanat warned against rushing willy-nilly into setting up an embassy, due to the risk 
of propaganda and subversion in Thailand: ‘We will deal with the Chinese Communists only 
on a basis of mutual trust and equality’.109    
Meanwhile, the Thai government officially ordered Radio Thailand to cease 
propaganda attacks against Communist China. In May 1971, Deputy Prime Minister Praphas 
gave an interview, saying that the government had cut down on ‘polemics against Communist 
China over Radio Thailand in order to find out if China would make a friendly response’. He 
emphasized that Thailand had a policy of being friendly with all countries, including 
Communist states, which were friendly to Thailand.110 Thanat agreed with Praphas, stating that 
the halt in radio attacks was ‘a way to reduce tensions’.111  
 
However, this early Thai detente with China inflamed public debate, and in particular generated 
the discontents against Thanat specifically, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
One consequence of this was that by the end of May 1971, Thanom made a decision to slow 
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the rate of contact with China until such a time that China ceased supporting the insurgent 
movements in Thailand: moving the process to what was described as ‘go-slow’ [Pai-cha] 
diplomacy. 112  The Thai government also decided against opening trade relations with 
Communist China for the present. Thanom was concerned that China would not separate trade 
from politics.113  
The Minister for National Development, Pote Sarasin, asserted that ‘if China can treat 
its economic relations with other countries separately from political considerations, there will 
not be problems in trading with other countries. The question is whether or not Red China can 
do that’. Consequently, it would be better for Thailand to be cautious in its development of 
economic relations with China and to open such relations only ‘when Red China separates her 
trade from political issues’. Likewise, Economic Affairs Minister Bunchana Attakorn echoed 
the same concern. Trading with China would not be ‘safe’ as long as that country continued 
attacking Thailand through Radio Beijing and carried on its ‘subversive infiltration’ of the 
kingdom. Thailand would not, therefore, change its ‘policy before that country changed its 
attitude towards us’.114 In brief, the government’s ‘go-slow, wait-and-see attitude to ensure 
minimum safety replaced a quickened pace to seek better understanding with Communist 
China’.115  
 However, ‘go-slow’ diplomacy was partially undone by the US National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing between July 9 and 11, 1971 and the 
subsequent announcement that Nixon would visit Beijing in February 1972. Kissinger had 
visited Bangkok en route and one early morning in July 1971, US Ambassador to Bangkok 
Leonard Unger invited a group of Thais, including Sulak Sivaraksa, a leading Thai public 
intellectual, and Tej Bunnag, a young Foreign Ministry official, to a working breakfast with 
Kissinger. The topic of discussion was ‘how to end the Vietnam War’. Tej recalled that at the 
meeting, ‘Sulak Sivaraksa said “the key to resolving the Vietnam War is China”. Kissinger was 
dumbstruck, but said nothing … we later learned that he went on a secret trip to Beijing’.116 
 The Beijing visit surprised many in the Thai establishment, including Prime Minister 
Thanom. He told the reporters that ‘Dr. Kissinger was in Bangkok, and then he left to return to 
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the United States. Now, we learn that he had not gone home but made a side trip to Beijing’. 
Asked for the Thai attitude toward this Sino-US rapprochement, Thanom replied that ‘we have 
not yet done anything about this, but our policy is that we will be friendly to all countries which 
are not hostile to us’.117 A day later, Thanom said ‘we will wait and see how other nations react 
towards the latest development’. Yet, he also insisted that if the other side eased its hostile 
attitude, Thailand would reciprocate.118  
In his initial response, Deputy Foreign Minister Sa-nga Kittikachorn admitted that the 
announcement was ‘a good sign for the easing of international tensions’, and ‘any easing of 
tension would be beneficial to Thailand’. Sa-nga asserted that Thailand, as a small state, could 
only watch international developments, and ‘we must first and foremost take care of our own 
interests’.119 Likewise, Economic Affairs Minister Bunchana Atthakorn expressed his personal 
opinion that Thailand may resume trade relations with China within two or three years. By 
foreseeing the widespread support for Beijing and its subsequent entry into the UN, he said ‘at 
that time Thailand may consider recognizing Communist China’. However, for now, Thailand 
should ‘wait and see’ to evaluate the development of Sino-US relations, ‘so we can adjust our 
policy accordingly’. Bunchana still held to his original belief that Thailand should not trade 
with China if that country did not change its attitude towards Thailand. However, he also 
admitted that ‘trade with Communist China is in the long run unavoidable’.120  
The pro-government United Thai People Party (UTTP) Representative, Yuang Iamsila 
(Udon Thani), even went so far as to ask Prime Minister Thanom to visit Beijing if an invitation 
could have come from Premier Zhou Enlai. He suggested that the Thai government should not 
send anybody ‘like Dr. Kissinger’ to Beijing to ‘fish’ for an invitation, but wait for the Chinese 
prime minister to send one: ‘When we get an invitation, we, the UTTP, will ask the Prime 
Minister to make the trip himself’. ‘Our Prime Minister should even visit Beijing ahead of 
President Nixon. We are closer’. He added, ‘we should not wait-and-see, as advocated by some 
government and opposition leaders, but get moving’. Yuang also proposed immediate trade 
relations with Mainland China. As he put it, ‘We need have no fears as to whether we have 
things to sell to the Chinese Communists. We can sell rubber, rice and tobacco. When the China 
market is opened, it means expansion of markets and this will lead to firmer prices’. The only 
reason for caution was, for him, ‘the infiltration of ideology’.121     
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Immediately following Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July, Thanat expedited 
contacts with China via third parties to ascertain the possibility of establishing diplomatic 
relations. In August, Prime Minister Thanom denied that Thanat had asked former Prime 
Minister Pridi Phanomyong to be a middleman to contact with the Chinese leaders. Thanom 
acknowledged that Thanat met Pridi in Paris ‘because they used to know each other and had 
once worked together’. While the Prime Minister reassured the press that Thailand had not 
asked any government to establish contact with Communist China, he admitted that ‘several 
countries with good intentions offered to inform Beijing of our policy and to inform us about 
the attitude of the Chinese Communists’.122  
Despite previous attempts to open up back channels from Thailand to approach the 
Chinese, there was no responses until October 1971. According to Ross Terrill, an Australian 
professor at Harvard University who spent some time in China, it was only in October that 
Beijing signaled a readiness to make a dialogue with Thailand.123 Secret reciprocal contacts 
facilitated by France, in particular the new French ambassador to Beijing Étienne Manac’h, 
had advanced to the point where China was now prepared to open talks with Thailand in order 
to begin the process of establishing formal relations between the two countries.124 Despite his 
attempt to hide the identification of the third party, Thanat reluctantly admitted that particular 
third country was ‘a country which is friendly to us and has a representative in Beijing’.125 
Also, the French Embassy in Bangkok had reportedly been using its ‘good offices’ to bring 
about an ‘understanding’ between Thailand and China. Officials of the Embassy told The 
Nation newspaper that although the Thai government had not requested the embassy to contact 
China and nor had the embassy offered the service, ‘it does not mean that things don’t take 
place’. They admitted that since France had an embassy in Beijing, it would only be normal for 
French officials to discuss Thai-Chinese relations when ‘chances arise’.126  
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In early October, Thanat disclosed in an interview with a foreign correspondent that 
Communist China had begun to respond to the suggestion of a dialogue with Thailand via a 
third country. He claimed that Thailand had realized the role which Communist China would 
play on the international scene for many years and this led to Thailand approaching the 
possibility of a dialogue. As he put it, ‘It will be easier for Thailand to get in touch with the 
People’s Republic of China after its admission to the United Nations’.127 According to Terrill, 
the Chinese expected to enter into such a relationship on the condition that, following Thanat’s 
claims, American troops would withdraw from Thailand with the peace settlement of the 
Vietnam War. In return, China was to stick strictly to its Five Principles of Coexistence and a 
policy of noninterference in Thailand, thereby ending its support of insurgencies.128 By that 
time, the beginning of a breakthrough in Thai-Chinese relations emerged. More importantly, 
Thailand could now make a direct contact with the Chinese at the UN, rather than via third 
parties, when on October 25, 1971, the PRC was voted to have a seat at the UN instead of 
Taiwan.    
 
4.3.2. The PRC’s entry into the UN  
The admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (UN) was a vital 
moment in the development of Thai-Chinese relations. At the outset, the Thai government had 
had a strong position against the question of Mainland Chinese representation. Giving a 
statement at the UN General Assembly in November 1969, Anand Panyarachun, Thai 
Ambassador to the UN, said that Communist China still maintained its ‘hostile behavior and 
inflexible policy’, and had not given up its ‘aggressive proclivities and expansionist tendencies’ 
towards the neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, including Thailand. As he put it,  
 
Since its assumption of the reins of Government on the Chinese Mainland, the Beijing 
regime has conducted a continuing and vicious campaign against this world body. It 
has defied the United Nations by acts which contravene the latter and the spirit of the 
Charter. The People’s Republic of China has, by word and deed, demonstrated its 
unwillingness to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.129    
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In November 1970, Anand reiterated this narrative at the UN General Assembly, by asserting 
that ‘we have seen no evidence that would qualify the People’s Republic of China as a 
peaceloving State’. ‘In our view,’ he claimed, ‘the People’s Republic of China has so far not 
shown that it was willing or able to accept the obligations as contained in the Charter of our 
Organization’, in particular no respect for the principle of non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of other states. Accordingly, Thailand continued to hold the view that the Republic of 
China, or Taiwan, was entitled to retain its seat in the United Nations.130  
By the mid-1971, a changing global balance of power, in particular the prospect of 
Sino-US rapprochement, revivified the debate regarding China’s UN membership among many 
countries, including Thailand. The Thai government could not afford to stand idly by, and 
developed a ‘two-China’ policy. Thailand, it was decided, would not oppose the admission of 
the PRC into the UN, yet would vote to retain Nationalist China, or the Republic of China 
(ROC), in the international organization.131 As Thanom told Parliament in August, if ‘there is 
a majority vote for Communist China to enter the United Nations, we will not protest. But we 
cannot support the ouster of Nationalist China because we are old friends’.132 However, in 
official discourses, Thailand did not subscribe to a ‘two-China’ policy because the policy was 
rejected by both the Communist China and Nationalist China. There was only one China.133 As 
Thanat made a statement at the UN General Assembly in September 1971: ‘It is indeed a fact 
that both Beijing and Taiwan firmly adhere to the concept of “one China”. Other countries, 
such as Thailand, likewise believe in the unity and integrity of all sovereign states, and it is 
hoped that time will bring an accommodation to the conflicting claims of the parties 
concerned’.134 In brief, though acknowledging de jure one-China policy, Thailand de facto 
shifted its position towards the dual representation in the UN.     
On September 10, 1971, the Thai National Security Council chaired by Prime Minister 
Thanom made an official decision that Thailand would vote for Beijing’s admission to the UN 
while voting to retain Taiwan inside the world body. The Council authorized Thanat to make 
any changes in these positions depending on circumstances at the UN, and he would radio 
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Bangkok for approval of any major change.135 According to Thanat, the Council realized that 
Communist China’s admission into the UN would ease world tensions as Beijing would be 
offered the opportunity to observe the UN Charter. For Thailand, moreover, Beijing’s entry to 
the UN would provide an opportunity for direct dialogue without the necessity of back-channel 
diplomacy via third parties. With Communist China in the UN, Thailand would be able to get 
a better sense of Chinese attitudes and be provided with opportunities for ending a Chinese-
sponsored ‘war of national liberation’ in Thailand. The Council concluded that Thailand, 
regardless of its vote for Communist China in the UN, would not follow up with either trade 
or diplomatic relations with China in the immediate future.136 It also banned any individual 
visits or travel to China.  
With regard to the dual representation of the Chinese at the UN, Thanat said that it was 
a Chinese problem, which both Communist and Nationalist China needed to settle on their own. 
Thanat saw Taiwan’s UN membership as a moral question. As he put it, ‘We feel morally 
bound to support Taiwan membership due to our good relationship since the end of the war’.137 
Before Thanat left for the UN in New York, Thailand had not yet decided whether it would co-
sponsor the American resolution for admission of Communist China into the UN and the 
retention of the Nationalist China in the international body.138  
Parenthetically, at the UN General Assembly sessions, there were two resolutions 
regarding the Chinese representation. One was the Albanian resolution, which proffered to seat 
Beijing in the UN and oust Taiwan. The Chinese Communist government showed clearly that 
it wanted to enter the UN on the terms of the Albanian resolution, which meant ‘restoration to 
China of its rightful place in the UN’. 139  The second resolution was the American dual 
representation resolution, which called for the admission of Communist China in the UN and 
for consideration of the expulsion of the Republic of China as an ‘important question’ requiring 
two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly.   
A Thai delegation headed by Thanat left on September 14 to attend the UN General 
Assembly which began on September 21. This included Thai Ambassador to the UN, Anand 
Panyarachun; Thai Ambassador to the Netherlands, Sompong Sucharitkul; Deputy Secretary-
General of the Cabinet, Dusit Boontham, and Secretary to the Foreign Minister, M.L. 
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Pirapongse Kasemsri.140 While in New York, Thanat decided to co-sponsor the American dual 
representation resolution and vote for China’s UN membership, while at the same time 
reaffirming his support for the continued membership of Taiwan in the UN.141 According to 
Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien, Thailand decided to co-sponsor the American 
resolution because:  
 
1. Communist China has a population of over 700 million people and should not be 
kept out of the UN. Because of its size, it should sit in the Security Council.   
2. Thailand has diplomatic and friendly relations with Nationalist China, which is a 
founder member of the UN.142  
 
Speaking at the UN General Assembly on October 22, 1971, Thanat as the Thai representative 
said that the question and reality of Chinese representation was felt more by Thailand due to 
its proximity. As he put it, ‘We are, in fact, dealing with something that touches upon tenuous 
threads of Asian political life as well as the precarious balance of forces both within the Asian 
and Pacific region and in the outside world’. He emphasized the principle of universality in his 
speech, noting that the principle had been invoked to justify the seating of Beijing. Thanat 
stressed that the same principle should be applied with equal force to the 14 million people of 
Taiwan. As he asserted, ‘any proposal which would result in the denial of representation of that 
entity in the UN is an unavoidable infringement of the very same principle and will not bring 
us any nearer to the goal of universality of membership of the UN’.143 Beijing’s entry, even on 
its own terms, could not undo the reality of Nationalist China. For Thailand, dual representation 
was the only logical solution at least in the short term, until the Chinese people themselves 
could resolve the question for themselves. As Thanat put it,  
 
That is why my Government has decided to support the representation of the People’s 
Republic of China in both the Assembly and the Security Council. If, however, we also 
support the continued representation of the Republic of China in the Organization, it is 
because Thailand has had friendly and normal relations with [Taiwan] and there is no 
valid justification to do away with them.144    
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Thanat stated that ‘ultimately it should be recognized that divergence between the Republic of 
China and the People’s Republic of China is strictly a Chinese affair and must and can only be 
resolved by the Chinese people themselves, certainly not by outsiders or even the UN’. Finally 
he expressed the hope that the peoples of the United Nations ‘will live as one world united 
under the sign of universality’.145 Thailand thus supported China’s UN admission despite 
wanting the representation of Taiwan to continue.  
On October 25, following the defeat of the American resolution, the General Assembly 
voted overwhelmingly to admit the PRC into the UN and expel the Republic of China under 
the Albanian resolution, by a historic 76-35 vote. Sino-US rapprochement – most notably, 
Henry Kissinger’s second and public visit to Beijing in October during the UN sessions and 
the announcement of Nixon’s impending visit to Beijing – was one of the key factors in 
securing the vote. Rather than voting against the Albanian resolution, Thailand abstained.146 
Thanat explained Thailand’s decision by claiming that, first, this was a prearranged 
government decision to record an abstention if the US ‘important question’ resolution was 
defeated.147 Second, he also claimed that the abstention was not a signal of opposition to 
Communist China’s entry, but an objection to the expulsion of Taiwan.148 As he put it later, ‘If 
we had voted against the resolution, we would have been down on record as against admission 
of the PRC to the UN’.149 On a practical level, following China’s UN entry, Thailand would 
have to allow Mainland Chinese delegations into Bangkok for meetings of the UN Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and other United Nations bodies. 
China’s admission to the UN brought forth an increased pressure on the Thai 
government to readjust its foreign policy towards Mainland China. The Thai public opinion 
clamored for improved relations with Beijing. Also, three Members of Parliament, including 
Khaisaeng Sooksai (Peoples Party; Nakhon Phanom), Sanam Thirasrichote (Socialist 
Economic Front; Khon Kaen), and Somkid Srisangkom (Social Democratic Party; Udon Thani) 
sent a cable to Chairman Mao Zedong congratulating him on the PRC’s admission.150       
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Shortly after the UN meeting in late October, Thanat had a stopover in Rome on his 
way back to Bangkok where he was granted an audience with Pope Paul in the Vatican. One 
Thai newspaper, Phim Thai, reportedly claimed that Thanat, accompanied by Major General 
Chatchai Choonhavan, Ambassador to Switzerland and Yugoslavia, would make a secret trip 
to Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese leaders.151 Thanat denied a rumor that he would make 
any trip, like Kissinger’s secret trip, to Beijing on his return to Thailand.152 When asked by 
reporters whether it was true that Foreign Minister Thanat had some talks with the Chinese 
trade delegation in Rome, Thanom replied, ‘Such a report was unfounded and Thailand would 
not take the initiative to trade with China in the immediate future.’ Questioned about what 
decision his government would make if China wished to open trade relations, Thanom replied 
that such trade would be certainly be beneficial to the country, but the government was not sure 
that China had the intentions to trade with Thailand. He insisted that a ‘wait and see’ attitude 
would be accurate in dealing with China for a time being.153 Due to the urgency of the changing 
international situation, Thanom asked Thanat to cut short his stay in Rome.154  
 
Upon his return, a meeting of the Thai National Security Council was held on November 3, 
1971 to discuss the Chinese admission. While Thailand continued to maintain friendly relations 
with Taiwan, Prime Minister Thanom raised doubts on China: ‘Red China has just been made 
a member of the United Nations and we still do not know whether she will respect the spirit of 
the UN’s Charter’.155 In an historic three-hour meeting on November 3, the National Security 
Council decided to establish friendlier relations with the Chinese. The Council agreed in 
principle to consider removing the ban on trade with Beijing by abolishing the Revolutionary 
Party Announcement No. 53; to relax existing anticommunist laws; and to allow visits to 
Communist China of invited sports and cultural missions. The Council reportedly approved of 
Thanat’s efforts to ascertain the Chinese government – either indirectly or through third parties. 
It identified the ECAFE annual convention during March 15-27, 1972 in Bangkok, as an 
opportunity for the first official talks between Thai and Chinese representatives.156   
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However, the National Security Council ruled out diplomatic relations with Beijing in 
the near future, and did not allow individual and political figures to visit Beijing.157 As Thanom 
proclaimed, ‘The softening of the government attitude toward Mainland China is aimed at 
paving the way for further relations with that country after it has been admitted to the United 
Nations’. 158  He said that trade with China would only be allowed on a government-to-
government basis in the initial stages. Trade relations between private groups continued to be 
banned. Thanom confirmed that the Government would continue to fight Communist 
infiltration and insurgency, but would no longer consider China as the ‘enemy of the nation’.159     
Although the NSC, led by the military elite, had signaled the necessity of foreign policy 
transformation, its ultimate aim remained the same: the cautious, ‘go-slow’ diplomacy. Many 
military leaders vocally echoed this stance. General Praphas Charusathien, Deputy Prime 
Minister, stressed that there could be no friendly diplomatic relations unless the ‘war of national 
liberation against Thailand’ was renounced: ‘We have not shown any hostility towards Beijing. 
But the Chinese Communists have been supporting the insurgents here’.160 He commented that 
the admission of Communist China into the UN did ‘not mean that Thailand should at once set 
up diplomatic relations with Beijing’. On the contrary, it ‘should be taken calmly, as a matter 
of course’.161 Praphas said that the Thai government would move towards a ‘status of relations 
on a basis of equality’ in a stage-by-stage strategy. In its step-by-step plan, the Thai government 
would first permit social contacts between Thai diplomats and Communist Chinese officials. 
Evaluating Beijing’s attitude from the response of the Chinese officials at informal meetings, 
the government would then consider the next move, namely the exchange of sport teams, such 
as table tennis or ping-pong. Subsequently, it would discuss other cultural exchanges. Praphas 
said that when the development of informal relations proved satisfactory, the government 
would consider the advantages and disadvantages of trading with Mainland China. At the 
outset, he would not allow any private companies to trade with Beijing directly, but through 
government agencies. As he put it, ‘We will not plunge into trade with any country if it looks 
like we are going to import much more than export’.162 Only when the government considered 
it time to trade with Mainland China, would it take the necessary legislative measures to 
abrogate Revolutionary Party Announcement No. 53. There were, for Praphas, ‘two kinds of 
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people’, who wanted Thailand to immediately establish diplomatic relations with Beijing: 
‘those who are panicky and those who are ignorant’. Both these people ‘want Thailand to go 
to Beijing and kowtow to the Chinese leaders’.163    
Thanat, on the other hand, now sought to expedite diplomatic talks with the Chinese. 
Having been informed of China’s readiness and willingness to enter a dialogue with Thailand 
by what we now know was the French, Thanat declared humorously,  
 
We will meet the Beijing representatives any place mutually convenient except, 
perhaps, the North and the South Poles’. Instead of contact via third parties, the direct 
dialogue would be conducted on an ambassadorial level, which was ‘the most 
appropriate level of contact at the moment.164  
 
 ‘We will’, Thanat continued, ‘inform the People’s Republic of China that we wish to live in a 
peaceful, neighborly fashion with all countries. We would like to see peace in the neighborhood 
and no interference from the outside’. With regard to the Chinese demand on Thailand to sever 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Thanat said, ‘we will have to find out how categorical, 
absolute, relative, inflexible or flexible the Chinese Communists are on this matter’.165 He 
hoped that rapprochement with China would decrease support of the Communist insurgents in 
Thailand.166         
However, referring to reports that Mainland China had begun to show interest in a 
dialogue with Thailand, Thanom had doubt that he did not quite understand Beijing’s real 
attitude because the response was mainly made through a third party.167 In short, the military 
leaders remained skeptical about the emerging discourse of détente with China. On November 
17, 1971, Thanom launched a coup d’état against his own government, ousting Thanat from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Heightened discursive anxiety ended with the pre-existing 
Cold War hegemonic discourse outgrowing détente.   
 
The military coup in November 1971 put an end to the three-year secret diplomacy led by 
Thanat Khoman, whose aim was to contact the Chinese and ascertain the conditions of 
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possibility for détente. For the military elite, it was needless to hasten diplomatic ties with 
Communist China. However, as the following chapter will demonstrate, the process of Sino-
Thai dialogue was deferred, rather than deterred. One significant discursive shift emerged: 
détente with China. That is, Thailand began not to regard China as the ‘enemy of the nation’, 
as Premier Thanom himself put it. Personal contacts between Thai and Chinese diplomats also 
began and increased at the UN.    
 
4.4. Conclusion  
In an interview in the Bangkok Post in early November 1971, Pridi Phanomyong said in Paris 
that he urged the Thai government to recognize the PRC immediately. He was quoted as saying 
‘the period of wait-and-see has ended. The time has come for a decision.’ Thailand, he believed, 
‘has already waited too long.’ ‘Now that People’s Republic of China has been voted into the 
rightful place in the United Nations by the overwhelming majority. It is placed in an 
advantageous position over us in any negotiations on diplomatic or any other relations’. 
Because China was recently recognized as a de facto and de jure big power, Thailand, as ‘a 
small nation’, could ‘exercise the balance of power by close friendly relations with all the big 
powers’ and ‘all nations, irrespective of ideological differences’. ‘We must be friends of all 
and foes of none’. Pridi contended that ‘let us remember the ancient Thai saying about going 
into the jungle with the courage to face a tiger’.168  
This chapter has shown the diplomatic practices of flexible diplomacy with the two 
Communist powers by détente proponents, especially Thanat. The latter shaped critical events 
and bettered the international situation between Thailand and the Communist powers. Their 
diplomatic practices set a condition of possibility for a more comprehensive détente. In other 
words, détente rendered many practices, which had previously been unthinkable, possible. This 
included trade and air transport relations with the Soviet Union, and the back-channel contacts 
with the PRC. Détente marked the beginning of a shift from a logic of enmity to a logic of 
friendship. The next chapter will situate Thai détente within the domestic context of power 
struggle. It was a clash of discourses between the hegemonic discourse of Cold War militarism 
and the emergent discourse of détente. This precipitated the coup in 1971 that, as this thesis 
argues, deferred, rather than deterred, flexible diplomacy.  
 Before proceeding to the next chapter, the different natures and characteristics between 
Thai-Soviet and Thai-Chinese relations should be noted, as follows. First, the Thai state in the 
                                                          




Cold War considered the Soviet Union and the PRC to pose differing degrees of threat 
perceptions. That is, Thai elites normally perceived the PRC as a primary threat to national 
interest while seeing the USSR as a lesser one. This was largely because the Chinese directly 
supported the Communist insurgency in Thailand. Second, the USSR and China had different 
diplomatic histories with Thailand. On the one hand, Communist China did not have diplomatic 
relations with Thailand, and, more importantly, the latter established and maintained close 
relations with another China, namely Taiwan. On the other hand, despite brief non-relations 
after the Bolshevik Revolution, Thailand had continual and business-as-usual diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union from 1941, with the exchange of their ambassadors since the 
end of the Second World War. Third, in Thailand, there were very few Russians, while there 
were a large number of ethnic Chinese who had long been present, and to an extent had 
assimilated with the local Thai people. In this sense, relations with China was perceived both 
as an opportunity (of a cultural and commercial interconnectedness) and danger (of being threat 
of communist infiltration). These differences between these two bilateral relations in large part 
explain how and to what extent Thailand’s diplomatic practices toward the Soviet Union and 
China proceeded at different paces, at least at the beginning: the way in which the 
rapprochement with China was far slower than the readjustment with the Soviet Union. The 







1971: A Coup against Diplomacy?  
 
‘The decision to send Prasit [Kanchanawat] and the ping-pong team to China [in 1972] 
is a major turning point in the process of redirecting Bangkok’s policy toward Beijing 
that was inaugurated by former foreign minister Thanat in 1968’. – Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)1  
 
On November 17, 1971, the Thai military junta, led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, 
launched a coup d’état against itself, ending the short-lived democracy. One of the first acts of 
the new regime was to oust Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Over the previous three years, an emerging discourse of détente had challenged the 
existing hegemony of Cold War rhetoric. The military and conservative elite remained deeply 
committed to the certainties provided by pro-Americanism, anticommunism and antagonism 
towards the Soviet Union and China. Proponents of détente, led by Thanat, questioned these 
certainties. Adjusting to a shift in global and regional power relations, they sought alternative 
diplomatic practices. Both within the elite, and through popular channels, they spoke openly 
about a new ‘flexible diplomacy’ and in doing so instigated what might be described as a series 
of ‘discursive struggles’. While existing scholarship has tended to characterize the 1971 coup 
as a coup against democracy, this chapter sees it equally as a coup against diplomacy.2 The 
dismissal of Thanat as Foreign Minister was a clear attempt to pull back from the move toward 
détente. 
However, by early 1972, détente was an international phenomena driven largely by the 
United States, China and the Soviet Union. In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon 
made his famous visit to China, and formally established a course toward Sino-US 
rapprochement. By then, the authority of new discursive practices within Thailand was already 
partially secured. This chapter demonstrates how the post-1971 military regime was, implicitly 
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if not explicitly, hemmed in by the discursive practices established prior to the coup. What 
began as an attempt to halt the progress of détente saw ‘flexible diplomacy’ continue but at a 
reduced pace. While a more formalized approach toward normalizing relations was put on the 
backburner, developments such as ping-pong and economic diplomacy ensured. In truth, the 
coup only deferred rather than deterred Thai détente. By 1972, the process of Sino-Thai 
rapprochement was, therefore, already well established. 
 
5.1. Discourses at War  
This section situates the newly emerging discourse of détente within the discursive struggles 
of Thai politics between 1969 and 1971. In particular, it focuses on the respective tussles that 
took place within the cabinet, between Thanat and the House of Parliament, and between 
Thanat and the press. It argues that these struggles were not simply between détente proponents 
and opponents but between those who championed a cautious approach to détente, compared 
with those who sought rapid progress, especially within Parliament. I argue that these 
discursive struggles set the conditions that made the November 1971 military coup possible.   
The discourse of détente with the communist powers, initiated by Thanat, triggered 
policy debates and contestations among the Thai elite. This was particularly true within the 
military, who remained largely committed to the existing discourse of anticommunism. The 
general perception of the Thai ruling elite about rapprochement with China was one of 
skepticism, largely due to lingering suspicion over Chinese support for the Communist Party 
of Thailand (CPT). Deputy Prime Minister General Praphas Charusathien stated in January 
1971 that ‘as long as I remain in office, I would follow the present policy towards Beijing’, and 
‘would not stand on two boats.’3 For him, Thailand would not recognize both the PRC and 
Taiwan at the same time. The government’s position was further expounded by Thanom’s 
younger brother and Deputy Foreign Minister, Sa-nga Kittikachorn, who said that ‘as long as 
Beijing pursues a hostile policy towards Thailand it would be “too early” to plan any change 
in the existing policy’.4  
The emerging discourse of détente was also further complicated by the new domestic 
context of democratization. That is, the promulgation of the eighth Constitution in June 1968, 
and its concomitant parliamentary election, held on February 10, 1969. This unleashed political 
debate and free speech both within political parties and the public sphere. While the military-
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dominated Sahaprachathai (United Thai People’s Party: UTPP), coupled with other pro-
military parties, controlled Parliament, other political parties that had been banned in 1958 
were extremely active in questioning and criticizing various areas – including foreign affairs. 
Regarding détente, ‘the most important problem’, as one local newspaper put it, was ‘that 
rapprochement with Red China remains ambiguous. So far it was not understandable. Some 
say this and some say that. It is hard to apprehend.’5 That said, it was the confused and mixed 
messages of the government’s stated policies on the PRC that brought about the debate in the 
first place.    
The main target of this debate was Foreign Minister Thanat, who reacted and responded 
to those who criticized détente in a temperamental manner, exacerbating an already fierce 
debate. This was no doubt made worse by the fact that in a semi-democratic regime, Parliament 
was more comfortable attacking the military regime’s foreign minister than the military leaders 
themselves.   
Moreover, the debate was not about Thanat per se, but was rather underpinned by 
discursive struggles concerned with how Thailand should respond to the provocative question 
of the Communist powers, and in particular the PRC. This can be represented in three sets of 
struggles: those between Thanat and the press, Thanat and the parliamentarians, and within the 
cabinet itself.  
The first struggle, the debate between Thanat and the press, had begun with the 
promulgation of détente policy towards the Communist countries, as shown in the previous 
chapter. The latest and perhaps harshest confrontation came to a head in May 1971 when 
Thanat made an allegation that certain journalists might have taken bribes from foreign sources 
or from local foreign embassies to attack his flexible foreign policy towards Communist China. 
Some reporters claimed the Foreign Minister linked the Siam Rath newspaper to his allegation.6 
This prompted Siam Rath publisher, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, to write a front-page statement 
demanding Thanat to name the ‘corrupt journalist or journalists’. He ended by saying that 
should the Foreign Minister fail to come up with the identification, ‘the people would not have 
confidence in Thanat Khoman as the Foreign Minister’.7  
The situation deteriorated when Thanat appeared on TV Channel 4 on May 19, and 
accused some journalists who had repeatedly criticized him. As he put it, ‘these newspapermen 
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have become the instruments of the aliens and have written reports antagonistic to government 
policy especially that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.8  The four Press associations – 
including the Press Association, the Reporters Association, the Journalists Association, and the 
Regional Press Association of Thailand – issued a joint statement demanding that Thanat 
should name the ‘misbehaving journalists’ while describing his speech as ‘an act of temper 
from a person unfit to hold the post of foreign affairs minister’.9  
This prompted Thanat to make an arrangement with the presidents of four Press 
associations in order to ease tensions. A ‘joint communiqué’, following their luncheon meeting 
was issued stating the Foreign Minister’s faith in the press. The supposed compromise 
nevertheless backfired when many reporters angrily claimed that the communiqué had been 
made without first consulting the associations’ members. The associations came up with their 
own version, claiming that the words ‘joint communiqué’ had been printed on top of the 
announcement without their knowledge. On the contrary, the spokesman of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Manaspas Xuto, announced that Press representatives had seen the words 
‘joint communiqué’ from the beginning, but this was denied by the Press associations.10 Some 
local newspapers maintained their criticism against Thanat’s policy towards China as well as 
his ‘hot-headed’ personality. Some even charged Thanat with having been bribed by the 
Chinese Communists.11   
In response, Thanat reportedly put strong pressure on the Thanom Government to make 
charges against three journalists. On June 7, 1971, the Police Department arrested Nopporn 
Bunyarit, Editor of Siam Rath; Kampol Vajarapol, Director of Thai Rath; and Prasarn 
Meefuengsart, a Thai Rath columnist – on charges of ‘defaming the character of a government 
official on duty’. Prasarn, alias ‘Krashae’ 12 , described Thanat as a very ‘temperamental 
person’, who was ‘unsuited for a position which requires a cool-headed person’, and pledged 
to fight for the freedom of the press to the end. Also, the four Press associations immediately 
held a meeting and decided to boycott Thanat in all newspapers by banning publication of all 
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interviews with, and pictures of, the Foreign Minister ‘until the controversy is settled or when 
the Foreign Minister’s term expires’.13 
This controversy dragged on for months until the coup in November. Despite the 
personal nature of the public wrangling between Thanat and the press, it was clear that the 
underlying tensions concerned the ongoing debate on Thai foreign policy towards China.    
     
The second debate was between Thanat and Parliament. Coupled with the Press, many 
Members of Parliament attacked Thanat’s temperamental personality, and urged the Thanom 
government to dismiss Thanat from his position. Once again, the underlying conflict was in 
regard to his policy toward China. Some Members of Parliament remained skeptical of the 
thaw in relations. Leader of Democrat Party, M.R. Seni Pramoj, for example, said that ‘you 
offer the Communists a hand and they grab your whole body. They don’t understand us.’ 
However, ‘China is there whether we like it or not, like the moon. Her entry into the community 
of nations is inevitable’.14 
In August, Thanat was questioned by MP Praseng Nuengchamnong (Independent, 
Chon Buri), who asked whether the Government intended to ‘take action against the Foreign 
Minister for having explicitly supported Communism through his declaration that he will open 
diplomatic relations with a Communist country (Communist China), without governmental 
authority’.15 Thanat made the observation that the question would violate the House Meeting 
Rules and Regulations, which precipitated a protest by a number of MPs who demanded Thanat 
formally withdraw his observation. Dissatisfied by Thanat’s replies, a group of over forty MPs, 
including those from the UTPP, walked out. They also pressured the Prime Minister to remove 
Thanat from the cabinet.16 The motion was withdrawn shortly after Thanom defended Thanat 
during a meeting with the UTPP. He claimed that Thanat had ‘carried out his functions and 
duties according to the government’s policy with the interests of the nation in mind. Every time 
before he leaves for an official trip, he always comes to me for policy’. Several MPs continued 
to argue that Thanat should control his bad temper if he wanted to achieve better outcomes in 
diplomacy.17  
However, a large number of MPs in both government and within the opposition parties, 
concurred with the discourse of détente and supported opening a dialogue with China. This 
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second discursive struggle was primarily, therefore, concerned more with both the extent and 
speed with which the Thai government should pursue the policy. A large number of 
parliamentarians put pressure on the Thanom government to expedite the Sino-Thai 
rapprochement in the form of commercial and diplomatic ties with the Chinese. In August 
1971, 70 Members of Parliament called upon the Prime Minister to repeal the trade ban on 
China on the grounds that the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 – which was initiated by 
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1959 to ban trade with all Communist countries, especially 
China – was not effective due to the unstoppable inflow of Chinese goods into Thailand.18 MP 
Yuang Iamsila (UTTP, Udon Thani) went further, suggesting that the Prime Minister should 
visit Beijing.19 Another MP also asked the Government to allow him to visit China, though 
Thanom told Parliament that he could not allow any MPs to go on a fact-finding mission 
there.20  
Parliamentarians found that the way in which Thanat and the MFA were dealing with 
the Chinese was neither fast nor efficient. In other words, Parliament favored a ‘go-fast’ [Pai-
rew] diplomacy as opposed to the ‘go-slow’ ‘wait-and-see’ attitude of the military regime. 
Unfortunately, Thanat’s form of détente was considered to be in the middle of these two 
diplomatic practices.   
After the Albanian resolution passed in the UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971, 
Thai representatives led by Thanat abstained, as discussed in the last chapter. Three MPs acted 
independently by cabling congratulations to Mao Zedong on China’s admission to the UN.21 
Some parliamentarians now called for the resignation of foreign minister Thanat due to his 
failure to vote with the international community. A motion, which was filed by MP Sanan 
Thirasirichote (Economic United Front, Khon Kaen) to convene an urgent session of 
Parliament to discuss foreign policy in light of the Chinese entry to the UN, stated that ‘Thanat 
should have already resigned because he blundered and should not be given the opportunity to 
continue doing so’. The motion also criticized Thailand’s support for the US resolution of the 
two Chinas in the UN, asserting that it was also against world opinion. The motion suggested 
that Parliament should be consulted before the government formulated a foreign policy. It was 
supported by many members from both the government and opposition parties.22  
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What made the debates in Parliament relatively distinct, therefore, was that rather than 
being concerned with whether détente should be pursued, they were more preoccupied with the 
speed of the process. It can be argued that criticism from Parliament was simultaneously both 
anti-Thanat and pro-détente. In this sense, strong voices in Thai Parliament were not as 
staunchly anti-Chinese, but rather pro-Chinese.     
 
The last and arguably most important struggle was within the cabinet itself. This was much 
more contested than is normally acknowledged. For Thanat, a high degree of confidence in his 
position, coupled with Thanom’s ‘greenlight’ signals and gestures of support, fueled the 
progress of a cautious rapprochement with the PRC. Well aware of the Cold War discursive 
hegemony, Thanat recognized the need to be discreet and to move cautiously within the 
military-led government. He routinely asserted that Thailand should not recognize the PRC 
until they had indicated their intention to curtail support for communist insurgencies in 
Thailand. 
However, the controversial figure of the Foreign Minister provoked public debate and 
strong criticism of Thai foreign policy toward the communist powers, which was deemed 
unnecessary for the military, and potentially reckless and dangerous to Thailand’s security and 
economic interests. By the end of May 1971, Cold Warriors like Thanom and Praphas, who 
were much more hesitant about the haste with which Thanat expedited the diplomatic process, 
specifically ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to follow a ‘go-slow’ [Pai-cha] diplomacy. 
They claimed that any contacts with China would be not possible until such a time that China 
ceased supporting insurgent movements in Thailand.23  
The Thai National Security Council chaired by Thanom decided against opening trade 
relations with Communist China.24 The Council was concerned that China would not separate 
trade from politics. Pote Sarasin, the Minister for National Development, asserted that ‘if China 
can treat its economic relations with other countries separately from political considerations, 
there will not be problems in trading with other countries. The question is whether or not Red 
China can do that’. Consequently, for Pote, it would be better for Thailand to be cautious in 
developing economic relations with China and only consider closer ties ‘when Red China 
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separates her trade from political issues’.25  The government’s go-slow diplomacy, as the 
Bangkok Post put it, ‘replaced a quickened pace to seek better understanding with Communist 
China’.26       
In early November 1971, when asked by reporters whether it was true that Foreign 
Minister Thanat Khoman had discussed establishing trade relations with a Chinese delegation 
in Rome, Thanom replied, ‘such a report was unfounded and Thailand would not take the 
initiative to trade with China in the immediate future.’ Questioned about what decision his 
government would make if China wished to open trade relations with Thailand, Thanom said 
that such trade would certainly be beneficial to the country, but added that the government was 
not sure that China had such intentions. He insisted that a ‘wait and see’ [Ror-doo] attitude 
would be most appropriate in dealing with China for the time being.27   
 
This thesis argues that the target of these triple struggles was primarily Foreign Minister Thanat 
Khoman and his version of détente. Discursively, there were struggles between three forms of 
discourse, namely anticommunism, a gradual détente, and a rapid détente. The discourse of 
anticommunism was spearheaded by military leaders while a rapid détente was supported by a 
number of factions in Parliament and a portion of public opinion. Thanat, who supported a 
gradual détente, was in the midst of these discursive struggles. 
By the early 1970s, as Suthichai Yoon of the Nation summed up, there were two broad 
rival ‘schools of thought’, regarding Thailand’s policy toward the PRC. One school clung to 
an existing Cold War hegemony and sought to ‘make clear to China that Thailand cannot 
possibly establish some sort of relations with her and sacrifice Taiwan, which has been a 
staunch ally for more than a decade’.28 Another school sought to consolidate a discourse of 
détente, which required ‘a total overhaul of the country’s approach towards China’.29 Given 
Thailand’s changing attitude toward China, which had not only been admitted into the United 
Nations but had shown ‘signs of willingness to establish some dialogue with Thailand’ through 
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third parties, this approach asserted the need for a more flexible diplomacy with China.30 This 
discourse consisted of those who preferred a cautious rapprochement and involved Thanat and 
the MFA, on the one hand, and those who urged for a rapid rapprochement such as a number 
of Members of Parliament, on the other.  
     
5.2. 1971: A Coup against Détente?  
On November 17, 1971, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn staged a coup d’état against his 
own government, and established military rule under the National Executive Council (NEC). 
He also took over the Foreign Minister job for himself. This section argues that the 1971 coup 
was not only a coup against democracy but more significantly a coup against diplomacy. It also 
asserts that while initially Thanom sought to freeze Sino-Thai rapprochement, changes in 
international circumstances, especially when Nixon went to Beijing in February 1972, made 
Thai détente inevitable. Détente continued, if reluctantly, on the same course.     
Upon seizing power, the military junta justified the coup on both domestic and 
international grounds. Domestically, the coup was to restore order and stability as well as 
efficient government: to ‘set our house in order again’.31  The underlying reason was to end the 
criticism from Parliament. It claimed that politicians were demanding economic development 
budgets for their local provinces, which in turn meant they sought to slash military budgets. 
Some members of the government’s UTPP were threatening to vote against the latter unless 
their development projects were allocated.32 
The criticism and obstacles of the parliamentary system annoyed the military.33 As 
Thanom stated in a press conference two days after the coup, ‘never, in my long political career 
have MP’s caused such trouble to government administrators as in these recent times. Some of 
them even attacked me over my private affairs.’ He blamed the country’s troubles on those 
‘self-seeking politicians who had interfered too much in the government to the point where it 
could not function smoothly and properly’. Thanom came to the conclusion that ‘if there were 
no MP’s, government administrators would certainly work more smoothly and efficiently, like 
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the days during the time of the late Field Marshal Sarit [Thanarat]’. 34  In other words, 
authoritarian impatience prevailed over democratic intransigence.  
Thanom also cited the communist threat as justification for the coup. He warned that 
closer relations with China posed a threat, due to the large number of ethnic Chinese living in 
Bangkok who may have communist sympathies. As he stated, ‘the situation in the country 
could be turmoil because it will aggravate the existing terrorist infiltration that exists in every 
part of the country’.35 While abrogating the Constitution, the military junta declared war on 
crime, pollution, and late night drinking. They issued 47 major decrees, including dissolving 
political parties, abolishing local elections and prohibiting strikes.  
On foreign policy, Thanom first cited the need to forestall leftist pressure from MPs for 
immediate relations with China and the need to regain control of foreign policy for himself.36 
His task was then to ‘build up a stable government in full control of the country’, and to 
‘negotiate from a position of strength with the Chinese Communists’. The National Executive 
Council did not consider relations with China to be an urgent matter and believed there was no 
necessity for trade with the Chinese Communists or for diplomatic relations in the near future.37 
General Praphas, Deputy Chairman of the NEC, warned against any rush toward establishing 
relations with Beijing. He claimed that before the seizure of power, a small but growing number 
of people were advocating a pro-Beijing diplomatic policy, and to move ‘quickly’ to establish 
diplomatic and trade relations with the Chinese Communists.38  
It can be argued that the coup was intended to end the discursive struggles in Thai 
politics. The coup was an attempt to take absolute control over the direction of Thai foreign 
policy, especially towards the Communist great powers. While he had given the greenlight to 
Thanat’s détente, he was still reluctant to pursue détente with China. That is, he was constantly 
oscillating between the new discourse and a defense of Cold War discursive hegemony. He 
was clearly uncomfortable about the switch from an anti-communist strategy to a more flexible 
diplomacy. 
However, the change in US foreign policy paradoxically exacerbated discursive anxiety 
for the Thai military junta. On the one hand, Nixon’s ‘peace with honor’ in the Vietnam War 
meant, first, an increase in US troops in Thailand. By the spring of 1972, the number of US 
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troops in Thailand increased to 45,000. Second, the US used Thai air bases to expedite large-
scale and secret bombing in Vietnam.39 But, on the other hand, Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
pursued détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the PRC as leverages in its 
triangular diplomacy and vis-à-vis Hanoi. While the former actions seemed to reassure Cold 
Warriors, who were considered to be détente opponents, the latter raised doubts, complicating 
Thai foreign policy and the existing discourse of anticommunism. 
The most important event was Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in February 1972. After 
the long secret diplomacy and back channels spearheaded by Kissinger and his Chinese 
counterpart, Zhou Enlai, Sino-US rapprochement was looking increasingly like an 
inevitability.40 These changing contexts continued to press the Thai military junta toward 
improving their relations with China. A few months after the coup, the military junta 
announced, ‘If China is not hostile to us, we are ready to be friends and we will respond to 
them’.41     
Additionally, the process of opening discussions between Thailand and China was 
synchronized by both sides in 1972. On the Chinese side, the most radical period of the Cultural 
Revolution came to an end and domestic politics returned to normality. Zhou Enlai’s peaceful 
coexistence strategy towards Southeast Asian states was restored. This change from the 
Chinese side helped facilitate a fundamental reassessment of the prospect of a Sino-Thai 
rapprochement.42    
 On the Thai side, while the military regime under Thanom and Praphas had dismissed 
détente proponents such as Thanat, it implicitly followed a détente discourse. Though 
developing formal diplomatic relations with China remained a way off, due to lingering 
suspicion over Chinese support for communist subversion and insurgency in Thailand, the junta 
did agree to develop and discuss non-political topics such as sports and cultural exchanges as 
well as trade relations. At the same time, the Thai business community urged the government 
to permit trade with China.43 For example, Charoon Sibunruang, the President of Thai Chamber 
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of Commerce, said that ‘Thailand will gain a lot from trading with Communist China, since it 
is a huge market’.44 
By 1972, some Thai elite who had once been against détente with China, started to 
change their position. This was an unnerving position for Cold Warriors, including Thanom 
and Praphas. Faced with the new normal of global détente, they hesitantly continued with Thai 
détente. One of the key leaders, Pote Sarasin, signaled in June 1972 that ‘Thailand welcomes 
mutual friendly relations with China, including exchange of visits by sports teams and trade’.45 
In brief, the coup that at the outset had strived for halting détente resulted in going with Sino-
Thai rapprochement. Harnessed by the global transformation, détente discourse was resilient 
in Thai diplomacy.  
 
5.3. Détente Continued 
This section explores the ways in which the military regime continued the process of détente 
by engaging in sports and economic diplomacy with the PRC. When Chinese leaders invited 
the Thai ping-pong team to visit Beijing, the military junta readily dispatched a team, and also 
sent Prasit Kanchanawat as a special envoy to initiate a rapprochement with the PRC in late 
August 1972. Further sports and economic diplomacy followed. The section argues that though 
the military reluctantly progressed with détente, the status and role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs persisted as an established institution and remained strongly committed to the détente 
discourse.     
 
5.3.1. Ping-pong Diplomacy: Prasit Kanchanawat as ‘Thailand’s Kissinger’    
 
‘The small ping-pong ball has moved the big earth ahead’. – Zhou Enlai46  
 
The preliminary process of Sino-Thai rapprochement began with ping-pong diplomacy in 
1972. The PRC invited Thailand to send a ping-pong team to the first Asian Table Tennis 
Union (ATTU) Championships to be held in Beijing on September 2-13, 1972. After a highly 
contentious debate within the Thai National Security Council, Thanom made a decision to 
accept the invitation and dispatch a 20-member ping-pong team headed by Police Lt. General 
Chumpol Lohachala, Deputy Police Chief on Special Affairs and the Chairman of the 
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Badminton Association of Thailand.47 The total team included thirteen sportspersons and seven 
officials, including Dr. Veekij Viranuvat, a team doctor. One of the sportspersons, Prachan 
Kunachiva, told the Bangkok Post that ‘I have been told what [China] is like, now I would like 
to see for myself’. Most of them were anxious to see the ‘real’ Communist China.48  
Following initial footsteps toward US-China rapprochement, Thanom and Praphas 
wished to use ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ to sound out China’s attitudes and intentions towards 
Thailand. In particular they sought to question China’s alleged support for the CPT, and discuss 
substantive matters such as the prospect of trade relations. Praphas, a staunch anticommunist, 
nevertheless, warmed to the idea of Thai-Chinese rapprochement. As Maynard Parker 
explained in 1973, Praphas sensed ‘the importance of the China question to Thailand’s future 
as well as the personally lucrative aspects of trade’, and therefore ‘set about placing the reins 
of Thailand’s China policy in his own hands’.49  
Praphas appointed Prasit Kanchanawat, a Deputy Director of Economic Affairs under 
the National Executive Council, as an advisor to the team.50 Better known by his original name 
Hsu Tun-Mao, Prasit was born in Thailand to Chinese parents and briefly educated in Shanghai. 
He was a leading Chinese-Thai businessman, Director of the Bangkok Bank, and above all one 
of Praphas’s closest confidantes. Both the Thais and Chinese knew perfectly well that Prasit 
would act as a de facto special envoy from Thailand to launch a Sino-Thai rapprochement. 
Prasit was preparing for the possibility of informal talks with Chinese leaders on many major 
issues affecting Sino-Thai relations, including China’s support for Communist insurgency in 
Thailand, dual nationality of the Chinese in Thailand, the Taiwan problem, trade, and Chinese 
representation at the ECAFE Headquarters in Bangkok. He was also expected to inform 
Chinese leaders that Thailand welcomed peaceful co-existence, and sought to resurrect the 
Bandung spirit of 1955. 51  Praphas also presented ping-pong team leader Chumphol, and 
advisor Prasit, to King Bhumibol at Chitrlada Palace. The King expressed his approval of ping-
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pong diplomacy for ‘social contacts between fellow human beings’. However, he advised his 
audience to remain aware of the fundamental political and ideological differences.52  
Before leaving for Beijing, Prasit asked Warnwai Phathanothai to act as personal 
contact with the Chinese. Warnwai, the son of Sang Phathanothai who was a prominent 
politician during the Phibun government, had been sent to Beijing in the mid-1950s at the age 
of twelve, together with his eight-year-old sister, Sirin. Both were brought up under Zhou 
Enlai’s patronage as a symbolic part of Field Marshal Phibun’s ‘secret diplomacy’ with China. 
At Warnwai’s insistence, Praphas had put his consent in writing, authorizing Prasit and 
Warnwai to contact Chinese leaders. In Prasit’s words, this was ‘so that my mission may 
achieve, in the best way, the results which are expected, I would like to ask Mr. Warnwai 
Phathanothai to go to Beijing ahead of me, in order to make initial contact, explain the nature 
of our mission and to arrange the necessary meetings with Chinese authorities’.53 This letter 
served as a guarantor for his own security. Due to the changing political situation in Thailand, 
where the anti-communism act remained intact, Warnwai feared that he might have been 
labeled a ‘communist’ and thrown into jail, as his father, Sang, had once been.54   
 
On August 12, 1972, Warnwai was sent to the United Kingdom to make contact with the 
Chinese government through the Chinese Embassy in London. He also sought to confirm the 
arrangements for Prasit’s trip. According to Warnwai’s younger sister, Sirin Phathanothai – 
who had stayed in London with her British husband after fleeing Beijing during the Cultural 
Revolution – it was her that arranged the meeting.55 Just ten days before the ping-pong team 
travelled to Beijing,56 Sirin had made contact with Yu Enguang, chief of Xinhua News Agency 
in London, who helped arrange the meeting with Ambassador Song Zhiguang. After she 
elaborated Prasit’s trip, Ambassador Song said he would convey the message to Premier Zhou 
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Enlai. In the meantime, Warnwai discussed with Pei Jiangzhang, the Chinese embassy 
counselor, in detail.57  
Warnwai informed Pei that the Thai government sent Prasit to sound out Chinese 
attitudes toward Thailand and seek to develop contacts. He asked if there might be an 
opportunity for Prasit to meet with Chinese leaders and, if so, whether Prasit would be able to 
discuss mutual problems as well as build mutual understanding for the future. Given that 
Prasit’s trip was not a normal sports exchange, but political, Pei then asked why General 
Praphas had given an interview in which he had claimed that this visit had nothing to do with 
political negotiations. Warnwai responded that Thailand did not know the precise nature of 
Chinese intentions, and feared that should things go wrong. Praphas would have lost face had 
the result turned out unfavorably. He affirmed to Pei that this trip was definitely about political 
negotiations: ‘because everyone in Thailand knew well that Prasit had no particular duty in the 
Thai Table Tennis Association and seemingly could not play ping-pong at all’.58   
The Chinese had only one reservation: the status of Taiwan. As Pei told Warnwai, 
‘China has only one vital condition in establishing relations with foreign countries, namely, 
that they recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole government 
of one China. Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and governments must be ready to sever 
any diplomatic relations they have with Taiwan’.59 He then asked what the government’s 
attitude on this matter was. Warnwai replied that he had not been authorized to express an 
opinion but assured Pei that Prasit would be empowered to discuss further details.  
In her memoir, ‘The Dragon’s Pearl’, Sirin recalled that, ‘a couple of days later, Yu 
Enguang called. From his voice I knew the news was positive.’60 On August 18, Warnwai was 
invited to the Chinese Embassy in London, and met Ambassador Song Zhiguang. The latter 
conveyed a message from the Chinese government: ‘The government of the People’s Republic 
of China wishes to inform the royal government of Thailand that it warmly welcomes Mr. 
Prasit Kanchanawat and his advisors Warnwai and Sirin Phathanothai as special guests of the 
Chinese government’.61 Song also told Warnwai that he was ‘delighted to see better and 
friendly Sino-Thai relations, starting with ping-pong diplomacy’.62  
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Prasit led the ping-pong team to Beijing between August 24 and September 10, 1972, 
and was well received as a special state guest, despite there being no formal diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. According to Cheng Rui-sheng, then Deputy Director of Southeast 
Asian Division of the Chinese Foreign Ministry – who would be a liaison and personal contact 
with Thai Foreign Ministry officials in developing Thai-Chinese relations in the years to come 
– the Chinese government treated Prasit as a ‘special envoy’. 63  In Beijing, Prasit was 
accompanied by Cheng Rui-sheng, as well as Warnwai and Sirin Phathanothai, who served 
sole translator in all official meetings.64  The Chinese also provided Prasit with the same 
‘Hongqi’ car that had carried US President Nixon in early 1972.65       
 Prasit met with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders, including Deputy 
Foreign Minister Han Nianlong, Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Li Qiang and Director 
of the World Peace Committee Liao Chengzhi.66 Though fluent in Mandarin, Prasit spoke in 
Thai while Sirin translated into Chinese. The first meeting was between Prasit and Liao on 
September 1 at 16.00 pm. Prasit began the conversation by stating that ‘there is an old Thai 
saying “Chinese and Thais are not strangers to each other but brothers”. From this point of 
view, there should be no problem in our relations’. ‘If there was any problem’, said Prasit, it 
was because sometimes it was ‘necessary for Thailand to link itself with other countries, 
especially with the United States and Taiwan after World War Two. Perhaps it is best not to 
discuss that so as not to arouse antagonisms’.67  
Liao said that ‘the international situation had been changing rapidly. US President 
Nixon had visited Beijing.’ He also provided the example of Sino-Japanese relations, which 
had taken 20 years to establish in the post-war period. He said he wished Sino-Thai 
rapprochement would not take such a long time. Moreover he stated that it was ‘not quite 
correct to say that Thailand had no relations with China. In fact during the Phibun 
administration we had initiated contact for a while’. Pointing to Warnwai and Sirin, ‘once, with 
Prime Minister Phibun, we had good people-to-people relations. They came to China when 
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they were children in 1956, they studied, and they grew up here’. ‘We had trading contacts’, 
Liao continued, ‘and many Thai delegations paid visits to China.’68  
 Prasit said Thailand was not yet ready to normalize relations with China. First, the Thai 
alliance with the US made it difficult. Second, Thailand was still afraid of Chinese ideological 
promotion and support for communist insurgency in Thailand. He emphasized that the Thais 
were a peace-loving, Buddhist people, with a monarchy. Liao replied, that was a domestic 
problem for Thailand but it was not quite accurate that Thailand was a peace-loving country. 
‘The Thai people were, but what of the Thai soldiers in Laos and Vietnam? Why was Thailand 
so afraid of China? In its long history, had China ever sent troops to Thailand?’69 While China 
supported the peoples’ revolution around the world, he stressed that revolution was not a 
‘product that can be exported’. According to Liao, a fear of China was ‘pure nonsense’. Liao 
asked Prasit to ‘tell the Thai people and government that we wish to be friendly with them. Let 
them come to China and see our country for themselves.’ Liao suggested that the two countries 
could begin with trade relations, and take sports, cultural, medical and scientific diplomacy 
step by step.70 Following the Liao-Prasit meeting, the Chinese government and the Asian Table 
Tennis Union hosted a formal dinner at the Great Hall of the People to greet all ping-pong 
teams.71       
During similar meetings with other Chinese leaders, Prasit initiated trade and cultural 
contacts with China. On September 2, at 16.00 pm, Prasit had a two-hour meeting with Deputy 
Foreign Minister Han Nianlong at the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Han Nianlong 
straightforwardly informed that China sought peaceful relations with Thailand, and wished to 
restore the relationship. The only criteria for the establishment of diplomatic relations was the 
recognition of the One China policy, meaning Thailand would have to terminate formal 
relations with Taiwan.72 He assured Prasit that if the Thai government was not yet ready to 
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establish formal diplomatic relations, China sympathetically understood the situation, and 
could wait until their relations had matured further.73 In the meantime, any contact should be 
based on commercial relations and cultural exchange. Han emphasized that the Chinese 
respected the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. In foreign 
relations, Chinese leaders emphasized that the relationship should be based on the Bandung’s 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.74  
Prasit also asked about the issue of dual nationality of overseas Chinese in Thailand. 
Han Nianlong, and subsequently Zhou Enlai himself, confirmed that his government did not 
support dual nationalities, but instead urged the overseas Chinese to assimilate with the local 
population, to adopt the nationality of the country they reside, and respect the domestic laws.75 
Han assured Prasit that the PRC ‘will not try to control overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian 
countries’. He asserted that ‘overseas Chinese should be loyal to the countries in which they 
live and obey the laws there’.76 Han also suggested to Prasit that, as a friend with goodwill, 
Thailand should withdraw its troops from Indochina.77 At the end of the meeting, Han stressed 
that China could wait for diplomatic relations when Thailand was ready, and that there was no 
obstacle from the Chinese side. In the meantime, Thai-Chinese contacts could be conducted on 
a step-by-step basis, starting with trade and sports exchanges.   
On September 4, at around 16.00 pm, Prasit met Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs 
Li Qiang. In a one-hour meeting at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Li told Prasit that China 
wanted to buy Thai products, such as rice, rubber, sugar, jute, gunny sacks, corn, and sorghum, 
and officially invited Prasit and a Thai trade delegation to the Canton Trade Fair in October 
1972. He said that the PRC was ‘interested in trade with Thailand, on a government-to-
government or government-to-people basis’. Prasit replied that ‘trade with China should not be 
difficult.’ He suggested that accounts could be opened in a bank in either country. After a year’s 
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trading, settlement could be made, with convertible currencies such as British Pounds, US 
Dollars, or Swiss or French Francs.78   
The Thai delegation was anxious about uncertainty regarding the meeting with Zhou 
Enlai. There had been no confirmation until midnight on September 5, 1972, when Liao phoned 
Sirin to inform her that Zhou would receive Prasit in the Sichuan Province Reception Room of 
the Great Hall of the People.79 During his 45-minute meeting with Zhou Enlai, Prasit discussed 
various Thai concerns. Zhou started the meeting by saying that the visit by Prasit and the Thai 
ping-pong team would be a good beginning for Sino-Thai relations and friendship. As he put 
it, ‘it was a good omen that we are shaking hands. We have opened our doors, and you are the 
first to come in’. Prasit replied by admitting ‘we feel somewhat awkward in our approach to 
you because of our long-term close relationship with Taiwan and the United States. We feel it 
will be difficult to cut off our relations with one side in order to improve our relations with the 
other’.80  
After reviewing the long history of Thai-Chinese relations, Zhou said that China 
understood Thailand’s position and sympathized with it. At the present moment, Zhou went 
on, ‘if there are obstacles to establish immediate diplomatic relations with us we are always 
patient, so we can wait.’ ‘But in the meantime, our two peoples can promote relations in other 
fields. Badminton and other sports teams may come. There may be exchange programs in the 
medical and scientific fields. We can also trade’.81 During Sirin’s translation, Zhou interrupted 
pointing to both Sirin and Warnwai to say that ‘they are part of the evidence for the existence 
of good relations between our two countries. They are now a sturdy bridge linking us together. 
Listen to her Chinese – she speaks Chinese with a better accent than mine.’ He continued, ‘So 
I hope that on your return you will inform your government that we understand its difficulty. 
And you know that in Indochina there must be peace. That war must end’.82   
In other words, Zhou strongly asserted that the Chinese wished to be friends with 
Thailand. As Prasit stated later, ‘China has opened its door to us, Mr. Zhou told me’. Zhou 
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welcomed ‘friendship on a basis of equality with Thailand’.83 However, China did not need to 
rush toward establishing formal diplomatic relations, and could wait until Thailand was ready. 
In the meantime, both countries could benefit from trade as well as cultural, and sports 
exchanges.  
Prasit also inquired directly about China’s alleged support for the CPT’s activities. 
According to Prasit’s biography, Zhou claimed that while China generally supported the 
peoples’ struggle for independence and freedom against imperialism, it did not interfere in 
other states’ internal affairs.84 Likewise, Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chairman of the National 
Executive Council, shared this topic with the US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, noting 
that ‘Prasit told the Chinese that the Thais were worried about terrorists. The Thai people … 
assumed that the Chinese were supporting the insurgents. Zhou said “we” had nothing to do 
with this but would continue to support freedom fighters’.85 However, the Thai government 
was ‘not yet certain of Chinese motives.’86 Last but not least, Pote confirmed that Premier Zhou 
sent warm regards to the Thai King, government leaders, and to Prince Wan Waithayakon, the 
former Foreign Minister whom Zhou Enlai had met at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung 
in 1955.87 Above all, Prasit’s historic meeting with Zhou, Pote Sarasin said, ‘was a correct and 
formal meeting’.88  
After spending two weeks in Beijing, Prasit flew back to Bangkok on September 10, 
while the remainder of the team continued the ping-pong competition.89  At Don Mueang 
Airport, he boarded a car at planeside to avoid reporters, choosing instead to report on his trip 
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directly to Thanom and Praphas.90 At a press conference at the NEC headquarters, Prasit 
announced the details of the meetings with the Chinese leaders, and provided his exotic and 
first-hand experiences of Beijing.91 Some named Prasit ‘Thailand’s Kissinger’.92   
In brief, Prasit’s visit to China was the first, despite informal, high-level meeting 
between Thai and Chinese leaders to begin exploring in earnest the possibility of improving 
relations. Symbolically, it was a stepping stone to subsequent contacts and meetings between 
the Thais and the Chinese. However, no concrete agreements were concluded during the trip. 
As Henry Kissinger summarized for the US President, ‘In August, talks in Beijing between a 
senior Thai official who accompanied the Thai ping-pong team and Zhou Enlai indicated that 
the PRC is now sufficiently interested in getting relations with Bangkok onto a different track 
to allow Bangkok to set the pace in moving the relationship in that direction. … Thailand, 
however, intends to move slowly and prudently. The Government recently approved a small 
delegation to the Canton Trade Fair this fall’.93   
 
5.3.2. Toward Trade Diplomacy  
The reaction of the Thai military elite to ping-pong diplomacy was mixed. For the first time, 
General Praphas Charusathien referred to Communist China as the ‘People’s Republic of 
China’. As he put it,  
 
We accepted the invitation to send a ping-pong team to demonstrate that we are friendly 
to all who are friendly to us and that we do not want to have any enemy. Because we 
have had no communications for 20 years, we decided to send as adviser to the team 
someone who knows the Chinese language and culture and who has a sufficiently high 
position. [Prasit] was welcomed with honor and was received by Chinese leaders of top 
levels.94  
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‘As a result’, Praphas said he was ‘satisfied’ not only on ‘the sports and cultural fields but also, 
unexpectedly, in the field of international politics. This is a good omen’. ‘We are thankful to 
the Chinese for their welcome but we have to think carefully of what we do now. After 20 years 
of separation, we should be sure that we make a good beginning’.95 
However, Praphas pointed out that ‘it is difficult to understand’ Zhou’s statement that 
China did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. He believed that ‘Beijing may 
have been changing its policy since its admittance into the United Nations and is reducing its 
intervention in other countries’. With regard to trading with China, Praphas said,  
 
At present, Chinese goods are smuggled into this country but they are also being sold 
legally. This is because goods seized by the authorities are sold by auction and 
merchants resell them in the market. … In future, it is likely that we will permit legal 
import of China goods and collect duty on them.96   
   
In other words, despite the fact that the Thai military was taking a major step toward 
improving relations with China, it felt there was no rush to establish full diplomatic relations 
with China anytime soon due largely to persistent suspicion and distrust of China’s role in 
supporting the CPT insurgency. Nevertheless, the government expressed interest in developing 
sports and cultural exchanges as well as economic relations.  
During his ping-pong trip to Beijing, Prasit Kanchanawat was invited by the Chinese 
Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, Li Qiang, to the Canton Trade Fair in October 1972. 
With Thanom and Praphas’s approval, Prasit headed the Thai delegation to the Canton Trade 
Fair. This 17-member delegation included Vicharn Nivatvong, Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Commerce, Pracha Gunakasem, Consul-General to Hong Kong, Wichian 
Pathommas, Trade Commissioner to Hong Kong, and key businessmen such as Ob Wasurat, 
the then First Vice President of the Board of Trade, Kiat Srifuengfung (Thai Asahi Glass), 
Pongse Sarasin (Coca Cola Thailand), Kiat Vadhanavekin (Thai Sugar Producers Association), 
Thavorn Pornprabha (Siam Motors Group), and Prasert Prasart-thongosoth (Bangkok 
Mechanical Co).97 This time, Thanom clearly instructed the trade delegation to convey the 
message to Chinese leaders that the Thai people were not hostile towards China.98  
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Before its departure, the team met Praphas at his Sukhothai Road residence. Praphas 
praised the trade delegation members as ‘the first group of merchants to visit the China 
mainland’: ‘After the Second World War, contacts were severed because of different ideologies 
and conflicts’. ‘We have to move with the changing world situation’, he said. ‘With the easing 
of the world situation, we must adjust ourselves. We had made first contact with the Chinese 
through accepting an invitation of the Asian Table Tennis Union to participate in an 
international competition’.99 As Praphas pointed out,  
 
We and the Chinese are turning our faces towards each other with peace as the prospect. 
… We felt that the atmosphere was good, and we saw the prospects of peace. The 
Chinese said that we could have peaceful co-existence if we have mutual trust and do 
not suspect or take advantage of each other. This is the way a dialogue should be.100     
 
Praphas specifically asked the trade delegation to ‘study the conditions for trade.’ 
However, ‘it’s not yet time for actual transactions. China’s trade is conducted by the state’. He 
also felt that establishment of diplomatic relations was not an urgent task: ‘We had been in 
touch with the Chinese for 800 years. Though we did not have diplomatic relations, we traded 
with each other’. Praphas highlighted Prasit’s report in which Beijing said that ‘diplomatic 
relations were not so very necessary at present. We should have contacts through sports, 
culture, education and trade first’.101   
Prasit also told reporters, who asked when actual trade with China would begin, that, 
‘it’s too early to say. We have only been in contact with China for one month. The matter is 
under study. Whatever we do we must consider our national interest as more important than 
anything else’. Thailand, he cautioned, was ‘a small country’: ‘We must work for survival. We 
will be friendly to those friendly to us, no matter whether they are a big power or small nation, 
or whether they have a different system from us’. ‘If the Chinese have goodwill towards us’, 
continued Prasit, ‘the opportunity for friendship and trade is great. We should not worry about 
losing in trade with China. Trade will have to go through a government organization’.102 When 
Vicharn Nivatvong was asked whether this trip to China would violate Revolutionary 
Proclamation No. 53 – which had banned trade with China since 1959 – he replied that the 
Decree would be amended in the future so that trade could be carried out more easily.103  
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On October 15, Prasit and his trade team attended the opening ceremony of the Canton 
Trade Fair, presided over by Chen Jia,  Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs. According to 
Prasit, the ceremony was marked by ‘fire-crackers, with no speeches or ribbon-cutting’, and 
the Thai delegation was given preferential treatment by the Chinese over other trade missions, 
including a banquet set up especially for the Thai trade members.104 Prasit met with Cheng Su 
Fu, Assistant Minister of Commerce, and Peng Chin Po, Foreign Trade Director-General. The 
latter told him that ‘the Chinese government is pleased to consider the purchase of Thai 
products available for export’.105    
After that, Prasit returned to Bangkok, while Vicharn Nivatvong continued to lead the 
remainder of the team to Beijing, where he met with Li Xiannian, Deputy Prime Minister on 
October 22. Li said that the Chinese understood Thai difficulties in restoring diplomatic 
relations with China and did not wish to rush the process. For the time being, he instead urged 
for a move toward informal relations with Thailand, including trade relations. Li suggested that 
the obstacle in establishing mutual trade did not originate with the Chinese, but with the Thais, 
largely because Thailand had not yet abolished Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53. Li 
therefore indicated to Vicharn that it was up to the Thai government to make a decision, while 
the Chinese were ready to trade with Thailand based upon the principle of ‘equality and mutual 
benefit’.106 During this visit, the Chinese apparently indicated an interest in purchasing many 
items such as sugar, jute, rubber, hard wood, and rice. For their part, the Thais indicated their 
interest in purchasing light manufactured items, fruit, and medicines.107  
After his trip to Canton, Prasit revealed that the Chinese were ready to trade with 
Thailand, yet in China such trade was conducted by the government. Thailand would have to 
set up its own government organization for the same purpose. He acknowledged that trade with 
China would narrow Thailand’s huge trade deficit, particularly with Japan.108 Prasit also said 
in his conversation with the US ambassador in November 1972 that ‘Thailand would begin 
trading with China as soon as arrangements for a formal mechanism could be worked out’. At 
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the same time, Thailand ‘preferred to set up a state trading organization’, which he believed 
would take at least two to three months to complete.109  
In an interview with the Bangkok Post, on January 23, 1973, Deputy Prime Minister, 
General Praphas, said that Thailand was willing to trade with China. ‘The Chinese can now 
place orders for any Thai product they require’, Praphas went on. ‘All they have to do is to 
contact the Ministry of Commerce and place their order and make their offers’. However, 
Praphas emphasized that Thailand would not ask the Chinese to ‘buy this and that’. He 
expressed the hope that the easing of tensions through trade and informal contacts ‘would lead 
to reduction or elimination of Beijing’s material aid for the insurgents.’110  
With Praphas’s reluctant endorsement, Commerce Minister Prasit encouraged 
applications from Thai firms to trade with China on February 21. However, only two 
applications were submitted, largely because the private sector feared that, given the existence 
of the anticommunism act, they risked being accused of communist sympathizers. They also 
remained uncertain about the extent of the government’s genuine interest in establishing 
commercial relations with China.  
During a press conference on March 22, Praphas asserted that the Thai government was 
prepared to trade with Beijing and would consider amending Revolutionary Proclamation No. 
53 in case the PRC made a request. However, he confirmed that, at this point, no proposal of 
this nature had yet been received from China: ‘At present there is no trade between the two 
countries and thus no change in the law will be made’. 111  
Praphas later admitted that ‘we are carrying out our policy to be friendly to all who are 
friendly to us. We have no hostility towards China and we want to be friends with the Chinese 
people. … However, their unfriendly action announcing support for communist insurgency 
makes us cautious about the People’s Republic of China.’112 He also suggested that ‘If the 
Chinese on the Mainland want to buy from us they may approach us and we will respond 
accordingly’.113   
 
Other developments in early 1973 helped facilitate Thai-Chinese rapprochement. On March 
20, for example, a Chinese medical team led by Professor Jang Wei-chun of Beijing Friendship 
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Hospital had a fifty-minute stopover at Don Mueang Airport. The delegation was comprised 
of seven physicians and one interpreter, and was en route from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) Convention in Geneva to a three-day WHO meeting in Manila. They met a team of 
Thai officials headed by Dr. Somboon Vachrotai, the Deputy Permanent Secretary of Public 
Health, and Dr. Veekij Viranuvat, who was the team doctor who visited Beijing during the first 
ping-pong delegation in August 1972. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested to the 
government that ‘medical diplomacy’ might facilitate a détente with China.114   
Another good signal was a commitment to initiate satellite communications between 
Shanghai and Bangkok by September, approved by the Thai government on March 28, 1973. 
This request had been made to the Thai Ministry of Communication by Beijing in January, and 
the rapid move to set it up was viewed in the press as a part of the progressive easing of relations 
with the PRC, albeit without precipitous abandonment of Taiwan.115 Deputy Foreign Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan even stated that ‘Thailand will do everything to have normal relations 
with the PRC short of diplomatic ties’.116 Chatichai also issued an invitation to the PRC to 
establish a permanent office at ECAFE in Bangkok.   
At the same time, the Thai elite voiced a growing irritation with the new Taiwanese 
Ambassador Admiral Ma Chi-chuang, who arrived in Bangkok in August 1972. Ma 
persistently made enquiries to both Thanom and Chatichai following a bout of intense 
speculation in the press that Thailand was on the verge of downgrading its level of 
representation in Taiwan from Ambassador to chargé d’affaires and the prospect of Thailand-
PRC rapprochement.117 This annoyed Chatichai, who publicly rebuked Ma  
 
whether Thailand is going to establish relations with Mainland China or not is an 
internal affair of this country. Whether the Government will change ambassadors or 
transfer them from one post to another is also an internal affair. No envoy stationed 
here has the right to make any enquiry into such internal affair.118  
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There was no doubt that Taiwan’s full diplomatic relations were numbered.  
By late 1972, therefore, the movement towards some kind of rapprochement with China 
had gained momentum, and the Thanom-Praphas government had concluded that peaceful 
coexistence with the People’s Republic of China was unavoidable. During this time, contact 
with Beijing increased, in the fields of sports and trade but there remained a reservation in 
terms of establishing formal diplomatic relations. As Praphas put it analogically in March 1973, 
Thailand should ‘not plunge headlong’ into trying to proceed with a dialogue with Beijing: ‘It 
is like a case of a young boy and girl. The fact that the boy has sent one letter to the girl does 
not mean that the girl should give herself to him otherwise it would be too quick. The girl could 
be accused of being too easy. We have to maintain our posture’.119            
 
5.3.3. Behind Sports Diplomacy: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stepped In  
 
‘I would contact China through diplomacy rather than ping-pong – though I am not bad 
at ping-pong.’ – Thanat Khoman, former Foreign Minister120  
 
This section examines the diplomatic practices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially 
in relation to sports diplomacy with China. This reactivation of détente led to the formation of 
personal relationships between Thai and Chinese diplomats that helped pave the way for the 
formal normalization of diplomatic relations in July 1975 to be discussed in Chapter 6.  
Before the 1971 coup, the MFA under Thanat Khoman had proactively launched a 
process of rapprochement with Beijing through so-called back-channel diplomacy. 
Specifically, Anand Panyarachun, the Thai Ambassador to the UN and the US, had made 
personal contact with the Chinese ambassador, Huang Hua, at the United Nations. After the 
coup, the Foreign Ministry was initially marginalized from taking a role in Thailand’s foreign 
affairs, and this was particularly true in relation to policy towards China. However, after the 
ping-pong diplomacy commenced, they were to resume duties. By late 1972, Thai diplomats 
reactivated their contacts with Chinese counterparts at the United Nations and in capitals 
around the world. Among others, the recently appointed Deputy Foreign Minister, Major 
General Chatichai Choonhavan, who was personally in favor of closer relations with the PRC, 
became an ardent advocate of détente.121  
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By mid-1972, the Chinese government clearly signaled its intention to move toward a 
dialogue with Thailand. The Chinese ambassadors in many other countries began to contact 
Thai ambassadors in order to promote friendly relations and build mutual trust. At first, 
however, Thai officials remained vigilant and aloof due to having received no clear instruction 
from Bangkok. In September 1972, the Chinese Ambassador to Copenhagen, Denmark, even 
invited Thai leaders to make a visit to Beijing. But Prince Prem Purachatra, Thai Ambassador 
to Denmark, did not actively respond.122 
At the United Nations, on October 5, 1972, the Thai delegation, led by Deputy Prime 
Minister Pote Sarasin and Ambassador Anand met Qiao Guanhua, Deputy Foreign Minister 
and head of the Chinese delegation at the Chinese Permanent Representative Office at the 
UN.123 According to Anand, both sides were ready to progress in the realm of trade as well as 
cultural, and sports exchanges in the short term, with governmental visits to follow later. In 
their conversations, they laid out key issues that directly affected their relationship; namely the 
Vietnam War, the Kuomintang army in Thailand, and the communist insurgency in Thailand. 
Anand grasped the centrality of anti-Sovietism in the Chinese worldview. By the end of the 
talks, they agreed that they would try to build a political atmosphere conducive to avoid any 
verbal attacks on each other.124  
In 1973, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a decision to convey Thailand’s 
readiness to initiate discussions with the PRC. MFA order No. 0100/371 was issued on January 
5 instructing Thai ambassadors around the world to approach their Chinese counterparts and 
communicate a willingness ‘to be friendly to every country that was friendly to Thailand’.125 
Thai diplomats in a variety of embassies including Stockholm, Tehran, Tokyo, Washington 
DC, Canberra, The Hague, Brussels, Madrid, and Consular Office in Karachi later telegrammed 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting their various contacts with the Chinese diplomats. 
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The Chinese Ambassador to The Hague announced that The Hague would be another contact 
point with Thailand and met with the Thai Ambassador, assuring him of Chinese interest in 
expanding contacts and interactions, and expressing its wish to cooperate with Thailand at 
international economic conferences. The Chinese insisted that they would not interfere in the 
domestic affairs of other countries, and urged the overseas Chinese in Thailand to obey local 
laws.126       
Both sides also met occasionally at international meetings such as the UN Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) meeting in Tokyo in April 1973. On April 16, 
the head of the Thai delegation, Dr. Boonrod Binson, Minister of University Affairs, met the 
Chinese delegation led by Director-General of Department of International Organization, 
Treaty and Law, An Chih-yuan. The latter expressed interest in establishing a permanent 
mission in Bangkok. According to Boonrod, the Chinese ‘asked how the Thai Government 
would feel if they were to send a mission to Bangkok.’ Boonrod replied that ‘ECAFE is a 
United Nations organization – this is not simply a matter between China and Thailand alone’. 
After the discussion, the Chinese explained that a Chinese study team would arrive in Bangkok 
‘sometime before September’ to make arrangements for establishing a permanent Mission to 
ECAFE. 127  They also discussed the possibility of exchange visits by economists and 
technicians. Both parties agreed to contact each other through the Chinese and Thai Embassies 
in Japan. In the meantime, Boonrod said that the Japanese acted as intermediaries with the aid 
of Suphat Thiensunthorn, Thai Ambassador to Japan, to facilitate this informal meeting.128      
At that ECAFE meeting, Cheng Rui-sheng, then Deputy Director of the Southeast 
Asian Division of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had a chance to meet Tej Bunnag, Director of 
the East Asian Division of the Thai MFA. Tej recalled that ‘This is the beginning of friendship 
between Cheng and me, which led to a series of negotiations between both Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs in Sino-Thai rapprochement’. Tej called it ‘corridor diplomacy’.129  
 This, so-called, ‘corridor diplomacy’ duly paved the way for the diplomatization of 
sports by the MFA, so as to achieve peaceful coexistence and détente with the PRC. Deputy 
Prime Minister Praphas allowed the sports exchanges between Thailand and China: ‘We do not 
regard sports as politics. We keep sports separate from politics.’130  
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The most important exchange was a Chinese ping-pong team led by Zhuang Zedong, a 
former three-time world table tennis champion who visited Bangkok between June 17 and 24, 
1973. This was the first Chinese delegation to visit Thailand since 1949. Chinese high-ranking 
diplomat, and Deputy Director of the Southeast Asian Division, Cheng Rui-sheng, 
accompanied the team as deputy head. 131  The team stayed at the Indra Regent Hotel at 
Pratunam, which was owned by Lenglert Baiyoke, the Chinese Thai businessman and a close 
confidante of Chatichai’s who would play a significant role as a liaison between Thailand and 
China over the next few years. The team was welcomed by members of the Thai Table Tennis 
Association, as well as the public at Don Mueang Airport. Tej Bunnag also greeted Cheng Rui-
sheng, who was said to be delighted to see his ‘old friend’.132     
On 17 June evening, a welcome party for the ping-pong team was hosted by the Table 
Tennis Association of Thailand (TTAT) at the Hotel. Its chairman, General Tem Homsetti, said 
‘this is a truly historic day. I welcome you most cordially on behalf of the Thai people.’133 The 
MFA officials including Arsa Sarasin, secretary to the Foreign Minister, and Suthee 
Prasasvinitchai, the Deputy Director-General of the Political Affairs Department, and Tej 
Bunnag also attended this party, and met with Cheng Rui-sheng. According to Cheng, Lenglert 
Baiyoke informed him that Major General Chatichai Choonhavan, Deputy Foreign Minister, 
wished to meet Cheng, and asked whether he agreed. Cheng readily agreed but stated he wanted 
the meeting to be informal, insisting that he should not go to the MFA itself.134    
The following day, the ping-pong team visited a crocodile farm at Samut Prakarn. 
Cheng Rui-sheng did not join them, but instead met with Arsa Sarasin, Suthee Prasasvinitchai, 
and Tej Bunnag at the Hotel. They had an informal working lunch, which lasted for three 
hours.135 Both parties openly exchanged points of view, identifying key problems in Sino-Thai 
relations as well as discussing the general situation in Southeast Asia. The Thais said that 
Thailand and China had maintained good relations since ancient times, and the Thai 
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government was glad to restore and improve Sino-Thai relations. Cheng replied that in the past, 
Sino-Thai relations were interrupted due to the international and regional situation, but the 
contemporary international situation had rapidly changed. He hoped that both sides would 
grasp this opportunity to develop contacts, and gradually restore relations step by step. Cheng 
also emphasized the Bandung five principles of peaceful coexistence, which respected 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 
He suggested that while China and Thailand held differing views about the situation in 
Southeast Asia, rapprochement would be beneficial for both. Cheng recalled that the informal 
meeting was held in a ‘friendly and sincere atmosphere.’136  
At night, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Minister of Agriculture and Vice 
President of the Thai Olympic Association, hosted a formal dinner for the Chinese delegation 
at the Indra Hotel. He said that sports exchanges between the two countries would lead to 
friendly relations. Deputy Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan was at the dinner and 
‘humbly and sincerely’ greeted Cheng Rui-sheng. According to Cheng, Chatichai was ‘a 
diplomat with a military background, who was military-like open, straightforward and 
generous, and at the same time diplomat-like prudent with good humor.’137  
The 18-member team did not meet Premier Thanom, allegedly because he held no 
position in the sports associations. Yet, on June 19, they did meet General Praphas, who was 
the President of the Thai Olympic Association at his Sukhothai Road residence. Praphas 
reiterated the Thai government’s position that ties with the PRC would begin if Beijing ended 
its support for communist insurgency as well as its radio attacks in Thailand.138 However, 
Praphas said that the visit of the Chinese ping-pong delegation brought about closer relations 
between the two countries, and ‘we will exchange other types of sports teams with China, if 
Beijing desires.’139  
On June 21, Cheng Rui-sheng was invited to a dinner with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan at his Soi Rajkru residence where they exchanged points of views. 
Chatichai put forward alleged Chinese support for the Thai insurgency, and Cheng Rui-sheng 
promised to take the issue back to the Chinese leaders.140 Cheng also invited Chatichai to visit 
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Beijing. Overall, ‘the informal meeting’, as the Thai MFA described it, was held in a ‘friendly 
and understanding atmosphere’.141   
 This ping-pong visit was particularly significant for the MFA because this was the first 
time the Ministry and its Foreign Deputy Minister himself were allowed to get to grips with 
the Chinese. For the Chinese leaders, relations were improving relatively fast since there had 
been merely 10 months between the inaugural visit to Beijing.142 The head of the Chinese 
delegation, Zhuang Zedong, told The Bangkok Post that the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan took more than two decades to establish diplomatic relations. However, ‘this does not 
mean that it will take such a long period of time to have ties between China and Thailand’. ‘Far 
from it’, he added. ‘But we cannot forget the fact that first things come first. Through sport 
exchanges, we learn about each other. Cultural exchanges bind us in closer friendship and trade 
enables us to help each other. Once we have known each other well then we will be in a position 
to establish diplomatic ties.’143  
 Premier Thanom gave an interview in which he said ‘Thais and Chinese have had good 
relations since ancient times. My government is glad that the Chinese indicate friendliness 
towards us. Our policy calls for us to be friendly to every country [that was] friendly to us.’ He 
went on to lay out the closer links between Thailand and China: ‘Last year the Chinese invited 
us to send a ping-pong team and then a trade mission. This year we permitted a Chinese ping-
pong team to come and play here. The exchange of sports delegations will improve 
understanding, beneficial to future relations.’ Thanom was aware that ‘there are some 
outstanding problems between the Chinese and ourselves. However, time, stability and mutual 
understanding will solve them.’144 ‘If informal relations are good’, Thanom said pointedly, 
‘they may lead to official relations in the future.’145   
  
Other sports exchanges also increased, particularly in 1973. For example, between August 7 
and 21, 1973, a Thai badminton delegation led by then Deputy Minister of Interior, Police 
Lieutenant General Chumpol Lohachala, who had headed the first ping-pong visit the year 
before, went to Beijing. Now however, he was accompanied by two high-ranking diplomats 
from the Foreign Ministry, Phan Wannamethi, Director-General of the Political Affairs 
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Department, and Tej Bunnag, Director of the East Asian Division.146 On August 13, Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping and Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong received the Thai 
delegation.147 Deng said that relations between China and Thailand had existed for as long as 
2,000 years and that contacts therefore ought to be continued in the future.148   
Later, Tej Bunnag disclosed that Thai Foreign Ministry representatives had extensive 
and cordial nine-hour conversations at a high level with Chinese Foreign Ministry officials in 
Beijing. The Chinese officials included Lu Wei-Jao, Director-General of the Asian 
Department, Cheng Rui-sheng, Deputy Director-General, Liu Yung-Chen149, the desk officer 
for Thailand, and Li Mok from the Foreign Affairs Friendship Association as an interpreter. 
Their talks were considered a ‘presentation of points of views’, rather than negotiations.150 The 
Thais brought up Chinese support for the Thai insurgency while the Chinese responded that 
the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese Government, dealt with the insurgents. The 
latter then raised the issue of Thai support for Kuomintang operations against China in the 
northern part of Thailand, indicating that both sides were even.151  
The Chinese brought up the alleged Thai government order to Nationalist China to close 
down their ten-kilowatt radio station at Mae Jan in Chiang Rai in North Thailand, and what 
they presumed was an intelligence operation, headquartered there. They then asked the Thais 
whether there might be a quid pro quo for the Chinese cessation of aid to the Thai insurgents. 
The Thai officials appeared unaware of the order, and said that they knew of no such 
intelligence operation.152 The Chinese also reassured the Thais not to worry about a road 
construction that the Chinese had constructed in Northern Laos.153 
With regard to Thai-Chinese trade, Chinese officials noted that while they were 
interested in trading with Thailand, Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 still hindered bilateral 
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trade, and strongly urged that the law to be rescinded completely. 154  However, Thailand 
refused, claiming that they would be able to amend the law to permit China to trade with 
Thailand.  
The Chinese informed Thai officials that the arrival of the PRC representative at the 
UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in Bangkok in September, as 
originally discussed, would be delayed because of a shortage of qualified personnel at the 
Chinese MFA, many of whom were busy with other UN duties. According to the Chinese, the 
representation would be in the form of a study mission to be followed by the establishment of 
a permanent office in Bangkok. The Thai officials stated that they would use this office like an 
embassy, to establish direct communication with China.155 
The Thais were generally unimpressed with Chinese understanding of Thailand. 
According to them, the Chinese appeared to form their opinions from reading some newspapers 
such as ‘Phim Thai’, ‘Siam Rath’, and ‘The Nation’. They suggested that the Chinese at least 
began reading ‘Prachathipatai’ as well.156   
Neither side raised the subject of the US military presence in Thailand.157 After the trip, 
Thai Director-General Phan Wannamethi disclosed to the press that China had not expressed 
any uneasiness over the American military presence in Thailand.158 Asked by the press whether 
Beijing objected to the US presence or indeed welcomed it as a counterweight to Soviet 
influence in the region, Phan denied that it was unsubstantiated.159 He also emphasized Thai 
diplomacy, which supported peaceful coexistence with all countries regardless of ideology.160  
According to Tej Bunnag, this meeting was ‘the most comprehensive exchange of points of 
view between Thai and Chinese MFA officials, and the basis for a rapprochement with the 
PRC in 1975.’161  
Shortly thereafter, between 26 August and 7 September 1973, another ping-pong team 
went to Beijing. The team was led by General Tem Homsetthi, chairman of the Table Tennis 
Association of Thailand. He was accompanied by Suthee Prasasvinitchai, Deputy Director-
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General of the Political Affairs Department, and Kosol Sindhvananda, first secretary at the 
Foreign Ministry.162 Both diplomats met Cheng Rui-sheng, Deputy Director-General of the 
Asian Department as well as Liu Yung-chen, and Zhang Jiuhuan, desk officers for Thailand. 
They further discussed a variety of international problems.163 In Bangkok, meanwhile, on 
August 26, General Pong Punnakanta, Minister of Transport, formally opened satellite 
communications services between Thailand and China. Via satellite services, Thai 
correspondents had an opportunity to interview General Tem Homsetthi, who was in Beijing.164  
 
In short, between 1972 and 1973, sports exchanges became more frequent and normal. This 
sports diplomacy was accompanied with regular informal meetings between Thai and Chinese 
diplomats. The development of close working relationships helped further progress towards an 
easing of relations. As Thanom said in a press conference in late 1973, ‘When people are able 
to visit one another, it creates good understanding, mutual sympathy, and compromises being 
reached in various matters both sides have joint interests in’, and ‘trade with the China 
Mainland will most probably be started in the near future’.165 
  
5.3.4. Amending the Law 
Following the trade and sports delegations to Beijing, the next step in improving Sino-Thai 
relations was to start trading with the PRC. The main technical obstacle was the Revolutionary 
Proclamation No. 53, issued by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1959 to ban trade with the 
Communist countries, especially China. The Thanom government repeatedly proclaimed its 
intention to revise or rescind this law, but by mid-1973 it had failed to act. In general, the 
benefits of trade with China seemed to be mutually recognized by leading power elites as well 
as by the Thai public. Charoon Sibunruang, former President of the Board of Trade, for 
example, said ‘I welcome trade with China and I don’t foresee any problems if trade is 
resumed’.166 Likewise, Ob Wasurat, as the current President of the Board of Trade, said in 
August 1973 that Thailand should have established trade relations with China much earlier. If 
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Thailand traded directly with the country, Ob believed that Thailand would reduce its 
dependence on Hong Kong and Singapore.167  
Within the business community itself, there was an internal debate between two factions 
over the best way to conduct trade with China. On the one hand, an idea described as state 
corporatism was spearheaded by Charoon Sibunruan and asserted that trade with China needed 
to be run by a State Corporation. This idea was also represented in various factions within the 
government, including the military and the Ministry of Commerce. Prasit Kanchanawat, 
Commerce Minister, proposed that such a corporation should be set up with a budget of two 
million baht.168 On the other hand, those who supported the idea of free trade liberalism saw a 
significant role for the private sector. The Thai Chamber of Commerce, headed by Ob Wasurat, 
wanted free enterprise and to open trade links with the PRC.169  
However, further improvement in Sino-Thai trading relations was delayed largely 
because of the reluctance to trade with the PRC on the part of the military government. This 
was caused by the persistence of an anti-communist discourse within military thinking. The 
Thanom government continued to favor caution in establishing trade with the PRC.170 By 
August 14, 1973, the Thanom government agreed in principle to amend, rather than abolish, 
Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53, only permitting government-to-government trade 
relations with China.171 In his speech to the National Legislative Assembly on September 6, 
Thanom briefly outlined government policy. While his government wished to trade with the 
Chinese government, he insisted that only when his government was convinced trading with 
China posed no security danger to Thailand, would he allow free trade to go ahead. Now, 
however, Thanom realized that it was inappropriate to trade freely with a country with which 
Thailand had no diplomatic relations. Skepticism of China had decreased, but remained intact 
due to China’s alleged support for the CPT. Thanom felt that a cessation of Chinese assistance 
to communist subversion and insurgency, and an end to clandestine radio broadcasts from 
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China against the Thai military government would be necessary before formal relations 
between the two countries could be established.172 By then, however, the idea of establishing 
diplomatic relations with the PRC had been tabled within the MFA.173    
In his meeting with US Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, in Bangkok 
in September, Thanom said that Thailand must develop its relationship with China very 
carefully, and not ‘jump in all at once’. He also permitted government-to-government trade 
relations with China, but emphasized that the government must avoid a situation in which the 
PRC could directly trade with individual Thai firms. Thanom made it clear that everything 
entering Thailand would be carefully checked, including financial transactions, to make sure 
that no funds went to the Thai communists.174  
The Thai government proposed three laws to the government-appointed National 
Legislative Assembly to establish the legal basis for trade with the PRC and communist 
countries in general, such as North Vietnam and North Korea. In order to permit goods from 
China to enter Thailand, the first law was to amend the decree by adding the words ‘except as 
approved by the Ministry of Commerce’ and to change ‘the Land of the Chinese Communists’ 
to ‘the People’s Republic of China’. The second law was to establish a state trading company 
with capitalization of two million baht within the Ministry of Commerce, to trade directly with 
China.175 The final law was to permit Thai civil servants to administer foreign trade with the 
People’s Republic of China.  
The proposal of these laws received an automatic first reading. The laws were then 
referred to the Legal Committee. In a press conference on September 19, Premier Thanom 
proclaimed that the amendment was readily passed in all stages by the National Assembly: 
‘The Ministry of Commerce is making preparations and this might take about 2-3 months, 
because it is necessary for preparations to be made in full to ensure smooth and satisfactory 
operation of trade when it is started’. ‘We must set up an organization or a unit to carry on trade 
at the government-to-government level’. As Thanom said, in order to preserve a proper balance 
of trade with China,  
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… under no circumstances must anybody be allowed to buy or sell anything as he 
pleases. All goods China offers to sell us will have to be considered by the Minister of 
Commerce first in order to decide whether we really need those respective goods 
quoted, as well as whether we could but them elsewhere at lower prices. After the 
Minister of Commerce considers that any goods are suitable, of good quality, and at 
lower prices than quoted by other countries, as well as that they are necessary for use 
in our country, then he will submit a report to the Cabinet for consideration and 
approval. He will not possess the authority to make any decision or reach any agreement 
on his own initiative. We are making all preparations in a careful and thorough manner, 
therefore this will take time.176         
 
This cautious road to trade with China instigated Chinese frustration. It was widely 
reported in the Thai newspapers that Chinese leaders were frustrated by the ‘inadequate’ 
amendment of decree 53. The amendment of the decree was ‘not sufficient’ since it continued 
to emphasize the requirement to be ‘hostile’ to Chinese communists.177 According to Thai 
MFA staff, the Chinese wanted the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 abolished. The Thai 
government desired to ‘avoid giving in to every Chinese request without obtaining anything in 
return’. In short, ‘The PRC had asked the RTG to abolish decree 53, the RTG compromised by 
merely amending it’.178 
The Chinese government was also annoyed by an incident that took place at the Dusit 
Thani Hotel in Bangkok on September 19, when Thai representatives’ walked out of an Asian 
Games Federation (AGF) executive committee meeting in protest against the expulsion of 
Taiwan. While the Thai government had announced its support for the PRC admission, the 
Thai delegation led by Luang Chattrakankson staged a walk out just before the Iranian vote 
which admitted the PRC and terminated Taiwan’s membership.179 It was clear that the Thai 
delegation was instructed by the government to vote for PRC admission to the organization 
and abstain on any resolution that admitted the PRC but expelled Taiwan. However, during his 
discussion with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua at New York, Chatichai was 
informed that the Chinese had taken no offence at the action of Thai Sports administrators. The 
talks were going ‘very well’.180    
 
To sum up, by 1973, laws facilitating trade relations between Thailand and China were in the 
making, and the prospect of establishing diplomatic relations was now firmly on the radar of 
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Thai leaders, or at least of those diplomats at the MFA. Rather than posing a ‘go-slow’ 
diplomacy, the Thanom government to an extent continued the détente strategy with the 
communist powers, which had been initiated by Thanat Khoman. Still locked in a Cold War 
mind-set, Thanom, Praphas and the conservatives remained skeptical of Chinese motivations 
and pursued a cautious road to détente. Tej Bunnag, then senior MFA official, recalled later 
that ‘we [the Thai foreign ministry] spent nearly three years trying to convince security officials 
to agree to build normal ties with the People’s Republic of China’.181 
However, on October 14, 1973, the military regime under Thanom and Praphas fell 
largely due to student-led demonstrations, coupled with internal conflict within elite circles.182 
The discourse of détente did not end. Rather, as the next chapter indicates, the process of 
democratization extradited the process of détente and the normalization of Sino-Thai relations, 
while the discourse of anticommunism appeared to be fading away. At the same time, the 
internal contradiction and tension between these two discourses persisted throughout the 
democratic interlude between 1973 and 1976.    
 
5.4. Conclusion 
‘The crisis’, as Gramsci put it, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’. In Thailand, 
the ensuing crisis of democracy and diplomacy, during the brief period of 1969 and 1971 
brought about an interregnum of full-fledged authoritarianism between 1971 and 1973. 
Thanom and Praphas launched a coup against their own government, dissolved the parliament, 
dismissed Thanat from the position of Foreign Minister, and deferred flexible diplomacy. At 
first, they appeared to pursue a ‘go-slow’ diplomacy with the communists. Subsequently, the 
changing dynamics of international politics, especially Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972, 
rendered the process of opening discussions with Beijing inevitable. This chapter has argued 
that there remained a persistence of the détente discourse with the PRC during this period of 
interregnum. Following the extraordinary ping-pong diplomacy, Thailand began the processes 
of negotiating trade links and developing other contacts. Throughout these processes, the MFA 
played an important role in negotiating with the Chinese, and inducing the increasingly close 
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working relationship and acquaintance between the two ministries and diplomats. While the 
foreign policy of détente was deepening and the prospect of Sino-Thai rapprochement was 
nascent, the legitimacy of the military regime drastically waned. The October 14, 1973 student-
led demonstrations marked the end of the military regime and its role in foreign affairs. The 
old discourse of anticommunism was fading away, yet a new discourse of détente had not yet 





A Diplomatic Transformation 
Chatichai, Kukrit and the Second Détente (1975-
1976) 
 
‘Our [foreign] policy changes considerably. Now, we can go to Red China and 
to Russia’.  – Chatichai Choonhavan, Foreign Minister1  
 
 
On October 14, 1973, the military regime of Thanom and Praphas was replaced with a 
civilian government. The ‘democratic interlude’ (October 1973-October 1976) that 
followed, facilitated a more open political climate where new realities could be 
acknowledged and put to the people. At the same time, the changing international 
environment made it possible for a culture of détente to flourish. Furthermore, the fall 
of US-backed regimes in Indochina in 1975 reduced American commitment to 
Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the end of the Cultural Revolution and the deepening of 
the Sino-Soviet split, saw China take a far less radical position in its diplomatic 
relations with Thailand. With the discourse of détente now deeply embedded in Thai 
politics, and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs able to take a far more active role in 
shaping foreign policy, those who supported the shift in relations were able to act 
decisively.  This culminated on July 1, 1975, when then Prime Minister, M.R. Kukrit 
Pramoj, and Foreign Minister, Major General Chatichai Choonhavan, established 
formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.    
This chapter elucidates how the normalization of Sino-Thai relations and 
ongoing improvement in Thai-Soviet relations followed the same fundamental 
principle: that the Communist powers could be friends rather than enemies. The first 
section argues that Thailand’s relations with the PRC continued to steadily improve, 
with ongoing petro- and sports diplomacy running alongside increasing trade. It closely 
examines a diplomatic revolution in Thai-Chinese relations, namely Kukrit’s visit to 
Beijing and the restoration of diplomatic relations, in detail. The second section 
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suggests that while Thailand had maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR since 
1941, better trade relations and a cultural agreement signposted a new approach to 
relations with Moscow.  
The chapter also recognizes that these changes created deep anxiety within Thai 
elite circles. As Benedict Anderson has explained, this period saw Thailand experience 
a number of ‘withdrawal symptoms.’ 2  US military withdrawal, changing class 
composition, and ideological upheaval precipitated a crisis for the existing Thai elite in 
a topsy-turvy world. To this, I would add the ‘symptom’ of the changed diplomatic 
environment, in which détente with the Communist powers gained momentum. On 
October 6, 1976, this anxiety would lead to mass violence, and a subsequent coup, 
which would prove the final attempt to reinvigorate an ultra-nationalist Thai 
administration, underpinned by a radical anticommunist discourse.    
 
6.1. Sino-Thai Rapprochement: Diplomatic Revolution  
6.1.1. Building a Necessary Foundation: From Petro- to Trade Diplomacy    
Following the ‘October revolution’ in 1973, King Bhumibol appointed the rector of 
Thammasat University, Sanya Dharmasakdi, to be the new Prime Minister. To meet 
popular demands, Sanya, with a middle-of-the-road personality, pledged to promulgate 
a new constitution and set out a roadmap for elections within a year. In foreign affairs, 
he negotiated the gradual withdrawal of American troops, and continued the détente 
strategy. In a speech to the National Assembly on 25 October he made clear that he 
would ‘take steps to further good relations with all countries which are friendly towards 
Thailand, including countries with different political ideologies’3 On the same day, the 
newly appointed Foreign Minister, Charoonphan Isarankhun Na Ayutthaya, stated that 
‘the government is opening the way for closer friendly contacts with the People’s 
Republic of China’.4 This policy toward China was largely driven by Major General 
Chatichai Choonhavan, who remained in position as Deputy Foreign Minister. 
 Government policy was now constrained by both popular demands to distance 
Thailand from the US, and the changing international situation. Most pressing was the 
                                                          
2 Benedict Anderson, ‘Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup’, in 
Exploration and Irony in Studies of Siam over Forty Years (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell 
University, 2014), pp. 48-49.  
3 Policy statement addressed by Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakdi to the National Assembly on 
October 25, 1973, Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol. XIII: No. 1 (August-October 1973), p. 28.  




global oil crisis in October 1973, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) drastically raised the oil price. It quadrupled by January 1974 to 
nearly 12 US dollar a barrel. The oil crisis seriously hurt the Thai economy not only 
due to the oil shortage, but also by pushing domestic prices up to 20 percent.5 Yet this 
also provided new opportunities for improved Sino-Thai cooperation. 
On November 17, 1973, the PRC approached the Thai government with an offer 
to sell high-speed diesel oil to Thailand in return for Thai tobacco. By now, the Sanya 
government was in urgent need of oil and welcomed the Chinese initiative. 
Subsequently, Anand Panyarachun, Thai ambassador to the UN, made direct contacts 
with his Chinese counterpart in a bid to arrange the purchase of oil supplies.6 According 
to Anand, Huang Chen, head of the Chinese delegation to the UN, requested that 
Thailand end its aggressive attitude towards Cambodia’s exiled government headed by 
Prince Sihanouk, in exchange for crude oil.7  
In early December, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN informed Anand that his 
government had agreed in principle to sell 50,000 tons of oil to Thailand. The Thai 
Foreign Ministry rendered this quick and affirmative reply as a ‘particular sign of good 
will’ and showed a ‘desire to broaden relations’. 8  Chatichai’s close confidante, 
Lenglers Baiyoke, a prominent Sino-Thai businessman and managing director of 
Sapanpla Cold Storage Industry, then made a secret arrangement with Beijing for 
Chatichai and himself to visit China. According to Lenglers, the main cause for 
Beijing’s decision to open the door for Thailand was due to favorable reports to Premier 
Zhou Enlai about the friendliness of the Thai people during the Chinese ping-pong visit 
in 1973.9 
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Chatichai eagerly proposed that the Sanya government abolish this 
controversial law. In the meantime, he accepted Beijing’s invitation, and on December 
21, 1973, departed for what was the first official visit by a Thai leader at ministerial 
level.10 At an airport press conference, Chatichai announced that the government had 
decided to rescind Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 but that this would need 
approval from the National Legislative Assembly.11 
Upon his arrival in Beijing, Chatichai was welcomed by Chinese leaders at the 
airport. Over the next few days, he met with Wang Yao-ting, Chairman of the Council 
for Promotion of International Trade, and other prominent officials, including Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Trade to negotiate the purchase of diesel oil. While the price of the 
oil remained in contention, Chatichai told the press later that ‘all Chinese officials 
taking part in the negotiations … welcomed us warmly and held talks as if we were 
relatives and members of the same family’.12  
On the last day of the visit, December 28, Premier Zhou Enlai spoke with 
Chatichai for two hours in the Great Hall of the People where they discussed Thai-
Chinese relations, as well as the world situation with particular reference to events in 
Southeast Asia. Zhou assured Chatichai of China’s desire for friendly relations with 
Thailand. Chatichai said that trade would be conducted normally through the Hong 
Kong Office of the China Resources Corporation and that the Thai government would 
control commerce only through licensing via the Ministry of Commerce. In other 
words, only those specifically licensed businessmen would be permitted to trade with 
China.13 Zhou did not ask for a rapid withdrawal of American military forces from 
Thailand. According to Chatichai, Zhou was alarmed by Russia’s expansionist strategy 
and naval presence in the Indian Ocean.14 The PRC’s main concern was thus to counter 
Soviet efforts to fill the power vacuum in Southeast Asia, making the US military 
withdrawal less of a priority.15  
Finally, Zhou and Chatichai reached an agreement for the sale of 50,000 tons of 
diesel to Thailand. According to Chatichai, the diesel purchase was equivalent to a six-
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month supply, and after lengthy negotiations on price, Zhou intervened to offer the 
price listed when Thailand had asked for it in November (one baht per litre). Zhou 
described this as a ‘friendship price’, and argued that it showed willingness to ‘help 
each other mutually’.16 Moreover, the Chinese did not require that Thailand recognize 
Prince Sihanouk’s government or sever its relations with Taiwan. 17  Rather, Zhou 
invited Air Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Defense Minister and the President of the 
National Olympic Committee of Thailand, to visit China.18  For Chatichai, the visit 
demonstrated that the ‘the People’s Republic of China is a defensive nation and not 
aggressive’.19   
The visit provided reassurance that the Thai government was committed to a 
policy of rapprochement with the PRC.20 To show good will, shortly after the visit, the 
Thai government for the first time officially advocated a ‘one-China policy’, reversing 
the long-term ‘two-China policy’ stance. As Chatichai reasoned, since the PRC was 
now the only member of the United Nations, Thailand thereby considered that there 
was only one China.21  
This petro-diplomacy also provided a stepping-stone toward the strengthening 
of Sino-Thai economic relations. The Sanya government decided to allow imported 
goods from China to enter the country from January 1, 1974. In February, Commerce 
Minister Chanchai Leethawon announced that Thailand would allow the import of eight 
Chinese goods; namely, machines and machine tools; chemicals for raw materials; steel 
and iron; raw silk; crude oil; petroleum products and coal; paper and newsprint; 
medicines and fertilizers.22      
At the same time, the government facilitated sports relations with China. The 
most important of these was led by Defense Minister Dawee in his capacity as the 
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President of the Thai Olympic Committee. Arriving in Beijing on February 7, 1974 for 
a week-long visit, Dawee met with Zhou and other government ministers such as Wang 
Meng, Minister of the All-China Sports Federation, Li Qiang, Foreign Commerce 
Minister, and Han Nianlong, Deputy Foreign Minister.23 The discussions ranged from 
sports to trade, as well as political and security issues. In particular, they discussed the 
Indochina situation, as well as Chinese support for CPT insurgents. Zhou reportedly 
reassured Dawee that since the Thai military regime had gone, China had no reason to 
support the Thai Communists, and that the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) 
Radio was not located on Chinese territory.24 As Dawee said, ‘Zhou stressed that the 
PRC does not want to export Communism. He admitted that in the past, China had 
supported terrorists in Thailand to fight for freedom because the former (Thanom, 
Praphas) government was dictatorial and curtailed human rights’.25  
Dawee also emphasized that the Thai government had already agreed to 
abrogate the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53, and was just waiting for the National 
Legislative Assembly to approve this decision. For Zhou, this should be a step toward 
opening ‘the door for brotherly relationships based on good intentions towards each 
other’.26 During the talks with the Chinese leaders, the old saying, ‘the Thais and the 
Chinese are none other than brothers’ was also highlighted. Furthermore, Zhou told 
Dawee that the Chinese realized how difficult it was for Thailand to establish 
diplomatic relations with the PRC and did not wish to rush the Thai government into it 
at the present moment. According to Dawee, the Chinese were concerned about the 
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Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and Zhou asked him to ‘tell your American 
friends’ to ‘watch the Russians’.27    
China also agreed, in principle, to sell an additional 75,000 tons of diesel oil to 
Thailand.28 As Dawee put it, in ‘showing her goodwill, China is willing to buy all 
agricultural surpluses like rubber and gunny bags from Thailand in order to help us not 
to suffer heavy trade deficit from the purchase of diesel oil’.29 Shortly after his visit, 
Dawee himself admitted to the press that he ‘spent more time discussing politics than 
sports’.30 As he later told the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Edward Masters, at the 
American Embassy in Bangkok, while he was ‘not likely to recommend any sudden 
foreign policy departures’, Dawee was ‘convinced Thailand should move ahead rapidly 
to permit trade with the PRC, particularly since Chinese goods [were] freely entering 
Thailand anyway.’31  
Throughout 1974, further sports exchanges became normal. For example, 
between 7 and 18 April, a Thai basketball team led by Colonel Anu Romayanon, the 
President of the Football Association of Thailand, attended a friendship match in 
Beijing. The team was accompanied by Kobsak Chutikul from the Foreign Ministry, 
who met with Cheng Rui-sheng, then Deputy Director of Southeast Asian Division of 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Between 15 and 30 May 1974, the Chinese badminton 
team led by Chu Tze attended the International Badminton Competition in Bangkok, 
while the Chinese football team arrived in Bangkok on November 5. Between 4 and 10 
December 1974, the Chinese basketball team returned the visit to Bangkok and played 
their Thai counterparts.32 Thailand considered the Chinese outstanding performance in 
sports helped to establish an image of China as a sports power.33   
Underpinning this thawing of relations was an increased focus on improving 
trade links. On December 6, 1974, the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53 was finally 
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lifted by the National Legislative Assembly. The Assembly also passed the State 
Trading Bill that set up a state-trading corporation under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Commerce to control direct trade with the Communist countries, including China.34 
Following the formal abrogation of the Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53, Foreign 
Minister Charoonphan said, ‘Thailand and the People’s Republic of China will develop 
normal trade relations’.35 In 1974, Thailand exported nearly 113,000 US dollars’ worth 
of goods (mainly rice) to China, and imported around 4.5 million US dollars (mostly 
crude and diesel oil).36 
Shortly after the lifting of the law, Deputy Commerce Minister, Prasong 
Sukhum, and Ambassador Anand led the trade delegation to Beijing to negotiate and 
improve trade relations. Joining the delegation was Ob Wasurat, the pro-Beijing 
President of the Thai Board of Trade, and Tej Bunnag37, Director of the East Asian 
Division at the Foreign Ministry.  
While there, Prasong and Anand met with the Chinese Deputy Vice-Premier Li 
Xiannian, who emphasized the importance of reciprocity and equality in Sino-Thai 
trade relations. Li made clear that the PRC intended to buy a substantial amount of 
rubber, tobacco, and timber from Thailand,38 while Prasong noted Thailand’s decision 
to allow government-to-government direct trade, whereby private traders could trade 
with China after registering with the Commerce Ministry. This process was to ‘assure 
that the good relationship established between the two countries is not destroyed by 
avaricious businessmen’.39 As Prasong explained,  
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There will be no barter but parallel trade. … It will be to the mutual benefit of 
both countries, with each filling the other’s needs. We will exchange lists of our 
exports and also of our import requirements.40  
 
The Thai state corporation, supervised by the Ministry of Commerce, would act as a 
channel for working relations with China, especially the Bank of China, and the China 
Resources Company in Hong Kong.41 According to Prasong, Chinese leaders also made 
it clear that a formal recognition of the one-China policy was a precondition for the 
PRC’s diplomatic normalization with Thailand.42  
In addition, Anand had a one-on-one hour-long conservation with the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. According to Anand, the Chinese were happy about 
the repeal of Revolutionary Proclamation No. 53, but remained reserved about the State 
Trading Bill. He reassured the Chinese that Thailand would treat all socialist countries 
equally.43 Anand also stressed that his delegation was not empowered to negotiate the 
restoration of diplomatic relations. ‘Whether the visit of the mission would lead to 
diplomatic relations’, said Anand, depended on ‘the attitudes of both governments’.44 
He defined his delegation as ostensibly a ‘people-to-people mission’.45  
In Bangkok, Deputy Prime Minister Prakorb Hutasingh proclaimed on 
December 16, that the Sanya government would not ‘hurry’ to open diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, and so it would be left to the elected government to decide after 
the general election, scheduled for January 26, 1975.46  
 
On January 6, Chatichai led another Thai delegation to Beijing, primarily to discuss the 
further purchase of oil.47 On this visit, he negotiated with Wang Yao-ting, chairman of 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). An agreement 
was reached only on January 8, the last day of the trip, when an additional 75,000 tons 
of diesel oil were promised to Thailand at the friendship price. The dinner, hosted by 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, was followed by a meeting between Chatichai and 
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Premier Zhou Enlai, who by then had been diagnosed with bladder cancer and therefore 
resided at Beijing Hospital. As he later explained to the press in Bangkok,  
 
When the car stopped in front of the hospital, Premier Zhou Enlai was standing 
at the door to welcome me, before I had even time to take off my overcoat. He 
took us into a reception room, reserved especially for his guests. We exchanged 
views on developments in the world situation, especially in the Indian Ocean, 
in the Middle East, in Laos and in Cambodia. The withdrawal of American 
military forces by gradual degrees from Thailand was also mentioned. … 
Though I was informed beforehand that I would be able to meet Premier Zhou 
Enlai for about 10 minutes only, he was so kind as to hold a conversation with 
me that lasted as long as 45 minutes.48  
 
During their 45-minute discussion, Zhou and Chatichai agreed to support the Laotian 
Coalition Government, and leave the Cambodian people to solve their own problems. 
Zhou said that, in principle, China did not approve of foreign forces being based in 
Thailand, but expressed his understanding that it was necessary for Thailand to balance 
among great powers. Zhou also invited His Royal Highness Crown Prince 
Vajiralongkorn to visit Beijing.49  
In Chatichai’s view, the visit was only about oil. ‘Diplomatic relations’, he 
made clear, should be considered ‘a totally different matter, which must be kept 
separate’. Yet, he also made clear that petro-diplomacy would ‘help make relations 
between our two countries closer and create good mutual understanding’.50 Shortly 
after returning, and as a clear demonstration of how the diplomatic mood had shifted, 
Chatichai announced to the newly established Chart Thai Party, of which he was 
Secretary-General, that after the coming election, a government led by his party would 
quickly establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.51 Normalization with the PRC thus 
became a foreign policy priority of Chatichai’s political party.      
 
To summarize, while the Sanya government did not prioritize a diplomatic 
rapprochement with the PRC, it built a necessary foundation for the subsequent 
normalization following elections. In other words, it pursued what Shee Poon Kim 
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described as a ‘slow thaw’ in relations with Beijing.52 While sports diplomacy and trade 
continued to increase the communications between the two countries, oil became a clear 
focus that helped to lubricate the process. Led by the MFA and in particular by key 
détente proponents such as Chatichai, the change was normalized by emphasizing the 
necessity of engaging in flexible diplomacy. As Chatichai explained in June 1974, 
‘[Thai] foreign policy has always changed. It is not necessary to be inflexible. On the 
contrary, our foreign policy must be revised according to changes and developments in 
the world situation.’ ‘Our [foreign] policy’, continued Chatichai, ‘changes 
considerably. Now, we can go to Red China and to Russia’.53     
 
6.1.2. Normalization: The Restoration of Sino-Thai Diplomatic Relations  
A Prelude to Diplomatic Relations  
A new constitution was promulgated on October 1974, paving the way for a general 
election on January 26, 1975. Following the vote, no political parties gained a majority. 
M.R. Seni Pramoj, the leader of the Democratic Party, failed to gain a vote of 
confidence from Parliament. This was because of the political maneuvering of his 
younger brother and the leader of the Social Action Party (SAP), M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, 
who had strong support from the military. 54  Shortly thereafter, Kukrit formed a 
coalition government and became the new Prime Minister on March 17.      
Détente began in earnest with Kukrit’s foreign policy statement to Parliament 
on March 19. He announced that the objective of Thai foreign policy was ‘to safeguard 
the national interests’. His government would pursue an ‘independent policy’ by taking 
into account ‘national interests in line with the economic objective as well as the 
security of the nation’. Like his predecessors, Kukrit would promote ‘peaceful co-
existence’ by befriending every country that demonstrated good intentions towards 
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Thailand, regardless of differences in political ideology or governmental systems.55 
What made him different, however, was that Kukrit indicated a strong endeavor (a) ‘to 
recognize and normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China’, (b) ‘to 
withdraw foreign troops from Thailand within one year through friendly negotiations 
keeping into consideration the situation in this region’, and (c) ‘to strengthen relations 
with neighboring countries and foster in every way close cooperation within ASEAN’. 
This was in order ‘to arrive at a balance in its relations with the superpowers’. 56 
Alongside maintaining good relations with the USSR, Thailand explicitly pledged to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and to negotiate the withdrawal of 
American troops by March 20, 1976.57      
Chatichai, a staunch détente proponent and now Foreign Minister, continued to 
play a significant role too. In March, he gave an interview to Newsweek, confirming the 
position of the Thai government to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations 
with the PRC in the near future.58 He asked Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to 
the UN and to the US, to contact the Chinese head of the delegation at the UN and 
inform him of these intentions. Also, Chatichai through Anand, officially invited the 
Chairman of the International Trade Organization, Wang Yao-ting, to visit Thailand. 
He wished to negotiate preliminary talks with the delegation, and regarded this 
invitation as the beginning of normalization.59 He also set up a task force at the MFA, 
chaired by Phan Wannamethi, the Permanent Secretary, in order to consider various 
problems which could arise. Of particular concern was the status of overseas Chinese 
in Thailand should normal relations between Thailand and Beijing be initiated.60   
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These diplomatic developments were accelerated by two key international events. The 
first was the Communist victory in Indochina, starting from Vietnam and Cambodia in 
April 1975. Specifically, the subsequent fall of the Laotian monarchy in December, 
shocked the ruling elite of Thailand who perceived the monarchy as an intrinsic part of 
the nation. The idea that Thailand might be the ‘next domino’ and ‘frontline state’ 
became prevalent, with conservatives perceiving the events as a direct ‘threat’ to 
Thailand’s security and survival. This drastically changing situation, however, only 
furthered the desire to embrace Beijing in the hope that the PRC might prove vital in 
containing Hanoi and safeguarding Thai sovereignty.61      
The second event was the Mayaguez incident in May when the US used the U-
Tapao Airport for an operation to retrieve the US merchant ship, Mayaguez, which had 
been captured by Cambodia, without consulting the Thai government. 62  Thailand 
protested the US encroachment on Thailand’s territorial sovereignty by presenting a 
protest memorandum. They also summoned the Thai Ambassador to the US, Anand, 
back to Bangkok for an indefinite period. 63  While delivering the protest note to 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Anand told him that Thailand had no objection to 
the results of the operation to free the Mayaguez but did object the procedures. He said 
that Kukrit was very ‘upset’ with the Mayaguez incident.64  The incident not only 
indicated the decline of Thai-US relations but also provided an opportunity for the 
government to speed up the policy of détente.  
In his session with a US National War College delegation on May 1, Kukrit said 
that the Chinese were ‘not really hostile to Thailand’. He speculated that ‘China would 
not invade Thailand, but would prefer to revert to its historical role of “big brother” ’ – 
having a ‘sort of influence in Thailand that the US exercised ten to fifteen years ago’. 
Moreover, he believed that the Chinese preferred the US presence in Thailand in order 
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to balance the increased Soviet influence in the region as well as its military presence 
in the Indian Ocean.65  
Foreign Minister Chatichai asked Thai ambassadors around the world to contact 
their Chinese counterparts to explore possible ways to establish diplomatic relations. 
For example, on May 5, Ambassador Anand had a conversation with the Chinese 
Ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua, in New York. The latter told Anand that the 
Chinese government congratulated Prime Minister Kukrit on his statement to 
Parliament regarding his determination to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. The 
Chinese leaders readily agreed to negotiate with the Thai government.66 The PRC had 
only one condition: that is, Thailand had to recognize one China and terminate its 
relations with Taiwan. According to Huang, the Chinese could not send the MFA 
officials to Bangkok to negotiate with their Thai counterparts, as requested from the 
Thai Foreign Minister, while the Taiwanese Embassy still remained in Thailand.67 
By early May, the Chinese government formally informed the Thai Foreign 
Ministry of its readiness to establish relations with Thailand.68  By then, Chatichai 
repeatedly told the Thai public that the PRC had informed him that it was agreeable to 
open diplomatic ties with Thailand. In his May 19 press conference, Chatichai said that 
Thailand would recognize the PRC before the United Nations General Assembly 
meeting in September. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministry drafted a bill to abrogate 
the law that set up a state trading organization to trade with the Communist countries. 
Since Anand’s visit to Beijing in December 1974, the Chinese had repeatedly informed 
Thailand that it considered the law to be discriminatory.69  
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Subsequently, Chatichai asked recently returned ambassador Anand to handle 
the process in detail.70 During his talks with Chinese counterparts, Anand recalled that 
‘the Chinese do not mention the term “kanperd kwamsampan” or “establishment of 
diplomatic relations” but use “kanfeunfu kwamsampan” or “restoration of diplomatic 
relations” ’ because ‘they consider formal diplomatic relations with Thailand had never 
disappeared’.71 Thus, the Thai term, ‘kanfeunfu kwamsampan’, was promulgated in 
official language, though in general ‘restoration’ and ‘establishment’ were used 
interchangeably.  
 
In his discussion with the US Ambassador to Thailand, Charles S. Whitehouse (1975-
1978), on May 21, Chatichai was asked about Thailand’s recognition of Communist 
China. He told Whitehouse that the PRC was ‘agreeable to a visit by him at any time, 
but Thailand was not yet ready’ because of the problem of resolving the status of the 
more than 300,000 Chinese with Taiwanese passports. ‘These people must decide 
whether they want to become citizens of Thailand or Mainland China’. Chatichai said 
that the Thai government was speeding up the process of the Chinese minority and 
would definitely recognize the PRC in the near future. Pracha Kunakasem, Director 
General of Information at the MFA, who accompanied with Chatichai, said that one 
reason for Thailand’s recognition of the PRC was to counter ‘Sathorn Road’ [the site 
of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok].72 For Chatichai, the search for Beijing’s tie was a 
means to counterbalance the North Vietnamese threat, and, possibly, the increased 
Soviet presence in the region.73 
By the end of the month, Chatichai made public the fact that he officially 
received notice from the Chinese delegation to the UN that the PRC was willing to 
establish diplomatic relations with Thailand immediately. He planned to pay an official 
visit to Beijing probably in late June, and optimistically told reporters that if all went 
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as planned, the establishment of diplomatic ties could be announced during his visit.74 
The Thai chargé d’affaires in Taiwan, Khanit Sricharoen, was recalled back to Bangkok 
and on May 26, Chatichai informally informed Ma Chi-chuang, Taiwan’s Ambassador 
to Bangkok, that he should prepare his embassy for departure in view of the imminent 
PRC arrival.75  
In late May and early June, there was a flurry of further visits to Beijing, 
including a Democratic Party goodwill mission led by Pichai Rattakul, MP (Bangkok), 
followed by a parliamentary delegation led by Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Prasit Kanchanawat, who had previously visited China twice. At the farewell banquet, 
Prasit said the visit ‘had enhanced the friendship and mutual understanding’ between 
the two peoples, and that ‘Thailand was willing to live in friendship with China and all 
other countries in the world on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. 
The Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua expressed his wish that the two peoples 
would ‘remain friends for generations to come’.76     
  
To mid-June, the question of who would go to Beijing remained unclear. At first, it 
seemed that Chatichai would head the delegation, scheduled to begin on June 27.77 
Initially, Prime Minister Kukrit was reluctant, wanting not to ‘upstage’ Foreign 
Minister Chatichai, who had worked so hard for the opening of relations. However, 
Chatichai felt that he had done his bit and that the Prime Minister should now take the 
lead, similar to leaders of Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.78 According to reports, 
Kukrit made the decision to go having been persuaded by both pro-government and 
opposition MPs. He also consulted with Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, former 
Defense Minister who had visited China and met with Premier Zhou. Dawee strongly 
urged Kukrit to go.79At a press conference on June 16, Kukrit hinted that the Prime 
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Minister should go to China himself, but that the visit was still the preparatory stage, 
during which necessary steps were required at the level of officials.80  
In the meantime, Chatichai assigned Ambassador Anand Panyarachun to lead a 
five-man working group to travel to Beijing and negotiate the details of resumed 
diplomatic ties, and to prepare the arrangements for the visit. Before his departure to 
Beijing on June 16, Anand told reporters that ‘We are taking our own draft with us and 
we will study the Chinese draft in order to formulate a joint communiqué. … Then, 
should a satisfactory agreement be reached, the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Chatichai] 
will go to sign the treaty.’81     
 Anand arrived in Beijing on June 17. Key issues to be resolved included 
addressing China’s reservations over the Thai State Trading Corporation, the status of 
the 310,000 Chinese in Thailand, the anticommunist law, and the matter of how to 
handle large Taiwanese-controlled investments in Thailand. The stickiest issue was the 
dual nationality of the overseas Chinese in Thailand.   
Anand had meetings with the Chinese Foreign Ministry officials led by Ko Hua, 
Director-General of Asian Affairs, and Cheng Rui-sheng, Deputy Director-General. 
The first informal meeting was held on June 18, between 11.00 and 12.00 am at the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry. Thailand presented its draft joint communiqué to the 
Chinese, which had already been telegrammed prior to the visit.82 The second meeting 
was on June 20, between 15.00 and 19.00 pm. This was the negotiation in details. At 
China’s insistence, the joint communiqué had an ‘anti-hegemonic’ clause, clearly 
directed toward the Soviet Union. The final draft was agreed upon by both sides.83 
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After that, Anand sent a cable to Bangkok asking whether and when the Thai 
delegation would go to China. In the cable, Anand reported that initial negotiations had 
been ‘successful’. He also asked for details of the planned visit, including the duration 
of stay, and the number of people in the delegation, so that programs could be drawn 
up with the Chinese leaders. Chatichai replied that Prime Minister Kukrit would go to 
Beijing, and sign the official agreement, which could be made on July 1 as originally 
planned.84   
On the last day, 21 June, Anand met with Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. The 
latter informed Anand that Premier Zhou formally extended an invitation to Thai Prime 
Minister Kukrit to visit Beijing between June 30 and July 5, 1975. 85  The joint 
communiqué was scheduled to be signed on July 1. The exchange of ambassadors 
would be arranged later. Sunthorn Santhienthai, Deputy Director General of the Thai 
Protocol Department, who accompanied Anand from June 17, remained in Beijing to 
continue making arrangements. 
Anand returned to Bangkok on the evening of June 22, and reported on his trip 
to Chatichai. The following day, Chatichai and Anand presented the draft joint 
communiqué to the National Security Council meeting: the first time that the MFA 
officially informed the Council regarding the issue. On June 24, after receiving 
approval from the Council, Kukrit presided over a cabinet meeting, which approved the 
wording of the draft and the establishment of diplomatic relations.86  
The full delegation consisted of Prime Minister Kukrit, Foreign Minister 
Chatichai, and 38 high-ranking government officials and businessmen. These included 
Prakaipet Indhusophon, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister, Air Marshal Siddhi 
Sawetsila, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, and six Under-
secretaries from Commerce, Defense, Finance, Agriculture, Interior and Industry. 
Foreign Ministry officials included, among others, Ambassador Anand Panyarachum, 
Nissai Vejjajiva (Ambassador attached to the Foreign Ministry), Kosol Sindhvananda 
(Director-General of the Department of Political Affairs), Manaspas Xuto (Consul-
General in Hong Kong), and Tej Bunnag (Director of the Asian Division). The team 
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also included a non-official ‘China expert’, Sarasin Viraphol from Faculty of Political 
Science at Chulalongkorn University.87 Lenglert Baiyok also joined the team in Hong 
Kong.88  
On June 25, Chatichai summoned Admiral Ma Chi-chuang, Taiwan’s 
Ambassador to Bangkok, to the Foreign Ministry where he informed him that after the 
signing of the joint communiqué with Beijing, formal diplomatic relations between 
Thailand and Taiwan would come to an end. The Taiwanese ambassador said he would 
leave Bangkok before June 30.89 In turn, Thai chargé d’affaires in Taiwan, Khanit 
Sricharoen, would fly back to Bangkok before July 1, 1975.90        
Prime Minister Kukrit met with US Ambassador Whitehouse on June 27. In 
their discussion, Kukrit noted the increasing importance of China in regards to the 
security situation in Southeast Asia. He believed that the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which 
was one of the main reasons Beijing wanted to ‘make friends’ with Thailand, provided 
opportunities for maneuvering by the countries in Southeast Asia including Thailand. 
The role of China would be significant in maintaining the balance with Hanoi, and 
perhaps the USSR. 91  Kukrit told Whitehouse that while he would sign the joint 
communiqué with Beijing in his upcoming visit, he had no intention of opening a Thai 
embassy in the near future. According to Kukrit, the Chinese may buy rice from 
Thailand for shipment to Cambodia where China was supporting the Khmer Rouge 
regime, which had come to power in 1975. He realized that ‘China is a fact of life and 
Thailand must deal with it.’ ‘We don’t’, however, ‘have to go to bed with them’, he 
claimed. Kukrit presented the developments as part of a nuanced and pragmatic foreign 
policy. He did not believe that China would stop supporting the Thai Communist 
insurgency merely because Thailand and China had diplomatic relations. For the US 
Embassy, Kukrit had ‘a realistic assessment of Beijing’: ‘He is not about to rush into 
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things but can be expected to approach Thailand’s new relationship in a measured 
way’.92 
On the evening of June 28, the night before his departure, Kukrit explained in a 
televised speech to the nation the nature of the trip. ‘In establishing ties with China’, he 
said, ‘we will not be at any disadvantages or suffer any adverse consequences’. ‘It is 
only normal’, he continued, ‘that with the recognition of Beijing, Thailand’s official 
ties with Taiwan will have to be broken. But this does not mean that all relations will 
stop because we still have trade relations with Taiwan’.93 Kukrit asked the overseas 
Chinese in Thailand ‘to choose whether to take up Thai or Chinese nationality’. He 
emphasized that under ‘the changing world political situation’, Thailand vitally needed 
‘more friends’.94 
In short, by the end of June, such Thai détente proponents as Kukrit and 
Chatichai were ready to go to Beijing and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Although he realized that the establishment of diplomatic relations did not mean that 
the Chinese would stop supporting the Thai Communist insurgency, Kukrit wished to 
promote ‘friendly relations and good understanding’ and strengthen trade relations with 
the PRC.95 The next episode began with Kukrit’s historic visit to Beijing.   
   
Kukrit’s Visit to Beijing and the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations  
On Monday June 30 around 11.00 am, Kukrit and his entourage arrived at Beijing 
Airport by Thai Airways International, Flight TG5501, where the Chinese government 
rolled out the red carpet to welcome him and his entourage. Coupled with several 
thousand ordinary people, Deng Xiaoping, First Vice-Premier, Qiao Guanhua, Foreign 
Minister, and other high-ranking officials, welcomed and shook hands with the Thai 
delegates. A grand welcome ceremony took place at the airport, which flew the national 
flags of China and Thailand. Big white posters were displayed from tall buildings 
saying ‘A warm welcome to the Distinguished Guests from Thailand’, ‘Long live the 
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friendship between the people of China and Thailand’, ‘Long live the great unity of the 
people of the world’ and so on. 96  
On behalf of Premier Zhou, Deng extended a welcome to Kukrit, by saying that 
‘The People of China and Thailand, which are close neighbors, enjoy a traditional 
friendship and have been widening the scope of friendly contact in recent years. Prime 
Minister Kukrit’s official visit will see the normalization of the relations between the 
two countries and promote the traditional friendship between the two peoples’. 97 
Accompanied by Deng, Kukrit reviewed a guard of honor from the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army, and the National Anthems of Thailand and China were played.98 As 
Kukrit recalled later, the reception ‘was very grand indeed. I think they put on one of 
their grandest shows for us. It was so big that when I saw it from the airplane, it was 
quite frightening. [Deng Xiaoping] was there to meet me. Mr. Zhou Enlai at that time 
was in hospital. Of course, the Chairman [Mao Zedong] wasn’t in a position to come 
to meet anybody’.99 Upon his arrival in Beijing, the Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) 
published an editorial entitled ‘A Warm Welcome to the Distinguished Thai Guests’. It 
extolled Thailand’s changing foreign policy as one that had ‘won widespread 
appreciation’, and reassured Thailand that China would not interfere in its internal 
affairs in the future.100  
After the welcoming ceremony, Deng led Kukrit and the Thai delegation to the 
Daioyutai State Guest House, where special foreign guests were received. Kukrit said 
that ‘I think it was the same house that all the other heads of state including Mr. Nixon 
were taken to stay’.101 The 30-member Thai press corps stayed at the Nationalities 
(Minzu) Hotel next to the Government Guest House. When Kukrit’s motorcade passed 
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the Nationalities Hotel, a Chinese friend asked a Thai journalist from the Nation: ‘Is 
that your prime minister? He should have come here a long time ago’.102  
In the afternoon, Kukrit, Chatichai, and other delegates103 held the first official 
talks with First Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, and Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua at 
the Great Hall of the People. The meeting started around 3.30 pm and lasted for an 
hour. They discussed a wide range of issues and challenges, including the Thai 
insurgency, US forces in Thailand, the situation in Indochina, trade, and a return visit 
to Thailand. They focused more specifically on the joint communiqué to be signed the 
following day.104       
After that, Kukrit and Chatichai went to meet Premier Zhou Enlai at Beijing 
Hospital. They had friendly talks for half an hour and discussed a wide range of issues. 
Later, Chatichai reported that Premier Zhou was very pleased that China would now 
have diplomatic relations with Thailand. He also said he was reassured that China 
would no longer interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs. Zhou told Kukrit and Chatichai 
that his government would urge the overseas Chinese in Thailand to adopt Thai 
nationality. Zhou also congratulated Thailand on its decision to withdraw foreign troops 
within the definite deadline. In his opinion, there was no need for Thailand to have 
foreign troops for its defense.105 Throughout the discussions, Chatichai felt that the 
Chinese leaders were concerned about the Soviet Union’s increased influence in 
Southeast Asia. Lastly, Zhou sent warm regards to Prince Wan Waithayakon, a former 
Thai Foreign Minister.106 According to one high-ranking official, the talks with Zhou, 
who looked ‘healthy but slightly pale’, were ‘very encouraging’: ‘We got many points 
clarified. The meeting was … very important to Thailand’.107  
On June 30 evening, First Vice-Premier Deng hosted a welcome banquet for 
Kukrit and the Thai delegation. After expressing a warm welcome, Deng began his 
speech by praising Thailand’s long history and struggle to safeguard its national 
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independence during the imperial era. Thailand’s ‘friendly relations with other Third 
World countries’ and determination to stand for ‘a peaceful and neutral Southeast Asia’ 
and oppose ‘power politics and hegemonism’ was also noted. Then he blamed postwar 
tensions in Southeast Asia and the ‘extremely abnormal’ relationship with ‘one of the 
superpowers’ that ‘persisted in a war of aggression in Indochina’. However, at present 
‘very favorable conditions’ had been created because ‘this superpower has finally 
suffered irrevocable defeat under the counter-blows of the Indochinese peoples and has 
to withdraw from Indochina’.108  
While not mentioning the USSR directly, Deng also pointedly said that ‘the 
other superpower with wild ambitions’ sought ‘new military bases in Southeast Asian 
countries’ and sent ‘its naval vessels to ply the Indian and West Pacific Oceans’. The 
‘specter of its expansionism’, warned Deng, ‘now haunts Southeast Asia’. It not only 
posed a ‘menacing threat to the peace and security of the Southeast Asian countries’ 
but also sought to convert ‘this region into its sphere of influence some day’. ‘Countries 
with different social systems’, continued Deng, ‘can develop state relations on the basis 
of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence’. ‘Foreign aggression and interference are 
impermissible and are doomed to failure’109.  
Deng condemned the ‘unfortunate’ interruption of contacts between Thailand 
and the PRC due to ‘imperialist obstruction and sabotage’. However, he stressed that 
this should be seen as a ‘brief interlude’ in a ‘long history of friendship between our 
two peoples’, which were more than two thousand years old. Their friendship was a 
kind of traditional kinship. He also highlighted the process of détente that led to the 
normalization of relations: ‘in recent years the traditional friendship of our two peoples 
has resumed and developed at a rapid pace. Cultural, athletic, scientific and commercial 
exchanges … have increased rapidly’. Kukrit’s visit, he made clear, had turned ‘a new 
page’ in the history of Sino-Thai relations.110 
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Kukrit thanked the Chinese leaders and peoples for their hospitality stating that 
it was a great pleasure in having ‘the opportunity to take part in the revival and further 
strengthening of the traditionally close and friendly ties.’ He also noted how this visit 
to Beijing was ‘the result of efforts that had ‘progressed step by step over the recent 
years’. All exchanges of sports teams, doctors, scientists, trade delegations and the visit 
by members of the National Assembly ‘played an important role in drawing our two 
peoples close together’. In this process, ‘both sides have cooperated with sincerity in 
the creation of mutual understanding’.111   
He went on to state that his democratic government, which was ‘elected by the 
Thai people and represents all the people of Thailand’, would now pursue an 
‘independent course’ in the conduct of its foreign policy, and that the normalization of 
relations with the PRC was a ‘high priority’. He reaffirmed that the people have the 
right to choose their own political, economic, and social system ‘free from outside 
interference’ and that the Southeast Asian nations would have to oppose ‘all manner of 
subversion from outside’.112 Referring to ASEAN, Kukrit defined the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration on a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) as an effort to free 
the region from great power rivalry, and welcomed PRC statements of support for 
ASEAN and its concept of ZOPFAN.113 The banquet had a friendly atmosphere, and 
lasted until 9.30 pm.  
On Tuesday, July 1, from 8.30 am, Kukrit and his entourage were taken on a 
tour of Beijing, visiting the Central Institute for Nationalities, and then the Summer 
Palace. Wu Teh, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, accompanied the Thai delegation. At the Central Institute for Nationalities, 
which was set up in 1951 by Mao to train cadres of Minority Nationalities, they met 
with teachers and students from a variety of nationality groups. The students gathered 
on the campus and waved bouquets, streamers and the National Flags of China and 
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Thailand amidst the beating of drums and gongs.114 Kukrit enquired about the study 
and life of the students and had a cordial conversation with students of Tai Nationality 
from the southern province of Yunnan, who entertained the guests with Tai dances. A 
Tai student and a student of Chingpo Nationality played a violin duet, ‘I love the 
frontier’. Both the hosts and the visitors expressed their wish that the traditional 
friendship between the two peoples continue to grow.115   
While at the Central Institute for Nationalities, Kukrit later recalled he was 
‘sitting in the hall looking at the entertainment and somebody came up to my chair and 
whispered in my ear: “The Chairman will see you now”.’ The Thai Prime Minister 
realized he was ‘utterly unprepared’. Wearing a blue Thai-style moh hom shirt, Kukrit 
went back to the Guest House to change and pick up the gift, a mirror box, ‘a big one 
presumably to put cigars in though I don’t think the Chairman smoked’.116   
Just before noon, Kukrit, together with Chatichai, went into Chairman Mao’s 
famous study in the Zhongnanhai compound: a room ‘in a rather large round building 
with a dome’, as Kukrit remembered. 117  When Kukrit arrived, the 81-year old 
Chairman was already sitting prepared. Mao shook hands with Kukrit, and members of 
his party including Chatichai, Ambassador Anand, and Prakaipet Indhusophon, 
Secretary-General to the Prime Minister. Kukrit later recalled that Mao got up all by 
himself and shook Kukrit’s hand, while making ‘a lot of noises.’ Kukrit said he did not 
know what to do because he did not understand. Then, Chatichai ‘went to him and he 
did the same thing, but he shook … Chatichai’s hand with less noise’.118  According to 
Chatichai, Mao greeted him, asking how many times he had visited China.119 Then, 
Mao had a friendly conversation with Kukrit and Chatichai, while Anand and Prakaipet 
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waited outside. The meeting with Mao was scheduled to last for ten minutes, but went 
on for an hour.120  
They sat down and the interpreters came in. The main Chinese interpreter was 
Nancy Tang, but there were other interpreters because sometimes Nancy Tang could 
not catch everything Mao said. Mao suffered from undiagnosed Lou Gehrig’s disease, 
which left his mental faculties intact but caused a gradual deterioration of the nerve 
cells controlling his muscles, leaving him with a speech impediment. As Kukrit put it, 
‘You had to watch the movement of his mouth to know what he was trying to say. There 
were very few people who could understand him. Sometimes they had to call in his 
nurse and sometimes even she didn’t understand it all. When she didn’t understand, 
they had to call in the old amah, the old lady who had served him personally. She would 
be the final authority’.121        
In an hour-long conversation, Mao sometimes got up and walked around while 
talking. Kukrit admired him greatly, commenting that ‘there was no sign of physical 
weakness except for this speech impediment’.122 First, Mao told Kukrit that he liked 
the interview the Thai Premier had given in Hong Kong the night before the visit. The 
comment referred to Kukrit’s response to a journalist who had asked why the visit was 
happening despite Chinese support for the Communist insurgents in Thailand. Kukrit 
had claimed he didn’t see the connection. ‘I represent the Thai government and I was 
merely going to China to make friends with the government of a sovereign state.’ Kukrit 
regarded Communist support to Thai insurgents as party affairs, rather than government 
affairs, and therefore, he said he had nothing against the Chinese government.123 Mao’s 
observation impressed Kukrit who ‘knew what was happening all around’.124  
Satisfied with Kukrit’s answers, Mao still wondered whether the Thai prime 
minister still wished to talk to him who was branded by the West as an aggressor.  
‘Aren’t you afraid of me’, asked Mao, ‘since Chiang Kai-shek and the West have called 
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me a bandit, a murderer?’ Kukrit affirmatively replied, ‘No, not at all’. 125  The 
conversations went on, ranging from the world situation, to the Indochina crisis to the 
situation in Thailand. Mao also advised Kukrit what to do with the insurgency in 
Thailand:  
 
First of all, don’t you go and condemn them. Don’t say rude words about them, 
because they like it. They won’t listen to you, they are thick-skinned, these 
people. Secondly, don’t kill them, because these people want to become heroes, 
make martyrs of themselves. As soon as you kill one, another five will come. 
So there’s no purpose in killing them. Third, don’t send any soldiers against 
them because they’ll run away. Soldiers can’t stay in the jungle forever. They’ve 
got to go back to barracks. And when they do, the Communists come back 
again. There’s no use. You waste time and money.126  
 
Mao mocked, ‘That’s what I’ve been doing to Chiang Kai-shek, and look where he is 
now!’127  Kukrit asked Mao, ‘What to do?’ He said: ‘Do what you’re already doing. 
Make people in the countryside happy. See that they are well fed, that they have work 
to do, they are satisfied with their work and their station. They won’t join the 
Communists. Then the Communists cannot do anything’. He demurred disappointedly, 
‘I’ve been Chairman here for, well, so many years, and in all that time not one Thai 
Communist has come to see me’. Kukrit teased him back, ‘Why didn’t you say so at 
the beginning, Chairman! I’ll send five of them over right away!’128  
Following this, Mao complained that he was getting old and that he was not 
long for this world. Kukrit reassured him that, ‘No, you can’t be serious. You can’t die 
at all, Chairman. The world cannot afford to lose its number one bad man as you know 
you are yourself’. Kukrit recalled how these words tickled him: ‘He roared with mirth, 
he banged on his armchair and got up and shook hands all around. He liked that very 
much’.129 
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Mao: ‘Really, I’m getting old. Nowadays, I can do no work; I merely serve as a 
civil servant. I draw my salary and that’s all.  
Kukrit: ‘Are you really serious about that? Do you really work as a civil 
servant?’ 
Mao: ‘Yes, or else how could I get any money to spend. I’ve got to have some 
salary’. 
Kukrit: ‘In that case, God save the Chinese civil servant’.130  
 
Kukrit’s impression of Mao was that despite his old age, Mao could switch on and off. 
Sometimes, he was like an ordinary old man. But then he could turn on a switch and 
become ‘very active’, ‘very intelligent, very well informed, [and] very powerful, at any 
moment’. Finally, Deng Xiaoping told Mao that it was time we should leave. When 
Kukrit got up to say goodbye, Mao had already switched off: ‘When I shook hands he 
didn’t even look at my face. He looked at the ceiling and was obviously ga-ga. He went 
back to his old age quite suddenly’.131     
Overall, Kukrit was highly impressed Chairman Mao: not only of his well-
rounded knowledge about the world but also his kindness and good humor. As Kukrit 
put it, Mao ‘knew everything, not only about Chinese affairs but about the world as 
well’, and ‘was a very, very kind, good-humored old gentleman who could talk with 
younger people and give them enjoyment in the conversation.’132  
 
In the afternoon, around 15.30 pm, Kukrit, Chatichai and other senior officials held 
another round of talks with Chinese leaders led by Deng. Deng was invited to visit 
Bangkok, and he readily accepted the invitation. During the discussions, Deng 
suggested that all overseas Chinese in Thailand should be allowed to take up Thai 
nationality because they had been living in the country for a long time, and had no 
intention of moving elsewhere. 133  The Communist insurgency was not directly 
mentioned during the talks.  
Deng assured Kukrit that the China-built road in Laos near the Thai border 
would not threaten Thai security as it was being constructed for economic purposes 
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only. Kukrit replied: ‘We never questioned the road project. In fact, we think it could 
be useful for us’.134 The Chinese Vice-Premier also described the Vietnam War as a 
‘bad mistake’. As he put it, ‘the principle of solving a conflict is a three-step method of 
courting (talking), fighting, and killing. But the Americans reversed the process and 
started by killing first’. In Vietnam, Deng expressed discontent that a superpower was 
trying to impose hegemony in that country: ‘It is highly possible that that superpower 
may request the use of bases in South Vietnam’.135  
Deng told Kukrit that China was opposed to the stationing of American troops 
in Thailand. He dismissed claims by some in Thailand that Beijing would like Thailand 
to keep the American troops to deter Russian influence.136 Throughout his talks on the 
world political situation, Deng mentioned Soviet expansionism several times. He 
reportedly warned the Thais to beware of the tiger (the Soviets) coming from the back 
door while pushing the wolf (the US) out of the front door. Deng also emphasized that 
China was a developing country and part of the Third World, rather than a part of any 
‘tripolar’ superpower game.137     
 
In the evening, Kukrit went to meet with Zhou at Beijing Hospital. At 19.00 pm. on 
July 1, Kukrit and Chatichai sat on the right hand side of a long table while Zhou sat 
on the left. In the middle of the table was a small flag-stand with miniature Thai and 
Chinese flags, while other Thai and Chinese officials stood behind them. Beside Kukrit 
and Chatichai, there were other 15 Thai delegates, including Anand, Prakaipet, Nissai 
Vejjajiva, and Tej Bunnag.  
Kukrit and Zhou signed a 10-point Joint Communiqué, which formally 
established diplomatic relations between Thailand and the PRC, and agreed to exchange 
ambassadors ‘as soon as practicable’. Endorsing the anti-hegemonic clause, the 
communiqué stated that the two countries opposed ‘any attempt by any country or 
group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of 
the world’. It also endorsed the principle of noninterference by both countries in each 
other’s internal affairs. The communiqué stated that Thailand ‘recognized the 
government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China’, 
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and had therefore decided ‘to remove all its official representations from Taiwan within 
one month from the date of signature of this communiqué.’138 In return, the PRC urged 
all 310,000 Chinese nationals living in Thailand ‘to abide by the law of the Kingdom 
of Thailand, respect the customs and habits of the Thai people and live in amity with 
them’.139 In Bangkok, the text of the joint communiqué was announced on Radio 
Thailand that very evening. Thailand became the third ASEAN nation and 102nd 
country to establish relations with the PRC.  
During their toasts, Zhou apologized to Kukrit that he could not drink 
champagne to celebrate the signing of the official joint communiqué. ‘My doctor 
forbids me to take any liquor so I will have to drink tea instead’, as he told the Thai 
leaders who all broke into broad smiles. 140  ‘I have to get Deputy Premier Deng 
Xiaoping to work on my behalf’, he continued.141   
With a cup of tea in his hand, Zhou clinked glasses with other Thai delegates. 
He praised the achievements and hard work of Chatichai and the Thai foreign ministry 
officials in opening the way for diplomatic relations: ‘I am very happy over the signing 
of the joint communiqué. We have worked very hard. This is the result of the hard work 
of Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and his party’.142 In a toast, Kukrit wished 
Premier Zhou a ‘long life’, and gave a carved bronze cigarette case to him, telling him 
in English: ‘Although this is not very valuable. I am still very proud to give it to you’.143 
The entire ceremony lasted for seven minutes.  
After the signing of the Joint Communiqué, the Thai delegation immediately 
went back to the Great Hall of the People to attend a soirée, in the company of Wu Teh, 
Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The 
soirée was arranged by the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The Thai 
delegation was entertained with a tour of the Great Hall of the People and a program of 
music and dance performances by Chinese musicians. The items were warmly received, 
and the performance of the Thai composition, ‘Beautiful Moonlight’, drew warm 
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applause from the audiences. At the end of the performance, Kukrit and Wu Teh walked 
up to the stage, shook hands with the performers and presented them with a bouquet of 
flowers.144 After the soirée, Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua, hosted a dinner for the 
Thai delegation at a famous Beijing restaurant, specializing in Beijing duck.145        
 
On July 2, Kukrit and the party left the Guest House at round 9.00 am to visit the Great 
Wall at Ting Ling, which was about 80-minute ride by car. They were accompanied by 
Li Qiang, Minister of Foreign Trade, and Han Nianlong, Deputy Foreign Minister. This 
time, Kukrit wore a blue ‘moh hom’ shirt to symbolize the dress worn by Thai farmers. 
Amid drizzling rain, the Thai delegates spent only 15 minutes at the Great Wall. Then 
they toured the Ming Tomb, and proceeded to the Summer Palace, which Kukrit had 
missed the previous day due to his impromptu summons to meet with Chairman Mao. 
They had lunch at the Summer Palace and in the afternoon toured the Forbidden City 
in Beijing.146  
Meanwhile, Chatichai was relegated to dealing with the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Qiao Guanhua, to arrange the finer details. They held another meeting in the 
afternoon. 147  According to Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong, Qiao asked 
Chatichai to help find a location for building the embassy in Bangkok and said our 
diplomatic staff will be less than 150. The Chinese Foreign Ministry would send an 
advance diplomatic mission, led by a chargé d’affaires, to Bangkok only one month 
after all staff of the Taiwanese embassy had left Thailand.148 Chatichai also held talks 
with Wang Yao-ting, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade.  
In the evening, Kukrit conducted a live radio broadcast with Akom Makaranont, 
a spokesman of the press.149 Kukrit said that Sino-Thai relations would be closer in the 
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future despite the differences between the two countries. He added that July 1, 1975 
would be written in history as a ‘special and important day’ in relations between 
Thailand and China. He told the Thai people that Chairman Mao had talked to him in 
an hour-long discussion and that Mao had emphasized that the Communist Party of 
Thailand was small and no serious danger to Thailand.150 Kukrit also noted that the 
Chinese completely denied having aided the Thai insurgents or supported the Voice of 
the People of Thailand Radio.151 Mao, he said, was ‘very kind to me. We had a long 
talk for about one hour and I learned a great deal from the Chairman and I don’t think 
I’ll ever be the same person again after that experience. It was such an outstanding 
experience to meet Chairman Mao’.152    
Kukrit noted that the Chinese were ‘neutral’ regarding the withdrawal of US 
forces and bases from Thailand, while the subject of increased Soviet influence in the 
region had not come up. He said the Chinese admitted they had sent soldiers to Laos 
‘to make roads’ to assist the Laotian people, but that they had withdrawn when the 
projects were completed. On Cambodia, he said he had asked Zhou to convey a message 
to Sihanouk that Thailand would be happy to make friends. Kukrit also said a trade 
protocol would be signed in the next few months, and Deng had agreed in principle to 
make a return visit to Thailand.153 Asked what the benefits of diplomatic relations with 
the PRC were, Kukrit replied, ‘normal relationship, that is a benefit. People can come 
and go to see each other.’154   
At the Great Hall of People on the evening of July 2, Kukrit hosted the return 
banquet for Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders. The Thai Football 
delegation led by Prachoom Ratanapien, which had just arrived in Beijing, and other 
diplomatic envoys of various countries to China were also present. On this evening, the 
National Flags of China and Thailand were hung side by side in the banquet hall.   
Both Kukrit and Deng gave speeches at the banquet. Kukrit called his 
conversations with the Chinese leaders ‘straightforward and frank’, but said they took 
place in a ‘friendly atmosphere.’ While there might have been differences of opinions, 
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the ‘close affinity’ between the two countries would ‘smooth out’ and ‘solve’ these 
differences.155 In his remarks, Deng Xiaoping rendered the talks rewarding on issues of 
common concern, and claimed that the visit to China by ‘our Thai friends’ had helped 
to increase ‘our mutual understanding’. He called for friendly relations between the two 
countries to grow stronger and develop continuously. Deng also reiterated that the 
superpowers that wanted to assume the role of hegemon would be eliminated ‘if we 
unite’.156    
After their speeches, the band played the Chinese National Anthem and the 
Royal Anthem of Thailand. Xinhua News Agency reported on the friendly atmosphere 
of the banquet: ‘The banquet was alive with a warm atmosphere of friendship. Hosts 
and guests warmly hailed the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
Thailand. They sincerely hoped that the Chinese and Thai people would live in 
friendship from generation to generation. Over the course of the banquet, the band 
played Chinese and Thai music’.157 According to a telegram from the Thai Consulate-
General in Hong Kong to the MFA, Kukrit’s visit to China and its concomitant 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China marked a ‘new 
chapter of friendship’.158          
The visit ended on July 3 when Chinese leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, gave a 
farewell ceremony for Kukrit and his entourage at Beijing Airport. Kukrit went to tour 
other provinces including Shanghai, Kunming, and Kwangchow for the next four 
days.159  
 
Kukrit returned to Bangkok on July 6 at around 14.00 pm, and stated in his televised 
interview that, right from the start, ‘the Chinese and ourselves made an agreement that 
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despite different ideologies and systems … we can still get along together, can still be 
understanding friends with mutual respect, and can still talk to each other on an equal 
basis’.160 He reported that the success of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
merely marked ‘a first step’: ‘both sides must exchange various missions, such as 
military, educational, sports, and cultural’. Only this cooperation could pave the way to 
‘closer ties of friendship and good understanding’.161  
He explained that was why ‘political success must come first’. During this visit, 
Thai leaders had made personal acquaintance and built trust with Chinese leaders. Now, 
both sides would hold talks and negotiations on various subjects, especially economic 
relations, in a ‘friendly and intimate manner … they will not be far apart as in the past’. 
Praising the Chinese leaders as ‘sincere’, Kukrit felt ‘certain that China will have a 
much better attitude toward us than in the past, [and] that it will be friendly’.162  
In retrospect, Kukrit’s one-week trip to China marked a key turning point in 
Thai diplomacy in general and in Thai-Chinese relations in particular. Not only was 
this a diplomatic breakthrough. The process of normalization also strengthened the 
narrative of détente. Thailand’s discourse concerning ‘China’ shifted from enmity 
towards friendship. In the process, Hanoi was constructed as the common enemy and 
became the subject of Sino-Thai conversations thereafter. This emerging discourse was 
of utmost importance because it not only symbolized the end of an era of confrontation, 
but also represented the advent of mutual cooperation between the two countries. This 
historic event was eloquently illustrated by The Washington Post as Thailand’s policy 
of ‘bending with the wind’, a ‘process that has been made even more urgent by the 
recent fall of the American-backed governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia’.163  
 
Thai-Chinese Relations Thereafter: A ‘Follow-up’ 
 
‘This is only the beginning. There has to be a follow-up.’ – Anand Panyarachun, 
Ambassador to the UN164  
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The visit of Kukrit, and the resumption of Thai-Chinese diplomatic relations, paved the 
way for greater cooperation in a variety of spheres. First involved the expansion of 
trade. The Chinese made a friendly gesture by immediately buying 200,000 tons of Thai 
rice to help alleviate the rice crisis in Thailand. An official Thai trade delegation led by 
Commerce Minister Thongyot Cittawira went to Beijing between August 17 and 21, 
1975 and completed a 50 million Baht barter trade deal, exchanging Thai rice for 
Chinese oil. The Thais would supply the PRC with 200,000 tons of rice, while China 
would export 251,237 tons of gas and 312,129 tons of crude oil to Thailand at a 
‘friendly price’ 165  The delegation indicated that there would be follow-up trade 
discussions with the Chinese regarding other commodities, such as maize, tapioca, 
kenaf, and tobacco.166 Following Kukrit’s visit to Beijing, this barter trade represented 
the first major deal between the two countries.    
In December, Wang Yao-ting, the President of the China Council for 
International Trade Promotion, visited Thailand as a guest of Foreign Minister 
Chatichai. They agreed to hold a trade exhibition on the second floor of the Bangkok 
Bazaar, a new shopping center complex behind Rajdamri Road, in March 1976.167 
Kukrit presided over the opening of the Chinese trade exhibition.  
Second involved the conclusion of important diplomatic formalities. Upon their 
return, Kukrit and Chatichai sent messages of thanks by telegram to Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai, and Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, respectively. As the Permanent 
Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Phan Wannamethi, said, this was the first-time 
official messages were sent by telegram direct from Bangkok to Beijing through the 
ordinary telegraph service.168 The Thais and the Chinese also agreed that before the 
setting up of Embassies, they would make contact via the Thai and Chinese embassies 
in Laos. The Thais who wished to visit China could apply for a visa at the Chinese 
Embassy in Laos.169    
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On September 23, the Thai Foreign Ministry nominated M.R. Kasemsamosorn 
Kasemsri170, Thai Ambassador to Jakarta, to be the first Ambassador to Beijing, while 
the Chinese appointed Chai Zemin to be the Chinese Ambassador to Thailand.171 Chai 
was an experienced Chinese diplomat whose previous posts included Hungary, Guinea, 
and Egypt. According to Edward Masters, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) of the 
American Embassy in Bangkok, Chai’s appointment as Ambassador to Thailand 
signified the importance that the PRC attached to its relationship with Bangkok: ‘An 
interesting thread that runs through Chai’s previous assignments is the presence of a 
strong and influential Soviet mission at each of his previous posts. This is also the case 
in Bangkok’.172  
In October, a 16-man advance team led by Lu Tzu Po as chargé d’affaires, went 
to Bangkok to prepare for the establishment of the Chinese embassy in Bangkok. The 
advance party stayed at the third and fourth floors of the Ambassador Hotel. At the 
same time, the Guangzhou acrobatic troupe opened a performance in Bangkok. Lu also 
greeted King Bhumibol at the premier performance of the acrobats.173 On 21 October, 
he met with Chatichai at the Foreign Ministry with a letter of introduction from the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua. Chatichai officially welcomed the party, 
telling them that both countries had maintained good ties for more than thousand years 
and the sudden stoppage of relations for 25 years in the recent past was a ‘passing 
cloud’. After a half-hour meeting, Chatichai disclosed that China would be free to make 
their choice on the location of their embassy in Bangkok.174  
The advance team played a visible and active role in the diplomatic circles in 
Bangkok during their three-week visit, attending the official opening of the ESCAP 
building, and the Austrian, Iranian as well as Soviet National Day celebrations. On 
November 8, a picture of the Chinese chargé and the Soviet Ambassador shaking hands 
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and smiling appeared on the front page of the Bangkok Post.175 The new Chinese 
Ambassador, Chai Zemin arrived in Bangkok on January 26, 1976, while Thai 
Ambassador M.R. Kasemsamosorn Kasemsri went to Beijing on March 16. After 
presenting his credentials to King Bhumibol at Bhuping Palance in Chiang Mai on 
March 21, Chai Zemin paid a courtesy call on Premier Kukrit.176      
Third was in relation to clandestine radio broadcasts. In the weeks following the 
visit, the Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT) shifted its propaganda towards a more 
anti-Soviet tone. For example, in a July 29, 1975 broadcast, it accused ‘the Soviet 
social-imperialists’ of ‘rapidly expanding their aggressive influence in Thailand’. It 
charged the KGB with increasing its clandestine activity in Thailand and claimed that 
there were 100 KGB officers in Bangkok supported by another 150 Soviet officials.177 
The VPT’s stance towards Kukrit was also moderated. Previously, the VPT described 
Kukrit as a ‘cunning’ ‘traitorous’ prime minister who was ‘selling out the nation and 
telling lies to the people’. After Kukrit’s visit to Beijing, it referred to the Thai 
government as the ‘reactionary ruling class’ (on 5 July broadcast), and Kukrit’s ‘clique’ 
(on 30 July broadcast).178    
Fourth were people-to-people contacts. Aside from the trade delegation in 
August, various Thai leaders, groups and private individuals traveled to China, 
including a group of Thai journalists from the provinces, a group of high-ranking Thai 
nobility headed by Princess Siritatna Diskul, and a group from the Socialist Party of 
Thailand, led by its party deputy leader, Khaiseng Suksai, in October. All these parties 
were official guests of the PRC, and were escorted and hosted by its representatives.179  
On February 22, 1976, a Chinese scientific delegation, led by Wang Shun-tung, 
secretary of the China Scientific and Technical Association, arrived in Bangkok for a 
three-week visit to exchange scientific experience and knowledge with Thai 
counterparts in various universities and scientific organizations. Wang told the press at 
Don Mueang Airport that he hoped his visit would foster good relations between the 
two countries and lead to the exchange of scientific knowledge. He praised Thailand’s 
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role in maintaining good relations with Third World countries, its contribution to 
ASEAN, and its opposition against any hegemony in the Asian region.180   
Last but not least, the resumption of diplomatic relations paved the way for 
normalization with Thailand’s Communist neighbors, the most notable of which was a 
rapprochement with Cambodia. As Kukrit said, ‘Cambodia was handed to us on a silver 
tray, with ribbons, by Mr. Zhou Enlai’.181 During his visit to Beijing, Zhou asked Kukrit 
of Thailand’s policy toward Cambodia, Kukrit replied that Thailand would like to be 
friendly.  
 
Zhou: Even if Prince Sihanouk were to come back as Head of State?  
Kukrit: Yes, especially if Prince Sihanouk were to come back as Head of State.  
Zhou: Are you quite serious?  
Kukrit: I am very serious.  
Zhou: May I tell Prince Sihanouk that?  
Kukrit: Yes, by all means.182 
 
According to Kukrit, Premier Zhou was very pleased with this conversation. Chatichai 
disclosed that on September 3, Ambassador Anand Panyarachun met with Cambodian 
Vice Premier Ieng Sary at the UN, and said that Thailand was ‘ready to supply 
Cambodia with necessary foodstuffs and other commodities on a government-to-
government basis’.183 Then in late October, the Kukrit government received word from 
China that Ieng Sary would be landing at Don Mueang Airport in a Chinese plane, on 
his way to China on a goodwill mission. After the visit, Kukrit said that ‘we were very 
friendly. And since then, very good things have been happening between Cambodia 
and this country. … We are really very friendly toward Cambodia’.184  
 
Overall, the formal normalization of Sino-Thai relations marked a diplomatic 
revolution in Thai foreign policy. For Chatichai this had three important outcomes: 
‘One – mutual confidence. Two – non-interference in each other’s affairs. Three – 
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mutual benefits’.185 Such a transformative event was also widely discussed during the 
meeting between Foreign Minister Chatichai and US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger on November 26, 1975. Kissinger told Chatichai of the forthcoming 
Presidential visit to Beijing and asked Chatichai about his visit to Beijing: 
 
Secretary: Do the Chinese support the insurgents [in Thailand]? 
Foreign Minister: They follow a two-track policy. The insurgents have moral 
support from the Chinese Communist Party.     
Secretary: Mao does not like foreign Communists at all. I am not sure that he 
likes Chinese Communists either. Did he form words when you met with him 
in Beijing?  
Foreign Minister: They used interpreters. There was a very nice-looking girl, 
Nancy Tang. When we came into the room, we did not see Mao at first. He was 
sitting in a chair. Then he stood up and greeted Prime Minister Kukrit. During 
the conversation, there was interpretation from Chinese to Chinese to English. 
Sometimes he would write things.  
Secretary: It was the same way when I saw him.186   
 
They also discussed the situation in Indochina, and the role of China there. They agreed 
that ‘the biggest threat in Southeast Asia at the present time is North Vietnam’. 
Chatichai added that the Chinese talked a lot about Vietnamese ‘hegemony’. Kissinger 
said that US strategy was to ‘get the Chinese into Laos and Cambodia as a barrier to 
the Vietnamese’. Chatichai told Kissinger that he ‘asked the Chinese to take over in 
Laos. They mentioned that they had a road building team in northern Laos’. Kissinger 
said that ‘we would support this’. He also asked Chatichai to ‘tell the Cambodians that 
we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in 
our way’. ‘We are prepared to improve relations with them.’ ‘Tell them the latter part, 
but don’t tell them what I said before’. Kissinger said that ‘we bear no hostility towards 
them. We would like them to be independent as a counterweight to North Vietnam’. 
Also, the Secretary of State firmly noted, ‘the Chinese fully support the 
Cambodians’187.  
 
To sum up, Sino-Thai rapprochement was an integral part of a broader geopolitical 
realignment within the region, underpinned for the Thais by the changing discourse of 
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friends and enemies. With the Chinese now framed as a ‘new friend’, the Thai were 
able to offer help to the Cambodian ‘thugs’ (the Khmer Rouge) while the new 
arrangement helped reinforce their view of the Vietnamese as a threat and an aspiring 
sub-regional ‘hegemonic power’. 188  This discursive change was to fundamentally 
shape the practices of diplomacy in the late 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the shift also 
reflected the wish amongst Thai officials for greater balance or equilibrium in relations 
with the major powers, including the US, the USSR, and the PRC. For Chatichai, 
Thailand’s foreign policy was ‘not to overemphasize relations with any single 
country’.189 Rather, it necessitated a three-pronged and balanced strategy: ‘we must 
stand out of balance, neither too close to one power nor too far from another power’.190  
 
6.2. Thai-Soviet Relations: Resilience of Détente   
6.2.1. Thai-Soviet Relations under Sanya  
Under the Sanya Dharmasakdi government, détente with the Soviet Union remained 
fairly intact. One of his aims was to sustain the Thai-Soviet friendship. On the one hand, 
Sanya wished to develop closer trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries. 
On the other, he sought to achieve a balance of interests with the great powers in the 
region, thereby eschewing the Soviet Collective Security in Asia proposal.191  
At the Foreign Correspondents’ Club on January 16, 1974, Foreign Minister 
Charoonphan Isarankhun Na Ayutthaya explained that, for Thailand, the Soviet Union 
was in ‘a strong position to contribute to the restoration of peace and harmony in the 
long suffering people living there (Indochina) and thereby contribute positively to the 
stability of the entire region’.192 It was a point he reiterated in a televised interview on 
February 28: ‘We would like to promote closer relations with [the Soviet Union], but 
we must create trust and confidence, mutual good understanding must exist, and there 
must be no interference. This is not meant for the Soviet Union or any other country, 
we do not want any interference in the internal affairs or our country.’ ‘The Soviet 
Union’, Charoonphan said, ‘has the opportunity to play a role in finding a way to help 
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restore peace and quiet to Southeast Asia, and especially to Indochina, since it desires 
to see peace restored’.193  
While Thailand under Sanya was not clear about how the USSR should 
contribute to the peace and stability of the region, it did not want the USSR to fill the 
power vacuum. In his speech to the Association for Asian Studies in Boston on April 
1, Ambassador to the US and the UN, Anand Panyarachun, endorsed Thailand’s 
increased friendliness with Russia but confirmed that Thailand did not accept the Soviet 
proposal on Collective Security in Asia. As Anand stated, ‘the Thai government rejects 
the Soviet Security Proposal as inappropriate and unnecessary, either to fill what some 
Thai see as a vacuum caused by an American withdrawal from Asia, or an anti-Chinese 
alliance’.194    
 Despite Thailand’s disapproval of the Soviet proposal on Asian Collective 
Security, there were key developments in three main areas. First, a series of people-to-
people exchanges commenced. In November 1973, a ballet company of the Leningrad 
Opera and S. Kirov Ballet Theater gave guest performances in Thailand. In February 
1974, an education delegation led by Sman Sangmali, Director-General of the General 
Educational Department of Thailand, visited Moscow to study the educational system 
in the USSR, and visit universities and institutions.195 In the same month, Vladimir 
Promyslov, the Mayor of the Moscow City, visited Thailand. During his three-day visit, 
Promyslov met with Adth Visutyothapibal, the Governor of Bangkok. The latter voiced 
interest in expanding trade between the two countries, but raised ‘domestic political 
sensitivities’ as an impediment to improved political relations. Promyslov also invited 
Adth to visit Moscow.196   
 In April, two Thai scientific officers of the Thai Industrial Standards Institute, 
Nippon Suwansukroad and Chalit Homhual, attended a four-month UN seminar for 
standards and metrology, organized by the State Committee of the USSR Council of 
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Ministers for Standards in cooperation with the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) in Moscow.197  
 The most important was a visit to the Soviet Union made by Princess Galayani 
Wattana, King Bhumibol’s elder sister, in May 1974. She was treated as a guest of the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In Moscow, she called on a raft of Soviet 
leaders: Ivan Grushetsky, Vice-President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, Mikhail Georgadze, Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 
Alla Shaposhnikova, Deputy Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, 
and other Soviet high-ranking officials. 198  As the head of the foreign languages 
department at Thammasat University, the Princess was interested in cultural exchanges 
and the Russian language. In her meeting with Vice-President Grushetsky, she said that 
Thammasat University would open Russian language as a major course in the near 
future, and that the instructors would be the two daughters of Yuad Lertrit, Thai 
Ambassador to Moscow. Yingboon and Yodboon Lertrit studied at Moscow State 
University.199 Both started teaching Russian at Thammasat University on August 1, 
1974.200     
 During her stay in the USSR, the Princess went to Moscow, Leningrad, and 
Kiev. She familiarized herself with the Soviet system of higher education and with its 
achievements in the fields of science, technology and culture. When interviewed by a 
correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency (APN), Princess Galayani pointed out that 
her visit to the USSR had been useful in many respects. ‘This trip has convinced me’, 
she said, ‘of the Soviet people’s friendly feelings for Thailand, its history and culture. 
Our countries are very different, and cultural exchanges between them would be very 
interesting … I hope that contacts between our two countries in the field of culture and 
education will become closer with each passing year’.201   
 Shortly after Princess Galayani’s visit, Adth Visutyothapibal paid a return visit 
as the head of a delegation of the Bangkok Metropolis between late May and early June. 
                                                          
197 Chalit told a correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency (APN): ‘The USSR has accumulated a 
wealth of theoretical and practical experience in the field of standardization, metrology and quality 
check-up. And, what is very important, it shares this experience with the developing countries. As far 
as we are concerned, the many things we have learnt while attending the course will be useful for the 
work done by our Institute’. ‘A diary of Soviet-Thai cooperation’, Bangkok Post, 7 November 1974, p. 
3.  
198 ‘A diary of Soviet-Thai cooperation’, Bangkok Post, 7 November 1974, p. 3.  
199 NARA, RG59, 1974BANGKO08082, ‘Visit of Thai Princess to Moscow’, 17 May 1974.   
200 Yingboon Lertrit, interview by author, Bangkok, 23 June 2015.   




The delegation acquainted itself with the municipal economy of Moscow and with the 
activities of the Moscow City Soviet, the legislative and executive organ of power in 
the city and one of the largest in Europe. They also visited Leningrad. In an interview 
with a correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency (APN), Adth pointed out that he was 
impressed by the efficient functioning of Moscow’s municipal economy, by the 
cleanliness and order prevailing in the streets of the city, by the rate of housing 
construction and by the Moscow public transport system. He hoped that ‘friendship 
between Moscow and Bangkok will be strengthened and deepened’.202  
 Three further visits were made by Thai writers and women’s organizations 
between August and October.203 In August, a group of Thai women led by Somthavil 
Sangkasaba arrived in the Soviet Union to present a gift of a sitting Buddha statue to 
the Soviet Buddhist community. Between August and September 1974, Ladda 
Thanathathankam, Vice-President of the Writers’ Association of Thailand, and Subhat 
Sawasdivak, the editor of the Sakulthai Weekly magazine, met Russian journalists at 
the Novosti Press Agency. In late September, a delegation of the Women’s Movement 
of Thailand led by Mom Dusdi Boripat na Ayutthaya, visited the USSR between 
September 26 and October 8. It was clear that by the mid-1970s, Thai-Soviet relations 
broadened to a series of people-to-people exchanges.  
The second development came with increased cultural cooperation. The new 
Soviet Ambassador to Bangkok, Boris Ilyichev (February 1974 – June 1978), 
proactively supported further cultural exchanges, and initiated a cultural agreement 
with Thailand, of which he claimed, there were no strings attached. As Ilyichev put it, 
‘One thing is certain, we will not export revolution anywhere’.204 His charge d’ affaires, 
Stanislav Semivolos, had a meeting with the Director-General of the Information 
Department, the MFA on February 5, 1974. In that meeting, he presented the Soviet 
proposal of a cultural agreement to the Thai Foreign Ministry. He said this agreement 
would help to promote good relations between Thailand and the Soviet Union.205 The 
Soviet proposal included a wide range of cultural exchanges, including musicians, 
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students and professors, football players and scientists. The Thai Foreign Ministry took 
the draft of the cultural agreement into consideration.     
 Ilyichev also broadened contacts with various groups of students, specifically 
offering scholarships – though this was never approved by the Thai government. In 
March 1974, an exhibition on the Soviet Union was organized by students and faculties 
of Phrasanmit College, Bangkok. The exhibition included about 1,000 photographs 
showing the most diverse aspects of life in the USSR. Alexander Karchava, a staff 
member of the USSR Embassy in Thailand, delivered a lecture, ‘From the History of 
Russo-Thai Relations’ on the occasion.206  
In May, an exhibition was held at Thammasat University in connection with the 
International Day of Working People’s Solidarity. The exhibition included a number of 
photographs on the USSR: on the activities of Soviet trade unions, on the position of 
women in Soviet society, and on working conditions in the USSR. Students who 
arranged the exhibition provided detailed texts to explain the photographs.207  
The third development was in trade relations. After the trade agreement had 
been signed in December 1970, Thai-Soviet mutual trade relations gradually developed 
mainly due to increased Soviet purchases of rubber and fluorites from Thailand. In 
October, the Soviet Union informed the Thai government that it wished to buy 50,000 
tons of maize from Thailand. However, Thailand was not able to meet the Russian 
demand because of its prior commitments to supply Japan and Taiwan. 208  
Nevertheless, the Soviets remained concerned about the new State Trading Bill, 
which set up a state trading corporation to control direct trade with the Communist 
countries. They felt that this law was ‘discriminatory’.209 Thai Ambassador to Moscow, 
Yuad Lertrit, said that a state trading organization would ‘prove useful in promoting 
commerce with Soviet Russia and East European countries’. He explained: ‘At present 
our merchants are afraid of police surveillance if they trade with Socialist countries. If 
trading is done through a governmental enterprise then there is no such problem’.210   
Between December 2 and 22, a Soviet trade exhibition was held at Lumpini Hall 
in Bangkok. V. Kulikov, trade representative of the Soviet Union in Thailand, 
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expressed hopes that it would help expand trade between the two countries, and 
improve already good relations. At the exhibition, 12 foreign trade organizations from 
Soviet countries exhibited their products, such as new models of agricultural trackers, 
passenger cars, trucks, pumps and hydrofoil boats.211  
  All in all, Thailand under Sanya maintained friendship with the Soviet Union. 
Mutual trade, cultural and people-to-people exchanges were fostered, which became 
the basis for Kukrit’s détente between 1975 and 1976.  
 
6.2.2. Thai-Soviet Relations under Kukrit  
Under Kukrit, with Sino-Thai rapprochement in the spotlight, changes to Thai-Soviet 
relations were relatively less radical. This was partly because of the changing 
geopolitical landscape in Southeast Asia, reflecting Sino-Soviet strategic competition, 
which in turn shaped the way in which the Thais sought to balance between the two 
powers. It culminated in equidistant diplomacy.  
This section argues that despite these limitations, Thai-Soviet relations 
remained resilient. While an increase in the Soviet political and intelligence activities 
in Thailand raised skepticism, Thailand’s discourse of détente with the USSR remained 
intact. It culminated in their mutual exchanges at various levels and the approval of the 
aforementioned cultural agreement.  
Upon taking office in March 1975, Prime Minister Kukrit proclaimed that there 
were no issues of dispute with Moscow, and looked forward to closer ties between 
Thailand and the Soviet Union. As he remarked, ‘we will maintain our friendship with 
the Soviets’.212 As a superpower, the Soviet Union, Kukrit said, ‘obviously has interests 
here in this region as elsewhere around the globe. The great potential is there for the 
Soviets to play a significant role that would be consonant with interests of the regional 
countries themselves’.213 One Soviet role, for example, could be to induce Vietnamese 
restraint. In the process of détente, the Thai government regarded the USSR, like the 
PRC, as a ‘friend’, and Vietnam as an emerging ‘threat’ that needed to be contained.  
Ivan Shchedrov, the Pravda correspondent to Thailand, wrote his commentary 
praising Kukrit’s new course of Thai foreign policy.214 On May 12, Shchedrov called 
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upon Chatichai at the Foreign Ministry. They discussed Brezhnev’s proposal for 
Collective Security in Asia, which had little accomplishment in the region. Shchedrov 
also requested the establishment of a Pravda office in Bangkok, which Chatichai 
approved in principle. Later, on June 25, Soviet Ambassador Boris Ilyichev, in his 
speech at the Foreign Correspondent’s Club in Bangkok, also highlighted Brezhnev’s 
idea of Collective Security in Asia. He said that the proposal would benefit the countries 
in the region, including Thailand, due to the fact that it stood for: ‘(1) the renunciation 
of force in orderly state relations (2) the respecting of each other’s sovereignty and the 
principle of inviolability of national frontiers (3) noninterference in the state’s internal 
affairs and (4) broad economic and other forms of cooperation on a basis of full equality 
and mutual benefits.’ 215   
Brezhnev’s proposal came up during an interview Shchedrov conducted with 
Kukrit in late June. Kukrit said that Thailand endorsed the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia without military bases or blocs. As he put it, ‘peace and security can only be 
established through the collective efforts of all countries of the region’. However, 
Kukrit stressed that Thailand’s interest in the ZOPFAN resolution was a way of 
rejecting the Asian Collective Security proposal. Regardless of the proposal, the Thai 
Premier strongly urged closer ties with the Soviet Union. 216 
 
However, Sino-Thai normalization deeply concerned Moscow. On June 1, when the 
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin, hosted a luncheon meeting for the 
new Ambassador to Moscow, Arun Panupong (1974-1977), he raised the Soviet 
concerns. Firyubin warned that Thai relations with other countries should not affect 
Thai-Soviet relations in a negative way or discriminate against the Soviet Union. 
According to Arun, Firyubin emphasized the anti-Soviet Chinese policy. He claimed 
that China never stopped intervening in the internal affairs of other countries, and 
threatened to annex the territories of Vietnam in the South China Sea. At the same time, 
the Chinese leaked news that the Soviets wished to build a naval base there. For 
Firyubin, these Chinese attempts to discredit the Soviet Union were merely to conceal 
their own intentions in seeking influence in Cambodia, and in attempting to attack 
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Vietnam. He also said that the Soviet Union was satisfied with Thailand’s policy of 
American withdrawal.217  
In bilateral relations, Firyubin stressed that the USSR wished to upgrade its 
relationship with Thailand. He told Ambassador Arun that despite their ‘normal’ 
relationship’, the actual content of Thai-Soviet relations was at a ‘standstill and too 
limited’. Firyubin suggested that there were effective technical and professional 
institutes that the Thai government could consider sending students to as part of a 
student exchange or straight study in Soviet Union. If Thailand had any problems or 
concerns, it was possible to have a straightforward and frank discussion. The Soviets 
would be pleased to listen and find a solution to alleviate skepticism. Arun replied that 
the Soviet Union, as one of the great powers, was of utmost importance to Thai foreign 
policy. He assured him that both countries did not have any significant problems or 
obstacles. Unlike Sino-Thai rapprochement, there was no exciting news in Thai-Soviet 
relations because the latter were normal. In his view, the Soviets were anxious that the 
Chinese were successfully establishing diplomatic relations with countries in Southeast 
Asia, and were dominating the headlines at the expense of the Soviet Union. They 
sought influence in the region, and therefore struggled with China’s greater alignment 
with countries such as Thailand.218  
When Kukrit returned from Beijing to Bangkok in early July 1975, he was asked 
by Thai reporters whether he would visit the Soviet Union anytime in the near future. 
Kukrit replied, ‘No, not now. One play at a time.’ He said that it was generally agreed 
that a visit to Moscow after the Beijing visit would be ‘most disappointing’ to the 
Chinese, who repeatedly stated to the Thai delegation of their fear of Soviet 
expansionism. According to Kukrit, Thailand would consider closer, though more 
cautious ties with the Soviet Union in order to keep foreign policy options open.219  
On July 17, the Thai Ambassador to Moscow Arun had a discussion with S. 
Nemchina, Director of the Southeast Asian Department, at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. 
While he understood that Thai rapprochement with the PRC was a readjustment to the 
regional reality, Nemchina warned that Mao and Chinese leaders had interfered with 
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the internal affairs of other countries. He did not believe that in the event of Sino-Thai 
normalization, the Communist insurgency in Thailand would disappear. The Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence and détente 
and sought to promote peace in the region via the Asian Collective Security proposal, 
which, he felt, many Southeast Asian countries misunderstood. Adopting an anti-Soviet 
stance, the Chinese in particular deemed this proposal an anti-Chinese scheme. 
Nemchina praised Kukrit’s diplomacy of independence and good neighbor policy. He 
also said that Thai-Soviet relations were normal, but wished to see an extension of the 
relationship based upon friendship and equality.220  
Subsequently, the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok directly complained to the Thai 
Foreign Ministry that the anti-hegemonic clause in the Thai-Chinese joint communiqué 
of July 1 was directed towards the Soviet Union. The Thais replied that they understood 
it differently, and that it meant hegemony by any power including the Chinese 
themselves. 221  It seemed that one of the Soviet aims was principally to counter 
increased Chinese influence in Thailand.  
Following Thailand’s formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, Thai Foreign 
Ministry officials noticed a sharp increase in Soviet diplomatic activities.222 Soviet 
Ambassador Ilyichev apparently broadened his contacts and influence at all levels of 
the Thai government and bureaucracy. As Phirat Itsarasena, a press division chief of 
the MFA, observed, the Soviets were ‘pushing very hard now, not only on the cultural 
exchange, but across the board’.223  
First and foremost, the Soviet Union attempted to conclude the Thai-Soviet 
cultural agreement, which had originally been drafted by the Russians. By June, the 
Thai Foreign Ministry had taken the agreement into serious consideration. It found that 
the original draft was different from other cultural agreements that the Soviet Union 
had with other countries, and suggested some changes, such as the inclusion of a non-
interference clause.224 This revised draft was sent back to the Russians during the 
meeting between Soviet Ambassador Boris Ilyichev and Pracha Gunakasem, Director-
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General of the Information Department in the Foreign Ministry on June 25. It was 
reported that a Thai mission would be dispatched to Moscow to work out the final 
details.225  
By the end of July, Foreign Minister Chatichai reaffirmed the fact that Thailand 
did not ‘have any dispute with Soviet Russia. We will soon sign a cultural 
agreement’.226 On August 1, at the Swiss National Day reception, Edward Masters, the 
US Deputy Chief of Mission, observed that Pracha Gunakasem, then director-general 
of the Information Department, the MFA, carried an envelope to the Soviet Ambassador 
with the remark, ‘This is approved from our side’. Masters assumed that this referred 
to the cultural agreement.227  
On August 18, Soviet Ambassador Ilyichev held a meeting with Chatichai at 
the Thai Foreign Ministry. Chatichai told Ilyichev that the cultural agreement would be 
approved by the cabinet on the next day, and if the Soviets wished to sign the treaty in 
Bangkok, he would like to invite the Soviet Foreign Minister to visit Thailand. No 
formal invitation would be issued until it was known that Gromyko could accept. 
Chatichai said that if the treaty could be signed sooner, the rumor of increased KGB 
activities would decrease. By August, a draft had been approved by both countries.228  
In September, Chatichai publicly announced that he would invite Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko to Thailand for the formal signing of a Thai-Soviet cultural 
agreement.229 He commented that ‘we don’t want the Soviets to feel that we are closer 
to China and the US than the Soviet Union’ and that ‘since we have established 
diplomatic ties with China, we should increase our contacts with the Soviet Union’.230 
The invitation was envisioned as a symbolic balance to the establishment of diplomatic 
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relations with the PRC with which the USSR had a heated political dispute. In general, 
Chatichai’s ultimate aim was to deal with the USSR without offending Beijing. 
Although Gromyko did not plan to visit Thailand, the cultural agreement was approved 
by both sides. 
Second, the Soviet Union stepped up its diplomatic and intelligence activities 
in Thailand. It increased its official presence from 70 officials in 1974 to 81 in 1975, 
working at the Embassy, the trade representation office, and at ESCAP.231 In July, a 
Pravda office was officially opened, and the Soviet Embassy requested for approval to 
station a Russian military attaché in Bangkok. While Chatichai denied any knowledge 
of such a Soviet request during his July 31 press conference, Nitsai Welchachiwa, the 
Director-General of the MFA Information Department, stated that the request had been 
received from the Soviet Embassy and forwarded to the Ministry of Defense for a final 
decision.232  
According to US Ambassador Whitehouse, ‘the Soviet military attaché question 
appears a ploy to fend off the Soviets without bruising their feelings overmuch. The 
Thai military establishment remains overtly suspicious of the USSR, and the MFA can 
blame the Ministry of Defense in the event of a negative … decision’.233 However, by 
the end of 1975, the Thai government agreed to accept a Soviet military attaché, while 
sending a Thai military attaché to Moscow too.  
Third, following trade and aviation agreements in the early 1970s, the volume 
of Thai-Soviet trade increased through the 1970s, but it remained marginal. The Soviets 
focused their exports to Thailand on the sale of both fixed and moveable machinery, 
and provided large-scale financing to local purchases, through the Moscow Narodny 
Bank in Singapore.234 They imported some Thai products, the most important of which 
was fluorite. However, the purchase of fluorite in 1975 decreased due to Soviet 
conditions that required Thai exporters to accept Soviet machinery as payment. In 
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September 1975, Foreign Minister Chatichai accepted the Soviet offer to send a 
technical team of energy experts to Thailand in exploring shale oil.235         
Throughout 1975, the Russian government repeatedly submitted formal 
complaints to the Thai Foreign Ministry regarding the State Trading Bill. The Soviets 
charged that the State Trading Bill targeted trade with both the USSR and the Eastern 
bloc, and would considerably affect the smooth functioning of trade relations. From the 
Soviet sides, the bill would automatically hinder the original Thai-Russian trade 
agreement that facilitated free trade between the two countries. They said they would 
consider the abolishment of their trade agreement if Thailand insisted on implementing 
the State Trading Bill. According to an unnamed high-ranking Thai official, the Kukrit 
government described this Russian intervention as a ‘political issue’, and it was 
believed that the Soviet move was aimed at checking the growing Chinese trade 
influence in Thailand. In mid-September 1975, the Kukrit government finally decided 
in principle to drop the law in order to maintain détente with Moscow.236  
Fourth, the Soviets steadily increased their influence within Thai civil society, 
and in particular, with some labor leaders and students. On the one hand, they sponsored 
the visits of several Thai labor leaders to the USSR. For example, Soviet Ambassador 
Ilyichev, invited five Thai labor leaders to visit industrial areas in the USSR in March 
1976.237 On the other hand, the Soviets sponsored Russian language courses offered at 
Ramkhamhaeng University. Also, Soviet cultural information officials, and in 
particular Mikhail A. Romanov, a Second Secretary for Cultural Affairs, became 
frequent visitors to Thammasat University. 238  The Soviets attempted to offer 
scholarships to Thai students to study in the USSR, and promote educational exchanges 
between Thailand and the USSR. However, these attempts were not particularly 
successful.239     
Fifth, the Soviet Union sought increasing influence in mainland Southeast Asia. 
This was largely due to the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which, according to Prasong Suntsiri, 
Assistant Secretary-General of the Thai National Security Council, was ‘intensifying 
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since the normalization of relations between Thailand and China’. 240  The Soviets 
increasingly supported Communist regimes in neighboring countries. In particular, they 
began to provide Laos with advisors and material assistance.  
By October, a series of border clashes along the Mekong River seemingly 
complicated relations between Thailand and the USSR further. The border incident 
occurred when a Thai patrol boat was crippled and a Navy man killed by the Laotians 
on the Mekong River on November 17. In response, the Thai government ordered the 
closure of the border to January 1, 1976. Vietnam immediately announced its full 
support of Laos, while the USSR regarded Thailand’s blockade as an act of 
intimidation. A Pravda commentary stated that an ‘unnamed’ country attempted to use 
Laos to expand its own influence or to interdict the process of social transformation in 
that country.241 Moscow supplied Laos with basic needs such as fuel and rice through 
an airlift until the border closure was lifted.   
However, face-to-face diplomacy was used to manage the border conflict. On 
November 23, Ilyichev had a luncheon meeting with Foreign Minister Chatichai at the 
latter’s Soi Rajakru residence. In their three-hour meeting, they discussed the Thai-
Laotian border incident. Giving detailed information over this incident, Chatichai told 
the Russian envoy that Thailand was very disappointed with Vietnam’s action. He said 
that while Thailand had attempted to ease tension with Laos, Vietnam had intentionally 
made the situation worse. Chatichai also explained to Ilyichev that he did not mean to 
refer to the Soviet Union when he earlier mentioned a ‘third country’ that had prodded 
the Pathet Lao into taking aggressive action against Thailand. He emphasized that 
Thailand did not want the USSR or any other country to intervene in the incident ‘which 
is strictly a Thai-Laotian affair’.242 Lastly, citing the rapprochement with Cambodia as 
an example, Chatichai assured the Russian Ambassador that Thailand was not an 
expansionist nation, but sincerely intended to coexist peacefully with neighboring 
countries.    
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In conclusion, compared with Sino-Thai rapprochement, Thai-Soviet relations were 
relatively less revolutionary. Despite Soviet skepticism about the closer Thai-Chinese 
ties and the border conflicts along the Mekong River, the discourse of détente with 
Moscow remained intact during the Kukrit administration. This can be illustrated by 
the fact that the cultural agreement was agreed upon while the business-as-usual 
relations in both trade and cultural exchanges continued. While the Kukrit government 
eliminated the State Trading Bill, which the Soviets considered to be an obstacle to the 
bilateral trade, Kukrit approved a new position of Soviet military attaché and the 
opening of a Pravda Office in Bangkok.  
 
6.3. ‘Withdrawal’ or Diplomatic Symptoms? ‘The Tiger 
Coming in the Back Door’?  
 By the mid-1970s, discursive anxiety that Thailand would become the ‘next domino’ 
in Southeast Asia dominated Thai politics. In his birthday speech on December 5, 1975, 
King Bhumibol observed, ‘some people predicted that, by the end of this year, Thailand 
will not appear on the world map any more. … Next year “Thailand” would become 
“Dieland”.’ ‘It is a deliberate plan’, he continued, ‘to obliterate our country from the 
world map. We will not allow that to happen. I think that is a kind of intimidation plan. 
But if we all remain united and help each other, we will not die. And the proof is that 
everyone who is standing here is not yet dead. This is not yet “Dieland”.’243    
This section discusses the deep anxiety within Thai elite circles and society 
following détente with the Communist powers, especially the restoration of diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. It argues that the outburst of mass violence in October 6, 1976 
and the return of dictatorship should be explained not only by what Benedict Anderson 
called ‘withdrawal symptoms’ 244  but also by diplomatic symptoms, or a clash of 
diplomatic discourses. Once again, the coup was symptomatic of a discursive tussle 
between anticommunism and detente.    
 Despite his diplomatic success, the Kukrit government faced a domestic crisis 
partly due to the nature of the coalition government and partly because of an economic 
                                                          
243 Quoted in King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work (Bangkok: Editions Didier Millet, 2016), p. 
133.  
244 Benedict Anderson, ‘Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup’, in 
Exploration and Irony in Studies of Siam over Forty Years (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell 




recession, exacerbated by the drastic cut in US economic assistance to Thailand and a 
drop in foreign direct investment. The fall of Kukrit can be explicated by the discursive 
struggle. His détente strategy lost the support of the military, which were strongly 
anticommunist. In particular, General Kris Srivara, the powerful Commander-in-Chief 
of the Army, started to shift his support to the opposition Democratic Party.245 Kris’s 
protégé and the new Commander-in-Chief, General Boonchai Bumrungpong, hinted 
that ‘a military coup could occur or other violence before the scheduled March 20 
deadline for US withdrawal’.246 On January 11, 1976, military leaders led by Kris called 
on Kukrit at his residence and made an ultimatum that sought his resignation. The 
following day, Kukrit dissolved Parliament and a new general election was announced 
to be held in April. At that election, Kukrit himself failed to get re-elected in Dusit, the 
military-dominated constituency in Bangkok, making the election a disaster for 
Kukrit.247           
The newly formed Democrat-led coalition government, led by Prime Minister 
M.R. Seni Pramoj, was very weak, while General Kris, who was appointed as the new 
Defense Minister, died suddenly on April 23. His mysterious death brought about 
tremendous instability within the military. The other faction within the military decided 
to invite two exiled ‘tyrants’, Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas 
Charusathien, back to Bangkok, which precipitated mass demonstrations. Since the 
October 1973 uprising, the right-wing and ultra-right movements, such as the Krathing 
Daeng (Red Gaurs), Nawaphon, and the village scouts, had emerged and increasingly 
used violence against the students’ and left-leaning movements. A number of peasant 
leaders and intellectuals were assassinated, such as the socialist leader Boonsanong 
Punyodyana.248 The most symbolic and spectacular event was the mass violence on 
October 6, 1976, when the rightists massacred students in front of and on the campus 
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of Thammasat University. A military coup stepped in and the King appointed a staunch 
anticommunist judge, Thanin Kraivichien, as new prime minister (October 1976-
October 1977).  
 
How can we explain these crises from within? In his provocative article, Benedict 
Anderson, rendered this new kind of violence as ‘nonadministrative, public and even 
mob character’, and argued that violence and the concomitant u-turn back to 
dictatorship were ‘symptomatic of the present social, cultural, and political crisis’, 
which he described as ‘withdrawal symptoms’.249 Anderson elucidates two structural 
setbacks, namely the process of class formation and ideological upheaval. On the one 
hand, Thailand’s integration in the American world economic system and its 
involvement in the Vietnam War had brought about a period of rapid economic growth, 
which in turn produced a new strata in Thai society. In particular, he pointed to the 
expansion of the education system, which had created a more self-aware bourgeoisie or 
middle class. Then, the mid-1970s saw a range of crises hit the country, ranging from 
the oil crisis, the prospect of American withdrawal, the collapse of the Indochinese 
regimes and the specter of Communism. These precipitated a growing anger and 
anxiety among the emerging yet insecure middle class, which, in turn, targeted the 
radicalized students, their demonstrations, and democracy itself. The latter were 
scapegoated. Anderson suggests that these explained why ‘many of the same people’, 
who ‘sincerely supported the mass demonstrations of October 1973’, provided ‘the 
social base for a quasi-popular right-wing movement’ that welcomed the return of a 
military dictatorship three years later.250  
On the other hand, during the democratic interlude, between 1973 and 1976, an 
ideological polarization emerged that pitted popular and democratic left-leaning ideas 
against the established conservative Thai ideology of Nation-Religion-King. The 
former questioned the legitimacy and authority of the latter, and in particular the 
centrality of the monarchy.251 Anderson traced the weak descent of so-called ‘radical-
populist, if not left-wing’ nationalism in Thailand to the absence of a historical legacy 
of anti-colonialism. As Anderson puts it,  
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A whole concatenation of crises in Thai society began to crystallize around the 
symbol of the monarchy. The end of the long economic boom, the unexpected 
frustrations generated by rapid educational expansion, inter-generational 
estrangement, and the alarm caused by the American strategic withdrawal and 
the discrediting of the military leadership – these linked crises were experienced 
most acutely of all by the insecure new bourgeois strata.252  
 
These withdrawal symptoms set the stage for mass violence by the right-wing 
movements, which culminated in the orchestrated mob massacre on October 6, 1976.           
In this thesis, I add one more setback that fueled the return of dictatorship: a 
diplomatic symptom. This diplomatic symptom can be understood within the 
framework of a discursive clash that was itself linked to a contestation over who should 
hold the hegemonic position over the Thai body politic. During the democratic 
interlude, the MFA played a pivotal role in the decision-making process in the realm of 
foreign and security policies, thereby marginalizing the role of the military, which had 
dominated this field for so many years. For instance, the MFA’s leading role in 
forbidding reconnaissance flights from U-Tapao airbase over the Indian Ocean was ‘the 
salient episode’ in its marginalization of Supreme Command’s former monopoly on 
Thai-US security relations.253 More profound disagreements existed in relation to both 
the withdrawal of US forces and détente with the Communist powers.    
 A telegram to the State Department written by US Embassy Minister, Edward 
Masters, captured this clash of discourses very well. According to Masters, Thailand in 
1975 was in the midst of a shift in foreign policy thinking along two ‘diverse tracks’: 
‘quick accommodation’, and ‘heightened defense’.254  On the one hand, those who 
supported ‘quick accommodation’, or what I call détente proponents, included ‘some 
officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. They argued that ‘Thailand must work out 
an arrangement with Communist Indochina’ and the Communist powers in general so 
as to ‘permit peaceful coexistence without surrendering to the North Vietnamese’. 
‘Increasingly referring to their history books’, détente proponents recalled that the 
Thais had been ‘forced to deal with hostile regimes … on several occasions over the 
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last 700 years. They have coped with the situation in the past and expect to do so in the 
future’. Highlighting continuity in Thai diplomacy, détente proponents strongly urged 
a rapid accommodation with the Communists. They also found the US military 
presence in Thailand to be a ‘hindrance’.255  
 On the other hand, those who favored ‘heightened defense’, or what I call 
détente opponents, included ‘senior generals in the Thai defense establishment’. They 
claimed that Thailand should ‘strengthen itself enough militarily to withstand pressures 
from Hanoi and Beijing without giving them major concessions’. In other words, 
détente opponents favored ‘a more militant stand toward Hanoi and Beijing’. This 
position presupposed increased military spending, and a ‘slowdown in the diplomatic 
approach’ to Beijing and Hanoi. A sufficient number of military capabilities as a 
deterrent would ‘convince’ the Communists of the military ‘seriousness’ and readiness 
of Thailand’s posture. Thus, these groups rendered a continued US military presence in 
Thailand advantageous, both strategically and tactically. This benefited Thailand 
twofold. First, their presence served as a hedge against those Communist countries. 
Second, the US presence helped guarantee continued military assistance for the Thai 
military, which was essential to the strengthening of the armed forces in addressing the 
Communist insurgency and the growing external threat.256 In brief, leading military 
leaders hoped for US military forces to ‘stay, preferably indefinitely and preferably 
with enough force to do some good’.257           
 In this sense, détente with China, and Kukrit’s visit to Beijing in July, was 
viewed by the military and conservatives with skepticism. They recognized that 
‘rapprochement with the PRC’ was ‘advisable’, but questioned ‘the haste with which 
MFA is plunging ahead’. They feared that détente proponents, particularly the MFA, 
‘endangered’ Thailand by ‘making deals that are ill conceived and giving away too 
much in the bargaining process.’258  
  Views of Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Secretary-General of National Security 
Council, demonstrated the discourse of those détente skeptics. In his interview with 
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Theh Chongkhadikij, the editor-in-chief of the Bangkok Post on September 7, Siddhi, 
who also accompanied with Prime Minister Kukrit to Beijing, said that the Chinese 
behaved like a ‘mutual adult’. He believed that ‘the present leaders intend to let us solve 
our internal problems. The Communist insurgency is a domestic problem’. However, 
he could not say what the situation would be like if the leadership in Beijing changed.259 
Like Deng Xiaoping, Siddhi warned that ‘while we drive the wolf away from our front 
door, we should be careful about the tiger coming in the back door. The tiger is not 
entering as an invasion force but is using subversion and other forms.’260 Unlike Deng, 
the metaphor of ‘tiger’ left it unclear whether it referred to the USSR or China, or both.     
We cannot explain the crisis only from exogenous or endogenous forces but the 
interrelationship between them and, more importantly, the changing discourses and 
practices of Thai diplomacy. Once again, a clash of diplomatic discourses – between 
those of diplomats and those of the military – ended in a power contestation, which can 
be ultimately expressed in the military coup after the October 6, 1976 massacre.261 We 
can read the coup, and its concomitant ultra-conservative government under Thanin, as 
a last attempt to bring back or reinstate the anticommunist discourse.   
In short, in Thailand, what Chatichai once described as ‘too much 
democracy’ 262  gave way to a right-wing authoritarian government and a highly 
controlled society. Simultaneously, too much diplomacy was now replaced with a brief 
return to the discourse of a strict anticommunism as espoused by the military. In the 
next chapter, I will demonstrate how the change in government left détente in disarray, 
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Kriangsak and the Third Détente (1977-1980) 
 
‘If we balance the big powers properly, everything will hopefully come out all 
right’. – General Kriangsak Chomanan, Prime Minister1 
 
After the October 6, 1976 coup, the new Prime Minister, Thanin Kraivichien, put a halt 
to détente with the Communist powers. His doctrinal anticommunism, in turn, alienated 
many Thai elites most of them were by then détente proponents. A year later, Thanin 
was ousted by the military groups led by General Kriangsak Chomanan, then Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces. Unlike the old military establishment, Kriangsak 
was a strong proponent of détente whose foreign policy position was not dissimilar to 
diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Kriangsak stated, ‘I see nothing wrong 
with being friends with the Soviets and the Chinese’. ‘I want to treat all friendly 
countries on an equal basis and not discriminate against any friendly country’. 2 
Kriangsak went to Beijing in March 1978 and to Washington D.C. in February 1979. 
He also became the first Thai Prime Minister to visit Moscow in March 1979.  
By the late 1970s, Kriangsak’s return to détente was an attempt to strike a 
balance between the great powers, or to develop what he described as an equidistant 
relationship (‘kanraksa rayahang’). The term became the buzzword in Thai foreign 
policy discourse.  
This penultimate chapter argues that despite the rhetoric of strict neutrality, 
equidistant diplomacy was in fact an alignment with the great powers in a more 
balanced and equal way. Despite some difficulties in rebalancing the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the PRC, Kriangsak’s Thailand achieved 
equidistance. However, this diplomacy generated another series of discursive struggles 
within Thai politics between balanced détente and unbalanced détente that 
ultimately precipitated the fall of Kriangsak in early 1980. Yet, the discourse of détente 
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in general, and that of ‘friendship’ with the Communist powers in particular, remained 
intact thereafter.  
 
7.1. Anticommunist Strike-back: Thanin’s Inflexible 
Diplomacy  
The year 1976 marked a watershed in world politics which rendered Thai détente 
difficult to achieve. Mao Zedong’s death on September 9 was a significant turning 
point. He was succeeded by Chairman Hua Guofeng. After eliminating the Gang of 
Four on October 6, Hua attempted to build his ideological credentials by supporting 
Southeast Asian Communist parties, including the CPT. This was before 
Chinese foreign policy moved to a non-ideological or realist stance – culminating 
with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader from the end of 1978.3  
For the USSR, 1976 marked the decline of détente, culminating with the 
deployment of SS20s, a medium-range missile, in Eastern Europe and the expansion in 
Africa thereafter.4 At the same time, the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence in 
Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam. Coupled with the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the 
regional rise of Vietnam had an impact on the peace and stability of Indochina. 
Furthermore, in the US, the newly elected President Jimmy Carter focused on human 
rights and democracy promotion, which in turn complicated its own détente process 
with the Soviet Union.5 The Carter administration also reduced aid to Thailand, and 
accused the Thai government of human rights violations.  
In late 1976, Thai détente was derailed not only by international but also 
domestic politics.  The coup on October 6, 1976 ended the democratic interlude, and 
installed an ardent anticommunist and royalist, the Supreme Court justice Thanin 
Kraivichien, as Prime Minister (October 1976 – October 1977). His short-lived 
government was dominated by a form of civilian authoritarianism that attempted to 
establish ‘democracy with the King as the Head of State’. Thanin promulgated a twelve-
year democracy development plan, reinstated a tougher anticommunist strategy, 
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suppressed progressive dissidents, and censored the press. 6  In foreign affairs, he 
yearned for Cold War certainties. Détente declined accordingly and Thailand’s 
relations with the Communist countries returned to that of hostility. Trade decreased 
while state-sponsored cultural exchanges evaporated. This section provides a brief 
overview of Thanin’s inflexible diplomacy.  
Upon taking office, Thanin denounced Communism as one of the ‘major 
dangers’ to the Thai nation, and demonized ‘Communist imperialism’. 7  His 
government launched a seminar on ‘national security’ aimed at indoctrinating 
bureaucrats on the dangers of Communism.8 Thanin also advocated massive campaigns 
to suppress Communists, who had been joined by students in the jungle following the 
October 6, 1976 massacre. The all-out war against Communism resulted in more 
confrontation, clashes, and casualties. The CPT responded in kind, including the 
assassination of Princess Vipawadi Rangsit during her helicopter trip to the South in 
February 1977.    
In foreign affairs, the Thanin government pursued a more hostile diplomacy 
toward the Communist regimes, including the USSR, the PRC, and the neighboring 
countries. Anand Panyarachun, Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, was 
relieved of his post, and accused of being ‘pro-Communist’ due to the role he had 
played in both establishing diplomatic contacts with Communist countries and in 
negotiating the withdrawal of the American military.9 Thanin, meanwhile, sought to 
improve Thailand’s relationship with the US and non-Communist world and asserted 
the status of ASEAN as an anticommunist organization. In his foreign visits, Thanin 
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almost always lectured foreign leaders on the ‘evils of Communism’. Thanin’s 
orthodox anticommunism alienated many of them.10  
As a consequence, Sino-Thai relations deteriorated rapidly. While the PRC 
attempted to improve relations, it was frustrated by Thanin’s anticommunist and pro-
Taiwanese policies.11 Thanin also prohibited Thai government officials from traveling 
to China. No Thai delegation visited Beijing until October 1977 when former Prime 
Minister Kukrit Pramoj made a private trip.12  Cultural and sports exchanges were 
limited, with the exception of a Chinese martial arts troupe that visited in February and 
a football team in June.  
The Chinese Ambassador to Bangkok, Chai Zemin, said that the PRC 
encountered a ‘very difficult time’ during the Thanin regime. In August 1977, he had 
one short meeting with Prime Minister Thanin, which he privately described as 
‘unproductive’.13 Chinese influence over the local Sino-Thai community was restricted, 
but he still maintained contact with a number of Thai military leaders, including 
General Kriangsak Chomanan, then Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Chai 
also continued to promote visits to Beijing of Thai groups that did not require 
permission from the government.14  
Relations between Thailand and the Soviet Union also cooled. The Thanin 
government failed to act on selected Soviet visa applications, denying entry to at least 
nine Soviet officials. This meant that ‘several positions vacated by departing Soviets 
remain temporarily vacant’, becoming a primary obstacle to improved Thai-Soviet 
relations. Ambassador Boris Ilyichev continued to broaden contacts and influence 
within the Thai elite at all levels, and officially expressed concern and displeasure over 
what the Soviets viewed as inferior treatment compared with the PRC.15     
Trade between Thailand and the USSR remained modest. The Soviets continued 
to export machinery to Thailand, including tractors, textiles, and mining equipment 
while they mainly imported fluorite. The majority of the 25 Soviet ships visiting the 
port of Bangkok per month were loaded with fluorite and run by Thasos, a joint Thai-
Soviet shipping agency. Large-scale financing, provided by the Moscow Narodny Bank 
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office in Singapore, decreased. According to the US Embassy in Bangkok, ‘The 
political climate during the past year did not favor growth, but neither was there any 
noticeable decrease’.16  
While the Thai-Soviet cultural agreement had been accepted in principle, it had 
not yet been ratified, and was thus shelved following the October 6 coup. Moreover, 
there were no cultural or student exchanges during the Thanin government. The absence 
of such exchanges meant the only outlet for cultural propaganda was the Soviet 
souvenir shop in Bangkok which operated under the auspices of the Soviet Information 
Service.17      
It is fair to say, therefore, that the processes of détente ceased under Thanin. 
Yet, his approach to diplomacy was to alienate many social forces in Thailand, 
including some factions within the military such as the so-called ‘Young Turks’.18 It 
was reported that top military leaders grumbled ‘that the civilian leaders, particularly 
Thanin and his Interior Minister Samak Sudaravej, are too inflexible and too 
dogmatically obsessed with anticommunism’.19 Thanin’s programs were increasingly 
seen as short-sighted, counterproductive, and detrimental to national security.   
By now, important segments of the Thai elite – including both the military and 
civilians – saw the benefits of détente, particularly with the PRC. These détente 
proponents, the most important of which included Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces, General Kriangsak, and Foreign Minister, Upadit Pachariyangkun, believed 
that the PRC occupied an important role as stabilizer in the region. This was due both 
to its influence in Cambodia, and as a counterbalance to Vietnamese expansionism. 
Following the coup, Kriangsak became good friends with the Chinese Ambassador, 
Chai Zemin, and held numerous cordial talks with him, especially on the Vietnam 
problem. 20  While visiting Washington in March 1977, Kriangsak confirmed that 
anticommunism alone would not revive American aid.21 In other words, Kriangsak, as 
a new détente proponent, used détente to counter Thanin’s anticommunist regime.  
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In August, a large number of the Thai military attended the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Day celebration in Bangkok. This could be 
seen as ‘an example of the military’s attempt to appear moderate in their attitudes 
toward the Chinese’.22 In early October, Kukrit Pramoj went to Beijing on a ‘personal 
visit’. Kukrit had meetings with Chinese leaders, including Chairman Hua Guofeng. In 
their 40-minute meeting on October 12, Hua assured Kukrit that the PRC was 
committed to fostering ‘firm’ and ‘friendly’ relations with Thailand, and would seek to 
promote peace between Thailand and its neighbors, especially Cambodia. According to 
Kukrit, China wished to see a change in the direction of Thai foreign policy. If Thailand 
improved relations with the PRC, the problem with Cambodia could be easily solved. 
Kukrit claimed that this was because Cambodian leaders had ‘sensible talk with the 
Chinese leaders’. The latter strongly urged a sense of moderation on Cambodia, which 
could alleviate the Thai-Cambodian border conflict.23 After his return to Bangkok, 
Kukrit revealed that Chairman Hua Guofeng ‘was not too happy about the Thanin 
government’s management of the relationship with China’. China’s concern stemmed 
from Thanin’s militant anticommunist stance.24 While Kukrit was in Beijing, Foreign 
Minister Upadit met his Cambodian counterpart, Ieng Sary, at the UN. Later, Upadit 
said he and Ieng Sary had ‘frank and useful talks. We agreed our two countries should 
be friends and that the benefits would be immense’.25      
Such discursive tussles, between anticommunism and détente, deepened with 
the deteriorating civil-military relationship. For Thanin, civil-military relations were 
like an ‘oyster-and-shell’: if the government did not receive ‘the strong support and 
protection’ from the military, it would be like ‘an oyster living outside its shell’.26 By 
mid-1977, the analogy proved correct as Kriangsak increasingly stopped hiding his 
criticism of the Thanin regime.27 On October 7, at a Press Conference he stated that 
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‘the military will not be a protective shell for any individual or group as it will become 
a worthless shell. In my opinion, the military will be a shell which protects larger things, 
namely, the Nation, Religion, Monarchy and the People’.28 Thus, Kriangsak concluded, 
‘the general situation had deteriorated to the point that it necessitated the military to 
beef up its strength for security reasons’.29    
The final showdown came when the ‘Young Turks’ called on the Thanin 
government to resign before making an ultimatum that he reshuffle the cabinet. When 
Thanin rejected their demands, his government was overthrown on October 20, 1977.30 
The coup-makers justified their action on a number of grounds. Politically, Thanin’s 
twelve-year democracy plan was unnecessarily ‘long and not in accordance with the 
wishes of the people’. In terms of the economy, ‘foreign investment has decreased and 
investors have been uncertain of the political situation’. Diplomatically, Thanin’s 
approach was too rigid, and antagonized the Communist states – both superpowers and 
neighbors. 31  With the strong support of the Young Turks, General Kriangsak 
Chomanan became the new Prime Minister. He adopted more liberal policies at home 
and a détente strategy abroad.    
In sum, Thanin’s diplomatic approach was a return to McCarthyist 
anticommunism, and thereby demolished détente. One of the key détente proponents, 
Kukrit, made a post-coup comment that the overthrow of the Thanin government was 
‘long expected’ as it was ‘the most unstable government in human history’, and ‘a 
serious mistake on the part of Thailand’.32 Kukrit said Thanin was ‘so absorbed in 
fighting Communism that he does not know what he is doing. He has mixed up foreign 
affairs and foreign relations with doctrinal struggle’. Thanin had begun ‘a Pinocchio of 
the army’, but turned out to be ‘Frankenstein’s monster’.33    
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7.2. The Return of Détente: Kriangsak and the Strategy of 
Equidistance   
This section examines General Kriangsak Chomanan’s pivotal shift toward détente. It 
argues that détente in this period was characterized as equidistant – a position whereby 
the country pursued more flexible and even-handed relations with the great powers. 
This culminated in Kriangsak’s official visits to three major countries: the PRC in 
March 1978, the US in February 1979, and the USSR in March 1979. The section 
begins with a discussion of Kriangsak’s politics and diplomatic approach in general, 
and then elucidates Thailand’s relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union, 
respectively.  
 
7.2.1. Politics and Diplomacy during the Kriangsak Administration: A 
‘Sigh of Relief’34    
Within the military, the sudden and mysterious death of the powerful General Kris 
Srivara in April 1976 brought about a leadership crisis, and the mercurial rise to power 
of General Kriangsak Chomanan, Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces. While Kriangsak had a weak power base in the Army, he held key positions in 
the Supreme Command, which had worked closely with the US military leadership 
throughout the Vietnam War.35 He increasingly replaced Kris as the primary military 
‘power broker’. 36  Yet, he nevertheless remained on the periphery of the military 
establishment, while a part of the bureaucratic polity.37  
Kriangsak was a key détente proponent, and thereby challenged Thanin’s ultra-
rightist anticommunism. With strong support from the Young Turks, Admiral Sangad 
Chaloryu and Kriangsak staged a coup on October 20, 1977. Sangad remained the 
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chairman of the National Policy Council, but was abruptly sidelined.38 Kriangsak was 
his own Prime Minister, promoting liberalism at home and détente abroad.   
In domestic politics, the Kriangsak administration consisted of a number of 
technocrats that advocated more liberal policies.39 Declaring himself a true believer in 
democracy, Kriangsak quickly scheduled elections for April 1979, and engaged in 
social and economic reform. His first priority was to restore stability and order. He 
reinstated freedom of the press, adopted a more moderate and conciliatory position 
toward political dissidents, students and labor unions, and broadened his political base 
into rural areas.40 Importantly, Kriangsak introduced an amnesty bill on September 16, 
1978 to free eighteen defendants, or the ‘Thammasat 18’, on charges of Communist 
subversion and lèse majesté during the October 6, 1976 demonstrations at Thammasat 
University. He also granted amnesty to students and activists who went into the jungle 
to join the CPT.41 As Kriangsak put it,  
 
I am convinced that most of [the students] have good intentions towards their 
country. We have opened the door and invited them all back. I hope they will 
accept that we have the same ideals, but experience has made us realize that it 
takes time.42   
 
Nevertheless, the government inherited chronic problems from the Thanin government. 
These included rising inflation, rising prices, trade deficits, and declining foreign 
investment that haunted Kriangsak’s prime ministership in the latter half of 1979.43 
With a more relaxed and pragmatic personality, Kriangsak sought to establish a more 
open society in Thailand.  
  
In foreign affairs, Kriangsak’s priority was to reverse Thanin’s rigid anticommunist 
diplomacy. He instead promoted détente with the great powers, and sought a return to 
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normalization with Communist neighbors. He declared that Thailand’s goal was to be 
on good terms ‘with all countries, regardless of ideology’.44 ‘Frustration with Thanin’s 
evident inability to improve relations with Thailand’s Communist neighbors’, 
according to US Ambassador to Bangkok, Charles Whitehouse, was ‘among the 
motives leading Kriangsak to advocate replacement of the Thanin government’.45 As 
the Prime Minister put it, ‘the government will adhere to a friendly policy toward 
neighboring countries and will not allow anyone to use Thailand’s territory to harm our 
neighbors’.46 The ‘goal’, explained Kriangsak, was ‘to discourage the Communist Party 
of Thailand (CPT) from clinging to the Khmer Rouge as their resort. If we could isolate 
the CPT and make them lose their backing, border problems would be diminished’.47  
Kriangsak believed that friendly relations between Communist and non-
Communist states would not only be able to ‘stop the flows of aid to the Communist 
movement in Thailand’, but also ‘weaken the Communist united front’. With peace at 
the frontiers, the government could concentrate its armed forces on Communist 
suppression at home.48 Kriangsak reassured the public that ‘we combat Communists in 
our country. We are not fighting Communism in Vietnam’, or other neighbors.49 
Once in office, Kriangsak sent letters to the leaders of Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos, inviting them to visit Bangkok. A series of exchange visits between the leaders 
of Thailand and the neighboring countries followed. In January 1978, Vietnamese 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, visited Bangkok. On January 31, Foreign 
Minister Upadit held a long meeting in Phnom Penh with Ieng Sary, Cambodian Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 50  Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, Phoun Sipaseuth, visited Bangkok in late March. On July 14- 17, Ieng Sary 
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paid a visit to Bangkok.51 In early September, during his tour of five ASEAN countries, 
Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong visited Bangkok, and promised that ‘Vietnam 
would not support Communist insurgents in Thailand directly or indirectly’.52 
Kriangsak also asked Thai diplomats to make bilateral contacts with their 
counterparts in neighboring countries. 53  A Vietnamese Embassy was opened in 
Bangkok on February 28 and the first Vietnamese Ambassador to Thailand, Hoang Ban 
Son, arrived in Bangkok in April.54 The Kriangsak government now began to view its 
Communist neighbors as promising markets. Bangkok and Hanoi signed a trade, 
economic and technical cooperation agreement in January 1978 and Thai trade 
delegations visited Laos and Vietnam in June. During the visit, Thailand and Laos 
signed a trade treaty and an overland transit agreement. In Hanoi, a Thai trade 
delegation worked out trading details with the Vietnamese. As well as offering a 5 
million dollar credit line, Thailand signed a communications agreement restoring 
telephone and telegraphic links with Hanoi. 55  Overall, Thai delegates hoped that 
increased trade would provide an incentive for neighboring countries to seek friendly 
relations.56     
 With the great powers, the Kriangsak government pursued what it described as 
an equidistant relationship. That is, while it often described its posture as neutral 
nonalignment57, equidistance was in fact a more flexible, balanced and even-handed 
diplomatic engagement and alignment with the US, the USSR, and the PRC. Referring 
to the US, Kriangsak said: ‘We cannot forget old friends, but we do not anticipate the 
return of American troops’. Contrary to Thanin, he argued that Thai policy toward the 
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USSR and China had not changed from the period prior to the 1976 coup.58 Foreign 
Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun stated that ‘Thailand doesn’t balance one power off 
against another. … Our policy is simply to contribute to the conditions for peace and 
stability in which both our country and the region can prosper’.59   
Kriangsak’s equidistance was constituted by the changing situation in the 
region. The late 1970s marked a watershed in global and regional politics: The Cold 
War was fought not only between the democratic and Communist regimes but also 
among the Communists themselves. From 1978, conflict in Indochina between 
Cambodia and Vietnam precipitated skirmishes along Thai-Cambodian border and 
fueled a subsequent refugee crisis, especially at Aranyaprathet in Thailand. This 
deteriorated into the so-called Third Indochina War when Vietnam invaded Cambodia 
on Christmas Day in 1978. Within weeks, Vietnamese forces ousted Pol Pot’s Khmer 
Rouge from power and installed the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh. Khmer 
Rouge guerrillas continued to fight the jungle warfare along the Thai border.60  
This Indochina tragedy was fueled by a change in the international balance of 
power. On the one hand, the PRC and the US supported the Khmer Rouge, while, on 
the other, the Soviet Union backed the Vietnamese. Shortly before the Vietnamese 
intervention in Cambodia, in June 1978, Vietnam became a member of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and in November, had signed the Soviet-
Vietnamese treaty of friendship and cooperation.61  Then, in February 1979, China 
launched a punitive war against Hanoi. The US under Jimmy Carter appeared neutral, 
but its aim was to contain Vietnam. In so doing, the US prioritized closer relations with 
China, culminating with the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.62 
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At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 
fundamentally damaged US-Soviet détente, and accelerated Sino-US normalization. 63  
Thailand was thus caught in the middle of this changing global security complex.  
More generally, Jimmy Carter’s shifting policy toward Southeast Asia was 
initially driven by the situation in Indochina, including the refugee humanitarian crisis. 
Thailand now became a focal interest of the US. In early May 1978, US Vice President 
Walter Mondale paid an official visit to Bangkok to guarantee continued US 
commitment and military aid. The US also appointed Morton Abramowitz, a China 
expert and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, as the new Ambassador to Thailand. 
He arrived in Bangkok in August. 64 
 Further US focus on Thailand was fueled by the Vietnamese military 
intervention in Cambodia. During Kriangsak’s visit to Washington in February 1979, 
Carter confirmed America’s security commitment to Thailand and extended military 
aid as well as assistance for refugee relief programs. In mid-1979, Kriangsak opened 
Thai borders to Indochinese refugees on humanitarian grounds. However, the US 
remained reluctant to become militarily involved in Southeast Asia. Only after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 did the US begin to feel that the 
Soviet Union, which threatened to gain strategic predominance in the Indian Ocean, 
had to be contained and isolated. As a result, the US under President Carter sought to 
normalize relations with Hanoi. This was a departure from the previous US position 
and placed the administration at odds with Kriangsak’s diplomacy of equidistance, 
which will be discussed below.     
 
In sum, Kriangsak was a prime minister who, as US Ambassador Whitehouse summed 
up, was ‘a less vocal opponent to Communism’, and ‘willing to adopt a more flexible 
approach in dealing with internal dissent as well as external relations’.65 Kriangsak’s 
diplomatic strategy was thus driven by equidistance as a balanced form of détente with 
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both the Western and Communist powers. According to political scientist Khien 
Theeravit, Thailand now entered a ‘new age of enlightenment in foreign affairs’.66    
 
7.2.2. Thai-Chinese Relations: Toward Tacit Alliance  
 
‘China has become cooperative, more friendly – especially with Thailand – and 
we regard this as a stabilizing role’. – Upadit Pachariyangkun, Foreign 
Minister67 
 
Unlike the Thanin regime, Kriangsak deepened détente with the PRC, culminating with 
a visit to Beijing in March 1978 and a return visit by Deng Xiaoping’s in November. 
Trade and technical cooperation were expanded and relations were strengthened 
through a realization of shared security interests in Indochina. Particularly following 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, this closeness became a 
priority to contain the Soviet-backed Vietnamese regime. By then, the Chinese 
leadership under Deng had even ended their support to the CPT. While Thailand 
formally upheld a policy of strict neutrality, it developed a Sino-Thai quasi-alliance, 
which was part and parcel of an equidistant policy.  
During 1977, Kriangsak’s détente with the PRC was accelerated by the 
transformation of Chinese diplomatic practices in Indochina. The Sino-Vietnamese 
alliance broke down for a number of reasons. This included increased clashes along the 
Sino-Vietnamese border where Vietnamese maltreatment of ethnic Chinese, or Hoa, in 
northern Vietnam saw many flee Vietnam. This precipitated a regional refugee crisis, 
largely composed of the ‘boat people’. In response, China terminated aid to Vietnam in 
mid-1977, which in turn pushed the Vietnamese toward Moscow for economic and 
military assistance.68 More broadly, the Chinese were increasingly convinced that the 
Soviet Union intended to move into the power vacuum in the region and seek 
dominance. This appeared evident by the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of November 3, 
1978. As Chairman Hua Guofeng told the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, on September 
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30, 1977, the worsening of Sino-Vietnamese alliance was due to the ‘hand of the USSR’ 
and ‘connivance’ between the USSR and Vietnam.69  
Worried about Sino-Soviet rivalry and the rising Vietnamese threat in 
Indochina, Chinese leaders led by Deng Xiaoping decided to protect the Khmer Rouge 
regime at all costs. In so doing, it was necessary for China to strengthen its relationship 
with Thailand, which had an adjacent and long border with Cambodia. By then, the 
Cambodian question – of how to support the Khmer Rouge and block Vietnam’s 
tentative occupation of Cambodia – was central to Chinese foreign policy, and by 
extension, to Sino-Thai relations.  
On December 8, 1977, the PRC officially invited Kriangsak to visit Beijing. In 
Bangkok, Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin delivered Kriangsak an invitation letter, 
and the Thai Prime Minister accepted. Both engaged in a ‘full and frank exchange of 
views on relations between the two countries.’ Kriangsak told Chai that ‘while Thailand 
makes its own sincere efforts to be friendly with Cambodia, China could also make a 
valuable contribution’.70  He hinted of a possible Chinese role in smoothing Thai-
Cambodian relations. The trip took place a few months later, between March 29 and 
April 4, 1978.  
Before the visit, the Kriangsak government set a clear agenda for discussions 
with Chinese leaders. First, Thailand needed Chinese help in smoothing relations with 
Cambodia, especially concerning border incidents. Kriangsak told US Ambassador 
Whitehouse that he found China ‘very helpful and friendly’, but would try to get 
clarification regarding Chinese policy toward Thailand.71 Second, Kriangsak intended 
not to press the insurgency matter or directly raise the question of China’s two-tier 
policy on foreign relations: while maintaining friendly government-to-government 
relations, the Chinese Communist Party maintained party-to-party relations with 
Communist parties in Southeast Asia.72 Kriangsak later told the press that the ‘question 
of Communist insurgency’ was an ‘internal problem’ for which Thailand ‘did not look 
to other countries for a solution’.73 Third, the Thai government wished to strengthen its 
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economic relations with Beijing in order to manage the unbalanced payments, and find 
an alternative source of oil. They wanted the Chinese to buy more products from 
Thailand and sell crude oil at a favorable price (See Table 7.1). The drafts of the trade 
agreement and the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation had been 
discussed between the two sides in detail.74 
 
Table 7.1: Thailand’s Trade Volume with the People’s Republic of China (million baht) 
Year  Volume  Export Import  Trade balance  
1972 0 0 0  
1973 0 0 0  
1974 94.4 2.5 91.9 - 
1975 735.3 391.4 343.9 + 
1976 2,728 1,266 1,462 - 
1977 3,452 2,082 1,371 + 
1978 3,201 1,498 1,704 - 
1979 6,511 1,572 4,939 - 
1980 11,066 2,531 8,535 - 
Source: Ministry of Commerce  
 
In general, Kriangsak’s diplomatic aim was to preserve Thailand’s sovereignty 
and promote an even-handed approach toward the three superpowers. He announced 
that following his trip to Beijing, he would pay visits to both Moscow and Washington. 
Kriangsak also authorized the stationing of a Chinese military attaché in Bangkok, 
following his approval of a Soviet military attaché several months ago.75 As a goodwill 
gesture to the Chinese government, Kriangsak permitted two Chinese-language 
newspapers, namely Chung Hua Jit Pao and Hsin Chung Yuan, banned during the 
Thanin regime, to reopen.76  
In a press interview, Foreign Minister Upadit announced that during 
Kriangsak’s visit to Beijing, the Thai and Chinese governments would sign two specific 
agreements covering trade, and scientific and technical cooperation. Both countries 
would further initiate a formal aviation services agreement. For Upadit, the main 
objective of the trip was ‘to strengthen the good relationship between Thailand and the 
People’s Republic of China’. ‘We just want’, he continued, ‘to exchange views with 
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the Chinese leaders on the general political situation around the world and the region’. 
Upadit characterized Sino-Thai relations as ‘excellent’.77  
 On March 29, Kriangsak was greeted by Chairman Hua Guofeng, and Vice-
Premier Deng Xiaoping as he arrived at Beijing airport. His 27-member delegation 
included, inter alia, his wife, Khunying Virat Chomanan, Foreign Minister Upadit 
Pachariyangkun, Industry Minister Kasame Chatikavanij, Secretary-General of 
National Security Council Air Marshel Siddhi Savetsila, and Director-General of 
Political Department of Foreign Ministry, Opart Suthiwart-Narueput. Chinese 
newspapers reported on Kriangsak’s visit positively. In its editorial, the New China 
News Agency praised Thailand’s independent foreign policy and its ‘friendly 
exchanges with Third World countries’. Xinhua also noted the improvement in relations 
with neighboring countries, adding that: ‘These policies, and the righteous stand taken 
by the Thai government, are beneficial to the common cause of the peoples of Asian 
countries in uniting against hegemonism, and they have received wide support and 
admiration’.78 
After the welcoming ceremony at the airport, Deng accompanied Kriangsak on 
a car journey to Beijing, where they engaged in erudite small-talk. Deng mentioned 
their historical relationship and the greatness of the ancient Thais. In his first formal 
speech, Kriangsak decided to focus on the historical relationship that Deng had begun. 
It went on for almost an hour, most of it off-the-cuff. At the end, the Thai Prime 
Minister described Deng Xiaoping as not only a great leader but also a great historian, 
who mastered the knowledge of history.79 He also urged for the recognition of each 
nation’s institutions. In the Thai case, he meant the monarchy. For Kriangsak, true 
peace and stability ‘can be obtained only if the traditional institutions of each country 
are respected’.80  
At the banquet in the Great Hall of the People that night, Deng gave a speech 
praising the Kriangsak government for his ‘determination to pursue an independent 
foreign policy’. He expressed that the Chinese supported ASEAN’s aims to achieve a 
‘zone of peace, freedom and neutrality’ (ZOPFAN), and opposed hegemonism in the 
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region. He stressed the friendly relations between China and Thailand. ‘Since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations’, Deng went on, ‘our traditional friendship has 
been enhanced’. He concluded that Kriangsak had made ‘positive efforts for the 
development of the relations between our two countries’, and his visit to Beijing would 
‘contribute significantly to the further progress of the friendly relations and 
cooperation’.81  
Kriangsak replied that he was ‘pleased to have an opportunity to take part in the 
strengthening of the close relations happily existing’ between the two peoples. He 
expressed his gratification toward the Chinese government for ‘adhering to the 
principles of equality among nations, whereby the big shall not bully the small nor shall 
the powerful impose its will on the weaker states’ as well as its ‘stand against 
interference in internal affairs and violation of sovereignty of others’. Kriangsak 
emphasized that ASEAN was not a ‘military organization’. He said he believed that 
Thailand and China had ‘common aspiration’ with regard to ‘peace, stability, and other 
major issues’ in Indochina.82 
 The following day, Kriangsak had his first meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Deng 
said the Chinese were willing to support ASEAN, and ready to discuss the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations with Singapore and a resumption of ties with 
Indonesia. Regarding Indochina, their main agenda was the Vietnamese threat to the 
region. Deng wondered why Vietnam had developed a closer relationship with 
Moscow, despite its historic ties with Beijing. He then complained that some 90 percent 
of Chinese supplies sent to Cambodia via Vietnam ‘never turned up’. In their 
discussions, both leaders agreed on their mutual interest in peace and stability in 
Indochina, especially their opposition to Vietnamese expansionism.83 Kriangsak asked 
Deng to persuade the Khmer Rouge to halt armed incidents on the Thai border. The 
Chinese Vice-Premier agreed to help because the security of China, Thailand and 
Cambodia was interrelated and ‘whatever happens to one will affect the others’.84 
When Kriangsak raised the question of Thailand’s concern over Communist insurgents, 
Deng reassured him that Beijing would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.     
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 On March 31, Kriangsak had a friendly talk with Chairman Hua Guofeng. Hua 
appreciated Kriangsak’s foreign policy and stressed that Sino-Thai relations had broad 
prospects for development and friendly relations.85 After that, Kriangsak held a second 
meeting with Deng, which lasted for one and a half hours. The Chinese leader noted his 
displeasure for hegemonism in the region, by which he meant the Soviet Union and 
defined the US as a ‘defensive’ superpower and the Soviet Union an ‘offensive’ one. 
He believed that the US adopted a weak posture following the Vietnam War, while the 
Russians became more vigorous and strong. Deng hoped that the US would increase its 
role and presence in the region. He described the Americans as ‘tolerable’ while the 
Russians were ‘intolerable’.86  Concerning the overseas Chinese in Thailand, Deng 
reaffirmed the existing policy. According to Kriangsak, ‘Vice-Premier Deng said the 
People’s Republic abided by the three principles that 1) overseas Chinese should adopt 
the nationality of the country of their residence; 2) if they are not willing or unable to 
do so, they should strictly adhere to the local laws and customs; and 3) the Chinese 
government does not, and will not, recognize dual nationality’.87  
On the same day, a trade agreement was signed. It provided the framework for 
future cooperation and development. Both sides agreed to expand trade relations on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit. China would export petroleum products, 
chemicals, machinery, metal products, agricultural implements, construction materials, 
and general merchandise. In return, Thailand would export sugar, rubber, maize, kenaf, 
chemical fiber, fabrics, medicinal herbs, tapioca products, tobacco and mung beans to 
China. Importantly, Beijing promised to sell 60,000 tons of high-grade diesel fuel at 
‘friendship’ prices.88 Both sides also signed an agreement on scientific and technical 
cooperation to exchange knowhow and technicians. This agreement set up a joint Thai-
Chinese committee under ministerial level co-chairmanship to facilitate cooperation.   
After the signing ceremony, Kriangsak made remarks at a press conference. His 
visit to Beijing, he believed, would ‘lead to expansion of the base of cooperation and 
good understanding’, and marked ‘the start of a new era of cooperation and close and 
warm friendship’ between Thailand and the PRC. The two agreements were, according 
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to Kriangsak, ‘a symbol of our firm intention to further develop and expand our bilateral 
relations.89    
That night, the Thai government hosted a return banquet for the Chinese. 
Premier Kriangsak gave a speech saying that both sides had ‘fruitfully discussed 
various matters of mutual benefit’, and ‘the earnest and constructive exchange of views 
on issues affecting our two countries and the Asian region’. Deeming this visit a 
‘complete success’, he said that ‘we have concurred in several important matters 
relating to peace and stability in our region’. At the end, Kriangsak highlighted their 
mutual cooperation, friendship and continued dialogue at the policy level.90  
Deng concurred with Kriangsak, and asserted that Kriangsak’s visit to Beijing 
was ‘a major event in the history of Sino-Thai relations’. He highlighted that Thailand 
and the PRC shared ‘identical views on a number of important international issues’, 
and supported ‘one another in the task of combatting hegemonism and building up their 
countries’.91 The Chinese leaders, including Chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice-Premier 
Deng Xiaoping were invited for reciprocal visits to Bangkok. The Chinese leaders also 
extended their invitation to the King and Queen of Thailand to visit Beijing.  
On April 1, Kriangsak and his entourage left Beijing for Shanghai where they 
spent one night. They continued to tour Kweilin and Kwangchow, before catching the 
train to Hong Kong on April 4. The following day, Kriangsak addressed the Hong Kong 
Foreign Correspondents’ Club. He said that ‘the horizontal base for cooperation’ 
between Thailand and the PRC ‘has been expanded and consolidated’, and both sides 
would seek to ‘proceed to build permanent vertical structures in the form of concrete 
and substantive exchanges and joint efforts’.92 Through his ‘frank and sincere’ and 
‘straight-forward’ talks with the Chinese leaders, he was clear they supported 
Thailand’s diplomatic approach, especially its efforts to normalize relations with 
Indochinese neighbors. Kriangsak said that he believed Thai-Cambodian border 
incursions had been instigated by the Thai Communists rather than the Khmer Rouge 
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Government.93 He believed the PRC was a ‘peace-loving country’, which sought to 
‘foster peace and prosperity’ for the world at large. Praising the PRC as a ‘major power 
situated closest to Thailand, Kriangsak said that the Thai and Chinese peoples have 
been in contact with each other for centuries’, and ‘never been at war with one another’. 
In their exchange of views, both leaders agreed that they shared ‘similar interests’ in 
the region. As Kriangsak put it, ‘trade and cooperation can lead to benefits for both 
sides. Friendship and good understanding between the two countries is important to 
peace and stability in the region as a whole’.94     
The Chinese leaders had also reaffirmed their approval of ASEAN’s zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), and desired to normalize relations with 
Indonesia and Singapore.  Regarding relations with the great powers, the Thai Prime 
Minister said he welcomed the constructive participation of the great powers if their 
aims were beneficial to the region. As he put it,  
 
We cannot prevent rivalry among the major powers, but we hope that for 
Southeast Asia, this rivalry will be in the nature of who can do more to better 
the lives of the peoples of this region and not who can gain military or strategic 
advantage.95    
 
Kriangsak said he was also prepared to visit the US and the USSR, and that ‘he who 
first invites will first receive’. The Thai Prime Minister reiterated his pledge to the Thai 
people that the government ‘will establish good and friendly relations with all countries, 
irrespective of their economic, social or administrative systems’.96  
In his eight-day visit to the PRC, the Thais and the Chinese had thus moved 
toward a sort of tacit alliance. For its part, China envisioned Thailand as a pivotal state 
both to check Soviet influence in the region and improve relations with ASEAN. The 
Chinese hoped that the Thais would encourage Indonesia and Singapore to establish 
full diplomatic ties with Beijing. On the other hand, Kriangsak’s heavy tilt toward 
Beijing was built upon the aspiration for better relations with Cambodia, and to contain 
Soviet-backed Vietnam. Over the long term, warmer Sino-Thai relations would isolate 
the domestic Communist insurgents. In order to alleviate pressing economic problems, 
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the Thais also strived for stronger trade relations, especially the import of Chinese oil. 
Above all, both countries shared common concerns, namely the possibility of the 
Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, and Soviet-Vietnamese collusion in Southeast 
Asia.    
 After returning to Bangkok, Kriangsak hosted a dinner for the Chinese 
Ambassador, Chai Zemin, to celebrate their mutual appreciation of the successful trip. 
Chai also presented the formal invitation for the Thai king and queen to visit Beijing, 
but Kriangsak indicated that the king would not visit the PRC in the foreseeable 
future. 97  The Thai government believed Chai’s good relations with Kriangsak 
undoubtedly helped make Kriangsak’s visit to Beijing a success. Chai was subsequently 
promoted to head the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. He was replaced by Chang 
Wei-lieh, former Ambassador to the Mongolian People’s Republic in Ulan Bator.98  
Thai-Chinese relations continued to broaden with an increase in both Thai 
delegations to Beijing, and Chinese counterparts to Bangkok. This included, a 24-
member private trade delegation led by Major General Praman Adireksan, President of 
the Association of Thai Industries, which left Bangkok on June 2 to attend an 
organizing meeting for the eighth Asian Games, to be held in Bangkok in December 
1978. Also in June was an 18-member Thai Press delegation, headed by Phongsak 
Phayakkawichian, President of Reporter’s Association and a 24-member trade 
delegation led by Commerce Minister Nam Phunwatthu.99 The group of Thai-Chinese 
Friendship Association, presided by former Foreign Minister Major General Chatichai 
Choonhavan100, met with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping on June 15. In the evening, 
Chatichai, who was in Beijing, telephoned Prime Minister Kriangsak to report his 
meeting with Deng, and confirmed that Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary 
would visit Bangkok in July.101  
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The first Chinese trade delegation to Thailand, headed by Hu Fu-hsing, arrived 
in Bangkok in early August 1978. They went to the rice demonstration station in 
Rangsit to assemble and demonstrate two paddy planting and two rice harvest 
machines, given to Thailand by China during the Kriangsak visit.102 On August 31, a 
Thai National Assembly delegation headed by General Tawit Seniwong Na Ayuthaya, 
met with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. While Deng emphasized Soviet 
expansionism in Southeast Asia and Vietnam’s role as a Soviet pawn, Tawit raised the 
issue of Chinese support for Thailand’s Communist insurgency. The latter said 
although he understood China’s two-tier policy between state and party policies, but 
found it unconvincing. Deng replied that Chinese support for the CPT was rooted in 
history, and was a complicated question. It was part of the International Communist 
movement in general, and could not be treated simply as a bilateral matter. He 
particularly focused on the competition between the PRC and the USSR for loyalty of 
Communist groups throughout the world.103    
As relations between China and Vietnam worsened, and following the signing 
of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty in November, Thailand became increasingly central to 
China’s regional strategy. In private talks with Thai leaders, the Chinese now referred 
to the possibility that the Khmer Rouge may be forced to resort to guerilla warfare 
against the Vietnamese. 104  Yet they remained cautious about becoming involved 
militarily and instead settled on offering support to the Khmer Rouge. With the prospect 
of a Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia looking ever more likely, the Chinese 
increasingly anticipated supporting the Khmer Rouge in a campaign fought from the 
western mountain ranges. In such a case, it would be unavoidable that the Chinese 
would wish to send weapons and food via Thailand.   
Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping began his ASEAN tour by arriving in Bangkok 
on November 5 for a five-day official visit. Coincidently, his visit occurred two days 
after the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty was signed in Hanoi. At Don Muaeng Airport, he 
was received by Kriangsak, his government, the diplomatic corps, and representatives 
of the Chinese community. In his arrival statement, Deng stated that the purpose of the 
visit was to ‘strengthen and develop the traditional friendship between our two peoples 
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and the cooperation between the two governments and to learn and benefit from the 
experiences of the Thai people in building up their country’.105 Accompanying Deng 
were his wife, Jjo Lin, and a total party of forty including Foreign Minister Huang Hua.   
Following a warm and friendly reception at the airport, Deng went to meet with 
King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikit, and Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn at the Royal 
Palace. He asked for and was given royal permission to attend the November 7 
ordination ceremony for His Royal Highness Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn at the 
Temple of the Emerald Buddha.106 This gesture indicated Deng’s sensitivities towards 
the symbolism of both the Thai monarchy and Buddhism, which the Thai government 
believed demonstrated his support for the key institutions of the country.107  
The following day, Deng held a meeting with Kriangsak. Besides bilateral 
relations, the Cambodian question was central to their discussion. According to 
Kriangsak, Deng admitted in private talks ‘that China was giving moral, political and 
strong material support to the present Cambodian government to maintain its stability 
in fighting against Vietnamese invasion’. Deng felt that Cambodia was ‘fighting against 
Soviet-Vietnamese ambitions in the area, which will contribute to peace and security 
to this region and serve our national interests as a whole’. He said that every country 
including the US, ‘should give Cambodia at least moral support’. The Chinese Vice-
Premier also urged Thailand and other ASEAN countries to make ‘some political 
gestures’ if Vietnam launched a military invasion.108 For Deng, the Chinese response 
would be ‘guided and gauged by steps which Vietnam is taking’. While the Chinese 
would ‘not be afraid to lose some of her manpower for Cambodia’, Deng refused to 
‘say definitely at present how China would use her manpower or commit her troops to 
the fighting’.109  
Kriangsak supported ‘the idea to keep Cambodia independent and free from 
outside influence’. He asked Deng to pass his ‘assurance to Pol Pot or Ieng Sary that 
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Thailand will not allow anyone to use our territory to create troubles for Cambodia’. 
Kriangsak asked that Cambodia send its ambassador to Thailand ‘as soon as possible’, 
and wished to ‘help Cambodia economically’.110 According to Kriangsak, Deng also 
made a strong criticism of the closer Soviet-Vietnamese relations. ‘Vietnam will be 
more ambitious and aggressive after signing the new pact with the USSR’, and become 
the ‘Cuba’ of Asia. Deng believed that ‘Pham Van Dong’s trips to ASEAN countries 
were designed to create doubts and suspicions about China’s intentions and policy, and 
to sell the USSR’s idea of collective security plan and isolate ASEAN from other 
countries’.111     
Both leaders reached an agreement on the sale of Chinese crude oil and high-
speed diesel oil to Thailand at the friendship price. Thailand granted permission for the 
Chinese to overfly Thailand on a weekly Kunming-Rangoon-Phnom Penh flight. Deng 
also suggested the establishment of a direct Bangkok-Beijing civil air link. Kriangsak 
said his government would take the proposal into consideration. Thailand asked for 
Chinese assistance in getting permission to fly to Angkor Wat. Deng told Kriangsak 
that a delegation of a Civil Aviation Authority of China would be dispatched to 
Bangkok to discuss the civil aviation agreement in detail later.112      
Kriangsak and Deng then addressed a press conference. Characterizing the 
exchange of views as ‘sincere and friendly’, Deng said that the PRC and Thailand had 
‘identical or similar views on many important issues’, and shared ‘the common desire 
of enhancing our friendship and cooperation’. Kriangsak agreed, noting that ‘China and 
Thailand hold completely complementary views with regard to the fostering of durable 
peace and stability in our region’.113  While Deng talked with Kriangsak, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua also met separately with his counterpart, Foreign Minister 
Upadit Parchariyangkun at the MFA.  
In the evening, the Kriangsak government hosted a banquet for Deng and his 
entourage at Government House. Kriangsak said that during Vice-Premier Deng’s stay 
in Bangkok, he ‘will have an opportunity personally to see and learn about Thailand 
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and her people, thus increasing your understanding of our country. This understanding 
is an important foundation for the further development of relations and cooperation 
between our two nations.’ The Prime Minister expressed his conviction that ‘the 
steadily growing relationship between our two nations will greatly contribute to the 
maintenance of peace, stability and progress in this region’.114  
Vice-Premier Deng expressed appreciation for the Thai policy of independence 
and its interest in developing friendly relations with countries regardless of their socio-
political systems. Deng highlighted a ‘highly turbulent’ international system with 
‘hegemonism’ that posed ‘a serious threat to world peace and security’. These 
hegemonists, he continued, had ‘stepped up their expansionist activities in Asia, 
particularly in Southeast Asia’. He praised ASEAN, which was ‘farsighted when it 
adheres to the proposal for establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality’, and 
Thailand, which had an increasingly important role in the region.115     
On November 7, Deng held informal talks with former Prime Minister Kukrit 
Pramoj, and former Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, now the President of 
Thai-Chinese Friendship Association. Then he attended a religious ceremony to witness 
Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn enter into the monkhood for a fortnight. After that, Deng, 
together with Kriangsak went to watch the final game of the First World Badminton 
Championships, organized by the World Badminton Federation, and distributed 
trophies, one of which went to Thailand and four to China. Kriangsak then hosted and 
cooked a dinner at his residence.116    
On November 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited the Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) headquarters in Bangkok, 
and met with its Executive Secretary, J. B. P. Maramis. He pointed out that the Sino-
Thai Agreement on Technical and Scientific Cooperation illustrated Chinese interest in 
promoting ESCAP activities. Maramis added that China was increasingly involved in 
regional development activities, as illustrated by Chinese interests in the Asian 
Reinsurance Corporation and the Mekong Project.117 
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On the same day, Deng gave a speech to a press conference. He began by 
expressing his appreciation for the friendly receptions. The Chinese Vice-Premier said 
he was satisfied with his visit, and stressed the accelerating development of diplomatic, 
political, economic, scientific and cultural ties with Thailand. He also reiterated the 
Chinese stance toward the overseas Chinese, maintaining that they should adopt Thai 
citizenship, and respect Thai laws. In addition, Deng maintained Chinese support for 
ASEAN. However, he claimed that China did not give much assistance to Third World 
countries because China was still poor. The Chinese did welcome opportunities for 
trade and scientific exchanges. Deng reaffirmed China’s two-tiered policy, which made 
the distinction between state-to-state and party-to-party relations. Referring to Chinese 
support for the CPT, he recognized that the problem had historical antecedents and 
could not be solved overnight. The Vice-Premier assured the Thais that the Chinese 
would be frank and sincere in discussing this problem with Thailand.118  
Deng directly criticized Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong’s pledge of 
noninterference during his September visit in Bangkok. As he put it, ‘if the Chinese 
people do just what Pham Van Dong said, it will bring disaster to Asia and the Pacific’. 
‘If anyone tells a lie, deceives, or sells out his soul’, continued Deng, ‘he will not win 
friendship. Therefore, I will not learn from Pham Van Dong’. He denounced Vietnam 
as the ‘Cuba of the Orient’, involved in ‘hooliganism’ in Southeast Asia.119  Deng 
strongly opposed the ‘hegemonists’, including the ‘big hegemonist’, and the ‘small 
hegemonist’, which demonstrated ambitious aggression against Southeast Asia, in 
particular against Cambodia: a clear reference to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. He 
went on, ‘we are waiting to see how far they advance into Cambodia before deciding 
on countermeasures’.120    
After his press conference, Deng flew to the Thai military center at Lop Buri 
where he was given a demonstration by the Thai military for two hours. The live-fire 
show included mock attacks by Thailand’s newly acquired F5-E’s, delivering Thai 
manufactured ordnance, helicopter-borne infantry assault, and artillery bombardment. 
                                                          
118 NARA, RG59, 1978BANGKO33056, ‘PRC Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping’s Press Conference’, 9 
November 1978.      
119 NARA, RG59, 1978BANGKO33056, ‘PRC Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping’s Press Conference’, 9 
November 1978.      
120 NARA, RG59, 1978BANGKO33056, ‘PRC Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping’s Press Conference’, 9 




In a show of friendly relations, Thai parachutes exploded in a shower of Chinese-
language banners stating Thai-Chinese friendship and welcoming the Vice-Premier.121 
On November 9, the two Foreign Ministers, Huang and Upadit, signed three 
protocols, the first of which was the establishment of the joint trade committee. This 
provided for annual meetings to decide on trade schedules, to review implementation 
of the trade agreement, to study and explore measures to expand bilateral trade, to seek 
solutions to problems, and to make appropriate recommendations. The second protocol 
was on the importation and exportation of commodities between Thailand and the PRC 
for 1979, which was based on equality and mutual benefit. The third referred to 
technical and scientific cooperation, providing a total of 29 projects. The Chinese 
projects consisted of 12 projects, such as research into potash deposits, sugar 
manufacture, rubber planting and processing, aquaculture of fish and prawns, 
horticulture, grape development, rice seed hybridization, prevention and control of 
disease, and Thai language training for three students. The 17 Thai projects included 
education in herbal medicine, rural health service, silk production, petrochemical 
industry, reforestation, irrigation, pig rearing, flower planting, and hydrological data 
from the upper Mekong.122  
Deng’s five-day visit to Bangkok marked a significant turning point in Thai-
Chinese relations amidst the deteriorations of Sino-Vietnamese relations and 
Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. In early December, Hanoi publicly announced its 
aim for regime change in Phnom Penh and on December 25, its troops invaded 
Cambodia. On January 7, 1979, the Pol Pot regime collapsed, and a guerilla war 
commenced along the Cambodian-Thai border. The international community, 
including ASEAN, condemned Vietnam.123After his visit to Washington to meet with 
President Jimmy Carter in late January, Deng assumed he had been given a green light 
from the US to launch punitive attacks against Hanoi in mid-February.124  
Wishing to avoid the attention of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, Deng led a 
secret military delegation to Thailand, landing at U-Tapao Airport on January 13. He 
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was accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong and an interpreter. Deng 
met with Kriangsak the following day. While the meeting did not last long, it laid the 
foundations for a Sino-Thai quasi-alliance during the Third Indochina War. Kriangsak 
agreed to provide the Chinese with logistic support and transport facilities to supply the 
Khmer Rouge, and to allow Khmer Rouge leaders to cross the Thai borders.125  
During their meeting, Deng told Kriangsak that the Chinese were going to 
support the Khmer Rouge at all costs. He also asked the Thai government to cooperate 
with the Chinese, and allow them to use Thai territory to supply the Khmer Rouge 
forces. The Chinese Vice-Premier also asked Thailand to use its influence in ASEAN 
not to recognize the Vietnam-installed Hang Samrin regime in Cambodia. According 
to Deng, Kriangsak replied that ‘currently we do not recognize them’.126   
In return for any sort of Thai help, Kriangsak insisted that the Khmer Rouge 
halt supporting the Thai Communist insurgency. Deng replied that the Chinese had 
already instructed Ieng Sary while he was in Beijing. He reassured Thai leaders that 
from now on, the Communist insurgency would be an internal affair rather than an 
inter-Communist one. Also, Deng asked Kriangsak to help Ieng Sary to transit through 
Thailand on his return to Khmer Rouge zones, and to meet with Ieng ‘to discuss or 
negotiate directly the problems of your two countries’. ‘Ieng Sary’, said Kriangsak, 
‘can come. I’ll do all I can to get him back through’. However, Kriangsak said he would 
not meet with Ieng Sary once he arrived in Thailand because of his enunciated policy 
of strict neutrality. According to Deng, Ieng Sary could contact the Thai government 
via the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok or through Chatichai Choonhavan.127  
Finally, Deng asked how the Chinese could transport material assistance to the 
Khmer Rouge areas. Deng said that Kriangsak suggested three ways. First, the Chinese 
could send arms to Koh Kong, a Cambodian island close to the Thai border, and then 
transport them to Khmer Rouge areas by small boats flying foreign flags. Kriangsak 
recommended that the Khmer Rouge should defend these areas, so as to receive Chinese 
aid. Second, the Chinese could supply arms and merchandise camouflaged as 
commercial goods in large boats flying foreign flags. When they arrived in Thailand, 
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the Thai army would unload them and the Chinese could parachute these arms by plane 
into northern Cambodia. Third, Beijing could sell oil to Thailand at favorable prices 
and during the shipping to Bangkok, the Chinese could stock arms in the cargo. Upon 
arrival, the Thai army would unload them, and later transport them by truck from 
Bangkok to Cambodia.128  
From the secret meeting with Deng, Kriangsak, while still maintaining a façade 
of neutrality, committed to help Chinese resupply operations to the Khmer Rouge. As 
Han Nianlong put it, ‘the most important problem is to maintain links to Thailand based 
on a common matter: oppose [Vietnam]. When it comes to the [Vietnamese] occupation 
of Cambodia and its threat to Thailand, the Thai support Cambodia. They say they are 
neutral, but it is only officially so. In reality they intend to aid Cambodia’.129   
Particularly following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Cambodian 
question became the focus of closer Thai-Chinese relations. The Thais viewed China’s 
punitive war against Vietnam in neutral or positive ways. Yet, in public Kriangsak 
maintained strict neutrality. At a press conference on February 18, Kriangsak stated 
that ‘we would rather see them negotiate than use force against each other. We don’t 
want the war to intensify because we want to have peace and stability in the region’. 
‘There is only one thing I must say’, he continued, ‘just don’t get us involved. It’s a 
matter for other people to fight about’. Thai newspapers expressed much the same line. 
The Nation presented a more favorable editorial, noting that ‘however much we may 
want the tensions to ease, there is inevitably a certain warmth in our heart that there is 
somebody who is not allowing Vietnam to run amuck in Southeast Asia’.130    
In addition, Thailand and the PRC also deepened trade and technical 
cooperation, which can be seen from the surge in visits between the two countries. 
Between January 10 and 15, 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Sunthon Hongladarom led a 
Thai delegation to Beijing to negotiate additional oil supplies for Thailand. 131  On 
January 14, both Thai and Chinese leaders signed a five-year protocol on the purchase 
of crude oil at the favorable prices. According to Prok Ammaranan, Deputy Minister of 
Commerce, the PRC would sell Thailand 600,000-800,000 tons of crude oil in 1979, 
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800,000 tons in 1980, and 1,000,000 tons per year between 1981 and 1983. The Thais 
would use Chinese crude oil to produce high-speed diesel fuel, which had been in short 
supply.132   
The Chinese also dispatched seven trade-related visits, culminating in the visit 
by Minister of Foreign Trade, Li Qiang, on March 5-13, and the visit of Minister of 
Communications, Zeng Cheng, on March 18-26. Out of five cultural delegations to 
Thailand, the highlight was a tour of the Eastern Music and Dance Ensemble between 
December 19 and January 29, and a visit by the Chairman of the Chinese People’s 
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Wang Pingnan, during March.133  
As the US Ambassador to Bangkok, Morton Abramowitz, summed up, 
Thailand’s objective was ‘to enlist PRC support for easing of tension with’ Cambodia, 
while China’s intention was to ‘strengthen its influence with Thailand’, especially as 
the Soviet Union and Vietnam attempted to extend their influence over Indochina. The 
Thais, according to Abramowitz, ‘seem more and more willing to accommodate the 
PRC’.134    
As Sino-Vietnamese hostilities increased and Soviet military activities in 
Cambodia swelled, it seemed natural for China to move closer to Thailand in many 
ways. First, the Chinese leaders sought to offer a certain form of security commitment 
to Thailand. On April 4, the Chinese Ambassador to Thailand, Chang Wei-lieh, made 
a statement saying the Chinese would support the Thai people should the Vietnamese 
‘hegemonists’ attack.135 In May, Deputy Foreign Minister Song Zhiguang, reportedly 
said that the Chinese would support Thailand in the face of any acts of aggression by 
the Vietnamese over the Cambodian conflict.136 
The Chinese moves prompted Kriangsak to inform the press on May 9 that 
Thailand would not accept any military aid from China in the event of Vietnamese 
aggression. He stressed his policy of equidistance by saying that ‘neither do we want 
Russian or American troops to be rushed to our country to our rescue’. That, he claimed, 
would be an embarrassment: ‘The Thai were capable of defending themselves, and 
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Thailand would not allow itself to be pushed or dragged by other countries into the 
Cambodian conflict’.137 While it was necessary for the Prime Minister to publicly deny 
any military cooperation with the PRC, Kriangsak began to take this option seriously. 
In early June, he asked his close confidante, Lieutenant General Tuanthong Suwannatat, 
the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, to convene a small meeting, later 
known as the ‘War Council’, to discuss this option in detail.138    
After the meeting, Kriangsak dispatched a secret military mission to Beijing to 
raise the issue of China’s military commitment to Thailand. The delegation included 
three military officials, including Lieutenant General Phin Gaysorn, Colonel Pat 
Akkaniput, and Colonel Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. On June 24, they provided Vice-
Premier Deng Xiaoping with briefings on the situation in Thailand and Thai concerns 
over the Vietnamese strategy. Deng first promised that, in the event of the Vietnamese 
invasion of Thailand, the Chinese army would launch military operations against 
Hanoi. Second, the PRC would gradually decrease its support to the CPT. Both sides 
agreed to establish military cooperation.139 
Although this Sino-Thai military cooperation was covert, the Chinese leaders 
reassured the Thai leaders of their security commitment on every occasion. For 
example, when Deputy Prime Minister Dawee Chullasapya led a delegation to Beijing 
in June, he said he was convinced that China would attack Vietnam if Vietnamese 
forces made any serious incursion into Thailand.140 During the state visit to Beijing in 
October, Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Thai Secretary-General of the National Security 
Council, straightforwardly asked the Chinese to clarify its security commitment to 
defend Thailand in the event of a Vietnamese invasion. However, the Chinese leaders 
failed to give the Thais any concrete support and definite commitment to match their 
public announcements. Deng Xiaoping said that such a decision would be made only 
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when necessitated by events, and would depend on the needs, requests, and actions of 
the Thai government.141     
The second Chinese move was to deal with the refugee crisis, from both the 
boat people from Vietnam and the Cambodian refugees. Initially, the PRC failed to 
respond to the refugee crisis. Kriangsak said he had sent messages to the Chinese 
government asking them to take 8,000 ethnic Chinese refugees from Indochina, but 
received no response. 142  On July 20, the Chinese Red Cross gave 200,000 RMB 
(approximately 130,000 US dollars) to the Thai government to aid Indochinese refugees 
in Thailand. This was the first donation the Chinese made toward the refugee relief 
program in Thailand. Chinese chargé d’affaires, Wang Buyun, presented the donation 
to Prime Minister Kriangsak. Wang later told reporters that he expressed sympathy with 
the Thai government for carrying the burden of the refugee problem. He regretted 
Hanoi’s expulsion of its people, and reiterated that the root cause was Vietnam’s 
expansionism. Wang also called for the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, and 
halt mistreatment of its own people. He said that the Chinese had already accepted more 
than 250,000 refugees.143 By November, the PRC decided to take more refugees from 
Thailand up to an overall limit of 10,000.144      
Third, the inter-Communist war brought about the de-ideologization of the Cold 
War in Indochina. Some even argue that this marked the end of Cold War antagonism 
in the region.145 Emblematic of this was the PRC’s move to cut support for Southeast 
Asian insurgents in order to focus on the Cambodian question, which necessitated 
support from non-Communist Southeast countries. This was largely due to a shift in 
Chinese foreign policy, spearheaded by the paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. Deng 
not only had informed the Communist Parties in the region, including the CPT, that 
they were now on their own, but also relayed this changing policy to the Kriangsak 
government.146 The Chinese subsequently terminated the CPT’s Voice of the People of 
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Thailand. Together with the internal disagreement within the CPT, the lack of Chinese 
support put a final nail on the coffin of the Communist insurgency in Thailand. During 
Deputy Prime Minister Dawee Chullasapya’s visit to Beijing in June, following 
repeated questions about the insurgents in Thailand, the Chinese labeled it a Thai 
internal affair, which did not have anything to do with the Chinese government.147 This 
was confirmed when in late October Thai parliamentarians went to China and met with 
Ji Pengfei, Vice-Premier. The latter told them that the Voice of the People of Thailand 
had stopped broadcasting.148  
Fourth, the Chinese attempted to conclude a civil aviation agreement with 
Thailand. This topic had been raised during Deng’s visit in November 1978 and the 
Thais had been studying the agreement since then. On June 21, 1979, Shen Tu, the 
President of Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), met with new Thai 
Ambassador to the PRC, Sakol Vanabriksha, in Beijing to ask about the progress of the 
air agreement. Shen informed Sakol that the Chinese had signed a similar agreement 
with the Philippines, and began negotiations with Singapore. He said this agreement 
would be a stepping-stone for further economic and cultural cooperation between the 
two countries. The Chinese also welcomed any Thai delegation visiting Beijing.149  
 When Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Panupong paid a visit to China in late 
August, he met with Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong, who pushed for a Sino-Thai 
air agreement. As Arun later told the American Ambassador to Thailand, the Thai 
government would not move very fast on this agreement because of the lucrative 
Taiwan air connection and because Thai Airways International did not have enough 
planes for the China route.150 A Thai delegation led by the Permanent Secretary of 
Communications arrived in Beijing on November 26 to negotiate the second round of 
a civil aviation agreement.151             
Last but not least, Chinese leaders were increasingly dependent on Kriangsak’s 
leadership. As the Chinese military attaché to Thailand, Mao Xianqi, told a senior US 
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Embassy official, the Chinese considered Thai cooperation essential to Chinese aims in 
the region, and in particular, to the survival of the Pol Pot forces. Deeming Kriangsak’s 
political survival strategically important, they became concerned over his position in 
Thai politics. This was largely because the Chinese leaned on Kriangsak and his tacit 
support for Chinese supplies to the Khmer Rouge. As the US Embassy in Bangkok 
reported, ‘The PM runs the Chinese assistance operation out of his hip pocket with few 
of his advisors aware of it’.152 In other words, the Sino-Thai quasi-alliance was built on 
Chinese ‘understandings with Prime Minister Kriangsak’. US Ambassador 
Abramowitz even claimed that ‘Thai cooperation with the Chinese could diminish 
significantly should Kriangsak fall from power’.153    
Amidst the political decline of Kriangsak in early 1980, the Chinese even 
stepped up their pressures on the Thai government to publicly side with China and the 
Khmer Rouge regime. During her visit to Bangkok, Deng Yingchao, the National 
People’s Congress Vice-Chairperson and Zhou Enlai’s wife, gave a speech reassuring 
Kriangsak of Chinese support for Thailand against Vietnam in the event of the latter’s 
attack on Thailand. Her speech, given at a lunch attended by senior Thai officials, 
caused some uneasiness and embarrassment to Kriangsak.154  
Overall, while not all Thai leaders were enthusiastic about military cooperation 
with Beijing, the Third Indochina War undoubtedly rendered Sino-Thai relations ever 
closer. In short, Thai-Chinese relations during the Kriangsak administration were 
developed and strengthened through economic and technical cooperation. The 
Cambodian question, especially after the Vietnamese military intervention into 
Cambodia, increasingly moved them toward a quasi-alliance. This was a part of 
Kriangsak’s equidistance, which was aimed at rebalancing with all the great powers.  
 
7.2.3. Thai-Soviet Relations: Correct but Distant?    
 
‘I see nothing wrong with being friends with the Soviets. … I want to treat all 
friendly countries on an equal basis and not discriminate against any friendly 
country’. – Kriangsak Chomanan155  
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While behind the scenes, Kriangsak was working ever closer with the Chinese, his 
government nevertheless attempted to maintain a semblance of equal and balanced 
relations with the two Communist powers. Compared with Sino-Thai relations, Thai-
Soviet relations were correct but distant, especially following the Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978. However, both countries continued a 
friendly relationship, culminating in Prime Minister Kriangsak’s visit to Moscow in 
March 1979. Despite the difficulties, discourses of détente and friendship remained 
intact.    
   Since entering office, Prime Minister Kriangsak’s aim was to maintain a policy 
of even-handedness with both the USSR and the PRC. In his speech to Foreign 
Correspondents’ Club of Thailand in 1978, Kriangsak said that ‘we want to have 
friendly relations with China [and] the USSR … I hope for expansion of trade with 
these countries. Regarding the USSR, we need their friendship. It is important to any 
concept of neutrality in Southeast Asia’.156 As he put it, ‘I see nothing wrong with being 
friends with the Soviets. … I want to treat all friendly countries on an equal basis and 
not discriminate against any friendly country’.157 However, Thai diplomacy toward 
Moscow was constrained by Sino-Soviet rivalry and the Soviet aspiration to consolidate 
its relations with Hanoi.158  
Bilaterally, the Soviet Union sought to strengthen its ties with Vietnam and, to 
a lesser extent, Laos. Moscow also echoed Vietnamese criticism of the Khmer Rouge 
regime in Phnom Penh, and regarded the Chinese as the source of Vietnamese-
Cambodian border conflicts.159 It publicly condemned the Chinese role in the regional 
Communist insurgency. Mikhail Kapitsa, head of Far Eastern Department of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry, criticized China for cultivating relations with the smaller nations in 
Southeast Asia, and in particular Thailand, at the state-to-state level while continuing 
to support Communist insurgencies against these governments at the people-to-people 
level.160   
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At the regional level, the Soviet Union did not develop close relations with 
ASEAN. Brezhnev’s idea of collective security in Asia was largely ignored by the non-
Communist states in ASEAN. Rather than endorsing ASEAN’s zone of peace, freedom 
and neutrality, the Soviet Union expressed support of the Vietnamese proposal for ‘a 
zone of peace, independence and neutrality’.161  
 In Thailand, the Russian Embassy in Bangkok sought to play a more proactive 
role within the détente environment. Bilateral relations improved, while trade continued 
at a steady pace. Shortly after the Chinese invitation of Kriangsak to Beijing on 
December 8, 1977, Soviet Ambassador in Bangkok, Boris Ilyichev, extended an 
invitation to Thai prime minister to visit Moscow, and Kriangsak agreed in principle.162 
In the same month, the position of the Soviet military attaché, Colonel Anatoli Gouriev, 
who was suspected to belong to GRU (Soviet military intelligence), was approved by 
the Thai government. Later, the Thai government appointed Colonel Wanchai 
Chitchamnong as Thai military attaché to Moscow.163  
Ilyichev also pushed the Thai government to sign the pending cultural 
agreement, which had been agreed upon during the Kukrit era and left unsigned under 
Thanin.164 At the same time, cultural and sports exchanges increased. For example, the 
Soviet sports delegation led by Vladimir L. Avilov visited Bangkok in early November 
1978 and met with the Sports Organization of Thailand. They agreed in principle to 
conclude protocol on sports cooperation for 1979.165   
There were also high-level visits, the most important of which were Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin’s two visits to Bangkok in March and 
October, respectively. During March 11-13, 1978, Firyubin called on Foreign Minister 
Upadit at the MFA. The purpose, according to a Soviet embassy official, was to 
‘establish friendly relations with present Thai leadership’. The ministers talked for an 
hour and a half. Upadit asked Firyubin about the Soviet position on ASEAN’s principle 
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of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. The Soviet counterpart replied that the 
Soviet Union supported any proposals for peace in Southeast Asia and similar proposals 
in other parts of the world. He did not say directly that the USSR supported the ASEAN 
concept of ZOPFAN. However, his response was not negative.166 He went on to thank 
the Thai government for supporting Soviet actions for peace such as nuclear 
nonproliferation and other UN resolutions.  
According to the Soviet Embassy official, both sides agreed that a settlement to 
the Vietnamese-Cambodian border conflict was desirable. The Soviet Union desired a 
cease-fire, ‘something along the lines of the Vietnamese proposal, although it doesn’t 
necessarily have to follow their exact points’. Firyubin also observed that the Thais 
were nervous about the fighting in the region. The long-pending Thai-Soviet cultural 
agreement was not brought up during Firyubin’s visit. However, the Soviets wanted it 
ratified.167   
In June, the incoming Soviet Ambassador to Thailand, Yuri Kouznetzov (June 
1978 – October 1984), arrived in Bangkok. It was reported that he was under orders 
from the Kremlin to take a tougher line with the Thai government. He held a press 
conference even before his credentials ceremony with the King. Press releases were 
sent to local newspapers, and the Soviet officials asked the editors to publish the Soviet 
viewpoint.168  
On September 27, Kouznetzov met with Deputy Foreign Minister, Wongse 
Polnikorn, at the MFA to discuss Kriangsak’s state visit to Moscow. No definite date 
had been set and Kouznetzov suggested that early 1979 would be the most suitable time 
since Kriangsak would visit Japan and the US at the same time. He also asked the Thai 
Foreign Ministry to support the Soviet initiative on nuclear non-proliferation, 
‘International Convention on Strengthening of Guarantee of Security of Non-Nuclear 
States’, at the United Nations General Assembly. Kouznetzov expressed the Soviet 
intention to expand embassy activities by increasing personnel at the Embassy. Wongse 
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requested that the Soviet Ambassador help to facilitate other official visits to 
Moscow.169 
In late October 1978, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin, visited 
three ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. He met 
with Prime Minister Kriangsak. After his talks with Firyubin, Kriangsak disclosed that 
the possibility of opening a formal dialogue between the Soviet Union and ASEAN had 
not been discussed. During the visit, the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand, Yuri 
Kouznetzov, told the press in an interview that the Soviet Union was ‘on the 
Vietnamese side’ and ‘ready to render not only economic but also military aid to 
Vietnam’. This aroused concern in the region.170 
The Soviets signed a treaty with Vietnam on November 3, just two days before 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited Bangkok. At both receptions for Deng at the 
airport and at Government House, Soviet Ambassador Kouznetzov was noticeably 
absent.171 During Deng’s visit, the Soviets were active in Thailand. Two delegations of 
Soviet tennis and basketball players came to Bangkok. Kouznetsov also asked the 
Kriangsak government to go on live television and mark the anniversary of the 
Bolshevik Revolution on November 7. The Thai authorities unsurprisingly turned down 
his request.172 Shortly after Deng left Bangkok, the Soviet Ambassador presented a 
strong verbal protest to the Thai Foreign Ministry claiming that there were unwarranted 
attacks in local Chinese-language newspapers against Soviet interests in the region.173 
At the end of the year, Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia. 
The Vietnamese deployed troops along the Thai-Cambodian border, having a direct 
impact on Thailand. The Soviets repeatedly reassured the Thais that the Vietnamese 
would neither attack Thailand nor cross the Thai border. The Soviet Ambassador to 
Bangkok, in his talks with the US Ambassador Abramowitz, said ‘I can guarantee 
Vietnamese forces will not go into Thailand’.174 In his interview with Thai-language, 
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Daily News, in January 1979, Soviet Deputy Chief of Mission, Olek Gershov, denied 
press reports that the Soviet Union had 4,000 military personnel in Cambodia 
supporting Vietnamese forces. He insisted that the Soviet government considered the 
new Heng Samrin regime the legal government, and only helped it politically and 
diplomatically. Gershov also pointed out that Thailand was not endangered ‘because of 
its wise policy towards Cambodia’.175     
Despite the Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 
and corresponding Soviet support of Hanoi, Kriangsak continued to pursue a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union, and emphasized his commitment to an equidistant 
strategy. His state visit to Moscow was a major turning point. In his dinner remarks at 
the Dutch Embassy in late January 1979, Prime Minister Kriangsak reiterated 
Thailand’s stance on Indochina. Underlining his position, he said that following his 
visit to his ‘good friend Jimmy Carter’, he would visit the Soviet Union in March.176 
While détente proponents such as Foreign Minister Upadit supported the trip, some 
factions within the military, including Interior Minister, General Lek Naeomali, 
Commander of Royal Thai Army, General Prem Timsulanon, and NSC Secretary-
General, Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsili, disagreed with Kriangsak’s decision. 177 
According to the American documents, they urged the US Ambassador to advise the 
Prime Minister to call off the Moscow visit. They reasoned that Thailand would gain 
nothing from the trip, and it was unnecessary for the Prime Minister to call on the Soviet 
Union as it supported the Vietnamese expansionism in Indochina.178 The Chinese also 
viewed Kriangsak’s visit with discomfort. The Chinese ambassador to Moscow mildly 
complained to his counterpart, Sathit Sathian-Thai, about the timing of the visit.179 
However, Kriangsak publicly and privately insisted that his Moscow visit was 
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important in order to sustain a more even-handed Thai diplomacy toward the great 
powers.180 
After the official invitation by the Soviet government, details of Kriangsak’s 
visit were prepared by the MFA and the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok. Deputy Foreign 
Minister Wongse sent the official schedule of Kriangsak’s visit to Kouznetzov on 
February 2, 1979. It was also reported in the Thai press.181 Even though the trip had 
been scheduled for March 14-24, it was postponed and rescheduled to March 21-27. 
According to Foreign Minister Upadit, this was due to the request made by Soviet Prime 
Minister Alexei Kosygin, who wished to have a rest between his trip to India and the 
Thai visit.182      
Soviet Ambassador Kouznetsov met with Kriangsak in late February to discuss 
Thai Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow and the joint communiqué. According to 
Kriangsak, he was asked by Kouznetsov for a substantial increase in the size of the 
Soviet Embassy in Bangkok. The Ambassador pointed to the size of American 
personnel in Bangkok, to which Kriangsak replied that when their trade and investment 
approached that of the US, he might take the Soviet requests seriously. He told 
Kouznetsov that he was not interested in Soviet weapons.183 On March 6, Kouznetsov 
called on Director-General of Political Department of Foreign Ministry, Opart 
Suthiwart-Narueput, to discuss the visit in detail.184 In Moscow, Sathit Sathian-Thai, 
Thai Ambassador to Moscow (1977-1981), also prepared the diplomatic protocol with 
his Soviet counterpart.185    
Shortly before Kriangsak’s visit to the USSR, Moscow vetoed an ASEAN 
Resolution on the Indochina conflicts, which proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops 
in Cambodia, at the United Nations Security Council. This had a negative impact upon 
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Kriangsak’s upcoming trip. In his conversation with American Ambassador to 
Thailand, Kriangsak said that he had no illusions about his Soviet visit. He would grasp 
this opportunity to clarify ASEAN views on Indochina situations, and emphasized Thai 
diplomatic ties with ASEAN and the US.186  
Upon the departure of the Kriangsak delegation to the Soviet Union, the Soviet 
Embassy in Bangkok placed a paid advertisement in The Nation newspaper to present 
its alternative picture of Thai-Soviet relations. The lengthy article, written by A. Olenin, 
suggested that talks between the Thai and Soviet leaders would ‘play a major role in 
promoting friendship and mutual understanding’. It went on to compliment the 
Kriangsak government for taking steps to extend relations with the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries. It praised the wisdom and realism of Thai leaders. According 
to Olenin, Thai-Soviet relations were based on principles of peaceful coexistence, 
regardless of the different socio-political system. Highlighting trade, cultural and sports 
cooperation, the article concluded that these relationships would gain new impetus 
during the Kriangsak trip.187  
Kriangsak arrived in Moscow on March 21, and was warmly greeted by the 
Soviet leaders led by Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko at the airport. His party included, inter alia, his wife, Khunying Wirat 
Chomanan, Deputy Prime Minister Sunthorn Hongladarom, Foreign Minister Upadit 
Pachariyangkun, Interior Minister General Lek Naeomali, Deputy Commerce Minister 
Prok Ammaranan, and NSC Secretary-General Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsili. Kriangsak 
stayed in Moscow for three nights, and spent another three days in Leningrad before 
returning to Bangkok.  
In the afternoon, Kriangsak met with Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin for 
two hours and forty minutes at the Kremlin. The Indochina situation was the central 
issue. After greetings, Kriangsak asserted that Thailand pursued a policy of 
independence and self-reliance, and wished to be friends with any country regardless 
of socio-political differences. Kosygin asked in an aggressive manner whether, in the 
event that one country invaded another, Thailand would be friends with it. Kriangsak 
responded with a firm exposition of Thai attitudes. He said that Thailand was neutral 
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in relation to the Indochina conflicts.188 As Kriangsak put it, ‘Thailand will adhere to 
its position of strict neutrality and will not incline toward any side of the present 
conflict’.189 
While Thailand would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, 
Kriangsak told Kosygin that Thailand would not fear defending itself against foreign 
aggression. Domestically, Thailand would continue to fight Communist terrorism. 
Despite Thailand’s respect for the monarchy and Buddhism, Kriangsak said the Thai 
government could be friends with Communist states. Kosygin reacted by asserting that 
‘the Communist terrorists were Chinese’, which, for him, were the genuine threat to 
Thailand.190 
The Thai Prime Minister stated that his government strongly supported the 
ASEAN peaceful principle, and the principle of inviolability of international frontiers. 
Thailand was opposed to any violations of the principle, and asked aggressors to 
withdraw their troops. He asked rhetorically whether Vietnam had violated the Thai 
frontier. Kosygin assured the Thai Prime Minister that it was impossible that Vietnam 
would invade Thailand. On the contrary, it was very possible that the PRC, which had 
invaded Vietnam, would someday decide to ‘teach Thailand and the other ASEAN 
states a lesson’.191 
Throughout their meeting, Kosygin strongly condemned the Chinese. 
According to Kriangsak, the Soviet Prime Minister told him that ‘in fact, President 
Carter sanctioned the Chinese aggression against Vietnam’. Deng Xiaoping had 
announced his intentions in the US, and the US was aware of Chinese plans to launch 
a punitive attack on Hanoi. The Soviet leader stressed that the Soviet Union would 
supply the Vietnamese anything they needed militarily.192  
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Maintaining a firm distinction between the Chinese invasion of Vietnam and 
the situation in Cambodia, Kosygin did not deny that Vietnamese troops were in 
Cambodia but treated the issue as settled. He encouraged the Thai government to 
recognize the Heng Samrin regime. He said the Pol Pot regime was finished, and 
contended that Thailand should recognize the new government which stood for 
neutrality and peaceful relations with its neighbors. Kriangsak reacted by commenting 
that he heard only two persons, Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, and two persons could not 
constitute a government. He told the Soviet Premier that he did not consider the Heng 
Samrin group as a legitimate government. His government would have to consult with 
the ASEAN leaders, he went on, but in the meantime, Thailand would not recognize 
any regime. Commenting on Pol Pot’s murderous regime, Kriangsak said that neither 
Thailand nor his ASEAN partners supported Pol Pot personally. However, he 
emphasized that there was a clear difference between the nature of a regime and a 
regime change by external forces. 193  On this matter, their interests and opinions 
diverged,  
 
Kriangsak: We render any invasion in other country wrong.  
Kosygin: What about the government killing its own people? Is it right? The 
Cambodian people did not kill each other, but it results from the Chinese 
influence.    
Kriangsak: I do neither accept that action, but they are different stories.  
Kosygin: They are much interrelated.  
Kriangsak: But I consider that it is unacceptable for any country to invade 
another country.194  
 
Kosygin mentioned the charges by Hun Sen, Foreign Minister of the Heng 
Samrin regime, that Thailand was permitting Chinese resupply operations to Pol Pot’s 
forces. Kriangsak replied that Pol Pot’s forces supplied themselves by seizing them 
from their opponents. Showing the Soviet leader with maps, Kriangsak pointed out the 
Cambodian coastline from Koh Kong to Kompong Som, and suggested that the Chinese 
could resupply very easily by the sea. Kosygin did not press the issue further.195  
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Kosygin moved to the existence of large ethnic Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia, which, he claimed, posed a serious threat to their security. He informed 
Kriangsak that in its borderland areas, the Soviet Union had been forced to expel those 
ethnic Chinese. He recommended that Thailand and other ASEAN states should do the 
same, especially around 300,000 stateless Chinese in Thailand. Kriangsak objected to 
the Soviet proposal.196  
Kriangsak mentioned the behavior of the Soviet Embassy in Thailand, claiming 
that for many years it had acted like a security force. Kosygin expressed surprise but 
promised to look into the matter. The Soviet leader also offered Thailand weapons, such 
as tanks. Kriangsak responded by saying he had supply relationships with the US, 
Britain, France, and Italy, which he planned to maintain. He told Kosygin that prior to 
his Moscow trip, he held talks with Suharto of Indonesia, and Hussein Onn of Malaysia, 
and they had mentioned difficulties dealing with the Russians. While Malaysia 
encountered the Soviet failure to finance Malaysian electrical projects, Indonesia could 
not acquire necessary spare parts from the Soviet Union. Kriangsak said he advised 
Kosygin to follow through better.197 They discussed the expansion of trade, cultural, 
scientific, and sports exchanges. Although Kosygin said at the outset that the Soviets 
would not push or impose any agreements on the Thais, one of Thai diplomats revealed 
that at lower levels, the Soviets tried very hard to obtain Thai approval for an economic 
and technical agreement.198 
In the evening, the Soviet Premier hosted a formal dinner for Kriangsak. 
Speaking on behalf of Vietnam, Kosygin said that Hanoi came ‘out actively for 
developing peaceful and friendly ties’ with its neighbors. Kriangsak replied that 
Thailand was ‘seriously concerned over the situation that has developed in Indochina’. 
He said that Thailand’s policy was one of ‘strict neutrality’, and would not be swayed 
into supporting anyone’s side in any conflict. He denied that Thai territory was used to 
transport arms or material to the Chinese-backed forces of Pol Pot in Cambodia.199 
After the dinner, Kosygin escorted Kriangsak and his entourage to the Bolshoi ballet 
performance. 
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On the following day, March 22, Kriangsak met with Soviet Secretary-General, 
Leonid Brezhnev, whom Kriangsak described as a ‘good man, healthy, but not strong’. 
He occasionally slurred his speech, and appeared to have difficulty swallowing.200 
According to a Tass report, Brezhnev told Kriangsak that Moscow fully supported 
Vietnam. Referring to China, he said that ‘reliable security’ in Asia must be based on 
the absence of force or the threat of force. In other words, Brezhnev reiterated the threat 
to peace posed by Chinese ambitions. He called for a ‘deepening of the process of 
détente’ in Asia. 201 Kriangsak informed Brezhnev that the Chinese did not use Thai 
soil to supply Pol Pot’s force. He stressed that Thailand should not recognize the newly 
installed Heng Samrin regime, and did ‘not want the presence of foreign troops’ in 
neighboring countries.202 He also brought up the matter of the Soviet veto in the UN 
Security Council against the ASEAN resolution, proposing the withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Vietnam and Cambodia. According to Kriangsak, ‘on this matter, we have 
differences of opinion’.203 
In his single 55-minute session with Brezhnev, Kriangsak urged the Soviet 
leader to recognize ASEAN and deal with the organization as a grouping. He noted that 
failure to do so would create suspicion in ASEAN countries. According to Kriangsak, 
Brezhnev listened attentively, and asked Kriangsak whether there were military 
features of ASEAN. Kriangsak replied that ASEAN was not a military pact. Brezhnev 
promised that ‘a dialogue between the Soviet Union and ASEAN would take place in 
the future’.204 However, the Soviet leader warned that ASEAN should avoid association 
with the Chinese who would endanger regional cooperation. According to Kriangsak, 
Brezhnev also stressed the importance of reaching the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) II agreement with the US for Soviet domestic economic reasons.205  
 On the same day, there were other meetings at the ministerial level. For instance, 
Deputy Prime Minister Sunthorn Hongladarom held talks with Soviet Deputy Prime 
Minister, Vladimir A. Kirillin. They discussed a proposed agreement covering full 
economic and technical cooperation, including an exchange of technicians. The Soviets 
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suggested that the Thais should negotiate separate technical agreements on specific 
issues. The Thais also requested academic cooperation on oil shale development. Soviet 
expertise on energy, especially nuclear power plants, hydro-energy, gas, and coal would 
benefit Thailand. Sunthorn suggested that both sides should exchange their 
technicians.206 
At the same time, Deputy Minister of Commerce Prok Ammaranan and his 
Soviet counterpart, M. P. Kuzmin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, discussed future 
trade cooperation. They noted how, in 1978, the trade balance was in favor of the 
Soviets. The value of Thai imports from Moscow was 222.8 million Baht, while exports 
were 148.3 million Baht. The leading exports from Thailand were rubber and fluorite. 
In 1978, Thailand earned 115.9 million Baht from rubber sales to Moscow. Prok 
suggested that the Soviets could cut the Thai trade deficit by buying canned pineapple, 
but Kuzmin was reluctant because of alternative supplies from Cuba and Vietnam. Thai 
Deputy Commerce Minister also complained about unpredictable rubber purchases 
from the Soviets. Prok said that the Thais wished to sell more rubber and textiles to 
Moscow, and buy products such as fertilizer, paper, and cement. They signed no 
agreement on trade because they believed a trade agreement signed on December 25, 
1970 provided sufficient basis for cooperation. Both sides agreed to increase trade 
between the two countries, and to exchange more trade delegations.207   
 On March 23, Kriangsak gave a press conference. Referring to the situation in 
Indochina, Kriangsak said that ‘we wish to see all sides cease hostility and withdraw to 
their former boundaries’. He repeatedly emphasized Thailand’s strict neutrality in 
Indochina conflicts. ‘We wish to preserve peace and neutrality in this region of the 
world’, he continued. ‘We do not think we should take sides. We cannot sit idly by 
while the situation is getting serious in this region. We expressed our concern over the 
settlement of this region’s disputes by force. We do not wish to see a state invade 
others’.208   
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The Kriangsak party spent three days negotiating the joint communiqué. 
Kosygin called on Kriangsak for three additional half-hour unscheduled meetings on 
March 23. For Kriangsak, Kosygin was ‘very tough’.209 Thai foreign minister Upadit 
avoided the negotiations on the wordings of the communiqué, and thereby assigned 
Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Arun Panupong, who was a former Thai 
Ambassador to Moscow and knew how to deal with the Russians. His Soviet 
counterpart was Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin. He became indignant when 
Arun insisted on deleting huge chunks from the Soviet-proposed draft. At one point, 
Firyubin threatened to abandon the communiqué altogether, to which the Thai side 
responded by showing their willingness to do the same. The Soviets however resumed 
negotiations. 210  In the end, they agreed on a compromised version of a joint 
communiqué. Kriangsak did not yield at all on the Indochina-related questions and as 
a result, the communiqué did not mention Vietnam, Cambodia or China.211    
The communiqué was promulgated on the last day of the visit, March 27, during 
Kriangsak’s visit to Leningrad. It began by saying that ‘a broad exchange of views on 
various aspects of bilateral relations and on major international problems of mutual 
interest was held’ during talks between Thai and Soviet leaders. ‘The Prime Minister 
of Thailand’, continued the communiqué, ‘expressed the determination of the Thai 
government to carry through an independent foreign policy, based on the principle of 
peaceful coexistence and aimed at strengthening friendly relations with all countries, 
irrespective of their political, economic and social order, for the sake of peace, progress 
and prosperity’. ‘The Thai side gave an account of ASEAN’, which were ‘aimed at the 
development of regional economic, social and cultural cooperation of its member-
countries’.  
‘The Soviet sides’, on the other hand, ‘emphasized that it consistently opposed 
mutually exclusive military-political and economic blocs’, and ‘expressed its readiness 
to deepen mutually advantageous contacts’ in relations with the ASEAN member states. 
On this matter, the Soviet Union did not go beyond its earlier positions on ASEAN. As 
indicated in the communiqué, it stated its readiness to deal with the member states 
bilaterally.212 Lastly, the communiqué indicated the intentions of Thailand and the 
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Soviet Union to maintain mutual contact, hold consultations and continue to develop 
relations ‘as extensively as possible’.  
Symbolically, Kriangsak’s visit to Moscow marked the first time that the Thai 
Prime Minister visited the Soviet Union. Despite the warm Soviet welcome and 
cordiality, it was not an easy visit. Nevertheless, Kriangsak characterized his visit as a 
‘pleasure trip’. He was pleased with the visit, having given nothing, and maintained 
firm positions protecting Thai and ASEAN interests. There was no treaty signed 
between the two countries during this visit.213 In his view, Kriangsak was assured by 
the Soviet leaders that the Vietnamese would not invade Thailand. Overall, the trip 
represented Kriangsak’s strategy of equidistance toward the contending powers.   
 
Following his trip, Kriangsak attempted to maintain a good friendship with Moscow. 
First, the Thai government allowed Soviet cargo flyovers from Bombay to Hanoi. This 
was partly because the Thais had been criticized of their support for Chinese resupply 
operations to Cambodia. The Soviets presented these flights as ‘innocent’ air traffic in 
conformity with international conventions. During March and May, reports of 79 Soviet 
flyovers to Vietnam were intercepted. Kriangsak told reporters that Thailand had 
permitted the Soviet Union to increase its flyovers on a temporary basis, but he said he 
had no idea what the aircrafts were carrying to Vietnam.214 In September, the Soviets 
incessantly asked Thai permission that Soviet aircrafts would be increased to 20 
flyovers per day. 215  The Thais reportedly suspected that the heavy Soviet cargos 
contained components that assembled T-45 tanks, MiG-21s and helicopters at the 
former American airbase at Danang.216 
Kriangsak asked the Thai National Security Council, chaired by Air Marshal 
Siddhi to overlook the flyover issue, and take steps to reduce the number of flights. 
Thai authorities told the Soviet Ambassador that from now on all flyover requests 
would be handled by the National Security Council. 217 In September, the Soviet Union 
also requested permission for a ‘goodwill visit’ by two military vessels to call at 
                                                          
213 NARA, RG59, 1979BANGKO09194, ‘Conversation with Prime Minister on Soviet Trip’, 30 March 
1979.      
214 ‘Soviet Airlift Reported’, The Washington Post, 25 May 1979; The Associated Press, 24 May 1979.     
215 NARA, RG59, 1979BANGKO14913, ‘Soviet Overflights across Thailand’, 4 May 1979.     
216 Richard Nations, ‘Bangkok Tries a New Tack’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1979, 
p. 12.     
217 NARA, RG59, 1979BANGKO39760, ‘Ambassador’s Meeting with Kriangsak’, 28 September 
1979; Victoria Butler, ‘Soviets Irk Thailand in Sport and Politics’, The Globe and Mail, 1 November 




Bangkok’s port, including the 4,000-ton guided missile destroyer Gnevny, and the 
7,000-ton training ship Borodino. Thailand refused to grant Soviet warships 
permission. Requests by Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, to increase the number of flights 
to Bangkok, was turned down, too.218   
  Second, mutual visits increased. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin was invited to 
Bangkok. In late May, Soviet Ambassador to Bangkok, Yuri Kouznetzov, sent a letter 
to Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Panupong, inviting Thailand to send an observer to 
the COMECON meeting in Moscow. 219  On August 20-26, Air Marshal Harin 
Hongsakul led an eight-member delegation of the Thai National Assembly to the Soviet 
Union. He gave an interview to the Tass News Agency stating how ideological 
differences were not an obstacle to friendly Thai-Soviet relations. The Soviets sent their 
sports delegation to Bangkok, including a boxing and tennis team.220   
Third, Thai-Soviet trade relations increased significantly. In April, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration bought trucks from the Soviets costing 13 million Baht. 
The Soviets also opened a trade exhibition in Nakornprathom province, close to 
Bangkok. The organizer, Min Sen Machinery, which acted as an agent for importing 
machinery from the Soviet Union, sold a number of tractors.221 In July, a newly elected 
president of the Board of Trade and the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Kijja 
Vadhanasindhu, led a five-man delegation to Moscow. He signed a private-sector 
agreement on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. The Soviets 
placed an order with Thai Hua for 50,000 tons of maize worth about 176 million Baht 
to be shipped to Vietnam.222 Under the International Trade State Corporation Act of 
1974, requiring trade with the Communist countries to have official approval, Thai 
exporters applied to the Commerce Ministry for a routine export license. The Ministry 
supported their sales to Moscow. It was reported that Thai exporters regularly met with 
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trade representatives in the Soviet Embassy on Sathorn Road. In December, the Soviets 
started lining up 100,000 tons of high-quality Thai rice, due to be shipped in January 
1980.223  
However, Thai sales of grain to the Soviets were viewed by the Americans with 
disapproval, and a disregard of President Jimmy Carter’s partial grain embargo against 
Moscow, imposed in January following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US 
Embassy in Bangkok privately warned Kriangsak that the US would retaliate if 
Thailand went ahead with its sales. Prok Ammaranan, Deputy Commerce Minister, said 
that ‘We have never had any commitment with the US that we would have to fall in 
line with its embargo’. ‘We are not a satellite of the US’, he stressed. ‘The US is trying 
hard to get Thailand to fall in line as far as rice exports to the Soviet Union are 
concerned’. ‘If a grain embargo became a United Nations resolution, we would 
certainly abide by it’. ‘But until then’, Prok explained, ‘we are friends with both 
sides’.224  
While Kriangsak condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he approved 
the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. He declared that the Soviet action was ‘considered 
a threat to the security, peace and stability of Asia and the world’. He asked ‘the Soviet 
Union to withdraw its troops and stop infringing on the sovereignty of Afghanistan so 
that the Afghan people can determine their fate by themselves’.225  With regard to 
Thailand’s grain sales to Moscow, Kriangsak said his government would make its own 
trade decisions. ‘We are an independent country’, he said, ‘and no one can tell us what 
to do’.226   
In short, the Kriangsak administration pursued détente with the Soviet Union. 
Thai-Soviet relations were friendly to the extent that they had a stable, yet distant 
relationship. They were not merely bilateral relations but, more importantly, part and 
parcel of the broader strategy of equidistance, based on the balancing of the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry in the region. It can be argued that Kriangsak’s equidistance policy was a 
discourse of balanced détente. On the one hand, it was fairly successful in maintaining 
flexibility and even-handedness with great powers. On the other, this policy generated 
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discursive disagreement with the military and security forces within Thai politics: a fact 
that eventually led to the fall of Kriangsak. 
 
7.3. The Fall of Kriangsak: Intra-Discursive Struggle?  
The existing literature explains the fall of Kriangsak either as related to endemic 
economic problems, a legitimacy crisis, or the lack of support from the military, 
especially from the Young Turks Group.227 It also pinpoints the year 1979 as the turning 
point in the gradual decline of the Kriangsak administration. According to this 
argument, the promulgation of the Constitution in December 1978 and a subsequent 
parliamentary election on April 22, 1979 served to weaken rather than strengthen 
Kriangsak, who decided not to run the election. The reason was twofold: first, the 
election was won by a group of opposition parties led by Kukrit Pramoj. Second, 
Kriangsak was able to remain Prime Minister, largely due to the votes of the appointed 
Senate. He therefore lacked support in the elected House of Parliament and his cabinet 
consisted largely of non-elected technocrats. The government was further delegitimized 
by pressing economic problems, including high inflation, widening deficits, and price 
rises, in particular of oil. Amidst the global oil crisis, Kriangsak’s decision to raise 
energy prices was the final straw, sparking a series of anti-government demonstrations. 
Economic mismanagement not only made it difficult for Kriangsak to broaden his 
support but also exacerbated military factionalism. The Young Turks finally shifted 
their support from Kriangsak to the new Army Commander-in-Chief and Defense 
Minister, General Prem Tinsulanon.228          
However, this economic explanation is both deterministic and at least partially 
flawed. As Vichitvong na Pombhejara has pointed out, 1979 was in fact a year of 
‘relative stability’. The Thai economy was not doing ‘too badly’ and despite the 
persistent inflation and trade imbalances, Thailand maintained economic growth. ‘On 
the macro level’, observed Vichitvong, the economy was ‘satisfactory’: ‘Trade deficits 
are not expected to adversely affect the rate of economic growth as long as export 
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expansion continues satisfactorily. Also, as long as the economy continues to grow at 
a high rate, the investment climate is likely to remain favorable. Investment, in turn, 
helps sustain economic growth’.229  
More importantly, the existing approach largely ignores diplomatic dimension. 
This chapter argues that the fall of Kriangsak can be understood through the lens of the 
discursive struggles over détente. By the end of the 1970s, it was no longer a struggle 
between the discourses of anticommunism versus détente, but between détente 
proponents about how détente should work. In other words, it was the intra-discursive 
struggle between balanced détente and unbalanced détente. In this version, it was the 
latter’s proponents that brought down Kriangsak and the major turning point was 
Kriangsak’s visit to Moscow in March 1979. 
The intra-discursive struggle that set the stage for Kriangsak’s downfall was 
fought on two fronts. The first was the domestic struggle between those balanced and 
unbalanced détente proponents. As was clear during the militant anticommunist regime 
of Thanin, most factions within the military had by then become either détente 
proponents or sympathizers. The same was true of civilians, especially those based at 
the MFA. It was not surprising, therefore, that both groups supported the coup in 
October 1977, and subsequently endorsed Kriangsak’s policy of equidistance toward 
the contending powers, and détente with the communist powers in general. Key détente 
proponent such as Upadit remained Foreign Minister in the Kriangsak government.   
However, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in November 
1978 gradually changed the perception and identity of military elites. They became 
skeptical of the policy of equidistance and disagreed with Kriangsak’s decision to visit 
the Soviet Union – particularly among security and military détente proponents.  
Generally, military and security elites supported détente, believing that 
Thailand should bend with the emerging Sino-American relationship or quasi-alliance. 
In turn, they advocated a set of policies in neighboring Indochina, including (1) 
explicitly denouncing the Vietnamese threat or expansionism; (2) implicitly supporting 
the Khmer Rouge forces along the Thai border; and (3) distancing from the Soviet 
Union, which politically and militarily supported Hanoi. We can call those who 
followed this course unbalanced détente proponents. 
                                                          
229 Vichitvong na Pombhejara, ‘Thailand in 1979: A Year of Relative Stability’, Southeast Asian 
Affairs (1980), p. 321. See also Vichitvong na Pombhejara, ‘The Kriangsak Government and the Thai 




As noted earlier, these unbalanced détente proponents such as Interior Minister 
General Lek Naeomali, Commander of Royal Thai Army General Prem Timsulanon, 
and NSC Secretary-General Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsili, disapproved of Kriangsak’s 
decision to visit Moscow, and even asked the US Ambassador to encourage Kriangsak 
to call off the visit.230 In his interview, Siddhi said that he totally ‘disagreed’ with the 
Soviet visit.231 Despite their support for détente in general, their stance was unbalanced 
in the sense that they promoted détente with the PRC, while remaining aloof with the 
Soviet Union.  
Even the Bangkok Post newspaper, which had advocated détente, printed an 
editorial on March 8, entitled ‘Call Off Visit to Russia’. It urged that rather than making 
an unproductive Moscow trip, the Thai prime minister should remain in Thailand to 
protect national interests, and exert strong and sensible leadership in dealing with 
urgent domestic problems, such as oil shortages. The editorial pointed to the lack of 
Soviet interest in Thailand, noting that Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin departed for 
India at the same time as Kriangsak’s visit was initially scheduled.232  
 Those proponents of unbalanced détente formed a new power configuration 
leading to a struggle within the Thai military, and it was this that saw Kriangsak begin 
to lose control of the army. After the April 1979 election, Prem became a new power 
broker, succeeding Kriangsak as Defense Minister, and retaining his position of 
Commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army. Through his dual positions, Prem also 
consolidated power within the military. Kriangsak’s power base was limited only to the 
Supreme Command, while his supporters, such as General Tuangthong Suwannatat, 
were marginalized from commanding battalions.233  
Despite their continued support for Kriangsak, the Young Turks Group started 
to raise concerns over the situation in Indochina, and Kriangsak’s equidistance policy. 
Its key member, Colonel Prajak Sawangjit said,  
 
…we are the class of 1960. At the outbreak of the war in Laos in 1961, we went 
to fight in Laos and [later on] in the jungle with the [Thai] communist terrorists. 
Our feelings while fighting in the jungle were that the country was decaying 
and degenerating because the mechanisms in the city were bad. We therefore 
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decided to get together and do something so that our union can survive. We 
were closely united, all of us determined in our pursuit of the same objective: 
to solve the nation’s problems. … We don’t want anything more than to save 
the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy.234 
          
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in November 1979 confirmed that the rhetoric of 
strict neutrality was not a viable option. In January 1980, the radical right-wing Red 
Gaur movement, which had massacred students outside Thammasat in October 1976, 
staged a demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy to protest the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and to attack Kriangsak’s foreign policy.235 In mid-January, General Prem 
began to distance himself from Kriangsak. He gave an address to a students’ debating 
club at Chulalongkorn University on the security situation in Thailand. On February 22 
1980, he opened an economic seminar at Thammasat University saying that ‘If people 
suffer, the government should do something to solve the problem’.236 
The situation worsened when, in early Febraury, amidst the global energy crisis, 
Kriangsak made a decision to raise energy prices. This brought about mass urban 
unrest, spearheaded by rightist political forces, and sparked political maneuvering 
within the military.237 With few options, Kriangsak reshuffled his cabinet on February 
12 in an attempt to balance the internal struggle. He replaced balanced détente 
proponents with those anti-Soviet or unbalanced détente proponents. Air Marshal 
Siddhi took the portfolio of Foreign Minister, instead of Upadit, and Prok Amranand, 
Deputy Commerce Minister, was dismissed, too. Yet it was too little too late and 
Kriangsak was forced to resign on February 29. General Prem, with the king’s support, 
was made the new Prime Minister on March 3, and formed what he called ‘the 
government of His Majesty’.238   
 
Secondly, the discursive struggle was also exacerbated by the United States. There are 
no documents that point directly to US involvement in the downfall of Kriangsak. 
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However, the US policy shift towards Indochina, and a corresponding disapproval of 
Kriangsak’s policy, did help those unbalanced détente proponents oust Kriangsak from 
power.239 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan encouraged a shift in American policy 
toward Vietnam. Carter’s close advisors, in particular Zbigniew Brzezinski, National 
Security Advisor and Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, 
believed that a normalization with Vietnam would diminish Soviet influence in the 
region, weakening its control of the Indian Ocean. American and Thai interests 
diverged. This became obvious during a meeting in Bangkok on February 13 1980 
between Kriangsak and Holbrooke. US Ambassador to Thailand Abramowitz, and 
Admiral Robert J. Long, a new US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINPAC) also 
attended the meeting. It ended with tense discussions and disagreement.  
During the meeting, the Americans emphasized the paramount importance of 
the Indian Ocean to their geopolitical interests, and underlined their anxiety that the 
Soviet Union sought access to Vietnamese port facilities such as in Cam Ranh. They 
thus wished to adopt a policy of normalizing relations with Hanoi in order to distance 
Vietnam from Moscow. For Kriangsak, any Western attempt to concede to Vietnam 
would jeopardize ASEAN’s regional diplomacy, rather than weaken the Soviet position 
in the region. Kriangsak reportedly stated that ‘After that, ASEAN could never stand 
up to Hanoi with the strength and determination of the past year’.240 For Kriangsak, 
Thailand’s objective was to secure a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. 
Kriangsak criticized the US for its failure to provide security needs for Thailand, and 
believed that US security in the region was dependent on a strong ally like Thailand. 
The Americans told Kriangsak that building up Thailand militarily would only 
aggravate regional tensions and obstruct US normalization with Hanoi.241 In his view, 
Kriangsak believed that one of the reasons his government fell two weeks later was the 
withdrawal of American support.242  
 
In sum, Kriangsak’s downfall fundamentally emerged from the intra-discursive 
struggle between the balanced détente discourse and emerging unbalanced détente 
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discourse, which shaped the way in which military elites and commanders shifted their 
support away from Kriangsak. An increase in energy prices was merely a pretext that 
precipitated the mass demonstrations against the Kriangsak government. While 
Washington’s disfavor did not directly cause Kriangsak’s downfall, the former 
rendered the latter possible. 
 
7.4. Conclusion  
By the late 1970s, a ‘fear of communism’, said Carter’s National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, was ‘no longer the glue that holds our foreign policy together’.243 
So was the case in Thailand. The Prime Minister’s Order No. 66/2523, which was 
promulgated by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon in April 1980, was just such an 
example. It has become conventional wisdom that the Order marked the end of 
communism in Thailand. It not only used political means to defeat communism but also 
pardoned the former Thai communists, thereby allowing them to return from the jungle.  
This conventional wisdom is problematic. Strictly speaking, the Prime 
Minister’s Order was not the move that ended communism, but rather one of the 
products of the détente discourse. Resulting from a long discursive struggle between 
anticommunism and détente in the long 1970s, détente ended communism in Thailand. 
The end of the Cold War in Thailand was thus marked by closer Sino-Thai relations, 
Thai-Soviet normal relations, Chinese withdrawal of support from the Communist 
Party of Thailand, and the CPT’s anticipated decline. 
‘Whether or not there is peace in this region’, as one Thai military officer close 
to Kriangsak put it, ‘depends entirely on how Beijing reacts to what it sees as direct or 
indirect Soviet threats’, and perhaps vice versa. 244  Kriangsak recognized these 
changing power realities in the midst of the emerging Third Indochina War in the late 
1970s. His policy of equidistance was a flexible and equal approach to diplomacy with 
the ultimate aim of balancing the intense Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region. Equidistance 
could be a de jure policy but proved to be extremely difficult to endure in practice. By 
that time, anticommunism was no longer a viable discourse, partly because of the de-
ideologization of the Cold War, and partly because of the establishment of Sino-
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American diplomatic relations. Yet it was also fading because of the simultaneous 






The End of ‘Bending-with-the-Wind’ 
Diplomacy?  
Back to the Future 
 
 ‘With regard to foreign policy, Thailand should be committed to following a 
policy of equidistance. Thailand should try to keep on the best possible terms 
with Major Powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, China … If we allow 
one Power to station troops here, we may get into trouble with another large 
Power or one of the smaller Powers. I do not want the United States forces to 
leave and the Soviets to come in place of them. I do not think we should have 
any at all. We should not ask any Major Powers to involve themselves too 
deeply’. – Thanat Khoman, 19751 
  
‘The age of “bending with the wind”, a metaphor commonly used to describe 
Thailand’s foreign policy, had come to an end’, proclaimed Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan in December 1988.2 His business-oriented diplomacy, culminated in the 
catchy slogan of ‘turning Indochina from battlefield to marketplace’, significantly 
redefined the framing of Thailand’s national interest. It in turn deemphasized national 
security to affirm Thailand’s status as an aspiring regional economic power.  
However, in reality, Chatichai continued to follow the recently constructed 
bending-with-the-wind strategy. Thailand still believed in maintaining a flexible 
relationship with the great powers, and in moving toward a closer alignment with 
China. We can say that it is easier to imagine the end of the Cold War in Asia – the 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, the end of Third Indochina War, and the peace 
settlement in Cambodia – than to imagine the end of bamboo strategy. Since then, the 
metaphor of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy endures. As one summarized, bamboo 
diplomacy ‘has been the norm in Thai foreign policy’.3 
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 This thesis is first and foremost a genealogy of Thai détente and the concomitant 
narrative of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy. It asserts a diplomatic discursive 
framework to understand and explicate the (trans)formation of Thai diplomacy toward 
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China between 1968 and 1980. I argue 
that a genealogy of Thai détente can be explicated as a history of rupture and history of 
the present in order to reassess and reinterpret changing diplomatic discourses and 
practices. On the one hand, a history of rupture indicates how the discourse of détente 
emerged in the late 1960s, and developed in three main episodes, namely under Thanat 
Khoman, Chatichai Choonhavan and Kukrit Pramoj, and Kriangsak Chomanan. It also 
emphasizes that the ascent of détente happened within discursive struggles with the 
hegemonic discourse of anticommunism. On the other hand, a history of the present 
demonstrates knowledge production of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy. It argues 
that bamboo diplomacy was recently produced during the détente era in Thailand. 
Rather than forming a long diplomatic tradition, it was the making of détente. This 
chapter concludes with these two contributions on which the thesis has sought to shed 
light.     
 
Genealogy as a history of rupture  
The thesis argues that during the Cold War, Thailand did not have a continuity of 
diplomacy, but rather experienced a rupture in diplomatic practices. From the late 
1950s, the dominant discourse in Thailand was anticommunism. It rendered 
communism – both as an ideology and a political struggle with the Communist powers 
– a vital ‘threat’ to body politic and to the survival of the nation. The emergence of 
détente discourse marked a rupture in Thai diplomacy in the late 1960s when the 
Communist powers began to be considered as ‘friends’. To put it dialectically, détente 
can be counted as an antithesis of the anticommunist discourse, which was a 
predominant thesis.  
Crucially, I argue that détente began even before the declaration of the Nixon 
Doctrine in 1969 and that the key proponent, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, 
initiated the concept of ‘flexible diplomacy’ and later ‘détente’ in order to seek 
rapprochement with the PRC and to readjust Thai-Soviet relations, hence bending 
before the wind. Kukrit Pramoj and Chatichai Choonhavan continued with détente in 




1975 and concluded a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union. From then, the 
discourse developed into balanced détente, which culminated in Kriangsak 
Chomanan’s stated policy of ‘equidistance’ toward the three great powers and was 
exemplified in his visits to three capitals, namely Beijing, Washington, and Moscow. 
Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila called this balanced détente a ‘balance-of-power’ or 
realist strategy.4  
A genealogy of Thai détente reconceptualizes diplomacy in various ways. 
Firstly, diplomacy as knowledge production constituted a new form of diplomatic 
knowledge, framed by the notion of ‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy. Second, 
diplomacy as subject formation formed the subject positions of détente proponents, 
whose identity and interests were shaped by the discourse of détente. The strength of 
leading détente proponents such as Thanat, Kukrit, and Kriangsak, was partly due to 
the fact that they were formerly known as staunch anticommunists. With clear records 
of anticommunism, they were not vulnerable to any accusations of sympathizing with 
the communists. Just as we say only Nixon could have gone to China, so we can say 
only Kukrit and Kriangsak could go to the PRC or the Soviet Union.   
Third, diplomacy as institutionalization. Détente rendered the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs an independent source of foreign policy formulation. When 
anticommunism was the hegemonic discourse, military and security elites dominated 
the Thai foreign policy decision-making while marginalizing the MFA. Since the 
1970s, however, foreign affairs for the first time became a sphere where the MFA 
would be the sole institution and legitimate actor, while Thai diplomats began to protect 
their own turf.    
Fourth, diplomacy as a power struggle. The discourse of détente did not prevail 
without a fight. Those anticommunists incessantly sought to strike back, which led to 
showdowns including the coups in November 1971 and October 1976. However, the 
1971 coup did not terminate détente. Instead, slow détente was pursued through sports 
and petro-diplomacy with the PRC. The 1976 coup, which installed the militant 
anticommunist regime of Thanin Krivichien, lasted only a year and was replaced by 
Kriangsak in late 1977. The détente discourse was once again strengthened, although 
subtly reformulated to maintain what was described as equidistance or balanced détente 
with the Communist powers. By the end of the 1970s, anticommunism gradually faded 
                                                          




from the discursive struggle in Thai politics, and everyone was to an extent a détente 
proponent. 
The fall of Kriangsak in early 1980 was the result of another discursive struggle, 
or what I call ‘intra-discursive struggle’. This time it was between two versions of 
détente. On the one hand, proponents of balanced détente argued for Thailand to keep 
an equal and balanced relationship with the great powers while seeing détente with 
Vietnam as a possibility. On the other, proponents of unbalanced détente promoted a 
closer alliance with the PRC and rendered détente with Vietnam unnecessary or even 
dangerous. The unbalanced form of détente prevailed.  
Those who supported unbalanced détente, especially the military and security 
elites, became the key actors in the Prem government in the 1980s. This was the 
beginning of a shrewdly pro-Chinese Thai foreign policy, which Pongphisoot 
awkwardly terms as a ‘bamboo swirling in the wind’5. Despite the Sino-Thai quasi-
alliance, the discourse of détente remained intact in a double sense. First, the discourse 
of anticommunism no longer existed in Thai diplomatic discourses and practices with 
the Communist powers. Second, flexible diplomacy and its corresponding languages of 
friendship towards the Communist powers endured up to the end of the Cold War. In 
other words, Thailand adhered to the pro-Chinese stance, while maintaining a correct 
but distant relationship with Moscow.  
The new discursive struggle between balanced and unbalanced détente has 
continued to dominate Thai diplomacy since the détente period. Three examples are, as 
follows:   
First, Prem Tinsulanon’s diplomacy was ruled by unbalanced détente. Prem’s 
Foreign Minister, Air Marshal Siddhi Sevetsila, called it ‘omnidirectional foreign 
policy’. In his 1985 article, ‘The Future of Thailand’s Foreign Policy’, Siddhi claimed 
that ‘Five years ago you will recall that we lived in a period of great anxiety. … All this 
forced us to confine the conduct of our foreign policy mostly within the political and 
security fields. There was no time to think of foreign policy as an instrument to enhance 
the national well-being, much less creating new initiatives in other fields. … We were 
in the process of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical, or the expedient. The 
tendency was more toward solving the crisis of the day’.6  
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‘For the first time’, Siddhi continued, ‘I think it is fair to say that our sense of 
direction has returned. So have our self-confidence and pride. We have adapted well to 
the changing circumstances’. He laid out the new omnidirectional foreign policy, 
stating that ‘it is therefore obvious that we need now, more than ever, to conduct our 
foreign policy with perseverance, persistence, subtlety, and flexibility. We must also 
be prepared to accept the fact that what has been achieved at one point may lost its 
significance as conditions change and that it may not always completely satisfy our 
principles. … With our expanded role we must build a new set of foreign policy 
principles, similar in scope but different in content’.7 
To put it differently, Siddhi suggested that this novel ‘omnidirectional’ 
diplomacy was ‘similar in scope’ but ‘different in content’ from the traditional 
‘bending-with-the-wind’ diplomacy: unbalanced détente. For Siddhi, the outline of a 
new foreign policy was based on four principles: (1) active diplomacy provided the best 
guarantee for Thai national security; (2) solidarity with ASEAN was an overriding 
priority; (3) strengthening Thailand’s relations with great powers is necessary; and (4) 
the conduct of foreign affairs is inextricably linked to the well-being of the Thai people, 
and every diplomatic tool should be used for Thai socio-economic development.8 
Regarding relations with the great powers, the Prem government moved toward a closer 
alignment with China, while to a lesser extent maintaining friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union.          
 
Second, the discursive struggle can be found across society, especially within the 
academic community. In the 1980s, a debate emerged at Chulalongkorn University 
between the Institute of Asian Studies (IAS) and the Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS).9 It was a debate between unbalanced and balanced détente 
discourses. On the one hand, the Institute of Asian Studies (IAS), led by its Director 
and Professor in International Relations, Khien Theeravit, firmly supported the Foreign 
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Ministry’s position that the PRC was the natural counterweight to Vietnam, and Thai 
foreign policy should endorse the Khmer Rouge regime. According to Khien,  
 
The question for us as a neighbor to the ‘Big’ Vietnam is whether we would 
allow the big fish (Vietnam) to swallow the small fish (Cambodia), which is 
now struck in the big fish’s throat; whether we should stay idle and let a few 
leaders in Hanoi brutalize innocent Cambodians and Vietnamese; whether we 
should tolerate threats and shoulder the displaced people who escaped the 
killing by the ruthless people. I think we should not stay idle. We cannot accept 
it, not because we hate Vietnam, but because Cambodia’s independence is our 
problem too. Man is not a wild animal, which tends to resort to violent means 
and ignore what is right or wrong. Even Vietnam itself doesn’t want to be a wild 
animal because she is trying to be a member of the United Nations. However, 
Vietnam only wants to obtain rights, not the duty and obligations of the UN 
resolution. Therefore, we must oppose Vietnam’s aggression and expose its 
deception and real goal.10  
    
On the other hand, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies promoted 
the discourse of balanced détente with the great powers. The Institute’s Director, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, criticized Prem’s foreign policy. In an interview, he argued 
that ‘the Thai government, among others, takes a rather complacent attitude towards 
this problem, at most admitting that the Khmer Rouge issue can be tackled as a part of 
the political settlement or after that political settlement has been reached. This is partly 
due to conceptual naivety, partly to fear of antagonizing Thailand’s Chinese patron, 
partly to continuing distrust of Vietnam and partly to the existence of bureaucratic 
vested interests in the Khmer Rouge connection. … The point is that there can never be 
a stable, durable and just political solution in Kampuchea as long as the Khmer Rouge 
is allowed to retain its present leadership or maintain its present level of military 
strength’.11 
Sukhumbhand recommended that ‘what is needed here is flexibility, vision, and 
a willingness to reexamine past assumptions. Without these, the best we can hope for 
is a continuing stalemate – with all its implications’.12 First, ‘Thailand should perhaps 
consider ASEAN as an end in itself and strive to create within that organization a 
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regional order whose purpose would go beyond common solidarity against one specific 
threat, toward a more distant (yet more self-fulfilling) horizon of idealism. … Without 
this change in Thailand’s security perception, no modus vivendi can be found on 
mainland Southeast Asia’.13 Second, the ASEAN countries, together with the Western 
powers, needed to promote cross-linkages and offer economic incentives and aid to 
Vietnam and Kampuchea.14 During the Chatichai Choonhavan government (August 
1988-February 1991), Sukhumbhand was appointed as a key advisor to the Prime 
Minister.   
 
The third example of the intra-discursive struggle was the foreign policy of Chatichai 
Choonhavan, the first elected Prime Minister since 1976. This was a return to balanced 
détente discourse. At the outset, Chatichai sought to control foreign policy formulation 
under his newly established policy advisors at Ban Phitsanulok, two of which were 
Sukhumbhand and Kraisak Choonhavan, his own son and Lecturer in Political Science 
at Kasetsart University. This caused a major conflict between Chatichai’s foreign policy 
advisors and Siddhi’s Foreign Ministry: once again instigating power struggle between 
balanced and unbalanced détentes. Both Sukhumbhand and Kraisak strongly criticized 
Siddhi’s foreign policy, which largely depended on the great powers. They advocated 
greater independence in foreign policy, were opposed to Thailand’s support for the 
Khmer Rouge, and urged economic interdependence among the neighboring countries. 
The latter culminated in Chatichai’s notion of ‘turning Indochina from battlefield to 
marketplace’, and ‘Suwannabhumi’ (golden peninsula), which focused on Thailand’s 
economic leverages to link Vietnam into a regional network of economic 
interdependence.15          
 ‘Rapprochement with Vietnam’, Chatichai addressed at a December 1988 
speech before the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, was ‘one of my top priorities’. He 
added that ‘Indochina must be transformed from a war-zone to a peace-zone linked with 
Southeast Asia through trade ties, investment, and modern communications’. ‘Politics’, 
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stressed Chatichai, ‘will take second place to economics’. 16  While he publicly 
supported the idea of developing trade relations with Indochina, Foreign Minister 
Siddhi Savetsila argued that it should be done only after the resolution of the 
Cambodian issue. Chatichai’s foreign policy advisors made statements challenging 
Siddhi’s position and contesting the right of the Foreign Minister to define priorities in 
foreign affairs. Sukhumbhand also revealed that the Prime Minister intended to visit 
Vietnam and to assume a greater role in foreign policy.17  
 The discursive clash between balanced and unbalanced détente worsened. The 
Foreign Ministry officials regarded the role of the Prime Minister’s advisors as 
essentially illegitimate diplomats or upstarts. Warning against what he called 
‘sensational diplomacy’, Siddhi, who was also the leader of the Social Action Party 
(SAP), insisted that changes to Thai foreign policy ought to be introduced gradually to 
achieve consensus. In an effort to reduce tension without conceding his position, 
Chatichai made a distinction between government-sponsored trade with Vietnam and 
private trade. While the former was dependent on Vietnam’s withdrawal from 
Cambodia, the latter could come prior.18 While Sukhumbhand resigned in August 1989, 
the discourse and policies of balanced détente continued in Chatichai’s foreign policy 
and Thai diplomacy thereafter. These three examples have illustrated the persistence of 
the détente discourse and the intra-discursive struggle after the long 1970s.  
By tracing a genealogy of détente, it is therefore possible to fully understand a 
discontinuity in Thai diplomacy from the late 1960s. Proponents of Thai détente not 
only contested the anticommunism discourse but established détente itself a new 
hegemonic idea in the foreign policy making process. At the onset of its hegemonic 
status, détente encountered conceptual contradictions from within. A dual form of 
détente emerged by the end of the decade: balanced and unbalanced détente with the 
communist powers. A dual track lent itself to an intra-discursive struggle. Prem and 
Siddhi’s ‘omnidirectional’ foreign policy was neither a reversal of détente nor a return 
to the discourse of anticommunism. Rather, it was a modified détente discourse – a 
synthesis of an unbalanced détente. It was guided by the formation of a quasi-alliance 
with the PRC and the US in the Third Indochina War. Nevertheless, the emphasis on 
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détente with the Soviet Union faded but did not vanish. Thailand and the Soviet Union 
remained what they called ‘friends’.   
 
Genealogy as a history of the present 
‘The myth of the success of Thai foreign policy due to its flexibility to “bend with the 
prevailing wind”,’ asserts Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘needs a serious 
reinterpretation’.19  Following this proposition, this thesis goes one step further: to 
historically problematize or genealogize the narrative of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy. It has demonstrated how the construction of the bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy narrative was constructed, only in the 1970s.   
The narrative of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy was, and remains, powerful 
in both policy-making and academic communities. Yet, few have stopped to ask why it 
is so dominant, especially within academia, and how it became a metanarrative, which 
cannot be easily transcended. Even those self-reflexive and critical minded scholars, 
such as, inter alia, Arne Kislenko, Sutayut Osornprasop, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, and Pongphisoot Busbarat, share a certain common ground. 
Namely, they see bending-with-the-wind diplomacy as a tradition, while recognizing 
its continuity. It thus becomes a flawless strategy, and/or a heuristic device for 
evaluating the success or failure of Thai foreign policy at any given time.    
In the most oft-cited article, entitled ‘Bending with the Wind: The Continuity 
and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy’, Arne Kislenko asserts that ‘whatever new 
winds blow in the region, Thailand will undoubtedly try to accommodate them. With 
an emphasis on flexibility, and a remarkable history of continuity, Thai foreign policy 
– like a bamboo – faces the 21st Century with solid roots’.20 In his thesis, Kislenko also 
conceptualizes Thai foreign policy during the Cold War as ‘the bamboo in the wind’, 
which was ‘always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend whichever way it had to 
in order to survive’. In other words, bending-with-the-wind diplomacy was a key to 
national survival. It does not reflect ‘mere pragmatism’ but more importantly ‘a long-
cherished, philosophical approach to international relations’, which is deeply rooted in 
Thai culture and religion. He claims ‘although the Thais had in the past entered into 
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diplomatic pacts with foreign powers, they were extremely careful to avoid anything 
more than temporary arrangements. Formal alliances of any kind were infrequent in 
Thai history, and Thais considered the stationing of even friendly foreign troops on 
their soil a serious affront to their independence’.21  
However, Kislenko’s proposition largely contradicts his main argument that in 
the 1960s, the special relationship forged with the US ‘seemed only logical, and entirely 
consistent with the “bamboo” nature of Thai diplomacy’. He contends that these closer 
ties were not ‘a fundamental digression from its traditional and renowned foreign policy 
flexibility’.22 He even holds that by the end of the 1960s, when it became apparent that 
the US military was losing in Vietnam, Thailand changed courses in line with bending-
with-the-wind diplomacy. As Kislenko put it, Thailand ‘bent its foreign policy with the 
new winds in Southeast Asia towards a peaceful accommodation with China and 
Vietnam’.23 In his final analysis, ‘the bamboo bent, but it never did break’.24     
Likewise, in his multi-archival dissertation on Thailand’s covert military 
intervention in Laos during 1960-1974, Sutayut Osornprasop concludes that the 
emerging Sino-Thai alliance against Hanoi’s expansionism since the late 1970s was 
‘Thailand’s traditional foreign policy of “bending as bamboo and never breaking”, 
rather than ‘a hawkish, military-oriented policy’.25 As he put it, ‘Interestingly, Bangkok 
had formed a close alliance with Washington against Beijing during the 1960s and the 
early half of the 1970s in order to obstruct Chinese expansion southwards. But with the 
American departure from mainland Southeast Asia, the Thais were successful in turning 
an old threat into an opportunity, and formed a new alliance with Beijing to deter 
Hanoi’. Bending-with-the-wind diplomacy, according to Sutayut, ‘had helped preserve 
Thailand’s security and sovereignty throughout the country’s history. It would protect 
Thailand’s interests throughout the tumultuous decades of the Cold War’.26  
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Even one of the most critical intellectuals in Thai Studies, Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun, implicitly adopts this traditional view of Thai diplomacy without 
questioning its emergence. Similar to the mainstream conservative narrative, he 
suggests that bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is dubbed as the accommodation 
policy, where the logic is simple: ‘to go with the flow of the wind, to align with 
hegemons of the day and to use this alliance to strengthen the power position of the 
Thai elites at home’. Its ultimate aim was to ‘maintain national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity’.27 While he traces this concept in Thai diplomatic history, Pavin 
only reiterates bamboo diplomacy as a ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ Thai diplomacy. That 
is, what he envisions is the continuity and persistence of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy – ‘since Siam’s old days up to Thailand’s modern era’.28  
Second, rather than reinterpret bamboo diplomacy as he initially aims, Pavin 
evaluates the success of Thaksin’s foreign policy based on the key criterion of bending-
with-the-wind diplomacy, which, for him, was guided by flexibility, pragmatism, and 
opportunism. He claims that Thaksin’s diplomacy was no longer bending with the wind, 
but instead sought to ‘set’ or ‘manipulate’ the direction of the wind.29 A deviation from 
bamboo diplomacy, therefore, rendered Thaksin’s foreign policy ‘unsuccessful’ and 
‘unsustainable’.30 Pavin contends that ‘the old bamboo policy may have no longer been 
desirable in the eyes of Thaksin since he embarked on a new process of reinventing 
Thailand and reinventing himself as a prominent regional leader. But what has 
remained intact … is the adoption of the accommodation approach in Thai foreign 
policy’.31 In other word, for Pavin, bending-with-the-wind diplomacy remains intact, 
and set the golden standard for evaluating Thai diplomacy.  
Pongphisoot Busbarat follows this same line of argument. In a recent article, he 
claims that Thailand since the early 2000s has encountered difficulties in maintaining 
‘its time-honored diplomatic tradition of flexibility and pragmatism’. Contemporary 
Thai foreign policy was shrewdly pro-Chinese. Pongphisoot labeled this policy 
‘bamboo swirling in the wind’. For him, it increasingly deviates from the ‘conventional 
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“bending with the wind” diplomacy that tends to reflect a better-calculated strategy to 
balance Great Power influence’.32       
Even when scholars criticize the current Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s 
diplomacy, they tend to employ a lens of ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’. As 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, political scientist at Chulalongkorn University, puts it, 
Thailand is ‘demonstrably famous for its foreign policy balancing. From the era of 
imperialism and two World Wars through the Cold War, Thailand's gifted geography 
and diplomatic finesse and skill shepherded the country's sovereignty and independence 
through the thick and thin of geopolitical headwinds.’ 33  According to Thitinan, 
‘whatever happens out there, the Thais (and their Siamese forebears) had a way to 
diplomatically navigate and geopolitically balance their national interests to stay out of 
harm’s way.’ ‘Centuries of diplomatic ingenuity and geographic luck’ is however 
undermined by ‘quick and careless acts of injudicious leadership’.34   
Until now, bending-with-the-wind diplomacy serves not only to narrate trans-
historical diplomatic practices but also to make a judgment on the achievement of 
respective Thai foreign policies. This in turn assumes that ‘great’ foreign policy is the 
product of a ‘great’ leader’s far-sightedness, diplomatic flexibility and pragmatism. 
They must demonstrate an understanding of Thailand’s geographically strategic 
location and the sustainability of so-called ‘national interests’. Arguably, even the most 
critically engaged scholar of Thailand in the modern era, Benedict Anderson has 
extolled ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’ as a ‘uniquely Thai’ blend of realism and 
flexibility.35  
 
However, what is mystified by this mainstream explanation is the making of the 
bending-with-the-wind diplomacy. It lacks two historical problematizations. First, this 
existing literature neglects the way in which the knowledge of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy was constructed within historical time, and was a very recent conceptual 
lexicon. Knowledge production of bending-with-the-wind diplomacy was, as argued 
here, the result of the changing diplomatic discursive practices or détente in the long 
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1970s. It was at this point, and not before, that bending-with-the-wind diplomacy arose. 
The introduction of ‘bending-with-the-wind diplomacy’ was thus not continuity, but 
the product of rupture or discontinuity. It rather emerged as a direct result of an 
epistemological break and a shift in diplomatic practices related explicitly and only to 
détente.  
While there might have been previous mention of bamboo-like or bending-with-
the-wind diplomacy before the 1970s, it was only then that the term became accepted 
knowledge, epistemically. It did so within academic and policy producing communities 
for whom the notion had become of clear use. In academia, pioneering works, led by 
Likhit Dhiravegin, Sarasin Viraphol, and Thamsook Numnonda, only appeared in the 
1970s, and began to narrate Thai foreign policy through the lens of ‘bending-with-the-
wind’ diplomacy (as indicated in Chapter 1). This not only explained contemporary 
Thai foreign policy36 , but was also the first time that the conceptual lexicon was 
employed to explicate Thai diplomacy in the past, such as to describe Siam during the 
colonial period in the nineteenth century, and again, to explain (or more accurately to 
obscure) Thailand’s position during the Second World War.37    
Normatively, bending-with-the-wind diplomacy justified the emerging 
discourse of flexible diplomacy and the technocratic role of the MFA in formulating 
foreign policy and relations with other countries. In other words, it legitimized the 
détente strategy and the practices of those détente proponents during and since the long 
1970s. A genealogy of détente thus sheds light on the making of bending-with-the-wind 
diplomacy in terms of knowledge and practices transformation.  
Secondly, the mainstream literature also naturalizes and essentializes 
conventional wisdom and wit of the bending-with-the-wind diplomacy narrative. It 
treats bending-with-the-wind diplomacy as (if) it is a ‘tradition’ of Thai diplomacy. If 
anything, however, this is an invented tradition. 38  Moreover, the essentializing of 
bamboo diplomacy led to some set-backs. First, the literature ignores the fact that 
bending-with-the-wind diplomacy emerged out of a discursive struggle linked to 
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contested power politics. It was neither a neutral nor value-free concept: it was 
inherently political and developed to overtly oppose the bipolar anticommunism of the 
early Cold War and to realign with a changed geopolitical reality. 
The second drawback is that given its status as a ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’ policy, 
bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is a powerful heuristic device that determines how 
particular governments or periods of time are judged or deemed successful or failure. 
In turn, it can legitimize one set of foreign policy while delegitimizing others. The risk 
here is of a determinism in Thai foreign policy, which overemphasizes realism or profits 
at the expense of neglecting universal or cosmopolitan principles as motives for 
Thailand’s foreign relations.39     
The third drawback is that bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is cast as a unique 
characteristic of the Thai nation in two senses. First, Thailand is accordingly viewed as 
an exceptional country that maintained independence and integrity in the midst of 
colonialism in the nineteenth century – due to its successful policy. This indicates the 
flawless continuation of Thai foreign policy and the farsightedness of the elites, either 
the king or the military. Bamboo diplomacy tends to be nationalistic and chauvinistic. 
Second, Thailand is unique in the sense that it cannot be compared with other countries. 
This tends to cause hubris in Thai foreign policy.  
The final drawback is that despite its status as an innovation in the 1970s, 
bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is first and foremost a conservative project. It serves 
the status quo, dominated by the predominant role and position of the MFA. It is 
presumed to be an art adopted entirely by the Thai elites, and suggests a lack of any 
participation from the public in determining foreign policy. As long as this 
metanarrative exists, therefore, it remains difficult to imagine an alternative means to 
conduct Thai diplomacy, let alone of democratizing it. Given these impediments, Thai 
diplomacy needs to be emancipated from the dominant perspective in order to adopt a 
genuinely balanced, equal and people-oriented approach.  
Concurring with Pavin’s proposition, I therefore argue that bending-with-the-
wind diplomacy is a myth that needs to be fundamentally reinterpreted, reassessed and 
rewritten. Moving beyond that, it should be genealogized or historically problematized 
in order to trace its emergence as a conceptual lexicon within historical time. Bending-
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with-the-wind diplomacy, which is constituted by and constitutive of détente, is a novel 
knowledge that was recently produced in the 1970s and was reproduced thereafter. It 
was a byproduct of Thailand’s shift in diplomacy toward détente with the communist 
powers. Since then, bending-with-the-wind diplomacy praxeologically shapes the way 
in which Thailand balances its position within the global politics, and in particular its 
relationship with the great powers. It epistemically narrates or explicates Thai 
diplomatic discourses and practices in the past, and determines foreign policy making 
processes in the present and the future. Bending-with-the-wind diplomacy is an 
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